Problems of Communism

1

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1982 VOL XXXI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editoral matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided on the inside back cover of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism*. Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism*, and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

1 The Church in Poland
by Jan Nowak

17 Kto Kogo in the Kremlin
by William G. Hyland

27 Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census
by Murray Feshbach

38 The USSR and Pakistan
by William E. Griffith

BOOKS

45 Mao's Uncertain Legacy
by Krishna Prakash Gupta

51 Women and Revolution: China and Vietnam
by Jayne Werner

56 Social Inequality in the USSR
by Basile Kerblay

Cover: Part of a crowd of nearly 300,000 Poles that assembled in Gdansk on December 16, 1980, to dedicate a monument in memory of worker casualties of December 1970 in the Baltic seaport city. Photo by Marc Bulka/Gamma-Liaison.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.
SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT)
David E. Albright
SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT)
Wayne Hall
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
William E. Freeman
Sophia Sluzar
DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
Linda A. Wray
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Gwenette Worthington

IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The Church in Poland
Jan Nowak

The Catholic Church in Poland has successfully resisted subjugation by the Communist regime and has the respect and allegiance of the vast majority of Poles. Since the late 1960's, the church has used this position increasingly to defend the principle of human rights, not only for itself, but for all groups in Polish society. Whether the church will be able to perform a mediator role in resolving the current situation will hinge on the military government's willingness to engage in a genuine dialogue with the social forces represented by Solidarity.

Kto Kogo in the Kremlin
William G. Hyland

Soviet politics basically consists of a struggle for power. Mikhail Suslov's death highlights the mortality of the present oligarchy, and a struggle for power among Leonid Brezhnev's epigones is to be expected when he goes. Determining who the principal actors are and where they stand helps answer a fundamental question: what are Soviet policies likely to be in the 1980's? Foreign policy is now in flux, and the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev. It will matter greatly how these issues fit into the internal power struggle.

Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census
Murray Feshbach

Significantly absent from data published by the USSR on its 1979 population census are figures on age distribution. A reconstruction of partial data on this aspect of the populace suggests serious problems of aging, a continued abnormal shortage of males, excess male mortality, concentration of the highest fertility rates and greatest proportions of young people in the Muslim areas of the USSR, and even the possibility of stagnation or decline of the total population in the 21st century. It will take decades to correct these problems, if it can be done at all. This may explain Soviet delays in releasing census data.

The USSR and Pakistan
William E. Griffith

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the Soviet army for the first time to the borders of Pakistan. Since then, Moscow has sought to intimidate Pakistan, for the Soviet leadership regards the present Pakistani government as one of its principal obstacles to crushing the Afghan rebels. This policy is likely to continue in light of Moscow's apparent determination to suppress the Afghan rebellion by military force, however long that takes.

(Essay-reviews on next page)

READEX FICHE

All issues available have been filmed. Unfortunately, any scattered missing issues are no longer available.

Essay-Reviews

Mao's Uncertain Legacy

Krishna Prakash Gupta

Current Chinese efforts to distinguish between a "good" and a "bad" Mao Zedong severely distort the nature of this passionate historical protagonist. Yet this practice has now been almost unconsciously assimilated even by professional China watchers in the West. A sounder approach would be to recognize that the contradictory aspects of Mao are inherent and inseparable parts of the same personality.

Women and Revolution: China and Vietnam

Jayne Werner

Revolutionary turmoil in China and Vietnam has dramatically changed the role of women in those societies. Nevertheless, the expectation that revolutionary regimes—particularly in China—would proceed to the full economic "liberation" of women has proven vain. Women still are valued as producers of new manpower, still work in less remunerative jobs (especially in agriculture), and often do not have an equal say with men in the dispensing of income within families.

Social Inequality in the USSR

Basile Kerblay

A close look at Soviet society reveals that for all its claims to the contrary, the Communist government has not really eliminated social inequality. Continued wage inequality is compounded by inequality of privilege and of access to higher education. Historically, the intelligentsia has moved from opposing to embodying state power. It is unclear whether the working class of the Soviet Union is developing a collective self-consciousness.

The Church in Poland

by Jan Nowak

No one would deny the importance of the Catholic Church in Polish society. Long recognized by Poles of all religious and political persuasions, this importance impressed itself on the rest of the world in the course of the last two years. Pictures of striking Polish workers wearing a cross around their necks or participating in religious services became a familiar sight. Now that the Polish government is repressing the workers' movement by military force, the press carefully watches for reactions by Polish church leaders. It reports any meeting between them and Polish government officials, even though little is known about the substance of these meetings.

To understand the present position of the church in Poland, it is useful to focus on its historic role there as well as on its interaction with the Communist government established after World War II. For purposes of analysis, this interaction can be broken down into three different phases: (1) the 1948–56 period, during which the church fought off attempts by the government to destroy it as an independent institution; (2) the 1956–70 period, during which the church successfully resisted the government's efforts to circumscribe religious and educational activities; and (3) the 1970–81 period, during which the church insisted on the unhindered exercise of religious rights and came to be the rallying point and defender as well of those who demanded the free exercise of all human rights.

Whether the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, will once again threaten the independence of the church remains to be seen. It is useful, however, to keep in mind the words of Leszek Kolakowski, who, in the summer of 1979, accurately predicted "an uncontrollable surge of strikes" in Poland and speculated about possible aftermaths:

> *And if it is feasible to smash 30 or so uncensored. . . journals and to gaol a few thousand active people, it is not possible with internal repressive instruments to destroy the most powerful crystallizing force of social consciousness to resist the Sovietization process and the most powerful source of moral authority, viz. the Catholic Church.*[1]

This unique position of the church has roots which go far back into the Polish past. A few highlights from that 1000-year history might help to explain more recent events.

Mr. Nowak is an expert and commentator on East European affairs, who has published in a number of journals, including New Leader. *From 1952 until 1976, he served as director of the Polish Division of Radio Free Europe in Munich.*

The Church in Polish History

In 1966, the celebrations by the church of the millennium of Christianity in Poland reached their peak. Rival celebrations staged by the regime of the millennium of the Polish state did not quite capture the popular imagination. Although the church celebrations focused on religious themes, the evocations of historical events could not help but be a reminder of the role of the church in the formation of the Polish state.

Every Polish school child knows that Duke Mieszko I of the Piast dynasty consolidated several loose tribes into the first Polish state. Mieszko married a Czech princess from the ruling Christian dynasty in Bohemia, and in 966, he and members of his court were baptized Christians. His acceptance of Christianity helped him to consolidate the state internally and externally. Catholic missionaries introduced the West European cultural heritage into Poland and raised the administrative level of

---

[1] Leszek Kolakowski, "Emergence of the Opposition: Introduction," Survey (London), Autumn 1979, Part 1 of two special issues on Poland, pp. 3–4. Kolakowski, now a Polish émigré, is a former Marxist intellectual.



Catholic priests celebrate mass and hear confession of workers in Gdansk's Lenin Shipyard on August 29, 1980, during the strike that gave birth to the Solidarity trade union movement.

—Keystone.

the new state. In external affairs, Poland acquired prestige through acceptance into the Christian family of nations.

Equally remembered is that the church organization introduced in Poland at this time was under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See in Rome rather than being dependent on an episcopal see in the (German) Holy Roman Empire. Thus, an independent Polish state came into being at the same time as an independent Polish bishopric was established at Gniezno.[2]

Another part of the historical tradition is that only one violent clash took place between Polish secular and ecclesiastical authorities—in the 11th century. In a conflict over ecclesiastical prerogatives, as well as over state orientation, Stanislaw, Archbishop of Cracow, sided with the nobles opposed to King Boleslaw II, the Bold. The king had the archbishop killed in 1079. However, this sacrilege forced the monarch to flee the country, and he died in exile shortly thereafter. Eventually, Stanislaw was canonized by the Catholic Church and is a patron saint of Poland. Boleslaw the Bold is remembered as a hothead. (It is worth noting that the visit of Pope John Paul to Poland in 1979 came on the 900th anniversary of the martyrdom of St. Stanislaw, which the Polish church was solemnly commemorating.)

During the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century, the widespread reformation movement in Poland, unlike that in other European states, did not precipitate civil wars over religion. Moreover, the Catholic Counterreformation in Poland, although—and perhaps because—it regained the allegiance of most Protestant Poles in the course of the 17th century, did not institute an inquisition or burn heretics. In fact, after 1572, the elected Polish monarchs promised in their coronation oaths to uphold the right of their citizens to freedom of worship.[3] Thanks to this relative toleration, the Roman Catholic Church did not acquire a divisive image among Poles, as it did to some extent among other European peoples, such as the Czechs and Germans.

---

[2] For background information, see *Chrzescijanstwo w Polsce* (Christianity in Poland), Lublin, 1980; *Historia Kosciola w Polsce* (The History of the Church in Poland), Warsaw, 1979.

[3] On this subject, see Françoise Le Moal, "Tolerance in Poland," *The Tradition of Polish Ideals*, London, Orbis Books, 1981, pp. 52–84; and Wiktor Weintraub, "Tolerance and Intolerance in Old Poland," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Spring 1971, p. 21.

When, at the end of the 18th century, Poland lost its political independence and was being partitioned among its three neighbors—Austria, Russia, and Prussia—the church was one of the links which maintained the sense of nationhood across dividing frontiers. In the part of Poland under Russian rule, religious differences between Orthodox Russians and Roman Catholic Poles helped to shield the national identity against Russification. After the Polish insurrection of 1863 in particular, the Russian government attempted to strike back at the Poles through their church, by resorting to curtailment of religious instruction in schools, the reduction of enrollments in Catholic seminaries, and the enlistment of priests to the government's side.[4] In the portion of Poland under Prussian control, Roman Catholicism also separated the Poles from the Lutheran Germans. Subsequently, when the German states were unified under Prussian leadership and Germany's chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, launched the anti-Catholic "Kulturkampf" (1871–83) in the German Empire, the Polish Archbishop of Gniezno was jailed. He even received his cardinal's hat while in a Prussian prison.[5] Thus, the church shared the fate of its people during the partition period.

The Polish state reconstituted after World War I was—like its pre-partition predecessor—a multiethnic and multireligious entity, but the ties between religion and nationality were closer among Poles than among other Europeans except perhaps the Irish. These ties were formalized in the interwar Polish republic by constitutional conferral on the Roman Catholic Church of favored status as the majority denomination of the population. It also became public practice to view religious affiliation as largely synonymous with national identity. Thus, on the eve of World War II, Poland's approximately 35 million inhabitants were identified as follows by religion: 22.3 million Roman Catholics (Poles and Lithuanians); 3.5 million Greek Catholics (predominantly Ukrainians); 4 million Orthodox (Belorussians and Ukrainians); 1.1 million Protestants (German and some Poles); and 3.4 million Jews.[6]

After World War II and the postwar territorial settlement, Poland became in many ways a different country. By 1945, its population had been reduced to only 22.7 million. The eastern area, where the prewar Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian populations had been concentrated, were annexed by the Soviet Union. Those claiming Polish nationality in these areas were resettled within the new Polish frontiers. In the west, Poland received formerly German territories up to the Oder-Neisse rivers under the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Most of the Germans living there fled or were deported to West Germany.

The Polish Catholic Church had likewise suffered staggering losses during World War II. Of the 12,000 priests and members of religious orders in the prewar church, approximately 2,500 were either executed by the Nazis or put into concentration camps.[7] Many of those who survived the war were debilitated for the rest of their lives. More than 200 churches were destroyed. The Polish seminaries had been closed, so that new priests could be trained only clandestinely. (This is how Karol Wojtyla, now Pope John Paul II, received his seminary training.)

However, the Polish Catholic Church emerged from the war with its authority perhaps greater than ever. No Polish bishops or priests had collaborated with the Nazis. The church had shared the sufferings imposed on the Polish nation, and many priests had participated in the resistance movement.

Avoiding Subjugation

Today, Poland has surpassed its prewar population of 35 million. But it is now a state virtually homogeneous in nationality and religion. Nearly 99 percent of the population identify themselves as Poles, and more than 93 percent have been baptized as Catholics.[8]

The number of clergy and religious has doubled since 1945. There are now approximately 20,000 priests and 80 bishops. Poland's 27 dioceses divide into 7,600 parishes, each serving 4,300 faithful, on the average. Children receive religious instruction in more than 21,000 catechism classes, which are held in churches, parish buildings, and private homes.[9] Vocations to the priesthood have been increasing. In 1980, nearly 6,300 seminarians were studying in the 46 seminaries in Poland.[10] The only Catholic university between the Elbe River in the west and Vladivostok in the east is located in Lublin. In general, one may claim that the Catholic Church exudes greater dynamism in Poland than in any other Catholic country in the world, not to speak of the other East European countries in the Soviet bloc.[11]

---

[4] For background information, see Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1974.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ryszard Bender, "The World War and Independent Poland," in *Chrzescijanstwo w Polsce*, pp. 271–95.

[7] *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, pp. 161 and 194.

[8] Witold Zdaniewicz, *Kosciol Katolicki w Polsce 1945–1978* (The Catholic Church in Poland, 1945–78), Poznan-Warsaw, Pallotinium, 1979, p. 21.

[9] *Pro Mundi Vita* (Brussels), July-August 1980; statistics based on information from the Press Office of the Polish Episcopate. For more detailed statistics on the Polish church, see Witold Zdaniewicz, op. cit.

[10] Polish Episcopate Press Office, Bulletin No. 7, 1981.

How can one account for this tremendous vitality of the Catholic Church in Poland? Why was the Polish Communist regime, backed by Moscow and possessing a monopoly of the instruments of coercion, unable to subjugate the church? To find some explanation, it is necessary to review briefly the position of the Polish Communist regime and the stance of the church, especially in the early years of Communist rule in Poland, between 1945 and 1956.

To begin with, it must be remembered that the Communists in Poland were in a relatively weaker position than those in the other East European countries which came under Soviet domination after World War II. The prewar Polish Communist party had been extensively purged on Stalin's orders and had actually been dissolved in 1938. Few of the prewar party leaders were available in 1944 when Moscow sponsored a pro-Soviet Polish Government of National Liberation, the so-called Lublin Committee. The Communists who had remained in Poland during the war had only a weak popular base created through their anti-Nazi resistance organization. (Poles had overwhelmingly joined the Home Army resistance movement, which was under the direction of the Polish government-in-exile in London.) In 1945, there were no more than 30,000 Communist party members in Poland. Thus, the Lublin Committee faced a hostile population which considered the Communists to be agents and instruments of Russian domination.

Prayers are offered in the Wroclaw cathedral on May 3, 1970, at the opening of a session of the Polish episcopate marking the 25th anniversary of the establishment by the Polish Catholic Church of its church organizations in the Western and Northern Territories. From left to right, Archbishop Antoni Baraniak from Poznan, Karol Cardinal Wojtyla (the future Pope John Paul II) from Cracow, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski (Primate of Poland and president of the episcopate), Archbishop Boleslaw Kominek from Wroclaw, and Bishop Piotr Kalwa from Lublin.

—CAF via Eastfoto.

---

[11] In July 1981, the Polish weekly *Kulisy* (Warsaw) published the results of a confidential public opinion survey on the Polish people's confidence in 15 different institutions and organizations. The poll was taken in May 1981 by the Center for Public Opinion Research of the Polish Radio. It was conducted with a random sample of men and women over the age 15. Each respondent could offer more than one vote of confidence. The church placed first, with 94 percent; the Solidarity trade union movement came next, with 90 percent; the militia and the Polish Communist party placed at the bottom, with 24 and 32 percent respectively. See Charles J. Gans in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), July 6, 198..

Furthermore, the Polish Communists could not avail themselves of some of the means for discrediting their opposition used by their East European comrades. Poland had, after all, been an Allied power during World War II; sizable Polish units had fought on the Allied side against the Nazis; and no Polish political groups had collaborated with the Nazis.[12]

Under these circumstances, the Communists had to proceed cautiously in trying to establish and consolidate their position. During the first three years, they relied on force, especially against the Polish Home Army, and on various pressures as well as co-optation, against the political opposition. By the end of 1948, the Communists had achieved complete control over the government. The membership of the Communist party—called the Polish United Workers' Party after the numerically much stronger Polish Socialist Party had been maneuvered into a merger—had risen to approximately 1.25 million. Within the party, the strongly pro-Moscow faction was gaining ground while the more independent Communists, such as Wladyslaw Gomulka, were being purged. (However, in contrast to their counterparts in other East European states, the pro-Moscow faction never felt sufficiently strong to stage major trials of deviant Communists.[13]) Nevertheless, by the end of 1948, the Polish Communists felt ready to undertake a "socialist" transformation of society according to the Soviet model and to take on any remaining ideological adversaries, such as the Catholic Church.

During the early postwar years, the Communist authorities in Poland (as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe) had—out of a combination of ambiguity and weakness—left the church relatively unmolested. The 1925 Concordat with the Vatican, which regulated church-state relations in Poland, was annulled. Otherwise, however, the authorities did not take any major steps with regard to the church.

In 1945, Cardinal August Hlond, the Primate of Poland, received broad powers from Pope Pius XII. The pope had granted such powers to some heads of churches that had come under Communist domination in 1939–40, in order to ensure that the church organization could continue to function even if communications with the Vatican were broken. Although the exact extent of these powers is not generally known, it seems clear that in the absence of an accredited papal nuncio, the Primate functioned as the representative of the pope. The Primate also acquired greater powers with respect to the church organization and appointments than he had previously possessed. In sum, the Primate became something more than the first among equals: he was very much the head of the episcopate.

Primate Hlond lost no time in using these powers to introduce Polish church administrators in the formerly German territories and to build up the church organization there.[14] In addition, in 1946 he elevated to Bishop of Lublin a little-known priest who was devoted to pastoral concerns. Before his death, Cardinal Hlond recommended this bishop to the pope to succeed as Primate. This was Stefan Wyszynski, who was named Primate in September 1948.[15] His towering personality came to dominate the Polish scene until his death in 1981.

The new Primate was greeted with a fierce antichurch campaign of slander and distortion by the authorities aimed at the pope, the Vatican, and the "reactionary part of the clergy." But the regime did not limit itself to propaganda. In 1945, an organization of "progressive Catholics," named PAX, had been created. Its founder, Boleslaw Piasecki, former leader of the prewar fascist organization "Falanga," had bought his life in Soviet prison by in effect offering to be a Trojan horse among Poland's Catholics. The Christian label was adopted by PAX to create an opposition of Catholic believers against the hierarchy from within the Catholic community.[16] Now, with the help of PAX, the nucleus of a "patriot priests" movement was formed in 1949. The state authorities also decreed the confiscation of "Caritas," the charity organization of the church, which owned more than 2,000 hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages. These were placed under the direction of the patriot priests. Another decree, on "protection of religious freedom and freedom of conscience," made the application of ecclesiastical sanctions against priests or laymen who collaborated with the regime a crime punishable by up to five years in prison.[17]

Henceforth, the Primate and the episcopate had to

---

[12] M. K. Dziewanowski, *Poland in the 20th Century*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 113–44.

[13] Ibid., p. 168; see also the excellent discussion of Poland and other East European countries in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969.

[14] Cardinal August Hlond returned from exile on July 25, 1945, with full power of the pope's legate "in tutto il territorio polacco" (in all Polish territories). On August 15, 1945, Hlond introduced Polish church administration in the former German lands, which he divided into five territorial units. Five apostolic delegates were appointed and granted the jurisdiction of residentiary bishops.

[15] Andrzej Micewski, "Cardinal Wyszynski," unpublished manuscript, p. 73; this manuscript is to be published in *Éditions du Dialogue* (Paris), in 1982. See also Peter Raina, *Kardynał Wyszynski* (Cardinal Wyszynski), London, Publishing House of Poets and Painters, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 295. Raina had access to the archives of the Primate's Institute in Warsaw.

[16] On PAX, see Lucjan Blit, *The Eastern Pretender*, London, Hutchinson, 1965; Radio Free Europe, *Prawda o PAXie i Piaseckim* (The Truth About PAX and Piasecki), London, 1968; and Andrzej Micewski, *Katolische Gruppierungen in Polen* (Catholic Organizations in Poland), Munich, Kaiser Verlag, 1978.

[17] Decree of Aug. 5, 1949, published in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Aug. 7, 1949.

The late Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, ordains new priests in Warsaw's St. John Cathedral.

—DPA via Pictorial Parade.

rely on their personal moral authority and appeals to maintain discipline among the clergy. The regime began to apply coercion against clergy who would not collaborate. Several hundred priests were arrested. Six were sentenced to death for alleged "political crimes." Those who had something to conceal in their private life, particularly priests who were guilty of violating their celibacy vows or of sexual abuses, were threatened with public exposure unless they joined the patriot priests. Such outright blackmail worked in some cases. In others, the priests were lured into cooperation by bribes or local concessions and privileges.[18]

Primate Wyszynski reacted with vigorous protests directly to the authorities, and with pastoral letters and sermons. The regime responded by threats to arrest on the spot any priests who read the Primate's statements in their churches. As a consequence, the pastoral letters were read in only one Warsaw church, by Wyszynski himself. However, his sermons and pronouncements reached the Poles because they were broadcast back to Poland by Radio Free Europe. Similarly, distortions in the regime's antichurch propaganda were exposed by Western radio broadcasts.

While escalating its subversion and propaganda campaign, the regime also applied pressure to Primate Wyszynski and the episcopate to conclude an agreement on state-church relations. This pressure was increased after Pope Pius XII issued a statement in July 1949 which was interpreted to mean that all Catholics who collaborated with Communists would be subject to excommunication.[19]

Primate Wyszynski was aware that similar pressures had already been applied by the Communist authorities on Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Primate of Hungary, and on Archbishop Josef Beran of Prague. Mindszenty and Beran were denied the right to exercise their episcopal functions and were interned. In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, bishops, priests, and laymen were arrested, pro-regime priests were put into positions of ecclesiastical authority, and the state came in effect to control the church organization.[20] Hoping to avoid a similar fate for the Polish church, or at least to gain time, Wyszynski and the episcopate—despite some dissension—signed an "understanding" with the Polish state in April 1950.[21]

Wyszynski managed to overcome the aversion to the agreement within the Polish episcopate. Despite a clause in the understanding stating that the church would not oppose a voluntary collectivization of agriculture, the Polish peasantry, undoubtedly the staunchest supporters of the church, did not seem to be alienated from it. While the Vatican clearly disapproved of the understanding, especially since it contained a clause committing the Polish episcopate to urge the Vatican to give permanent and regular status to the Polish church organization introduced in the formerly German territories, the Vatican did not speak out publicly against it.[22] In fact, in 1952, Primate Wyszynski was elevated to the rank of cardinal.

Thus, the expectations of the regime that the understanding might be a useful tool for the application of "salami tactics" to the Polish church were not realized. Therefore, the authorities came to resort more and more to repressive means. In 1953, four bishops were imprisoned, and four others were forbidden to exercise their office. A newly published decree made all church appointments, transfers, or changes in pastoral jurisdiction subject to prior approval by the government. In effect, the regime acquired the right of church appointments at the recommendation of bishops.[23] The same decree empowered the authorities to remove clergymen from their posts.

---

[18] Techniques for recruiting patriot priests were decribed in detail by former PAX member Andrzej Micewski in *Wspolrzadzic czy nie klamac* (To Co-Govern or Not to Lie), Paris, Libella, 1978, pp. 42–43.

[19] *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* (Vatican), July 13, 1949.

[20] Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917–1979*, Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1981, pp. 268 ff.

[21] For the full text, see Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1965.

[22] Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican*, p. 276.

On this issue, Cardinal Wyszynski decided to confront the regime. From his pulpit he declared: "We teach that it is proper to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God that which is God's. But when Caesar seats himself on the altar, we respond curtly: he may not."[24] In a strong letter to the party leader, Boleslaw Bierut, the episcopate listed all acts of persecution and declared: "We shall rather leave them [church positions] vacant . . . than surrender spiritual authority to the unworthy. . . . Similarly, if faced with the choice of handing over ecclesiastical jurisdiction to be an instrument of secular authorities or of accepting personal sacrifices, we shall not hesitate."[25]

The rejection of the decree on church appointments and the refusal to condemn a bishop sentenced to 12 years in prison precipitated the arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski in September 1953. The Polish episcopate was faced with an ultimatum: to elect as chairman of the episcopate a bishop proposed by the government or to share the fate of the Primate. With one dissenting voice, they agreed. A statement—dictated by the authorities to the bishops—implying condemnation of the imprisoned Primate and promising cooperation with the government was read under duress in all churches.[26]

It was the hope of the regime that the removal of the Primate would make possible a rapid expansion of the patriot priest movement. The attitude of the faithful frustrated these plans. Such priests were ostracized by their flocks. This spontaneous boycott was so massive and effective that the patriot priests were often left without parishioners and without financial support as well. Even not so steadfast priests, when faced with conflicting pressures from the regime and the people, preferred to resist the regime rather than to face general contempt. The names of the few recruits to the patriot priests were widely publicized as examples to be followed by others. But the number of active patriot priests never exceeded 400–500.[27] The overwhelming majority of the clergy remained united and loyal to the imprisoned Primate. In one case, a priest who was threatened with public exposure of his old love affair, confessed it publicly after Sunday service and asked his parishioners whether they still wished him to remain their pastor. That day, he became their idol, and blackmailers left him alone.[28]

Years later, Cardinal Wyszynski summarized what happened after his removal: "Strike the shepherd, and the sheep will scatter. Often this has been tried and proven to be so. But whenever it has been done in Poland, it has served only to draw the sheep together."[29]

One cannot explain how the Church withstood infiltration and subversion without understanding the various forms of resistance offered by the population. In this period of Stalinism, society was atomized by fear, and mutual suspicion was sown by informers who spied on neighbors, friends, and even family members. Not only were organized forms of resistance impossible, but even informal social links became attenuated. The Polish resistance in these times took on a largely passive form. The educated class withdrew like snails inside the walls of their houses. The output of the mass media and the regime's writers and artists was so bad and so widely ignored that finally party and nonparty intellectuals rebelled against producing it. The public simply refused to read the official newspapers and books or to listen to the domestic radio.

In the economic realm, workers reduced their labor efficiency to the minimum necessary to avoid reprisals. The cumulative effect of this behavior led to the failure of the 1949–55 economic plan. Lower-echelon officials, charged with carrying out the government plans, quietly changed sides and sabotaged implementation, especially of forcible collectivization of the peasantry and antichurch policies.[30] The Communist rulers discovered suddenly that their instruments of power were blunted, and their lines of communication with the masses, broken.

---

[23] Decree of Feb. 9, 1956. See *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[24] The sermon delivered on June 4, 1953, as quoted in Adam Michnik, *Kosciol, Lewica, Dialog* (The Church, the Left, and the Dialogue), Paris, Literary Institute, 1977, p. 44. A French translation of this work, *l'Église et la Gauche—le dialogue Polonais*, was published by Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1979.

[25] For the full text, see Raina, op. cit., pp. 497–525.

[26] See ibid., pp. 553–54.

[27] P. J. Babris, *Silent Churches*, Arlington Heights, IL, Research Publishers, 1978, p. 281. Babris quotes an unnamed Polish prelate who estimated that about 400–500 priests had associated themselves with PAX "in one way or another." The present writer, as the director of the Polish Service of Radio Free Europe, forwarded to the Vatican in 1955 a list of 400 "activists" from the ranks of "patriot priests," compiled by RFE Research from the press in Poland. Nearly 1,000 patriot priests were registered as members of ZBOWID (a regime-sponsored organization of former combatants). However, less than half of them were actively involved. Some 4,700 priests participated in meetings throughout the country organized by the authorities in December 1955, but most had been brought by the political police. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 210.

[28] From the author's own conversation with a member of the episcopate. It is worth noting that the core of the present clergy (including the current Primate, Jozef Glemp) were trained as clerics in these critical years (1949–55). During the entire 1945–78 period, the number of entrants into seminaries beat all records (they amounted to some 900 in 1950, 1,100 in 1951, 1,050 in 1952, and 1,000 in 1953). Only 200 clerics graduated in 1951, and only 300 each, in 1952 and 1953. See Table 3 in Zdaniewicz, op. cit., p. 38. Most of the seminarians in these years abandoned their vocation under considerable pressure by the political police. Inadvertently, the regime created an elimination system which in the longer run benefited the church. Only the strongest and most determined clerics passed the trial by ordeal.

[29] Sermon in Czestochowa, Press Bureau of the Polish Episcopate, January 1966.

[30] Dziewanowski, op, cit., pp. 169–79.

Relaxation of the stringent policies, however, was facilitated by several fortuitous events. First of all, Iosif Stalin had died in March 1953, and the Soviet leadership was in the throes of a succession struggle, eventually won by Nikita Khrushchev. In February 1956, he made his famous "secret speech" denouncing Stalin.

In addition, a high-level member of the Polish secret police defected to the West in 1953. His revelations about the activities of his feared and despised service were broadcast to Poland by Radio Free Europe in 1954–55. They not only brought about further disillusionment among the population but necessitated, in the view of the party, a purge and reorganization of the political police as well as restraint of its activities.[31]

A monument is unveiled in Poznan in June 1981, commemorating workers who participated in the June 1956 demonstrations in that city. Thousands of Poles gathered in Poznan for a commemorative mass on Sunday, June 28.

—Keystone.

The party membership, and especially its intellectuals, gradually were learning the facts about Soviet measures with regard to Poland, even before Khrushchev made his speech. Failure of the 1949–55 economic plan brought out disagreements within the party leadership over policy and erupted into an overt factional struggle. The general sense of discontent eventually culminated in workers' riots in Poznan in June 1956.

Two months later, on August 26, a million pilgrims from all over Poland gathered around the holy shrine of the Madonna in Czestochowa.[32] The religious demonstrations of unprecedented dimension turned into a massive display of support for Poland's imprisoned spiritual leader. In the following months, requests for the release of the Primate figured high on the list of demands raised at mass meetings all over Poland.

When, in October 1956, the revolutionary wave reached its peak, Gomulka, the newly elected party leader (who himself had been recently released from prison), was confronted before the Central Committee building by thousands demanding that the cardinal be set free.[33] Wyszynski was hurriedly brought back to Warsaw from the monastery where he had been detained, to receive a hero's welcome. He was now a celebrity, and his persecution made him virtually immune from rearrest in the future. In his first words to the Warsaw crowds, Wyszynski appealed for peace, calm, and unity.

During his confinement, Wyszynski had refused to negotiate; now he lost no time in opening talks with the government. These led to another "understanding" with the new party leadership. The decree on church appointments was abolished; the government retained its veto power only in cases of residentiary bishops and parish pastors.[34] All imprisoned priests were released, expelled bishops were returned to their dioceses, and optional religion classes were reintroduced into the schools.

Resisting Obstruction

Hostilities between the church and the regime were resumed as soon as the party, under Gomulka, regained control of the situation in Poland. However, the church and the Primate were in a stronger position than in 1948. The regime's attempts to revive the patriot priest movement were not effective; PAX had lost its credibility and thus was devoid of much utility in the eyes of the regime. Since Gomulka hoped to limit church influence in society and especially among the young, Marxist indoctrination in schools and atheistic propaganda campaigns were stepped up. Social legislation opposed by the church was introduced (the church objected particularly to the legislation on abortion).

---

[31] Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 240.

[32] *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 210.

[33] Stefan Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," *Scientific American* (New York, NY), July 1981, p. 50.

[34] Decree of Dec. 31, 1956, in *Dziennik Ustaw*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 1957. The new "understanding" concluded on Dec. 8, 1956, allowed priests free access to hospitals and prisons, and permitted expelled nuns to return to their convents.

Wyszynski approached these and other problems with his characteristic flexibility. When teaching of religion in public schools was again forbidden, he made verbal protests while ordering the organization of a wide network of Catholic religion classes.

Only when the regime sought to extend its control over the teaching of religion in chapels, parish buildings, and private homes did Wyszynski call for civil disobedience. State inspectors were refused access to Catholic catechism classes. Harassment and discrimination against those who accommodated such classes were strongly protested. When the government banned members of religious orders from teaching catechism, the proscription was ignored. After religion instructors were ordered to be licensed and paid by the state,[35] the church ruled that priests were not permitted to accept remuneration from the government. When, in 1969, ruinous taxes were imposed on parish priests and church property, the clergy was told by the episcopate not to pay them. The regime rarely tried to enforce the law coercively, for fear of violent confrontations with the faithful.

The most serious problem the church faced in this period was the need for more churches. Substantial birthrates in the postwar era together with repatriation and resettlement had added greatly to Poland's population. Moreover, industrialization and the creation of new urban centers were causing millions to move from the countryside to the cities; hence, much of the population had no church within reasonable distance. The regime clearly hoped that removal of the growing working class from contact with priests and churches would result in a gradual atrophy of religion. In most cases, permits to build new churches were denied. When appeals and collective petitions were rejected, the parishioners together with their priests built primitive barracks, chapels, or even churches without waiting for the permits. In many instances, the arrest of the priest and dismantling of an illegally erected church led to demonstrations and local clashes with the police. Persistent public pressure usually prevailed, as was the case in the large industrial center of Nowa Huta, where, after years of struggle, a great modern church was finally built.[36]

High mass is celebrated at the new church in Nowa Huta, built after years of struggle with Polish state authorities.

—EUPRA

Friction between the church and the state arose also over a somewhat different issue. Toward the close of the Vatican II Council in 1965, the Polish episcopate sent a letter to the episcopate of West Germany. Although the letter summarized the 1,000-year history of Polish-German relations from a decidedly Polish national perspective, it was at the same time conciliatory and invited the German episcopate to the millennial celebrations at Czestochowa in 1966. The phrase upon which the Polish government pounced in the ensuing antichurch campaign was: "We forgive and ask forgiveness." This could suggest that the perpetrators of crimes and their victims were placed on the same level of moral guilt. Memories of 6 million dead and of Nazi atrocities were still very much alive in Poland. Thus, Communist propagandists saw a unique opportunity to create a rift between the Polish people, with their nationalistic feelings, and their church. To make matters worse, the response of the German bishops was distorted by the official media through the omission of key words.[37] It seemed that, for the first time, the Primate and the Polish episcopate might be losing public support. The cardinal had to vigorously defend this gesture to the German people.

---

[35] Decree by the Minister of Education, Aug. 19, 1961. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 222.

[36] It seems that the Communist regime was more successful in promoting religious indifference than in fostering atheism. Although in totals of divorces and abortions, Poland still remains far behind most European countries, there is an upward trend in both statistics. As a result of ultraliberal divorce laws, the number of divorces increased from 11,100 in 1950 to 40,300 in 1979. The law introduced in 1956 removing all restrictions on abortions had a similar effect. In 1957, there were 36,400 registered abortions, in 1967, 144,500—or one fourth the number of children born in the year. *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, pp. 200, 204, 233. This discrepancy between the teaching of the church and the moral norms applied in a predominantly Catholic society may indicate growing religious indifference of Catholics.

According to a public poll conducted among clergy in 1971 by the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, (Cracow), 18.3 percent of respondents considered indifference in religious matters as the main difficulty in their pastoral work. In all, 14 percent complained of the secularization of their flock. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 243.

Eventually, Wyszynski was vindicated by events. Although the Polish hierarchy had been guided by religious considerations, their letter encouraged a conciliatory trend of opinion in West Germany and helped pave the way for the Bonn-Warsaw agreement concluded in 1970. By this agreement, the government in Bonn accepted the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. As a result, the Vatican yielded to the relentless pressure of the Polish church, and the western territories were recognized as an integral and permanent part of Poland and its church administration.

Much of the antichurch propaganda in the mid-1960's was focused on Cardinal Wyszynski personally. He was widely attacked in anonymous letters and pamphlets disseminated by the Polish political police. Forged texts purporting to be his sermons were circulated.[38] There was an attempt to humiliate him before the Second Vatican Council. All the bishops taking part received a memorandum, signed by nonexistent "Polish



Polish pilgrims gather at Jasna Gora in Czestochowa on August 15, 1981, to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Black Virgin. The sign on the wall reads: "Queen of Poland, pray for us."

—Joseph Czarnecki/Gamma-Liaison.

---

[37] For texts of both letters, see *Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu Polski 1945–1974* (Pastoral Letters of the Polish Episcopate), Paris, Éditions du Dialogue, 1975, pp. 829–36.

[38] The last known case of forgery took place in 1974. The Holy Cross sermons, delivered in Holy Cross Church in Warsaw by Cardinal Wyszynski, were published as a book in Rome. A forged version was circulated in Poland. See *Survey*, Autumn 1979, p. 216.

priests," which accused him of fostering an exaggerated Marian cult, bordering on heresy.[39]

Wyszynski was also criticized by bona fide Catholic intellectuals for intransigence in dealing with the government and for autocratic tendencies, ultraconservatism, and a reluctance to implement the Vatican Council's reforms. Criticism originating from the respected "Znak" group of Catholic deputies to the Sejm (parliament) found greater credibility in Western Catholic circles than the attacks of Communists.

Nevertheless, in retrospect, there is little doubt that the solidarity of bishops and clergy could not have been maintained without a touch of the qualities for which Wyszynski was criticized. He had very limited means for imposing his policies on others, yet his decisions were obeyed and followed. His advocacy of a people's Catholicism was based on the premise that ordinary working people were more reliable supporters of the church than were Catholic intellectuals. He felt that because the Catholic deputies to parliament from the "Znak" group functioned with the regime's consent, they had a vested interest in pressing the church into concessions and compromises. "The church," Wyszynski told them, "does not need politicians, but confessors and defenders."[40]

The Polish church has often been accused of superficial religiosity, expressed mainly through ritual and external forms of devotion appealing strongly to simple folk but lacking intellectual depth.[41] However, since the church was denied access to the mass media, and even the right to have its own printing facilities,[42] the various religious manifestations, pilgrimages, and rallies of the church represented the only opportunity, aside from regular services, to reach the people directly. The traditional church celebrations also provided millions of people with their only chance to manifest support for their church and opposition to the official state doctrine. Although the cardinal's strong personal faith makes it unthinkable that he was using the Marian cult as a tactical device, nevertheless the deep devotion of Poles to the Holy Virgin of Czestochowa, rooted in a long tradition, played an important role in the survival of Catholicism in Poland.

The reforms of the Vatican II Council were implemented, but the Primate did not allow his critics to dictate the pace of change.[43] In his view, spontaneous reforms from below could have undermined the discipline of the clergy. This would have been dangerous to the church, which was still living under conditions of siege. Thus, the episcopate remained firmly in control of reforms, which were introduced gradually and cautiously.

Defending Human Rights

Since the 1960's, however, the church has gradually evolved its own brand of ecumenism in Poland. It has assumed more and more the role of champion of human rights of all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation.[44] Even when the church itself has not been attacked, it has raised its voice in protest against the persecution of others. In 1968, when student demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed, the episcopate collectively and Wyszynski individually strongly condemned police brutality and repressive measures.[45] Two years later, after the workers' revolt in the coastal cities of Poland, the church spoke out in support of workers' rights. The Primate stated publicly that the events of December 1970 aroused the conscience of the nation and galvanized its will to live under more democratic conditions.

In the 1970's, the emphasis on defending human rights became even stronger. The Primate had a formidable ally in Archbishop Karol Wojtyla of Cracow, who became a cardinal in 1967. Although Wojtyla worked in the shadow of Wyszynski in most matters, he grew very outspoken in his public pronouncements in defense of human rights. For example, Wojtyla showed his opposition to the anti-Semitism campaign of Gomulka's regime by encouraging his students to care for neglected and abandoned Jewish cemeteries.

In 1975, another wave of dissent in Poland started with collective letters of protest against proposed changes in the Polish Constitution. The episcopate followed with a separate letter to the authorities, and without tying itself to the protesters, it gave them its support.[46] After another outburst of labor unrest in June

---

[39] The author saw the original copy.

[40] At a meeting with all five Znak deputies to parliament in May 1968. See Micewski, op. cit., p. 493.

[41] Wyszynski himself, in an interview published in *Przewodnik Katolicki* (Poznan), Sept. 7, 1969, saw the main features of Polish Catholicism to be the Marian cult, emotionality, tradition, and massive displays (*masowosc*) of religious feelings. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 238.

[42] The censorship did not allow the printing of missals in the vernacular, which were necessary for the introduction of the Vatican Council's liturgical reforms. The Pallotines printed 24,000 copies in Paris, but shipment was stopped by Polish customs authorities. Eventually, the publisher in Paris was allowed to mail single copies to individual addressees. See Babris, op. cit., p. 272.

[43] The episcopate defended its implementation of the reforms of the Second Ecumenical Council in a pastoral letter of Oct. 17, 1966, to the clergy. For a full text, see *Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu Polski*, pp. 453–69.

[44] The evolution in the church's position on human rights is discussed extensively in Michnik, op. cit.

[45] Letters of Mar. 21 and May 3, 1968, from the episcopate.

[46] *Dissent in Poland 1976–77*, London, Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977, pp. 19, 147.

1976, the church again took a strong stand and demanded leniency for the workers who were being jailed or fired after the demonstrations.[47]

It took some time for radical and liberal intellectuals to recognize this new ecumenical role of the church. The left-wing intellectual elite, numerically small but highly articulate and influential, were traditionally anticlerical and inclined to identify the church with right-wing nationalism.[48] Marxist dissidents who wanted a "socialism with a human face" remained hostile to the church, even though they may have broken with the Communist party. To them, the Catholic Church seemed to represent only another brand of totalitarianism.

A change in attitude by the intellectuals came in the late 1970's. It is exemplified by Adam Michnik, one of the young leaders of the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR). Michnik, an avowed atheist and a target of the 1968 anti-Zionist campaign, concluded that the prevailing attitude of intellectuals was mistaken. The church, wrote Michnik, had become the most formidable opponent of the totalitarian system. As such, it was the mainstay of all people fighting for greater freedom, be they believers or nonbelievers. Similar ideas were expressed in the many uncensored publications which mushroomed in Poland after 1976.[49]

The church has reaffirmed on numerous occasions its commitment to promoting all human rights. Primate Wyszynski articulated his views on this subject clearly in a letter written in 1978 to Kazimierz Kakol, director of the Department of Religious Affairs:

> *The defense of one's right . . . is simply the duty of the citizen . . . any category of citizens who share the sense of responsibility for the fate of the state must see it. They must make their voices heard even if they have to pay for it dearly. There is today no one in Poland exempt from the duty of speaking the truth. He who keeps silent is a potential wrecker of the state and society.*[50]

The former archbishop of Cracow, speaking to his compatriots after his election as Pope John Paul II, said:

> *The love of our country must unite all of us despite and over all our differences. I address these words to all my compatriots who respect the outlook and convictions of others, without exception.*[51]

Fully conscious of his strong position, Wyszynski was relentless in pressing his demands. Yet he always knew where to stop. He did not hesitate to ask the faithful to disobey secular authorities whenever he felt that secular laws and decisions endangered the essential mission of the church. At the same time, he always tried to keep at a safe distance from the brink. He was aware that the memories of 1956—and the risk of violent confrontation—had a restraining influence on his Communist adversaries; but he never threatened such confrontations. In his dealings with the government, Wyszynski carefully walked the thin line between compromise and resistance. He never let the church be identified with a particular social or economic system, and his criticisms were never aimed at communism per se or at a specific leader. They were directed at abuses. The Primate preached:

> *. . . let no one think that the Bishops embarked on a struggle against the system. No, they only recalled the rights of Man, of the family and citizens in their country. These are the only objectives that guide us. We cannot accept comments, appearing in particular in the foreign press, which scent political motives in everything we do.*[52]

The position of the church as a unifying link and crystallizing factor in Polish society was graphically illustrated during the pope's visit to Poland in 1979. A future historian might describe the drama which took place in Warsaw on June 2, 1979, as a climax in the life of the 1,000-year-old Polish nation. Pope John Paul II, a Pole and the first non-Italian successor to St. Peter since 1523, was in the capital of his homeland, which is ruled by Communists and controlled by Moscow. He was celebrating a pontifical mass in the open air. A huge cross and the altar for the mass had been put up by the Communist government itself for fear that, were church authorities left entirely in charge of the preparations, the people might later resist the dismantling of these symbols of Christianity.[53] The mass, conducted with great liturgical solemnity in Warsaw's Victory Square, was attended by a quarter of a million people and watched by hundreds of millions more on television throughout the world. How ironic that this square, which had been given its name after World War II by Communist rulers confident of success in shaping a new, "socialist," Poland, should, a third of a century later, be the scene of one of the greatest victories of the Polish church.

---

[47] Ibid., p. 151.

[48] Before the war, many priests, including bishops, openly supported the right-wing National Democrats. See Bender, loc. cit., p. 292.

[49] See Michnik, op. cit., and Lidia Ciołkosz, "The Uncensored Press," *Survey*, Autumn 1979, pp. 56–67.

[50] Radio Free Europe Research, *Situation Report* (Munich), No. 9, May 29, 1981, p. 43.

[51] Papal address to Poles, Oct. 23, 1978.

[52] *Dissent in Poland*, p. 150.

[53] This actually had occurred in Nowa Huta in April 1960. See Stehle, *The Independent Satellite*, p. 89.



Poles fill Warsaw's Victory Square to overflowing on June 2, 1979, as Pope John Paul II celebrates mass upon his visit to his homeland.

—EUPRA.

This triumph continued during the succeeding eight days of the papal pilgrimage to Poland's shrines and cities. Millions of people enthusiastically thronged to greet their pope and to participate in the liturgical celebrations. The air resounded with traditional Polish religious hymns and prayers.

Not all of those millions who gathered around the pope in those eventful days were religious believers. For those who were indifferent, agnostic, or atheist, his visit was an occasion to demonstrate their opposition to the totalitarian system as well as to show their allegiance to the West, long symbolized by Polish ties to Rome. Others were displaying their immense national pride in the fact that a Pole was the head of the Catholic Church.

For all, however, the true face of Poland and the bond uniting all of Polish society were suddenly revealed. As a novelist and former leading commentator on Polish radio was to write, "it suddenly became obvious that 'the emperor had no clothes.' "[54] The pontiff's visit left people with a marked sense of their own strength and their rulers' weakness. Added to this was a feeling of new things to come, of a renewal.[55] Bohdan Cywinski, a Catholic writer, noted perceptively: "The papal visit will be a time of sowing, the moral harvest will come later."[56] It was this prevailing mood which helped pave the way for the nonviolent victory of the workers one year later.

Solidarity and the Church

Until 1980, when Solidarity was formed, the church was the only organized force in Poland which cut across all social groups and confronted the government when the latter abused the civil rights of separate groups. Although the Committee for the Defense of the Workers consisted primarily of intellectuals who defended the workers from 1976 on, it was not certain until 1980 that the workers would risk arrests and persecution on behalf of intellectuals, peasants, or other groups.

---

[54] Andrzej Szczypiorski, "The Limits of Political Realism," *Survey*, Autumn 1979, p. 29.

[55] For a good analysis of the impact of the Pope's visit, see Alexander Tomsky, "Poland's Church on the Road to Gdansk," *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston, Kent), No. 1-2, 1981, pp. 28-39.

[56] *Survey*, Autumn 1979, p. 232.

It is important to remember here that although the church had defended various dissenting groups before government authorities, its protests to the government had been couched in terms of civil and human rights in general rather than in terms of defense of a specific group. That is, the church, despite defending dissident groups, maintained its distance from them. Thus, up to 1980, the relationship between the church and the party-state structure could be characterized as bipolar. The church was the only institution that was independent of the regime, and as such, confronted the regime.

The strikes of 1980 and the emergence of the Solidarity movement as a legal third force transformed the role of the church from major adversary of the regime to a much-needed mediator between the regime and Solidarity. Initially, this new role created some misunderstandings. Basing himself on his own experience in dealing with the government, Wyszynski recommended a cautious step-by-step approach in a sermon delivered at the end of August 1980.[57] Quoted out of context by the regime's media, the sermon was interpreted as an appeal to end the strikes—to which the workers paid no heed. The Primate's position had to be explained in a letter issued by the episcopate on the next day. Any remaining misunderstandings were cleared up when Wyszynski met with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa shortly thereafter.

In the last months of Wyszynski's life, the church strongly supported Solidarity and the people's right to free assembly and freedom of expression. At the same time, the Primate and the bishops sought to influence the authorities, workers, and peasants in a patient effort to induce them to resolve their disputes and avoid a violent confrontation. In this period, Cardinal Wyszynski himself met several times with state and party leaders and was in constant touch with the leaders of Solidarity.[58] On some occasions, conflicts were avoided through mediation by the Primate or his representatives.

Wyszynski's successor as Primate, Archbishop Jozef Glemp, spelled out in a series of press interviews the position of the church in this entirely new situation. He said:

> *For the church, the emergence of Solidarity as a power which has moved to the forefront of society, came as a big surprise, but acceptance of Solidarity as a free trade union movement did not confront us with any problem. . . . The church is supporting Solidarity not as an ally but as defender of human rights in the spirit of the Gospel. . . . We do not want to dominate Solidarity, but we are ready to defend it if human rights are violated. . . . The church will counsel moderation and restraint in any conflict situation.*[59]

At the left, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa meets with the new Polish Primate Jozef Glemp on July 22, 1981; at the right, Glemp mets with Polish Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski on July 11, 1981.

—Joseph Czarnecki/Gamma-Liaison and UPI.

---

[57] Radio Free Europe Research, *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland*, Munich, 1980, p. 133.

[58] Wyszynski met with Stanislaw Kania on Aug. 25 and Oct. 21, 1980, and Feb. 7, 1981; with Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, on Mar. 26, 1980. See *Tygodnik Powszechny*, June 7, 1981.

[59] Ibid., June 21, 1981.

Polish Society and the Church

Pope John Paul II, when addressing Primate Wyszynski and his countrymen after his election, said:

> *There would be no Polish pope on Peter's throne without your faith which did not falter in the face of imprisonment and suffering, without your heroic hope. . . . There would be no Polish pope without the entire era in the history of our country so closely linked with your service as bishop and Primate.*[60]

These words by the pontiff to the Polish Primate and pilgrims, if their full meaning is examined, go far to explain the strength and vitality of the church in Poland.

In the first place, Poland is a society which is nationally homogeneous and where over 90 percent of the population profess Catholicism. It is also a country where the official ideology never carried much appeal, and where Marxist revisionist philosophies, such as exemplified in the writings of Leszek Kolakowski and others before 1968, could not be translated into practice. Thus, the church has no vital ideological rival.

Amidst a prevalent religious indifference that the Catholic Church has faced worldwide since the 1960's, and especially so in urban and industrial areas, Poland stands out as a striking exception. The Polish church did not lose the allegiance of industrial workers. According to a sociological survey on religious attitudes, conducted in four new industrial centers (Pulawy, Kazimierz, Plock, and Nowa Huta), between 82.4 percent and 93.7 percent of the respondents identified themselves as believers. Moreover, between 10.6 percent (Nowa Huta) and 32.8 percent (Kazimierz) described themselves as "deeply religious." Between 16.5 and 19.4 percent of the believers were prepared to give their lives in defense of religion and the church—only slightly less than the number of people who would do so in defense of their country (21.9 percent to 24.1 percent).[61]

The deep religious feelings of the Polish working class were manifested also during the sit-in strikes of 1980. Religious emblems—the cross, pictures of the Madonna of Czestochowa and of John Paul II—were displayed everywhere alongside the Polish national flag. Sunday services celebrated in dockyards were attended by crowds of fervently praying strikers. One of the worker demands submitted to the authorities was that Sunday mass be broadcast on the state-controlled Polish radio.

As has been indicated earlier, Poland's liberal intellectuals, without necessarily becoming practicing Catholics, have to a large extent recognized the importance of the church as the repository and guardian of Polish spiritual and national values.

The personality and leadership of Cardinal Wyszynski, who set the example and largely determined the posture of the church in Poland, is also an important factor. The cardinal shared and expressed the aspirations of his people. Under his leadership, the church did not stand in conflict with the personal and national interests of the Polish people. At the same time, while being concerned about Polish national survival, the cardinal unremittingly defended moral values and preached that they must be practiced in everyday life.

In their eulogy to the dead cardinal, the leaders of Solidarity paid tribute to his example. They stated that he had initiated the Polish "renewal" long before 1980 and that Solidarity's achievements would not have been possible without his lonely struggle in earlier years. He always urged courage and fearlessness on his flock:

> *Have the courage to confess Christ and his church publicly—in school, at the university, at work, in the office. Do it without thinking of the consequences you might suffer. . . . If you believe deeply within the four walls of your home, do not lack the courage to confess Christ in public. We have not only the right but the moral and religious duty to defend the faith, our traditions, and our Polish culture.*[62]

In 1963, he had declared: "If a citizen does not demand his rights, he is no longer a citizen: he becomes a slave."[63]

As Cardinal Wyszynski's successor, Archbishop Glemp is establishing his leadership under most difficult conditions. He, like Wyszynski in earlier years, is trying to preserve the church and shield his nation. After a certain initial hesitation, he is speaking out ever more strongly against the repressive martial-law regime. At the same time, he remains fully aware that the function of the church is to oppose violence and hatred. In a sermon criticizing the extraction of loyalty oaths from workers, Archbishop Glemp likened Poland's situation to the crucifixion of Christ. Yet, he went on to say:

---

[60] *The Washington Star*, Oct. 24, 1979.

[61] Wladyslaw Piwowarski, *Religijnosc Miejska w Rejonie Uprzemyslowncsci* (Religious Attitudes in Industrial Urban Centers), Warsaw, Biblioteka "Wiezi," 1977. The results of Piwowarski's survey show a higher number of believers than do other public opinion polls. A group of sociologists of Warsaw University conducted public surveys on religious attitudes among students in 1958 and 1978. In 1958, 69 percent of the respondents were believers, including 9 percent who believed deeply, 26 percent who practiced regularly, and 29 percent who practiced irregularly. In 1978, believers constituted 64 percent, including 10 percent who believed deeply, 21 percent who practiced regularly, and 31 percent who practiced irregularly. See Stefan Nowak, loc. cit.

[62] Quoted in *Kultura* (Paris), No. 6, 1978, p. 88.

[63] *The New York Times*, May 29, 1981.

Christ hanging on the cross forgave all his oppressors, all the villains who flogged and crucified Him. This is our Christian way, our difficult way. . . .[64]

Later, in another sermon, he stated:

If we want cooperation in our country, we need dialogue. It is not enough to threaten people, to fire them from jobs, it is necessary to talk to people. . . .[65]

As these comments indicate, certain responses by the church are inevitable in view of its spiritual mission. However, the position which the church will adopt vis-à-vis the regime will be largely influenced by the actions of the regime itself. The worst possible alternative which can be foreseen is that the present Polish military rulers, acting under Soviet pressure, will move beyond the liquidation of the worker and peasant Solidarity movement and of the democratic movement of the intellectuals. In any attempt to bring Poland back to a more orthodox model, the church would inevitably become the next target of the regime. Such a course would have to involve considerable escalation of repressive measures, and force the church to refight battles it had previously won.

There is also the possibility that continuing nonviolent resistance, compounded by economic pressures, may lead to a situation where, with Moscow's concurrence, the military government in Warsaw pursues a more conciliatory policy. Under these circumstances, the regime may seek a dialogue with the church as the only remaining spokesman of society. There is little doubt that, should the regime seek a policy of cooperation—or even of accommodation—the church would offer to act as a mediator in the search for an acceptable compromise.

---

[64] Ibid., Jan. 11, 1982.

[65] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1982.

Kto Kogo in the Kremlin[*]

by William G. Hyland

One of the casualties of the prolongation of the Brezhnev era has been a decline in the art of Kremlinology. Faced with what seemed to be a fairly stable Soviet leadership, students of the Soviet scene have gradually strayed off into the more alluring fields of behavioral sciences, generational change, nationality problems, military doctrine, etc. The game of Kremlin politics has increasingly been ignored.

Yet the deaths of two major Soviet leaders—Aleksey Kosygin in December 1980 and Mikhail Suslov in January 1982—are sharp reminders not only that personalities are important elements of Soviet politics but that the constellation of political power is an increasingly fragile one. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a Soviet leadership without Suslov, who seemed a permanent fixture bridging the Stalin period and the present. His presence somehow conferred a legitimacy on both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. The succession to Brezhnev has to be quite a different process without the participation of Kosygin and Suslov. Who replaces Suslov—not merely in name or title, but who performs the function of guardian of orthodoxy, who becomes the senior arbiter of high-level disputes? How will domestic policy be affected? Has Brezhnev become suddenly more vulnerable?

Speculation about political personalities in the Soviet system is difficult and too often fruitless, and speculation about the relationship between personalities and policy questions is even more hazardous. But Western governments simply want to know: (1) who will rule the USSR in the 1980's, and (2) what will Soviet policy be?

These questions are not as shallow as they may sound. Sovietologists surely know that there is a revisionist school of history which views the course of East-West relations as a record of missed opportunities. While revisionist theories are always greeted with skepticism, it is nevertheless true that there have been turning points when one side or the other has made a crucial decision based on a guess about the other's intentions (e.g., NCS–68).[1] Sovietologists would do well to bear this fact in mind.

What follows is a deliberately semi-provocative review of some of the issues which need to be addressed in this context. Let us begin with the question of the Soviet leadership.

The Men in the Kremlin

The Marxists are wrong. Individuals and their personalities do matter. They do shape history. And they certainly have shaped Soviet history.

It is unfortunate that Western Sovietology has come under the sway of a school of analysis that has subconsciously accepted some key premises of Marxist determinism. These analysts argue that only the system counts. It has a massive momentum and its own laws, institutions, and dynamics. Since Stalin's death, leaders come and go; it does not matter who is on top. Soviet policy will turn out to be about the same.

This is nonsense. Leonid Brezhnev is not Nikita Khrushchev, nor was Khrushchev Iosif Stalin. It is inconceivable, for example, that Brezhnev could carry out the

Mr. Hyland is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, DC). He served in the US government from 1954 through 1977; in 1975 he was appointed Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In addition, he has been a Senior Fellow of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. He is a coauthor of The Fall of Khrushchev, *1968.*

---

[*] "*Kto kogo?*" is colloquial Russian for "Who wins? Who loses?"—Eds.

[1] NSC–68 was a document delineating a US policy response to the perceived Soviet threat in 1950 in light of the USSR's new nuclear capabilities and its presumed intentions. See, for example, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NCS 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1979, pp. 116–58.

ruthless bloody purges of the 1930's, even if he had the power and opportunity. Or, to look at things from a different standpoint, let us suppose that Khrushchev had thwarted the coup of October 1964 and had remained in office until his death. How would he have handled the Vietnam war, the Czechoslovak crisis, or *Ostpolitik?* The same as Brezhnev? Would Khrushchev have invaded Czechoslovakia on the eve of a summit meeting with President Lyndon Johnson? Suppose Brezhnev had not survived when he was ill in 1975. Would Andrey Kirilenko have prevailed? Would Cuban troops now be in Angola or Ethiopia? Would there be a strategic arms limitation treaty?

True, analysis of personalities from afar is a dubious art. It inevitably lapses into an analysis of career patterns. Thus, so and so is a "survivor," because he has, in fact, survived. The "formative experience" of so and so was his rapid rise during the purges, or during Stalin's last days, or under Khrushchev, or even under Brezhnev. This is useful but limited, and for a policymaker it is normally frustrating.

Every recent American president has asked, "What is Brezhnev really like?" Before the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972, a large package of papers was prepared, drawing on mountains of public sources. But probably the most valuable briefing paper was that by Henry Kissinger, who had seen Brezhnev at close quarters for several days just a month before. Since then, a growing number of officials have dealt with Brezhnev, and he is no longer such a mystery. But what about the other Soviet leaders?

There is the rub. The Soviet system conspires to shield a large number of officials from non-Communist observers. How many diplomats or other observers have had much contact with, let us say, Viktor Grishin, who could conceivably become the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)? Or, if you prefer, Kirilenko or Konstantin Chernenko? Yet, some day President Reagan or his successor is certain to ask the same question: What is X really like?

All of this is to suggest that the succession needs to be analyzed and discussed in terms of leading personali-

ЗА МИР,
ЗА КОММУНИЗМ!

A poster featuring Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev on display in Moscow's Red Square for the occasion of Revolution Day, November 7, 1981.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

ties, rather than sociological groups or institutions. It is important to distinguish between a Grishin and, say, a Yuriy Andropov. It must take a peculiar personality to preside over the grisly work of the Committee for State Security, the KGB. Picture a man who moves from the Central Committee apparatus to the Foreign Ministry, ultimately receiving an ambassadorial assignment (Hungary, 1954–57); subsequently returns to the Central Committee; and then, suddenly, at age 52, becomes the Chairman of the KGB. On the one hand, the Politburo members must have regarded him as sufficiently manageable to pose no threat to the collective; on the other hand, they must have deemed him to be sufficiently ruthless to perform the dreaded work of the KGB. Surely, if Andropov were to become General Secretary of the CPSU, he would be a different leader from Grishin, who has spent his entire career in the environs of Moscow on economic and party assignments.

Beyond the idiosyncrasies of this or that individual, there is the question of interaction. No guarantee exists that several men thrown together by politics will automatically be supportive. Nevertheless, over time cliques do form, and friendships as well. Moreover, even in more calculating relationships there is a certain supportiveness in common decisions. For instance, one finds it plausible that when Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Nikolay Podgornyy—once the heads of party, government, and state—were in agreement, this was a powerful bloc, and few would have dared to challenge it.

It thus may be of some interest that in recent years Brezhnev has stood more and more alone, surrounded more by cronies than by equals. Only a few Politburo members who were active at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are still on Brezhnev's Politburo.[2] One can only wonder how this state of affairs has affected his decisions, let us say, in the Afghanistan and Polish crises.

Power Politics

In any case, Brezhnev does now stand apart from most of his colleagues. Indeed, the story of Soviet politics over the last five years is largely a narrative of Brezhnev's accumulation of ever greater power.

He began in 1977 by focusing on two institutions, the Secretariat of the CPSU's Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first step was the removal of K. F. Katushev from the Secretariat in March 1977 and his eventual replacement by one of Brezhnev's close personal aides, Konstantin Rusakov. It really does not matter why this shift was made; the net result is that Brezhnev placed a close protégé in an important position in the central party apparatus, to work with foreign Communist parties (and thus constitute a potential replacement for Boris Ponomarëv as head of the International Department). Of related interest was the promotion of Vasiliy Kuznetsov to First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, thus weakening somewhat the Foreign Ministry apparatus. Kuznetsov's replacement as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was Georgiy Korniyenko, a man of undoubted ability, but without the prestige of Kuznetsov. Another of Brezhnev's close personal protégés, Ye. M. Tyazhel'nikov, left the post of head of the Komsomol to take over the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. Most important, of course, Brezhnev forced out his longtime comrade Podgornyy from the chairmanship of the Presidium and himself assumed the post of head of state. At first, it seemed somewhat surprising that he would want this largely ceremonial office, but, on reflection, it made sense. Why not take the ceremonial office, so as to represent the Soviet state as well as the party? To strengthen Brezhnev's hold on foreign policy, the Foreign Ministry press spokesman, Leonid Zamyatin, was transferred to head a newly created Central Committee Department of International Information. Gradually, this department has begun to overshadow the conventional Foreign Ministry apparatus. Finally, Brezhnev's hold on the party apparatus was further enhanced by the promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo of Chernenko, one of his oldest cronies.

The next major target was the governmental apparatus, the USSR Council of Ministers and Prime Minister Kosygin himself. In November-December 1978, Konstantin Mazurov was removed from the Politburo and as First Deputy Prime Minister, although he had served for more than a decade in the latter position. Obviously, in light of Kosygin's health and age, the post of First Deputy Prime Minister was a crucial one, so the installation of Nikolay Tikhonov, Brezhnev's old friend,[3] in this job and his promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo was another sign of the times. The implications of the promotion were further underlined by the fact that Chernenko at the same time attained full membership in the Politburo, after only 19 months as a candidate. Soon Kosygin became ill. Although he reappeared for a while, his retirement was announced in the fall of 1980,[4] and his replacement was, of course,

---

[2] Of the 13 full members of the Politburo in February 1982, only Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and A. Pel'she held this position in 1968.

[3] N. Tikhonov, who is a year and a half older than Brezhnev, has known the General Secretary since their student days in the 1920's.

[4] Kosygin died in December 1980.



Soviet leaders after laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin Wall on May 9, 1980, the 35th anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II. In the front row, from left to right, are: N. A. Tikhonov, K. U. Chernenko, A. A. Gromyko, M. A. Suslov (since deceased), L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin (since deceased), A. P. Kirilenko, and V. V. Grishin. At the right, saluting, is Marshal N. Ogarkov.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Tikhonov, who also became a full Politburo member. Tikhonov's new first deputy is still another Brezhnev protégé from Dnepropetrovsk, Ivan Arkhipov. In December 1980, Ivan Bodyul, an old associate of Brezhnev from the 1950's in Moldavia, was appointed a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In the space of three years, then, the Brezhnevites have greatly strengthened their hold on the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the government, including the KGB. The importance of this fact lies not in Brezhnev's decision to take such a step. His decision is quite understandable if one bears in mind that Soviet politics remains fundamentally a struggle for power. Why should Brezhnev not surround himself with old and trusted friends, protégés, and cronies? Given what happened to Khrushchev, it is simple prudence.

Rather, the significance of these developments stems from the degree to which it increases the probability that once Brezhnev disappears, the upheaval at the top will be severe. After all, why would Brezhnev's successors want to remain dependent on the coterie of his old political friends, even if these successors do share a common background with them, from the old days in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia?

The result of these shifts, therefore, has been a sort of political paralysis. At the 26th CPSU Congress, for example, no change whatsoever was made in leading personnel. Probably no one other than Brezhnev was prepared to propose even a minor shift in the correlation of political forces lest the entire situation come apart. Replacement of any leader because of age would open some sensitive political questions.

In such circumstances, the outlook is for a struggle for power among Brezhnev's epigones. Although the Brezhnevites have a lock on certain key positions, their hold has to be only tentative, for it is derivative of Brezhnev's power. By promoting protégés who have no special base of their own, except perhaps for Chernenko,[5] Brezhnev has deprived them of the chance to survive the bloody politics of the succession. Meanwhile, it is worth keeping in mind, as Myron Rush has wisely pointed out,[6] that Brezhnev remains a dominant figure, still capable of rearranging the Soviet power structure and even of engaging in some daring forays abroad at a time of supposed political stagnation.

---

[5] Chernenko might have some base in the Central Committee apparatus, where he served for many years.

[6] Myron Rush, "Understanding Brezhnev's Political Strength," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Aug. 20, 1981.

Power and Policy

This brings us to the most important issues. What are the foreign and defense policies of the USSR likely to be (keeping in mind that there will be a struggle for Brezhnev's mantle)?

It is tempting to draw on previous succession periods—1953-57 and 1964-66—as analogues. In both periods, there was a tendency toward relieving foreign pressures by conciliatory policies while the internal power situation was sorted out.

But two things are lacking now that were present then. First, the successors in the 1950's and 1960's were younger. Second, in both cases, the successors were initially intent on some internal change—halting the Stalinist terror after 1953 and rebuilding a divided party after 1964.

One can envisage a post-Brezhnev Politburo of more sharply differing factions: the Brezhnevites, deeply entrenched but without the ultimate power of the patron, will undoubtedly want to preserve the status quo; some of the old guard—such as Andrey Gromyko or Dmitriy Ustinov—could still be powerful and prestigious figures to be reckoned with; and a somewhat amorphous group of younger men in the Secretariat and on the Politburo may be building pressure against the old guard. It will be tempting to inject into this situation the professional military and the KGB as decisive factors. Indeed, their influence in partisan politics could be significant, as perhaps it may have been in the past when towering heroes such as Marshal Georgiy Zhukov were engaged in politics.

But some skepticism is in order on this score. Nikolay Ogarkov, the present Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, does not strike one as much of a political actor, and certainly neither does Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the head of the Warsaw Pact forces. The KGB under Andropov, of course, is a different matter, because of his political status and because the KGB has technical capabilities—security, and leadership transportation and communication. Nevertheless, the possibility of a threat of force by the KGB seems remote. Furthermore, some of the old antagonism between the professional officer corps and the KGB must still exist.

To be sure, the military certainly will not gracefully accept a cut in its forces or resources, and the KGB presumably will resist any liberalization of the internal order. Thus, they are both likely to be strong forces favoring the status quo. At the same time, they will in all probability also be political targets. A new General Secretary will eventually want control over the KGB and the General Staff. Brezhnev's record in this regard is a case in point.



Important regional party leaders: left, G. V. Romanov, First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee and member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); right, V. V. Shcherbitskiy, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and CPSU Politburo member.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Despite a strong inclination toward conservative policies, the new leaders will be under pressure to innovate. It is the consensus among outside observers that the objective situation requires new directions, especially in internal economic policy.[7]

But crucial questions remain. Who, precisely, will be in the vanguard of those arguing for new directions? Certainly not the older men who have comfortably settled in for the duration. Nor the General Staff, nor the KGB. Probably not the Central Committee apparatus. Who, then? Perhaps the provincial secretaries, in Leningrad, Kiev, and elsewhere. Or it is possible that earlier patterns will be repeated. That is, one major figure may fight for power on one platform—almost certainly a conservative one—but after eliminating his rivals and securing his position, he may then adopt a different, more effective and realistic program. Again, such speculation cries out for names and faces.

One reason why names and faces are important is that few in the Soviet Union are qualified to take over the conduct of foreign policy. The bulk of the Soviet leadership concern themselves with internal policies. Even though Brezhnev had served as chief of state before the anti-Khrushchev coup, he had not been involved in the operation of Soviet global policy. That was largely Kosygin's preserve, on which Brezhnev encroached only gradually. But since taking over the reins of Soviet foreign policy in the early 1970's, Brezhnev has dominated it—so much so that no one else has had much experience. Except for Gromyko, only those in the Secretariat of the Central Committee who deal with foreign Communists have much background in foreign affairs. In this context, the emergence of Zamyatin's new department is of some significance.

---

[7] Seweryn Bialer, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 999 ff.

If Gromyko survives, then, he will be the major voice in mundane foreign affairs, but the strategic line will still have to be set by the General Secretary. Recall the struggles in 1953–57 between Khrushchev, the neophyte, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the old professional.[8]

For Western observers there are two areas of greatest concern: (1) whether the buildup in Soviet military forces will continue, and (2) whether Soviet foreign policy will have an aggressive character, or begin to moderate.

Defense Policies

It is likely that several members of the present Politburo aside from Brezhnev have been involved in defense policy: obviously Ustinov, as Defense Minister; Gromyko, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; probably Kirilenko, because he is the "second" Secretary; Chernenko, who has some responsibilities in the defense field; probably some in the Secretariat who are involved with defense industries; and the head of the KGB. Moreover, in contrast to foreign policy, defense policy—because of its widespread repercussions in the economy—must be generally familiar to all in the Politburo (not in terms of a knowledge of esoteric weapons, but in terms of the number of workers, the amount of steel, etc., required).

By background and by inclination, Brezhnev is promilitary. Indeed, no one would argue that he has not been more than kind to the defense establishment. But, except for Ustinov, the others have no such long background or emotional attachment. Thus, it is very unlikely that a new leader would have the wherewithal to challenge the military immediately.

But can this situation last? If the military proves to be untouchable and keeps its share of the national economy, and if the economy slows down as much as Western observers predict,[9] then the military share of the national product will grow absolutely and relatively and become a tempting target for reductions. All of this probably means that after the first phase of the struggle in which the successor enlists the tacit support of the military, he will eventually turn on his supporters, if he wants to pursue a successful economic policy.

It may be somewhat easier for Brezhnev's successor to confront the military problem because, strangely enough, Brezhnev seems to be laying the groundwork to reduce the military's claims to priority in national policy. He has done so by assaulting one of its sacred preserves: military doctrine. For years, the Soviet military were permitted to write that nuclear war was winnable. They did not do so in crude terms, but this was certainly the import of their writings. Just when it seemed to Westerners that they had a firm fix on Soviet military doctrine and policy, however, Brezhnev has confused the issue. To appreciate what has happened, one needs to trace his statements over time.

In the early 1970's, with the advent of parity, Brezhnev declared: "We have created strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of deterring aggressors." Nevertheless, a reliable Soviet deterrent was still considered precarious and subject to Western attempts to regain strategic superiority. Thus, Brezhnev repeatedly warned that the USSR would "respond to any and all attempts from any quarter to obtain military superiority over the USSR. . . ."[10]

By 1975, however, Brezhnev had concluded that the new strategic balance was firmly enough entrenched so that a return to Western strategic dominance was increasingly unlikely and hence the West had accepted détente. As he put things:

> *International détente has become possible because a new relation of forces has been established in the world arena. Now the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer entertain serious intentions of resolving the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, by force of arms. . . .*[11]

Less than two years later, the General Secretary deemed that the increase in all levels of Soviet forces had reached a point where it was no longer effective politics (or policy) to trumpet this new balance of power, for it was creating a backlash in the West, where Soviet statements about "superiority" or "victory" were cited in support of Western rearmament.[12] In January 1977, he

---

[8] Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, 1962, pp. 263 ff.

[9] Rigler, loc. cit., pp. 1004–05.

[10] Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978, p. 137.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* (New York, NY), July 1977, p. 21.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor G. Kulikov, center, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Treaty forces, pictured at joint maneuvers in East Germany in 1980.

—Christian Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

began to insist that the USSR did not seek strategic superiority and to rebut the allegation that the USSR was intent on a first strike, which he dismissed as "absurd and utterly unfounded."[13] These denials, of course, were intended to counter American apprehensions that the new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) would eventually achieve a capability of neutralizing the US Minuteman ICBM force. By the end of 1977, Brezhnev had gone even further and was insisting that the USSR "*will not* seek military superiority over the other side. We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength existing at present . . . between the USSR and the United States."[14]

This new line was echoed rather consistently until, in 1981, Brezhnev took another step. He denounced aspirations for victory in nuclear war as "dangerous madness."[15]

It may be significant that one of the more vigorous assaults on nuclear confrontation was carried out by Chernenko in April 1981 at the Lenin birthday celebration. He introduced the Malenkov heresy—that nuclear war posed a threat to "all civilization." Later in the same speech, he said that nuclear weapons placed the "future of mankind in doubt."[16] Chernenko has a unique record in this area. On several occasions, he has seemed to be well ahead of others in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war: for example, when he stated in November 1976 that "mankind might be totally destroyed."[17] Since he was promoted during this very period, we have to assume his attack was endorsed, if not encouraged, by Brezhnev. Indeed, as noted, Brezhnev finally entered the arena with more graphic language—"madness"—and a Central Committee pamphlet repeated the Malenkov deviation.[18]

All of this occurred at a time when the military itself

---

[13] Quoted in Garthoff, loc. cit., pp. 139–40.

[14] Ibid., p. 141. Emphasis added.

[15] Dusko Doder, "Nuclear Flap," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 23, 1981, p. A26.

[16] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Trends in Communist Media* (Washington, DC), May 6, 1981, pp. 6–9.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, *The Soviet Threat to Europe*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981.

Changing of the honor guard (a KGB unit) at the Lenin Mausoleum outside the Kremlin Wall in Moscow.

—J. Vautier/FPG.

was engaging in a spirited and rather amazing defense of itself, primarily through a July 1981 *Kommunist* article by Marshal Ogarkov.[19] In this article, Ogarkov vigorously defended the legitimacy of Soviet military doctrine, duly cited Brezhnev on the doctrine's "defensive" character, and repeated Brezhnev's formulation that the use of nuclear weapons would mean that the "future of all mankind would be at stake." But this obeisance was minor compared to some of Ogarkov's startling claims.

First, the Chief of Staff bemoaned the fact that Soviet youth did not understand that some wars are "good" and some are "bad," and he maintained that they needed to be educated by the party. In this connection, he urged the party to explain to all of the people "in a more profound and better reasoned form the truth about the existing threat of the danger of war. It should not be overdramatized, but it is obligatory to show the seriousness of the contemporary international situation." Such remarks seem to be a rather blatant pitch to protect his budget.

But perhaps more important than this special pleading (which suggested that he still feared that economic stringencies would impinge on defense's share of the country's resources), Ogarkov laid out a claim to even more resources. In modern operations, he argued, the "system of rear and technical support should acquire new content." Particular importance, he wrote, should be attached to the country's rear services, which "must make good in a shorter space of time the loss of high quantities of combat hardware and weapons, without which it is virtually impossible to maintain the armed forces' combat capability at the necessary level." This statement cannot be read except as a demand that the economy supply not only operational equipment but more for stockpiles as well. Indeed, he also reminded his readers that modern weapons change "every 10-12 years." In other words, cuts in defense in later years would also be dangerous.

This military claim is even more significant when we consider that for most of 1979 and 1980, Brezhnev was warning the heavy industry clique that they had to make a greater contribution to consumer goods production, and that defense industries in particular had to help out.[20] Hence, Ogarkov may have been answering Brezhnev.

In any case, the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev. It could not really be otherwise if we consider that defense claims 12-15 percent of the Soviet national economic product.[21]

While there is an idea in the West that the Soviet military buildup is sacrosanct, it of course is not. What matters is how it fits into the internal struggle. Khrushchev called in Zhukov to defeat Georgiy Malenkov and Molotov (who incidentally had reputations as Stalinists but actually favored some soft policies).[22] But Khrushchev then threw out Zhukov and conducted a long attack on the military, even though he also laid the groundwork for much of the strategic buildup carried out by Brezhnev. So nothing is preordained in Soviet politics.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is also in flux. Throughout the past two years, Soviet policy has been trying to come to grips with the shifts in the West: the uproar over Afghanistan and the sanctions against the USSR imposed by the Carter administration, the collapse of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the election of President Ronald

---

[19] N. Ogarkov, "Defending Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80-91.

[20] Speeches to Central Committee plenum, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Oct. 22, 1980, p. R/1, and Nov. 29, 1979, p. R/1.

[21] Abraham S. Becker, *The Burden of Soviet Defense*, Report 2752-AF, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, October 1981.

[22] Conquest, op. cit., pp. 329 ff.

The Kremlin office of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Reagan, followed by plans for major increases in American defense spending.

All of these developments, of course, could be laid at Brezhnev's door. His defense has been interesting. At the Central Committee plenum in June 1980, he took the position that the USSR had to act with restraint and should not let itself be provoked by the West. He became almost nostalgic about the 1970's: "We should continue to spare no effort to preserve détente, *all the good things* that the seventies brought us. . . ."[23] Moreover, the plenum formally registered approval of Brezhnev's performance. According to the plenum resolution, the 1970's had seen an improvement in the international situation, and there was an "obvious decline in the cold war." The CPSU, the plenum document went on, was displaying "a truly Leninist restraint." In essence, thus, the resolution was a holding operation. It called for strengthening defense, on the one hand, and for mobilizing forces to prevent a "sliding down to a new cold war," on the other.[24]

By the time of the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, however, hopes that the cold war was not returning were fading. Before the congress, for example, Ustinov maintained that the threat of war had increased; Ogarkov claimed that the forces of imperialism were striving to wreck the process of relaxation and that therefore there were increased demands on "combat readiness."[25]

Nonetheless, there was still an inclination to try to retrieve the situation. Dinmukhamed Kunayev contended that the USSR had to show firmness and not permit the "torpedoing of détente."[26] Vladimir Shcherbitskiy warned against permitting events to turn the world back to the "worst times of the cold war."[27] Grishin called for "preserving détente."[28] Even Ustinov said that the Soviet Union had enough self-control not to yield to provocations.[29] At the congress, Grigoriy Romanov expressed the same theme: that despite the severe test, the USSR was not being "driven from the course of normalization" of the situation.[30]

But after the congress the tone of comments became more ominous. Although *Pravda* claimed that the struggle for peace was the leitmotif of the congress, it then went on to mention strengthening defense three times.[31] *Izvestiya* held that implementation of the congress plans "depends directly on the country's defense might."[32] In April, Chernenko warned that the "war danger, which somewhat diminished in the middle of the last decade, has increased again."[33]

The situation, however, remains rather confused. At the Central Committee plenum finally called in late 1981 to adopt the five-year plan announced in February, Brezhnev claimed: "In working out the plans we naturally also had to take into account the worsening of the international situation." And in going over the main features of the plan, he noted that "reliable" provision was being made for the needs of defense.[34] In presenting the 1982 budget, moreover, Minister of Finance Vasiliy Garbuzov said that while struggling for peace, "our party and state evaluate soberly the international situation."[35] Thus, Brezhnev seems to have positioned the party to move either toward conciliation, thus justifying "Leninist restraint," or toward confrontation. The ultimate decision may well be made by his successors.

---

[23] *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1980, p. R/1. Emphasis added.

[24] Ibid., pp. R/4–6.

[25] Ustinov, as translated in ibid., Dec. 11, 1980, p. V/1; Ogarkov, in ibid., Jan. 16, 1981, p. V/1.

[26] Report to the 15th Kazakh Communist Party Congress, ibid., Feb. 18, 1981, p. R/3.

[27] Report at the 26th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress on Feb. 10, 1981, ibid., Feb. 25, 1981, p. R/1.

[28] "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. III," translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1981, Supplement, p. 44.

[29] *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 23, 1981, p. V/5.

[30] "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. IV," *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 27, 1981, Supplement, p. 38.

[31] *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 11, 1981, p. P/1.

[32] Ibid., Mar. 12, 1981, p. P/1.

[33] Ibid., Apr. 23, 1981, p. R/1.

[34] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1981; *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1981, p. R/1.

Kto Kogo?

In conclusion, let me reiterate a basic theme. An eminent Sovietologist, Jerry F. Hough, has written:

> *. . . even if Westerners knew who the next general secretary would be, the information would be of little use. There is almost no Politburo figure of the Brezhnev period whose position in the Soviet political spectrum has been agreed upon by Western specialists. . . .*
>
> *The most useful contribution that can be made beforehand to an understanding of the succession is to analyze the problems and the most likely possible variants—both "healthy" and "pathological."*[36]

Such an approach, in my opinion, concedes the field too easily. A diligent effort, which Hough himself has often demonstrated, should yield a great deal more about Soviet power politics.

But it is not simply a question of analyzing changing generations. Rather, it is a question of determining the principal actors and where they stand on major policy issues. While it is true that the previous track record of Kremlinologists is not enviable, the main rules continue to be valid. Soviet politics, at bottom, is a struggle for power. And there is absolutely no basis to believe that it will not continue to be so. What we have to do is to identify the players and their policies.

---

[35] *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1981, pp. R/16–17.

[36] Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 151.

Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census

by Murray Feshbach

Demographic trends in the USSR are of major importance, bearing on all aspects of Soviet society both today and in the future. These developments affect the labor force, the military, the formation of households, and the size of ethnic groups of the Soviet multinational state. They also shape demand for housing, for educational facilities, and for food and proper nutrition, as well as for capital investment to meet these needs.

Recognizing the importance of demographic matters, the Soviet Union has conducted three censuses in the postwar period—in 1959, 1970, and, most recently, January 1979. After the first two, the Soviet government published a wide range of basic demographic data on the characteristics of the population. A total of 16 volumes containing the results of the 1959 census appeared, one each for the USSR and its 15 union republics.[1] Each of these volumes was divided by subject, covering the size, location, age, sex, marital status, education, social class, economic activity, occupation, nationality, native tongue of the populace, plus information on families—a normal pattern of topics for such endeavors (although it is clear that much more was collected than was actually released). Seven volumes were published on the results of the 1970 census. Each volume dealt with a subject area and had data not only for the USSR but also for each of the 15 republics. Volume 1, appearing in 1972, covered the size of the population and its location (urban/rural). Volume 2, on distribution by sex, age, and marital status, and Volume 3, on education, also appeared in 1972, i.e., within three years of the census date. The remaining four volumes—on nationality, on employment, on occupation, and a combined volume on migration and family composition—came out in the following two years.[2]

Judging from this track record, one would have expected a comparable publishing program following the latest Soviet census. So far, however, this has not been the case. Today, three years after the census, not a single volume has been published, nor does the new, combined Publishing House of Finance and Statistics (Izdatel'stvo finansy i statistiki) list a single census volume in its publishing plan for 1982.[3] Rumor variously has it that only two volumes will appear, that no volumes will be published until all the data have been analyzed, or that there may be none at all.

In the absence of such publications, the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) has released some general census results in its *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Herald) and in the general news media.[4] This material relates to nationality, native tongue, education, training,

Mr. Feshbach is Senior Research Scholar, Center for Population Research, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, and Professorial Lecturer, Department of Demography, Georgetown University (Washington, DC). He has published widely on issues of Soviet demography, his most recent work being (with Christopher Davis) Rising Infant Mortality in the USSR in the 1970's, *June 1980.*

---

[1] See USSR Central Statistical Administration (hereafter TsSU), *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda: SSSR (svodnyy tom)* (Results of the 1959 All-Union Census: USSR [Summary Volume]), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962; and the 15 republic volumes, under the same authorship and title (except for designation of the name of the republic), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962–63.

[2] TsSU, *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census—hereafter, *Itogi 1970*), Vols. 1–7, Moscow, Statistika, 1972–74.

[3] Gosudarstvennyy komitet SSSR po delam izdatel'stv, poligrafii i knizhnoy torgovli, *"Finansy i statistika"—annotirovannyy tematicheskiy plan vypuska literatury izdatel'stva na 1982 god* ("Finance and Statistics"—Annotated Plan for Publication of Literature of the Publishing House for 1982), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981.

[4] *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), Nos. 2, 6–12, 1980, and Nos. 1–2, 4–5, and 11–12, 1981; issues of the central press for Apr. 22, 1979; and TsSU, *Naseleniye USSR po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (Population of the USSR—from Data of the 1979 All-Union Census), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980—a brochure drawn exclusively from data previously published in *Vestnik statistiki.*

Computers of the USSR Statistical Administration being prepared in January 1979 to receive data from the All-Union Census.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

marital status, and employment. Singularly absent has been data relating to age structure.

The net result is a very incomplete picture of the census results. However, the underlying demographic realities remain important. Hence, it is worth the effort to examine the highlights of the information released to date, venture some inferential judgments to fill gaps in what has been released, and point to some selected implications of these data for future Soviet population growth, or lack of it.

Demographic Problems

The principal conclusion emerging from a review of the 1979 census results available and from estimates made on the basis of the published data is that important changes are occurring in the structure of the Soviet population today relating to its internal distribution and age structure. These fall into four general, interrelated categories: (1) differential rates of population growth among different national groups; (2) failure of the male population of the USSR—particularly in predominantly Slavic areas—to regain its demographically normal share of total population in the postwar period; (3) uneven geographic distribution of the youngest population cohorts (those aged 0 to 9 years); and (4) an "aging" of the overall population.

These demographic developments have enormous implications for the future size, structure, and distribution of total population and of individual ethnic groups. They must be taken into account not only by Soviet authorities but also by decision-makers of other countries whose future security depends upon an accurate assessment of the nature and strength of Soviet society. While Moscow clearly has considerable information on these trends and Soviet specialists have even used the term "deformation" (*deformatsiya*) to describe one aspect of them,[5] none of the critical census data have yet been published.

Despite such limitations on the available evidence, one can reconstruct some picture of these significant demographic trends. The emphasis here is on presentation of the data rather than a detailed discussion of the underlying issues or policy responses. Nonetheless, some comments will perforce be included.

1. *Differential trends among nationalities.* The 1979 census confirmed an extremely low rate of growth of Slavic nationalities and of the general population in the predominantly Slavic republics, which must be of major concern to the Russians in the Kremlin. From published data, we can determine that the rate of growth of the Great Russian population was only 0.70 percent a year during the 1970–79 intercensal period. This rate was below the figure for the USSR as a whole (0.90 percent per annum), above the rates for the other two Slavic ethnic groups (0.50 for the Belorussians and 0.43 for the Ukrainians), but less than one third the rate of growth of the population of Muslim origin (2.47 percent). Individual Muslim ethnic groups grew at markedly faster rates: the Uzbeks at 3.43 percent and the Tadzhiks at 3.45 percent. All of these rates reflect a slowdown from the rates of growth in the 1959–70 intercensal period. In the earlier period, the growth of the USSR population was 1.34 percent a year; that of the Great Russians, 1.12 percent; that of the Belorussians, 1.23 percent; that of the Ukrainians, 0.82 percent; that of the Muslims as a whole, 3.25 percent; that of the Uzbeks, 3.93 percent; and that of the Tadzhiks, 3.94 percent.[6]

Obviously, rates of growth of the various ethnic groups reflect the net impact of natural increase (the excess of live births over deaths), processes of assimilation, and any migration into or out of the Soviet Union. In explaining differential growth rates in the case of the nationalities in the USSR, the last two factors are of relatively minor quantitative importance, except perhaps for Ukrainians and Belorussians calling themselves Russians for census purposes and the unclear situation regarding the number of Jews in the USSR.

Net emigration from the Soviet Union over the whole postwar period (mostly in the last decade) probably amounts to somewhat less than 400,000, or only a very small 0.15 percent of the 262 million citizens counted in 1979. These included perhaps 250,000 Jews, 80,000–90,000 Germans, 10,000 Armenians, and the rest scattered in lesser quantities among the other nationalities.[7] Emigration clearly is of importance to the several nationalities mentioned, but it has had little impact on Slavic or Muslim population trends.

A woman and her children pictured in Dushanbe, capital of Tadzhikistan.

—Mary Ann Brockman/Photo Researchers.

Likewise, assimilation might be assumed—if it had any impact—to have narrowed the spread between Slavic and Muslim population growth statistics. Simply put, there is little evidence of persons of Slavic origins adopting Muslim nationalities, and whatever success the Great Russians have had in assimilating persons of Muslim origin has served only to moderate the growth of Muslim nationalities.

Thus, we must look elsewhere for our explanations of the differential slowing of growth rates of different ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. The most likely factors are differential trends in fertility and mortality.

Soviet official sources have provided some information on fertility over the years, but it has generally been highly aggregated and reported only by republic. Hence, it has been less than fully enlightening with regard to differences among nationalities of the USSR. Western observers were thus hopeful of gaining new insight into fertility trends from the 1979 Soviet census, which asked every woman how many children she had given birth to (the first such question on fertility in a Soviet census since 1926). This key question undoubtedly was included to permit development of a better picture of the actual fertility patterns of the population than can be obtained from current statistics or from sample surveys. Cross-tabulated by nationality, age, education, urban/rural residence, etc., this information would be extraordinarily important for any analysis of current and future fertility patterns. So far, however, such data have not been published, even in summary form.

---

[5] See D. Valentey and A. Kvasha, "Population Problems and Demographic Policy," in *Pravda* (Moscow), June 19, 1981, p. 2, which dealt with outmigration of young people from the Non–Black Earth Zone.

[6] See Table 1 of my paper for the "Symposium on the USSR and the Muslim World," held at Tel Aviv University, The Russian and East European Research Center, December 29–30, 1980; and Table 1 of Stephen Rapawy's unpublished paper, "Census Data on Nationality Composition and Language Characteristics of the Soviet Population: 1959, 1970, and 1979," Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, US Bureau of the Census, May 1980.

[7] Based on information provided by the US Department of State, the Embassy of Israel, and official statistical publications of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In their absence, is there other evidence from the 1979 census that might provide insight into reasons for differential growth of Soviet nationalities and a slowing of population growth in the USSR as a whole? One set of clues can be found in published data on the distribution of the population by sex and in evidence regarding disturbing trends in male mortality.

2. *A shortage of males.* With the initial publication of partial census results, it was clear that something was affecting the population, particularly males, in a dramatic way. It was reported that, nationwide, males still constituted only 46.7 percent of the total population.[8] This is a very low share, with worldwide norms for developed countries falling in the range of 48 to 49 percent.[9]

To be sure, the male population of the Soviet Union experienced severe losses in World War II. At the time of the 1959 census, males still accounted for only 45.0 percent of the population. By 1970, the share had risen to 46.1 percent.

But, while the trend could have been expected to continue apace in the 1970–79 intercensal period with the birth of new cohorts (distributed normally according to sex) and the passing of older cohorts (distorted in sex distribution because of heavier wartime losses among males), it actually decelerated. The revised official figure for 1979 is 46.6 percent.[10] In arithmetic terms, this means that in 1970–79, the "recovery" rate of males slowed to slightly more than 50 percent the rate for 1959–70, after one adjusts for the different lengths of time between censuses (9 and 11 years respectively).

Further, there are striking differentials between the Slavic and Baltic north, on the one hand, and the Muslim and Transcaucasian south, on the other, with respect to the male share of the local population (see Table 1). While data for all major geographic areas reflect the same trend toward recovery (and the same slowing of this trend in the 1970–79 period), the "Slavic" republics (the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia) continue to lag far below normal percentages, thereby depressing the national figure. By contrast, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia appear to be close to normal distributions of males in the population.

The low levels for the Slavic republics in 1959 doubtless reflected the sharply disproportionate burden of wartime losses suffered in these areas. In addition, there was significant postwar migration of Russian males to other republics. But perpetuation of this deformation of normal distribution must have other explanations.

One very likely contributing factor may be an increased mortality rate among males, especially those in the prime working and military ages of 20–44, but also among those who had survived the war but in weak physical condition. (It might be noted that a rise in infant mortality observable in the Soviet Union in recent

Table 1. Males as Percent of Total USSR Population, by Republic, 1959, 1970, and 1979

	1959	1970	1979
"Slavic" republics:			
RSFSR	44.6	45.6	46
Ukraine	44.4	45.2	45.8
Belorussia	44.5	46.0	46.5
Moldavia	46.2	46.6	47.1
Baltic republics:			
Estonia	43.9	45.7	46.2
Latvia	43.9	45.7	46.1
Lithuania	45.9	46.9	47.2
Transcaucasus:			
Armenia	47.8	48.8	48.7
Azerbaydzhan	47.5	48.5	48.8
Georgia	46.1	47.0	47.1
Kazakhstan	47.5	48.1	48.3
Central Asia:			
Kirgiziya	47.2	47.8	48.0
Tadzhikistan	48.7	49.2	49.4
Turkmenistan	48.2	49.2	49
Uzbekistan	48.0	48.7	49.1
USSR	45.0	46.1	46.6

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: Data are from national and regional censuses. The figure for Turkmenistan in 1979 was provided to only 2 significant places. The figure for the RSFSR in 1979 is only approximate, because no republic-specific figure has yet been published; the approximation was made only to 2 significant places.

---

[8] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 22, 1979.

[9] Worldwide, more males than females are born—in a ratio of about 104 males to every 100 females. However, the survival rate of males is lower; therefore, there are, on average, 95 males for every 100 females.

[10] TsSU, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1979), Moscow, Statistika, 1980, p. 8.

years[11] may also be having an input to male mortality, inasmuch as male infants tend to be weaker than female infants and hence more likely to die in infancy. While data regarding this phenomenon are for the USSR as a whole, the achievement of normal shares of the population by males in the Muslim areas suggests that the impact is unusually great in Slavic areas. What evidence of this trend can one cite?

First, it should be noted that the life expectancy at birth of Soviet males as a group has been declining. It was officially reported to have decreased sharply from 66 years on the average for 1965–66 to 64 years on the average for 1971–72.[12] Working from information that the crude death rate has been increasing beyond what might be expected from changes in the age structure of the population—in 1980 it was at 10.3 per 1,000 compared to 8.2 in 1970—and from death rates by age groups reported separately for males and females for 1973–74 and in combined form for 1975–76,[13] one can estimate the current life expectancy of males at age 0 to be as low as 62–63 years.

(It might be noted in passing that as of 1971–72 [the latest Soviet data available], the life expectancy of the average male in the Soviet Union at age 0 was 10 years shorter than that for the average female at age 0. Such a gap exceeded that for all other countries in the world except Gabon, according to United Nations' figures.[14] Updating of this statistic must await publication of the relevant information generated by the 1979 census.)

Between 1963–64 and 1973–74, the death rates of males of ages 20–44 increased from levels which were 2–2.5 times as high as those for females of the corresponding age groups to levels 3–3.5 times as high.[15] What is to explain this situation? Doubtless, a major factor is the continued increase in alcoholism—estimated to have grown at the rate of 4.4 percent a year between 1955 and 1979. While increasing numbers of young people and women in the Soviet Union are falling victim to this disease, the problem remains greatest among adult males.[16] In this regard, there was a virtual doubling of coronary disease death rates for the USSR in the period 1960–78, partly attributable to an increase in ischemic heart disease, which has been linked to alcohol consumption.[17]



Stopping for a drink of wine at a shop along Moscow's Gorkiy Street.

—EUPRA.

More evidence on excessive male mortality was provided by a round table on family problems run by *Nedelya*—the Sunday supplement of *Izvestiya*—early in 1981. At the meeting, A. Volkov, the head of the Depart-

---

[11] On the rise in infant mortality, see Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach, *Rising Infant Mortality in the USSR in the 1970's*, Series P–95, No. 74, Washington, DC, Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, June 1980.

[12] TsSU SSSR, *Naseleniye SSSR—chislennost', sostav, i dvizheniye naseleniya—1973, statisticheskiy sbornik* (Population of the USSR—Number, Composition, and Migration of the Population—1973, Statistical Compendium), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 139.

[13] *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 12, December 1975, p. 84; and ibid., No. 12, December 1977, p. 76.

[14] United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1978*, 3rd ed., New York, NY, 1979, Table 22, pp. 396–417.

[15] TsSU, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1964), Moscow, Statistika, 1965, pp. 36–37; and *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 12, December 1975, p. 84.

[16] See Vladimir G. Treml, *Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1982 (forthcoming). Dr. Treml also has uncovered evidence of incredible rates of poisoning from defective alcohol and other causes in the USSR. In 1976, for example, 40,000 persons—largely males of working age—died from acute alcohol poisoning. This number is 100 times that for the United States (400), or more than 88 times the US rate per 100,000 population (15.9 vs. 0.18). See his "Death from Alcohol Poisoning in the USSR," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Nov. 10, 1981. Treml cites evidence of inadequate medical treatment in this area.

[17] Coronary heart disease death rates per 100,000 population for the USSR were 247.3 in 1960 and 500.0 in 1978. See John Dutton Jr., "Changes in Soviet Mortality Patterns, 1959–77," *Population and Development Review* (New York, NY), Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1979. On the linkage between alcohol abuse and ischemic heart disease, see John R. DeLuca, Ed., *Fourth Special Report to the US Congress on Alcohol and Health, US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Association, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, January 1981.

It might be noted that over the same period (1960–78), deaths rates from coronary disease in the United States declined from 515.1 per 100,000 to 442.7. See US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, *Mortality Trends for Leading Causes of Death, U.S., 1950–69*, DHEW No. (HRD) 74–1853, Series 20, No. 16, Washington, DC, pp. 60–61; *Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Final Mortality Statistics, 1978*, DHHS Publication, No. (PHS) 80–1120, Vol. 29, No. 6, Sept. 17, 1980.

Table 2. USSR Population Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1979

	Total population, in thousands	Population with higher education, in thousands	Number per thousand aged 10 or older with higher education	Implicit population aged 10 or older, in thousands	Derived population aged 0 to 9, in thousands	Those aged 0 to 9 as a percent of total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
"Slavic" republics:						
RSFSR	137,410	8,312	71	117,070	20,340	14.80
Ukraine	49,609	2,766	65	42,554	7,055	14.22
Belorussia	9,533	512	63	8,127	1,406	14.75
Moldavia	3,950	169	52	3,250	700	17.72
Baltic republics:						
Estonia	1,464	93	74	1,257	207	14.14
Latvia	2,503	160	74	2,162	341	13.62
Lithuania	3,391	174	61	2,852	539	15.90
Transcaucasus:						
Armenia	3,037	219	91	2,407	630	20.74
Azerbaydzhan	6,027	301	65	4,631	1,396	23.16
Georgia	4,993	425	103	4,126	867	17.36
Kazakhstan	14,684	679	60	11,317	3,367	22.93
Central Asia:						
Kirgiziya	3,523	150	57	2,632	891	25.29
Tadzhikistan	3,806	130	49	2,653	1,153	30.29
Turkmenistan	2,765	104	53	1,962	803	29.04
Uzbekistan	15,389	632	58	10,897	4,492	29.19
USSR	262,085	14,826	68	218,029	44,056	16.81

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Data in columns 1–3 are reported in *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), June 1980, pp. 41, 43–46, and in ibid., January 1981, p. 63. Column 4 equals Column 2 times 1,000 divided by Column 3. Column 5 equals Column 1 minus Column 4. Column 6 equals Column 5 divided by Column 1.

ment of Demography of the Central Statistical Administration's own Research Institute, revealed that premature deaths of males exceeded divorces as a reason why women became heads of households. Ages were not given, but presumably Volkov must have been referring to males in the age range of 30 to 50 years when he reported that there were 8 million such early male deaths between the 1970 and 1979 censuses.[18] No wonder the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is paying so much attention to family and health problems.[19]

3. *Distribution of population aged 0 to 9.* Turning from deaths to live births—perhaps the most significant indicator of future population trends—we find indirect evidence of sharp regional imbalances in the share of children aged 0 to 9 years. The need to resort to indirect calculations stems from a remarkable Soviet silence regarding such census data.

There is no question that the data exist. Indeed, the 1979 census was more comprehensive in its questioning on the matter of age than were its two predecessors. In addition to asking the number of years since birth, the 1979 questionnaire also asked for the year of birth and for whether the birth occurred before or after January 17 of the given year.[20] Clearly, census officials understood the need for improved age data.

Moreover, the USSR Council of Ministers' guidelines for the conduct of the 1979 census specifically included age data among the information to be processed and published.[21] During 1979, the deputy chief of the Central Statistical Administration of the Armenian SSR confirmed that

> *Data concerning the composition of the population according to sex, age, nationality, language, level of*

---

[18] Cited in Yelena Mushkina, "Family Service and Demography, Report from a Meeting of *Nedelya's* Public Council," *Nedelya* (Moscow), Jan. 12–18, 1981, pp. 2–3, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Jan. 12–18, 1981, p. 8.

[19] See Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the November 1981 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, *Izvestiya*, Nov. 17, 1981, and "The Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981–85 and for the Period Through 1990," adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress and published in *Pravda*, Mar. 5, 1981.

[20] Author's copy of the 1979 Soviet census schedule form.

[21] *Sobraniye postanovleniy SSSR* (Moscow), No. 4, 1978, Article 25, pp. 76–82.

education, family situation, and distribution by sector and social group will soon be obtained and published.[22]

There has been no indication of any hardware or software problems in the processing of census data. Therefore, it may be deduced that publication of age data has been held up for reasons of policy.

It is possible, however, to penetrate the Soviet silence on the matter of age distribution by examining census materials published on educational attainment. The two sets of data needed to piece together the regional age distributions for the population 10 years of age and older and for the population 0 to 9 years old were provided in the June 1980 and January 1981 issues of *Vestnik statistiki*. The first contained data on educational attainment by level of education in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the employed population 10 years of age and older, for the USSR and by republic. The second provided census data on the employed population for the USSR and by republic in absolute terms.[23] Working from these data, we can derive estimates for the distribution of cohorts aged 0 to 9 as of 1979. The derivation and results are given in Table 2, on the opposite page. (A similar procedure was applied to 1970 data in the case of the USSR and the RSFSR. For both, the derived estimates came within 1 percent of the corresponding reported absolute figures.)

As can be seen in Table 2, the proportion of the population aged 0 to 9 years varied sharply from republic to republic in 1979. These age cohorts accounted for only 14–16 percent of the population in each of the Slavic and Baltic republics, while comprising 29–30 percent of the population in Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

What is of even greater significance is the trends in these data over time. In Table 3, I have compared the 1979 proportions with the corresponding information from 1959 and 1970. This comparison highlights a sharp decline in the proportion of young persons in the European republics and the persistence of high proportions of young people in the Muslim republics, a sign of continued high fertility in the latter. Of the four Central Asian republics, only Kirgiziya saw its share of children aged 0 to 9 drop more than roughly one percentage point from 1959 to 1979, an anomalous trend that probably reflects the large presence in that republic (particularly in the capital city, Frunze) of non-Muslims having lower fertility.[24]

Another way of describing the trend is to compare absolute figures. As can be seen in Table 4, on page 34, the youngest age groups experienced sharp declines in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia in the period 1959–79, in contrast with sharp increases in their ranks in the predominantly Muslim republics of Azerbaydzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1959, the combined total population aged 0 to 9 in these six republics equaled 30 percent of the figure for persons of the same age in the RSFSR; in 1970, 52 percent; and in 1979, 59 percent.

Based on estimates and projections made in 1977 by Godfrey Baldwin of the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the US Bureau of the Census,[25] one can estimate that by the year 2000, the youngest cohorts of the six Muslim republics will total some 85 percent of the total for cohorts of the same 0 to 9 years of age in the RSFSR. These youngsters in turn will be the progenitors of the USSR's population in the next century, of the future labor force and of military manpower in the USSR.

Table 3. Trends in Share of USSR Population Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1959, 1970, and 1979

(In percent)

	1959	1970	1979
"Slavic" republics:			
RSFSR	21.92	16.36	14.80
Ukraine	18.85	15.98	14.22
Belorussia	21.95	18.37	14.75
Moldavia	25.78	20.56	17.72
Baltic republics:			
Estonia	15.81	14.61	14.14
Latvia	15.09	14.75	13.62
Lithuania	18.68	18.02	15.90
Transcaucasus:			
Armenia	29.02	25.76	20.74
Azerbaydzhan	29.36	30.39	23.16
Georgia	21.48	20.18	17.36
Kazakhstan	27.81	25.25	22.93
Central Asia:			
Kirgiziya	29.48	28.78	25.29
Tadzhikistan	30.75	33.51	30.29
Turkmenistan	30.36	31.89	29.04
Uzbekistan	30.19	31.77	29.19
USSR	22.20	18.61	16.81

SOURCES: For 1959 and 1970, TsSU SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 2, Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 12–73. For 1979, Table 2 above.

---

[22] V. Zulayan, in *Kommunist* (Yerevan), Aug. 9, 1979. Emphasis added.

[23] That the latter excludes employment in the private subsidiary agricultural sector is not germane, because the calculation is performed with the data given and not the total employment figure.

[24] *Itogi 1970*, Vol. 4, 1973, p. 290.

[25] Godfrey S. Baldwin, *Population Projections by Age and Sex: For the Republics and Major Economic Regions of the USSR, 1970 to 2000*, Series P-91, No. 26, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, September 1979.

Table 4. Population Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1959–79

	1959 (thousands)	1970 (thousands)	1979 (thousands)	Change, 1959–79 (percent)
"Slavic" republics:				
RSFSR	25,768	21,286	20,340	–21.06
Ukraine	7,890	7,533	7,055	–10.58
Belorussia	1,768	1,654	1,406	–20.48
Moldavia	744	734	700	–5.91
Baltic republics:				
Estonia	189	198	207	9.52
Latvia	316	337	341	7.91
Lithuania	507	564	539	6.31
Transcaucasus:				
Armenia	512	642	630	23.05
Azerbaydzhan	1,086	1,555	1,396	28.55
Georgia	869	946	867	–2.30
Kazakhstan	2,585	3,285	3,367	30.25
Central Asia:				
Kirgiziya	609	844	891	46.31
Tadzhikistan	609	972	1,153	89.33
Turkmenistan	460	688	803	74.57
Uzbekistan	2,451	3,748	4,492	83.27
USSR	46,362	44,986	44,056	–4.97

SOURCES: For 1959 and 1970, TsSU SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 2, Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 12–73. For 1979, Table 2 above.

4. The problem of aging. Yet another way of understanding the demographic problems facing the USSR is to examine what appears to be a dramatic general, if regionally differentiated, aging of the population due to different trends in fertility and—to a lesser extent—in mortality. Again, we would like more details on the actual age structure by republic and by nationality, but until (or unless) such becomes available, we will have to make do.

Nationwide, the share of the population in the officially defined pension ages (males 60 and over and females 55 and over) grew from 10.4 percent in 1950 to roughly 15 percent in 1970, and it is projected by Western observers to reach 19.1 percent in 2000. By 1970, the figure for the RSFSR was 15 percent, and it is expected to increase to 22 percent in the year 2000. For the four Central Asian republics, where the birthrate remains high, the share of this population group is expected to *drop*, from 10 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in the year 2000.[26]

The aging of the Soviet population can also be seen in data and projections with regard to the average age of a Soviet citizen. From 28.7 years in 1975, it is likely to reach 33.1 years by 2000. For the RSFSR, the comparable figures are 31.1 and 37.1 for the years 1975 and 2000; and for Uzbekistan, 17.8 and 20.7.[27]

The problem of aging of the population has a particular salience in the countryside. This "deformation"—and the term itself is employed by Soviet demographers—has been particularly disturbing in the 29 oblasts and autonomous republics (ASSR) of the RSFSR that comprise the Non-Black Earth Zone, on whose development Moscow places such hopes for increasing the food supply of the Soviet Union.[28] Having succeeded in past policies designed to increase the urban labor force, Soviet authorities are now hard put to reverse signals and entice young persons, especially those trained to handle machinery, back to the countryside.

Continued Soviet concern about the "deformation" of the rural age structure indicates that adverse trends noted earlier persist. For example, between 1959 and 1970, the number of persons aged 20–24 in the rural population of the RSFSR dropped by almost 50 percent; those 25–29, by more than 50 percent; and those 30–34, by roughly 20 percent. (By contrast, for the same period, the reduction among those aged 20–24 and 25–29 in the rural population of Uzbekistan was only about 20 percent, and the number of those aged 30–34 actually increased by 14 percent.[29]) Unless the census officials publish age data for the rural population by republic and oblast, we must settle for something less than precise knowledge about this important demographic problem area.

The drop in the number of young adults in the countryside, of course, also adversely affects the fertility of the rural population. This may help account for the remarkable fact that the crude birthrates in rural areas of Belorussia have for many years been lower than those in urban localities in that republic.[30]

In the Ukraine, declines in numbers of young adults in the countryside may be contributing to the deceleration

---

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] See fn 5. The Non–Black Earth Zone comprises 24 oblasts and 5 autonomous soviet socialist republics, all in the Russian republic. These include the total area of the Northwest, Central, and Volga-Vyatka economic regions, plus Kaliningradskaya, Sverdlovskaya, and Permskaya oblasts and the Udmurtskaya ASSR. In the Northwest region are Arkhangel'skaya, Leningradskaya, Murmanskaya, Novgorodskaya, Pskovskaya, and Vologodskaya oblasts, plus the Karel'skaya and Komi ASSR's; in the Central region, Bryanskaya, Ivanovskaya, Kalininskaya, Kaluzhskaya, Kostromskaya, Moskovskaya, Orlovskaya, Ryazanskaya, Smolenskaya, Tul'skaya, Vladimirskaya, and Yaroslavskaya oblasts; in the Volga-Vyatka region, Gor'kovskaya, Kirovskaya, and Mordovskaya oblasts, plus the Chuvashskaya and Mariyskaya ASSR's.

[29] *Itogi 1970*, Vol. 2, 1972, pp. 19–75.

[30] TsSU Belorusskoy SSR, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Belorusskoy SSSR, statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (National Economy of the Belorussian SSR, Statistical Yearbook), Minsk, Belorus', 1980, p. 15.



The reading hall of a boarding house for pensioners in Moscow, pictured in June 1981.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

in overall growth of population of Ukrainian nationality. While we still lack data on migration and on the age structure of the population of the Ukrainian SSR, there is a strong possibility that the slowing growth of Ukrainians results not only from cultural assimilation with the Russians but from the flight from rural localities of population in the child-bearing ages and their settlement in urban areas where fertility rates tend to decrease.

Implications for the Future

What are the long-term implications of the demographic trends in the USSR discussed above? In terms of ethnic distribution, the Great Russians may be expected to continue their decline as a share of the Soviet population. In 1959, they were 54.6 percent of the total; in 1970, 53.4 percent; and in 1979, 52.4 percent. By the year 2000, the figure may be 46–48 percent. Overall, the Soviet Union might even face a stagnation in growth or even a downturn in total population, with important implications for manpower and the economy.

In order to understand the importance of the last matters, it may be useful to project Soviet total population out to the year 2000 and on to 2050 based on five different constant hypothetical fertility rates: 1.0, 1.8, 2.0, 2.2, and 3.0 children per woman. Such a set of projections is presented in Table 5, on page 36. I have employed a model developed at the Center for Population Research at Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics for projecting the population in less-developed countries.[31] The projections assume that mortality levels by age group will remain constant throughout the period, at the level reported in 1975–76.[32] To be sure, the projections may well prove low if the health of the Soviet population increases dramatically. But, if not? In light of recent mortality trends, the health situation may worsen before it improves. Therefore, the assumption of constant mortality rates over the 70-year period of the projections seems reasonable. Even a modest improvement of life expectancy would not change the relative dimensions of the projections.

Speculative though the projections in Table 5 may be, they provide a basis for comparing the dramatic impact that different future fertility rates may have on the size of the total population and, implicitly, on its age structure. Depending on whether Soviet women on average bear 1 or 3 children, total population in the USSR may vary by a factor of 2:1 in the year 2000 and by as much as 4.5:1 in the year 2050.

---

[31] I am deeply indebted to Mr. Richard K. Collins of Georgetown University's Center for Population Research for his assistance in this matter.

[32] *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 12, Dec. 1977, p. 76.

Looking first at the year 2000—only 20 years hence—we find that if there were today an instantaneous drop in average fertility to 1 child per woman, population would end up at 267.1 million, or slightly below the current estimate of 267.8 million. This projection is much lower than the latest projection of Soviet population for the year 2000 made by Godfrey Baldwin (300–302 million).[33] The latter projection can be derived from the model used here if we assume that each woman will have 1.8 children, which is very close to the current estimate for fertility in the RSFSR (1.9 children per woman), an estimate based on Soviet statistics.[34] With higher fertility rates, the population would become younger in the year 2000, as on the average more children would be born. With 2 children per woman and all other things being equal, there would be 311.1 million persons in 2000. If the current estimated nationwide fertility rate of 2.2 children per woman[35] remained unchanged, the population would total 317.1 million, and with 3 children per woman for the entire Soviet female population of child-bearing age, there would be 355.1 million. However, any expectation that Slavic and Baltic women will suddenly revert to fertility behavior of the long distant past, comparable to that of Muslim women at the present time, is highly problematic.

As we look out to the year 2050, the possible shifts become even more dramatic. The projected population varies from 139.0 million to 632.2 million, depending on whether fertility is at 1 child or 3 children per woman. Since the population ceases to reproduce itself at levels of fertility below 2.65 and since the current estimated fertility of 2.2 children per woman in the USSR appears to be dropping, one can expect the actual population in 2050 to be toward the lower end of the range, although there may not be quite the halving of the year-2000 level that would occur with a fertility of 1. As the figures in the table indicate, fertility of 1.8 would result in a drop of some 29 million persons between 2000 and 2050.

Table 5. Projection of Total Soviet Population to 2050, Based on Different Fertility Hypotheses

(population in millions as of mid-year)

	Assuming the following constant rates of fertility—i.e., number of children per woman aged 15–49				
	(1.0)	*(1.8)*	*(2.0)*	*(2.2)*	*(3.0)*
Projections:					
for 2000	267.1	302.3	311.1	317.1	355.1
for 2025	217.2	303.5	328.3	346.6	471.0
for 2050	139.0	273.2	319.8	355.5	632.2

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: These projections were based on the reported Soviet population of 241.6 million in 1970 and an estimated 1980 USSR population of 267.8 million based on the 1979 census results and derived using the Center for Population Research model mentioned in the text.

Part of an increasingly precious Soviet resource: infant Slava Anisimov, in the arms of his pediatrician in a leading children's polyclinic in Leningrad.

—TASS via EUFRA

All of these projections assume constancy of certain important variables—fertility and mortality. But experience tells us that matters demographic are not so predictable. As late as 1976, a Soviet source was citing an earlier official projection of 270–280 million for the total population of the USSR in the year 1980 and 340–350 million for the year 2000.[36] The figure for 1980 turned out to be closer to 267 million, and current Western projections for the year 2000 see the Soviet population totaling only 300–302 million. As suggested above, this unanticipated deceleration in population growth apparently resulted from sharp reductions in fertility and male life expectancy, and also from increases in infant mortality.

* * *

Soviet officialdom is clearly aware of the problems discussed above. This was evidenced in the attention paid to the slowing growth of the population in speeches at the 26th CPSU Congress in early 1981.[37] More significant, the concern voiced there was followed up in short order by two pieces of implementing pronatalist legislation, in March and September.[38] That the Russian leadership of the Soviet Union is concerned not only about overall Soviet population trends, but also about disparities among growth rates of different ethnic groups (i.e., Slavs and Muslims) was clear in the regionally differentiated timetables for applying new, partially paid leave to women staying at home to care for newborn children in the regulations announced in September 1981.[39]

---

[33] Unpublished estimates and projections prepared by Baldwin in the spring of 1980.

[34] See information in *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 11, November 1980, p. 76.

[35] Based on information in ibid.

[36] Ye. V. Ovechnikov and M. S. Fishel'son, *Gorodskoy transport* (Urban Transportation), Moscow, Vysshaya shkola, 1976, p. 4.

[37] See fn. 19.

Only time will tell whether these or other policies will have any success in reversing or modifying what Moscow sees as adverse trends in population growth and distribution. However, in an important sense such policies are already too late: that is, any changes in fertility today are changes for the 21st century. Children born next year comprise the manpower pool from which the Soviet military force will be drafted in the year 2000 and from which the Soviet labor force of the first decades of the next century will be drawn.

Thus, Soviet decision-makers today must be deeply engrossed in determining what to do about a clearly indicated burgeoning of Muslim population and a decline in Slavic population over the next 20 years. The difficulties this trend presents and the uncertainties over how to respond to it may go far toward explaining the failure of Soviet officials to release sensitive census data on fertility and age structure that would give greater publicity to these intractable problems.

---

[38] "On Measures for Strengthening State Aid to Families with Children," *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1981; and "In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Council of Ministers, and AUCCTU," ibid., Sept. 6, 1981.

[39] The liberalized leave allowances were to go into effect in November 1981 in portions of the RSFSR (Siberia, the Far East, and certain other northern provinces) and would become effective in Soviet Central Asia only in 1983. See *Pravda*, Sept. 6, 1981.

The USSR and Pakistan

by William E. Griffith

> *Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these words breathe only a sense of utter remoteness, a memory of strange vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of the world.*
>
> **—George Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India[1]**

One day last August, I visited a large, well-kept Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan about 15 miles from the border of Afghanistan, on the road from Quetta to Qandahar.[2] That evening I was to dine with a Baluch acquaintance whom I had first seen some seven years before, on the day in Quetta that three Baluch students had unsuccessfully tried to blow up the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. At that earlier juncture, a Baluch tribal rebellion was winding down, no match for the Pakistan army and some Iranian helicopters that the Shahanshah of Iran had sent to aid it. The Soviet Union had been thrown out of Egypt and was beginning to lose ground in Iraq; the alarm in the West about the Persian Gulf was mostly about its rulers pushing up petroleum prices, rather than about the Soviet Union threatening to take it over.

Driving back toward Quetta that hot August afternoon, past hilly, desert land and herds of camels, I thought how much had changed in so short a time. The Shah was gone, replaced by a fanatical Shi'i theocracy which hated Moscow and Washington with equal fury. Nearer where I was that afternoon, the Soviet army was on the southern borders of Afghanistan. The Red Air Force was therefore only 500 miles from the Strait of Hormuz and could now give fighter cover to Soviet bombers over it. And in Baluchistan . . . ?

That evening, talking with my Baluch acquaintance while eating, from the linoleum floor, an elaborate and very spicy Baluch dinner, I asked him what he thought the prospects were for an independent Baluchistan. Very few, he replied, unless there was outside aid, which he did not seem soon to expect. (He had himself, several years ago when I saw him last, thought the prospects for it much more favorable.)

Indeed, my impressions in Quetta in 1981, as in 1980, were of considerably greater stability than existed in 1974, when I was first there. While there is no political participation, economic development has increased, and the Governor General, Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, has followed a moderate policy. Moreover, the memory of the ruthless suppression of the rising in the early 1970's is still fresh. Nothing fails, after all, like failure. All in all, therefore, while Baluchi insurgency may revive, the memory of failure will probably restrain it for some time more, unless the Soviets aid it massively—which seems doubtful.[3]

Mr. Griffith is Ford Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA), and Adjunct Professor of Diplomatic History, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (Medford, MA). He has written numerous studies of Soviet foreign policy and Soviet international relations; his latest book is The Superpowers and Regional Tensions: The USSR, the US and Europe, *1981.*

---

[1] Quoted in Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Afghanistan: The Imperial Dream," *The New York Review of Books*, (New York, NY), Feb. 21, 1980.

[2] This essay is based primarily on travels in Pakistan and the Middle East in the summers of 1980 and 1981, for which I am grateful to *The Reader's Digest*, of which I am a roving editor, and to its editor-in-chief, Edward T. Thompson, who sponsored my travels. I have also profited from conversations in the Soviet Union in April, June, and December 1981; from discussion with Steven Rittenberg and Irwin Selnick of Columbia University in November 1981 on South Asian and Central Asian matters; from many talks with my friend Zalmay Khalilzad of Columbia University; and from conversations with my MIT colleague, Myron Weiner.

[3] My estimate here differs from that in Selig Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, Washington, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981. That said, however, the book is a mine of information on Baluch separatism, and especially on the neglected area of Iranian Baluchistan.

Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq addresses an extraordinary session of foreign ministers of the Islamic Conference that opened in Islamabad on January 27, 1980, to discuss the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Seated is M. Habib Chatti, Secretary General of the Islamic Congress, who presided over the opening session.

—Chip Hires/Gamma-Liaison.

The Strategic Setting

Aficionados of Rudyard Kipling will remember that Russia's drive toward the Indian subcontinent did not begin with Lenin. What Kipling indelibly christened the "great game," the struggle between Russia and Great Britain for dominance in Central and Southern Asia, was long a major motor of the collision between Russia's southward and Great Britain's eastward expansion. As so often elsewhere, the legacy of this struggle was that the borders of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (at the time, part of Great Britain's Indian Empire), were drawn in border wars and the diplomatic maneuverings of *Realpolitik*. For our purposes here, only two points need to be made. First, because Russia and Great Britain found Afghanistan so difficult to conquer, because each was determined that the other would not absorb it, and because in the early part of this century they were pushed together by their common fear of the rising threat of Imperial Germany, the two powers in 1907 decided that Afghanistan should be neutralized, with Great Britain predominant in foreign policy. Second, the boundaries of Afghanistan and the Indian Empire, in part by Russian and British design, split ethnic groups: Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan and Russia, and Pathans and Baluch in Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan. This situation gave ammunition for future irredentist struggles.

As Winston Churchill foresaw with impassioned, imperial clarity, Britain's 1947 retreat from India meant the end of her control of the Indian Army, and therefore of her empire. Thus, the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf became vacuums at a time when Soviet military power was beginning to grow. In the 1960's and early 1970's, moreover, the United States was first absorbed in the Vietnam war and then largely immobilized in foreign policy by the war's aftermath.

Before that, however, the patterns of post-1947 Soviet and American alliances and alignments in the area had been set. Moscow chose India, and Washington chose Pakistan—or, more accurately, India chose Moscow, and Pakistan chose Washington. Since then, each superpower has tried, intermittently and always unsuccessfully, to reach its maximum goal: to influence both states at the same time. But the inveterate hostility between India and Pakistan has made this impossible.

The other major regional tendency has been for India to become more powerful and Pakistan less so. To Pakistan, and to Muslims in general, it has seemed both unexpected and unnatural that the despised Hindus should accomplish this—that Islam should prove an insufficient bond between West and East Pakistan; that India should stage a nuclear explosion and begin an impressive space program; that India's industrial growth and technological progress should be higher than Pakistan's; that Pakistan should lose every war with India. Is it any wonder that Pakistan has always lived under the fear of another defeat by India? Or that India has consistently resented, especially since its defeat of Pakistan in 1971, the refusal, as New Delhi has seen it, of the United States, in contrast to the eagerness of the Soviet Union, to accept Indian predominance in the subcontinent?

More recently, two other developments have altered the attitude of the superpowers toward the subcontinent. One has been the changing perspectives of Moscow and Washington in regard to China; the other has been their increasing involvement in the Middle East, with respect to which Pakistan has become important but India has not.

The hostility of both Moscow and Washington to Beijing from 1959 until 1971 was bound to give way, in light

BREZHNEV QUIT AFGHANISTAN
BREZHNEV HANDS OFF AFGHANISTAN
SELF DETERMINATION

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's visit to India in December 1980: at the left, Brezhnev is greeted at the airport by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi; at the right, New Delhi's Afghan population expresses its views on Soviet policy in Afghanistan.

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

of Soviet-American tension and the Sino-Soviet split, to a Sino-American entente to contain rising Soviet power. This has now become a triple entente, with Japan the third, reluctant, junior partner—a genuinely major development in international affairs. In the subcontinent, its net result has been, as we can now see, to drive India closer to the Soviet Union, and Pakistan, to the United States.

Yet one must at once make two main caveats. First, India never has been, and in all likelihood never will be, a "satellite" of the Soviet Union; rather, it is a partial ally. Second, Pakistan is a partial, recent, reluctant, and suspicious ally of the United States. Islamabad feels that until the Reagan administration, Washington had proved itself unwilling to be a faithful ally of Pakistan and, worse, had often—in providing aid to India in 1962, denying aid to Pakistan in 1971, and opposing Pakistan's nuclear plans—worked contrary to Pakistan's interests.

Soviet Policy in South Asia

It will be noted that I approach developments in the subcontinent since 1947 primarily from the Indian and Pakistani viewpoints, rather than treating the two South Asian states as pawns successfully manipulated by one or the other of the superpowers. It follows that I also view Soviet policy toward the region—in fact throughout the Third World—as essentially reactive, not initiatory of developments.[4] To put it another way, the Soviet Union recognizes and exploits opportunities for expanding its influence in the Third World, but it seldom creates them. It does not operate according to some master timetable for world conquest. Certainly, its objectives and methods are influenced by the combination of Russian history and Marxist-Leninist ideology which make up the Soviet foreign policy tradition. Certainly, the Soviet Union moves with "all deliberate speed" to accomplish its aims. Yet students of Soviet history know that, with the exception of such aberrations as the Cuban missile crisis—staged, after all, by the "hairbrained schemer" Nikita Khrushchev—the Soviet leadership normally has been cautious and not inclined to adventurous risk-taking.

Indeed, Marxism-Leninism, because it makes its high priests believe in the ultimate victory of socialism throughout the world, requires them only to help speed it up. Khrushchev hoped at first to accomplish this end by his economic and arms support of such Third World leaders as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Kwame Nkrumah. But the overthrow of many of them in the 1960's by military juntas led Soviet theorists and, presumably, the Soviet Politburo to move again to a preference for revolutionary regimes directed by "vanguard," self-proclaimed "scientific socialist" (although not yet in Soviet terminology "Marxist-Leninist") parties. Thus, the Soviet favorites today are South Yemen, Afghanistan, Angola, and, provisionally, Ethiopia (where Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam seems to be resisting Soviet pressure to set up a ruling "vanguard" party.[5]) Moreover, the Soviet military buildup has also rendered it easier for Moscow to help put and keep in power such revolutionary regimes, rather than *nolens volens* to accept less reliable substitutes.

---

[4] See Robert H. Donaldson, Ed., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: Successes and Failures*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981.

In any event, Soviet hostility to China and the United States, and India's resources, power, secularism, leftist, anti-American tendencies, and key position in the nonaligned movement rendered Moscow's de facto alliance with India natural. This alliance was confirmed by, as it in part encouraged, Pakistan's alliances with the United Sates and China. From time to time, to be sure, the Soviet Union has also tried to improve its relations with Pakistan—notably, by its 1965 Tashkent mediation between India and Pakistan. But it has rarely succeeded, and Islamabad has understandably figured less importantly than New Delhi in Moscow's calculations.[6]

It would be provincially subcontinental, however, to think that Moscow's privileged relationship with New Delhi is comparable, on the global or even the Asian scale, to Pakistan's ties with the Sino-American-Japanese entente. India is certainly stronger than Pakistan, but it is so much weaker than the triple entente that the post-1971 Indian claim to predominance on the subcontinent (initially but, as it turned out, only briefly recognized by the Carter administration), has been overridden by the American naval and air buildup in the Indian Ocean—and, indeed, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This American buildup originated out of Washington's concern to insure the security of oil deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz and, for that purpose, to maintain the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms. More generally, the "extended Middle East" has become increasingly central in American as well as in Soviet policy.

From this viewpoint, Pakistan should be essential to American policy, and hence dangerous to Soviet purposes. Pakistan is Muslim, geographically close to the Gulf, and has a large number of trained military personnel and much surplus labor.

Over the last decade, moreover, Pakistan has become tied much more closely to the Middle East. It now receives about US$2 billion yearly in remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf. Pakistani military personnel, seconded or on contract, play a major role in the armed forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms, and even as far afield as Libya. Indeed, some reports indicate that a substantial Pakistani military force is about to be sent to Saudi Arabia, where it is bound to have an important part in ensuring the stability of the rule of the Saudi royal family. Thus, from the standpoint of the Soviet Union, Pakistan is exercising an increasingly negative influence in Middle Eastern politics, while for the United States, Pakistan, because of its new Middle Eastern role, has become more important, and India less so.[7]

Moscow and Islamabad

By far the most significant event in Soviet-Pakistani relations in the recent past has been the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I have written elsewhere on recent Afghan developments;[8] therefore, I shall treat them here only insofar as they affect Soviet-Pakistani relations.

Ever since the establishment of Pakistan, there has been tension between Islamabad and Kabul over the issue of "Greater Pushtunistan." Briefly, the Pakistani-Afghan border, the so-called Durand line, was drawn by the British in the 19th century according to the time-tested imperial rule of *divide et impera*. It split the Pathans between Afghanistan and what was then the British Indian Empire. (The same was true, to a much lesser extent, with respect to the Baluch.) The Afghan elite, largely Pathan, has long been anxious to "recover" the Pathan part of Pakistan, which includes much of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province—including its capital, Peshawar. Indeed, the US alliance with Pakistan in the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization pushed Afghanistan

---

[5] Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1981.

[6] For Soviet views of Pakistan, see especially the various works by the leading Soviet expert on it, Yu. V. Gankovskiy of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His *The Peoples of Pakistan*, which is available in English (Lahore, People's Publishing House, n.d), includes an extensive bibliography, largely in Russian. For an authoritative and more general Soviet statement, see Ye. M. Primakov (director of the Institute of Oriental Studies), "The USSR and the Developing Countries," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York, NY), Fall/Winter 1980/81. The same issue of this journal contains an important article on Soviet policy toward India by Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in South Asia: A Friend to Rely Upon?," and two articles on Soviet Middle Eastern policy by Karen Dawisha and Robert O. Freedman.

[7] As a consequence of Pakistan's Middle Eastern role, I do not share the subcontinental perspective that Selig Harrison sets forth in "Fanning the Flames in South Asia," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1981/82.

[8] William E. Griffith, "Super-power Relations After Afghanistan," *Survival* (London), July/August 1980. See also Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," ibid. For the current situation, see "Russia in Afghanistan," *The Economist* (London), May 23, 1981; for historical background, see Kazemzadeh, loc. cit. See also the general survey of recent Afghan developments by Wolfgang Berner and Gerd Linde in Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, *Sowjetunion 1980/1981* (Soviet Union 1980/1981), Munich, Hanser, 1981, pp. 280–89.

Civilian and military refugees from Afghanistan at a camp in northwestern Pakistan.

—US government photo.

toward the Soviet Union, and therefore further exacerbated Soviet-Pakistani relations.

When Mohammad Daoud came to power in Kabul in the early 1970's, he also initially followed the "Greater Pushtunistan" policy. But toward the end of his rule, in the year or two before he was overthrown in 1978, he began to try to increase his freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by improving his relations with Pakistan and Iran. With the coming to power in Kabul of Nur Mohammad Taraki and the Khalq, however, Afghan relations with Pakistan rapidly worsened again, and Kabul resumed its "Greater Pushtunistan" propaganda. Moreover, the tribal rebellion which soon broke out in Afghanistan resulted in an increasing flow of Afghan refugees to Pakistan.

After Taraki and the Khalq took over in Kabul, Moscow began to question the Durand line, and this stance produced a deterioration of Soviet-Pakistani relations. But it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that sharply worsened these relations.

The Soviet invasion had several consequences of relevance here. It brought the Soviet army for the first time to the borders of Pakistan. It greatly increased the flow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, where there are now something more than a million. It highlighted the activities of the Afghan rebel leaders in Pakistan. Not only do the leaders of the principal rebel groups live in Pakistan, but many of the rebels themselves, having brought out their women and children to the Pakistan refugee camps, regularly go back and forth across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to fight the Soviet invaders and what is left of the Afghan army. Finally, Western reports indicate that Western and Chinese arms aid to the rebels is being channeled regularly through Pakistan.[9] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union regards the present Pakistani government as one of its principal obstacles to crushing the Afghan rebels.

Why has President Zia's government given sanctuary and assistance to the rebels, and what has this policy implied for its relations with the Soviet Union? To answer these questions, I must first attempt, however briefly, to characterize the present political situation in Pakistan, as I have seen it there in the last two summers.[10]

---

[9] See, for instance, Carl Bernstein, "Arms for Afghanistan," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), July 18, 1981.

[10] For current Pakistani politics, see *The Economist*, Oct. 31 and Dec. 12, 1981, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Apr. 22, 1981. See also the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 16, 1981, including an interesting interview with President Zia ul-Haq. For Islam in Pakistan, see Nasir Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangla Desh," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (Cambridge, England), Vol. 13 (1981), pp. 52–72. This article also contains a useful discussion of Baluch and Pathan nationalism.

Pakistan, the only state in the world whose sole justification for existence is Islam, has always suffered from endemic ethnic strife. The majority Punjabis (allied with the *muhajirs*, those who fled from India to Pakistan after 1947) are too strong to permit either a confederation or a genuine federation, but they are too weak to crush dissent of the Pathan, Sindhi, and Baluch minorities permanently. In addition, Pakistan has alternated between civilian-democratic and military-authoritarian regimes. Its current military regime is headed by General Zia ul-Haq, who was the chief of staff of the Pakistani army when he overthrew Bhutto in July 1977. Pakistan, like Prussia and Jordan, is an army (indeed an overwhelmingly Punjabi-Pathan army) which possesses a state, and is not likely soon to surrender it.

Army rule, and General Zia personally, remain unpopular. Zia's attempts to help revive Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan have been more divisive than unifying, particularly vis-à-vis the substantial Shi'i minority.

But the unpopularity now seems diminished, even though Pakistani history indicates that sooner or later army rule will again for a time give way to civilian rule. The Soviet menace has somewhat united the Pakistani population. There have been two good monsoons and the healthy flow of remittances from the Gulf. Although the opposition Pakistan People's Party, led by Bhutto's wife, once enjoyed a fair amount of popular support because Zia did not stay Bhutto's execution, it has been discredited by the sojourn in Kabul of Bhutto's two sons and their association with the recent hijacking of a Pakistani airplane, during which a Pakistani diplomat was killed. The Baluch (and Pathan) tribes remain quiet, and Soviet preoccupation with Afghanistan probably explains why there is no evidence of Soviet encouragement or support of any Baluch tribal insurgency. Finally, the Reagan administration has completed what the Carter administration began: a major American arms aid program for Pakistan.

Despite the improvement in Zia's own position and his new closeness to Washington, however, Pakistan's external situation remains precarious (and is thought by most Pakistanis to be even more so than it is) because of the increased Soviet threat. The evidence of this threat is plain to be seen. Presumably at Soviet direction, the Afghan air force (indeed, perhaps with Soviet pilots) regularly overflies Pakistani territory. Border incidents, in which Afghan troops encroach on Pakistani territory, are frequent. Soviet propaganda regularly denounces Pakistan's ties with China and the United States, and above all its alleged aid to the Afghan rebels.

Most Pakistanis also fear a Soviet-encouraged Indian attack on them. (Hence, two thirds of the Pakistani army is stationed on the eastern border facing India.) This fear is the primary explanation for Zia's efforts to reach a détente with India. His efforts have not so far been reciprocated by Indira Gandhi, who has been particularly outraged by the US sale of F-16's to Pakistan. However, India's and China's recent attempt to improve relations with each other, to which Moscow is clearly opposed, will probably have a restraining effect on India vis-à-vis Pakistan. But the Pakistanis' historic fears of India, which has defeated Pakistan thrice and dismembered it once, make it unlikely that Pakistani apprehensions of an Indian attack will decrease.

Although Zia and his able Foreign Minister Agha Shahi have constantly tried to improve their relations with Moscow, they have to date been unsuccessful—despite Pakistani indications that Zia might be prepared to move toward relations with Kabul. Indeed, the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay P. Firyubin to Islamabad in August 1981 seems to have had no significant results.[11]



Three Pakistani hijackers of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft finally debark in Damascus, Syria, on the night of March 14–15, 1981, after gaining release of Pakistani political prisoners in return for release of passengers held hostage for almost two weeks.

—Claude Salhani/Gamma-Liaison.

---

[11] On the Firyubin visit, see *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Aug. 29, 1981. I was in Islamabad during the visit.

Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq, left, meets with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Firyubin in Rawalpindi on August 25, 1981.

—Wide World.

Nor is this surprising. In my judgment, Moscow intends to continue its attempt to suppress the Afghan rebellion by military force, even if it takes 10 years or more to do so. From a diplomatic standpoint, Moscow hopes to get as many states as possible, and particularly Pakistan, to move toward recognition of Babrak Karmal's embattled regime in Kabul.

After all, Moscow presumably regards the Afghan rebellion as not only supplied (which it reportedly is) but also inspired (which it is not) by the Soviet Union's two principal enemies, China and the United States. Certainly, Moscow is quite aware that it is threatened with encirclement by the new Sino-American-Japanese entente.[12] It intends to break out of this encirclement in advance. It believes that it will do so in two key areas—Afghanistan and Indochina—and it may well hope to do so in Iran as well. Moscow therefore has every incentive to continue to fight in Afghanistan, to support India, and to seek to intimidate Pakistan.

And in the long, bloody, sputtering struggle, the fate of many a Soviet soldier will remind those with a historical bent of Kipling's advice to other soldiers fighting in Afghanistan long ago:

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
An' the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains,
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.[13]

---

[12] Moscow has now stated this publicly: "The way the nuclear forces of the United States and other nuclear powers in and out of NATO are deployed, they have in effect, enveloped, even encircled, the Soviet Union and its allies." See *The Threat to Europe*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 8.

[13] Rudyard Kipling, "The Young British Soldier."

Books

Mao's Uncertain Legacy

by Krishna Prakash Gupta

DICK WILSON. *The People's Emperor Mao: A Biography of Mao Tse-tung.* New York, NY, Doubleday, 1980.

ROSS TERRILL. *Mao: A Biography.* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1980.

JOHN BRYAN STARR. *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

DICK WILSON, Ed. *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

LI JUI. *The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung,* trans. by Anthony W. Sariti. New York, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977.

RAYMOND F. WYLIE. *The Emergence of Maoism.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980.

STEVE S. K. CHIN. *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung: Form and Content,* trans. by Alfred H. Y. Lin. Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong, 1979.

TOM KERRY. *The Mao Myth and the Legacy of Stalinism in China.* New York, NY, Pathfinder Press, 1977.

THERE IS NOTHING more demeaning to a protagonist than to split his personality into good and bad components. Such an act of ingratitude can result only from a condescending postmortem that misses the whole in looking at parts. The career of a real protagonist is indivisible, and affirmation or denial of his message must come in a totality. Anything less is nearly always embarrassing, not so much for the protagonist as for his uncertain assessors; for they have to build up a case, often through patently self-negating bits of convoluted logic, that his character was discordant.

The current Chinese assessment of Mao Zedong reveals this embarrassment of an ambivalent generation that has no courage to confront the protagonist frontally. To say that "the Chinese people would never do to Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin"[1] is not saying much, because the new official caricature of Mao may turn out to be worse than a straight "de-Maoification."

To be sure, the Beijing media still hail Mao as "a great revolutionary," but this greatness is now reduced to the life cycle of an ordinary mortal who becomes smug and conceited with victory, forgets his Marxism and mass line, and shows unmistakable signs of senility as he plunges China into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The continued attachment to such a man's "thought" and the habit of invoking it now and then as "a spiritual weapon to guide and advance the Chinese revolution" is indeed pathetic, for it is no longer Mao *qua* Mao that is behind such invocations. Rather, it is a wholly artificial contrivance, "Scientific Mao Zedong Thought," formulated by presumably cleansing Mao's utterances of his "mistakes" and attributed not just to Mao alone.

If Mao's thought is not of his own making and represents only the crystallization of a collective revolutionary experience, as the Chinese now claim, what role can one conceivably assign to Mao the individual in China's revolution and reconstruction? The official answers are once again somewhat embarrassing. With a certain monotonous candor, we are now told that without Mao, the Chinese people would perhaps have groped in the dark much longer. There is, of course, no way to estimate the extent to which Mao's path to revolution in China constituted a shortcut. In fact, the fabled Chinese historiographic sensitivities have become so fuzzy today that even the timetable of Mao's achievements has to be circumscribed with shockingly imprecise phraseology—such as "before the 1960's or, rather, before the last few years of the 1950's."[2] This hesitant slicing of Mao's career is done only to suggest, rather impolitely, that "*some* basic principles that Mao put forward in this period, that is before the last few years of the 1950's, are very correct."[3]

---

[1] This assurance was first publicly given by Deng Xiaoping in his interview with Oriana Fallaci on Aug. 21–23, 1980. The full text of the interview appeared in *The Guardian Weekly* (London), Sept. 22 and 28, 1980. Many of the evaluations of Mao that were subsequently publicized in the Chinese media were apparently picked up from this interview. On not "destalinizing" Mao, see, for example, Zheng Bian, "The Trial Doesn't Involve Chairman Mao," *Beijing Review,* Jan. 5, 1981, p. 4.

Such insipid admiration for a passionate protagonist like Mao is indeed a sad commentary on his achievements. To dismiss the Mao of the Great Leap Forward and thereafter is to dismiss the essence of the Maoist model. The Chinese would not need much historical surgery to see that the Mao they want to uphold today is no different from the Mao they have learned to condemn. In both life cycles, it is the same Mao: self-righteous, opportunistic, and arbitrary, yet fiercely nationalistic. One cannot accept the one and reject the other; only the two together constitute a meaningful evolving whole.

BUT THE CURRENT Beijing mythology of splitting the good and bad Mao has become so pervasive that it has now been almost unconsciously assimilated even by the hard-core professional China watchers. Two recent post-Mao biographies of Mao reviewed here—those by Dick Wilson and Ross Terrill—do for social science what the Chinese have been doing for propaganda. Wilson's great Mao is "propelled by a concern for the dignity and equality of human beings" yet is "vindictive," "unable to work with his colleagues," and "ends up by constructing willy-nilly a dictatorial system"; "champions for the Chinese people a voice of sanity and reasonableness" yet "wastes his energy on a series of futile, debilitating two-line struggles"; "invents for China a completely new system of life, economy and government" yet "fails because the Party would not support him" (pp. xvii, xviii, 490–98). These contradictions inhere not so much between Mao's vision and his work-style as between the biographer's faith and his data.

Terrill's construction of Mao is even more jarring to elementary academic aesthetics. This Mao is so static and unreal that many a time Terrill is himself amazed to see his Mao very un-Maolike. In the 1950's (the officially approved safe period), this happens only occasionally, such as at the time of Mao's handling of the counterrevolutionaries, which does not appear to Terrill very Maoist (p. 214). By the 1970's, however, Terrill's Mao becomes highly unstable, and in Terrill's own words: "it no longer made sense to ask if Mao was these days a Maoist. One day he was; the next day he wasn't" (p. 393).

A more sensitive biographer would perhaps have altered his image of Maoism rather than attribute such silly instability to his subject. Must theoretical constructs of personalities remained fixed in the face of alternative evidence? Obviously, Terrill does not face this dilemma, for his theory of personality growth permits his Mao—whom he first brings up on the world stage as "a giant of this century," endowed with "a doctrine surpassing that of any previous Chinese person," "to be put alongside Confucius and other sages"—to be suddenly transformed into "an amoral gambler," "flashing out of senility or perversity inexplicable signals," "adding confusion and compounding problems," and "using his doctrine only as a rapier of power" (pp. 352, 376, 409, 426–29). But the unkindest cut of all in Terrill's biography is the startling suggestion that "China might have been better off if Mao had died twenty years earlier than he did" (p. 431). If one sees in this judgment some parallels with the current official Beijing verdict on Mao, one should begin to probe for something more than mere coincidence.

Had Mao indeed died 20 years

Reviewers in This Issue

KRISHNA PRAKASH GUPTA—Reader in Chinese Studies, Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, University of Delhi; author of articles in journals such as *China Report, Seminar, New Quest,* and *Contribution to Indian Sociology;* currently working on a study of tradition and change in China's education.

JAYNE WERNER—Research Associate, Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University (New York, NY); author of *Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasant and Priest in the Cao Dai in Vietnam,* 1981, and of articles and chapters on women in the Vietnamese revolution.

BASILE KERBLAY—Professor of Russian and Soviet Civilization, Paris-Sorbonne University; author of *Les marchés paysan en URSS* (Peasant Markets in the USSR), 1968, *L'Izba d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* (The Peasant Household Yesterday and Today), 1973, and *La société soviétique contemporaine* (Contemporary Soviet Society), 1977, the last of these to appear in English translation in 1982.

---

[2] This imprecise slicing of Mao's career also first emerged in Deng's interview with Fallaci. However, the English text in *The Guardian Weekly* removes the imprecision by stating that Mao had correct ideas "until the Sixties, or to be exact before the later part of the Fifties." See *The Guardian Weekly,* Sept. 22, 1980, p. 17. The Chinese press has, for some reason, restored the imprecision by using the word "rather" in place of "to be exact." See, for instance, Zheng Bian, loc. cit., p. 4.

[3] Zhen Bian, loc. cit., p. 4. Emphasis added.

earlier, one wonders whether it would have been at all possible to see in him, à la Wilson and Terrill, a giant revolutionary on the modern world stage. Although social science objectivity is deceptive, it may be useful to recall that 20 years earlier most China experts portrayed Mao as only an inconsequential accomplice of Soviet global designs. His death would have brought even fewer tears at that point in history. The nostalgia for that point, then, comes from a rereading of history that has been only currently made fashionable in China.

In retrospect, one can even see a subtle process of osmosis through which expert assessments of Mao's legacy seem to have unwittingly picked up many of their cues and insights from planted pieces of official propaganda. There are, of course, always dissenters, but the mainstream approach amply bears out this contention. One need not go too far back to look for evidence. The Mao of Cultural Revolution vintage is a fairly recent example, and books such as John Starr's *Continuing the Revolution* resurrect the historical biases of the late 1960's and early 1970's with great verve and unsuspecting self-confidence. With laborious textual documentation, Starr places the theory of continuing revolution, first put forward by Mao only during the Cultural Revolution, in the historical context of Mao's *entire preceding* life and work. There is here no hint of any possible discontinuity in Mao's career. To Starr, the theory appears to be a logical culmination of Mao's political thinking and actions up to that point (pp. 300–04). This was precisely the official line on Mao at that time.

In fact, the impact of this line on Western experts lasted right through Mao's life, and it began to wear off only some years after his death, when the Chinese themselves decided to unabashedly slice his career into its good and bad parts. Even in 1977, when the cues were coming but were still not confirmed, few could dare to bifurcate Mao's legacy for reasons of historical justice. Not one single contributor to Dick Wilson's *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History* finds any need to discover the two types of Mao. In most articles, Mao's contributions are viewed in totality, and the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution are invariably treated as indivisibly Maoist in essence and orientation (see, for example, pp. 9, 65–68, 76–77, 88–89, 171, 177, 215–16, 245, 262, 296–97, 304–05). Edward Friedman's paper in this volume goes to the extent of saying that "the innovations of Mao which are usually summed up in the term 'Maoism' mostly begin in the early 1960's" and "had Mao died at that point, all evaluations of his contribution would have been affected by the idea that his vision had failed, and his peers would most likely have reversed his course" (p. 306).

QUITE CLEARLY, it is not an easy task to decide when Mao should have died. What were once applauded as the most precious ingredients of his message are today being reviled as un-Marxist bits of a senile autocrat. It is tragic to see how many responsible social scientists have internalized this purely propagandistic volte-face. Not many evidently have the courage to stand up and be counted as more Maoist than Mao's own native "followers." When the recent official Chinese "Resolution on Questions in Party History since 1949" itself sternly states that all of Mao's principal theses for initiating and sustaining the Cultural Revolution "conformed neither to Marxism-Leninism nor to Chinese reality,"[4] few outsiders any more dare to defend Mao's alternative model of development. Slowly but surely, this part of Mao's legacy will wither away under the present Chinese dispensation. What would be left would be a Mao whose revolutionary credentials, notwithstanding the many myths that are now being dusted and wrapped afresh around the pre-1956 Mao, would not go beyond the successful opportunism of a fiercely nationalistic Chinese, accidentally turned Communist hero.

Once the debunking begins, there are many questions that are bound to be asked inside and outside China about this pre-1956 Mao. Some evidence suggests that such questioning has already occurred in China, but the details are still missing.[5]

The point to ponder is whether a perverse adult who would be ready to forsake his vision and ideology for reasons of crude self-aggrandizement could have had a genuinely revolutionary adolescence and youth. Or should the stories of his concern and commitment then also be treated only as make-believe half-truths? In biology, freaks appear with regularity, but with new evidence on Mao's deformation in adulthood, the need for a second look at some of the popular myths of his revolutionary genesis would increasingly become self-evident.

---

[4] This resolution was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on June 27, 1981. For the full text, see *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981, pp. 10–39. For a fuller indictment of the Cultural Revolution, see especially pp. 20–26.

[5] Several articles appeared in the Chinese press in the middle of 1981 which seemed to be defending Mao and the CCP against the charges of causing the civil war and destroying national unity. See, for example, *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), July 4, 1981, and *Wenhuibao* (Shanghai), July 22, 1981. A brief review of these two articles may be found in *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), Aug. 28, 1981.

Deng has already called Jiang Qing "a mistake" of Mao, and it may not be too far-fetched to suggest that many in China might be tempted to reopen the whole question of Mao's marriage to her. Mao's flirtation with the Kuomintang and the Hunan independence movement would also inevitably come up for review, and this would create new strains in keeping up an idealized image of the pre-1956 Mao.

Yet Mao's biographers still cling to many such stories, and the myth of Mao's rebellious childhood remains a favorite staple. It is a Mao who shares his lunch with a deprived schoolmate, protests against his teacher's formalized instructions, sells his family's pig and donates the proceeds to a beggar, shows a determined tenacity to read books of his own choice, approves a poor peasant's burgling of his own house, and threatens to jump into a pond only because he is scorned in the presence of some family guests (Wilson, pp. 9–12; Terrill, pp. 9–12). These are all marks of a concerned citizen in the making.

This same Mao, however, does not express a word in protest when his father marries him to a girl six years his senior. Only some years later would Mao write eloquent articles against arranged marriages. Now he goes through his own wedding in blissful silence. His faithful biographers assure us that Mao never "laid a finger on her" (Terrill, p. 12) and she "eventually married someone else" (Wilson, p. 12). Whether such contrived compensations indeed exonerate Mao is not the issue. The question is why a concerned and rebellious adolescent should consent to go through the ceremony at all.

It is not a trivial question, because Mao's later alliances and commitments tend to show a similar disdain for propriety and consistency. Books like Li Jui's do manage to provide us a homogenized version of Mao's early revolutionary activities, but they do so, as Stuart Schram has amply documented in this case, by glossing over many awkward problems in the career of young Mao (see Schram's "Introduction" in Li Jui, pp. xi–xii, xx–xxi, xxviii–xxix, xxxiv–xxxv, xlii). His flirtations with the Kuomintang (KMT) Propaganda Department and the Autonomous Hunan Movement are the two best known. Here again, the more disturbing questions have yet to be asked.

At some point, someone is going to reopen the whole matter of Mao's attachment to Marxism-Leninism. The issue then will not be the 1919 article by Mao that Li Jui quotes to show how Mao already integrated a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution (which, as Schram has established, he did not as yet do, see pp. xxviii, 111–15). Rather, it will be why Mao, who only two years earlier had recommended physical education for China's salvation and even now rated Pëtr Kropotkin's ethic of social harmony higher than the violence of Marxist struggle, *suddenly*, in a period of a few months, switched to applauding the Soviet Union, setting up societies and bookstores to propagate Marxism, and working to organize teams to visit Russia for the study of the Russian revolution. Mao's own explanation, that he read a couple of books on Marxism at this time and was enlightened, is a bit thin to provide any firm clues to his conversion.

There are still no hard data about this whole process of Chinese intellectual "attraction" to Marxism in the early 1920's, but if the Indian evidence of that time has any parallels, one might suspect that such sudden and massive Chinese organizational efforts as the publication of many Marxist journals, distribution of vast amounts of Marxist propaganda literature, and the setting up of a string of local-level Marxist study societies concealed many more variables than the mere appeal of an alien ideology. No doubt Mao was caught up in a stream of intellectual consciousness of which he was only a minor part at this time.

It must be said to Mao's credit that, unlike many others of his generation, he perhaps never moved beyond a crudely utilitarian approach to his own "convictions." How, then, could he negotiate with his colleagues to secure the label of the great Chinese revolutionary who sinified Marxism-Leninism? The answer to this comes in part from Raymond Wylie's *The Emergence of Maoism*, but here again the constraints of social science prevent Wylie from probing beneath the conventional wisdom.

Wylie, like others before him, argues that Mao succeeded because he produced a distinctive Chinese Communist ideology which held immense appeal to party intellectuals, which established China's cultural independence from the West (including the Soviet Union), and which overshadowed the ideological alternative offered by the KMT (pp. 282–83). Such an argument is evidently predicated on Mao's superior insight into the Chinese situation and his capacity to apply the universal categories of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of the Chinese revolution. On both these counts, however, the evidence merits a fresh scrutiny.

Mao's turning to the peasantry is often cited in this context as his greatest Marxist-Leninist innovation, but the chronology of facts on this question still leaves the issue somewhat hazy. Mao first worked among the Hunan peasants in the autumn of 1924. He then went to work for the Kuomintang Propaganda Department, hardly a place to enrich his Marxism. In February 1926, he explicitly upheld the leading role of the urban proletariat, yet in about six months he switched over to stress the preeminent revolutionary potential of the peasantry. In 1928, he argued once more, as Zhou Enlai's recently released writings reveal, in favor of the centrality of Communist work in the cities, but he reversed this position again in less than a year's time.[6]

There are further doubts whether such intellectual acrobatics on Mao's part were accompanied by any serious theoretical reappraisal of the nature of Marxism-Leninism and its particularization in China. In 1939, Mao was ready, in complete disregard of the elementary canons of proletarian internationalism, to accept aid from the United States; in 1940, he was prepared, if one accepts Wang Ming's testimony, to collaborate with Japan, then China's hated aggressor; and in 1944, he was ready to accept American intervention and, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, even stomach the American proposal to place a US general in command of the entire Chinese war effort.[7]

It is perhaps not too difficult to justify each of these moves as transitional tactics in some wider Marxist-Leninist strategy, but the final evidence strongly suggests another possibility. After all, the same Mao who had joined the Kuomintang publicity apparatus when his Communist comrades were languishing in Canton jails later accepted the desirability of a coalition government and nearly a decade after the Communist takeover still pleaded for a synthesis of Russia's revolution with America's practical spirit. All this was a rather bizarre way of sinifying Marxism-Leninism.

SUCH AN ideological assessment of Mao is hardly new. Many a time before, Mao has been subjected to evaluations from the fixed theoretical standpoints of different kinds of Marxism. For example, true believers like Steve S.K. Chin have found in him a synthesis of Chinese national forms and Marxist-Leninist content, while critics like Tom Kerry have accused him of forsaking the genuine Marxist-Leninist legacy. Such praise or blame almost always exposes the evaluator's bias; it does little to describe, much less explain, Mao's thought on Mao's own terms.

Chin's use of the hopelessly dated analogy of the Beijing revolutionary opera to explicate Mao Thought—national in form but Marxist-Leninist in content (pp. 1, 14–16, 114–20, 142)—totally misses Mao's continuous experimentation with ideas, and it is possible to argue, as the Chinese themselves are doing today, that Mao was on many occasions using a Marxist form only to push some very un-Marxist contents. Needless to add, this kind of argument merely replaces one kind of bias with another.

In such scenarios, the suggested solutions—recipes of what Mao should really have done—are sometimes worse than the original diagnoses. Kerry's Trotskyite suggestions are a case in point. His recommended course of action would have seen Mao trying to win over the Japanese occupation army morally through efforts to arouse their sympathies, keeping his faith in the efficacy of the urban proletariat simply because that could possibly have prevented Chiang from running away to Taiwan, and turning over his country to the USSR after 1949 to create one grand federal political entity under the auspices of a single socialist commonwealth (pp. 27, 33, 118). At this point, one can only say, "thank god, Mao was not a Trotskyite."

But even if one grants to each his own prejudice, the question of Mao's legacy still remains unresolved. What, after all, are Mao's own terms for looking at him and for assessing whether he is at all relevant to China today?

The claim to sinification of Marxism-Leninism is hardly an improvement on Hong Xiuquan's mid-19th century delusion that he was the younger brother of Jesus Christ. Mao's place in history cannot ultimately rest on the adaptation of alien ideology, on the working out of a synthesis which he tried to implement in vain. His pre-1949 struggles can in no way be considered crucial breakthroughs of great theoretical significance in the corpus of orthodox Communist literature. Whether his doctrinal formulations of this period are an enrichment of Marxism-Leninism or its distortion depends upon the bias of the analyst. That he fought many a military battle and won is common knowledge, but whether China would have groped in the dark a little longer without him or would have undergone a social transformation without so much violence and hatred are questions that even history may never answer.

---

[6] For a conventional analysis of Mao's turning to the peasantry as the mainstay of China's revolution, see Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, pp. 167–92. See also his "Mao Zedong and the Role of the Various Classes in the Chinese Revolution, 1923–1927," in *The Polity and Economy of China* (The Late Professor Yuji Muramatsu Commemoration Volume), Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1975, pp. 227–39.

Schram has argued that Mao turned decisively to the Chinese peasantry with his September 1926 article entitled "The National Revolution and the Peasant Movement." This dating, however, needs to be reviewed in the light of Zhou Enlai's testimony. Zhou shows that Mao's thinking on this issue went through several phases, and that even as late as the Sixth National Congress in 1928, Mao "had not arrived at the idea of focusing our work on the rural areas." See *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 1, Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1981, p. 179.

The fact that Zhou's article has inspired several other studies of Mao's role in making the peasantry the focus of China's revolution suggests that the current Chinese leadership is willing to demythify the earlier claims as to Mao's original enrichment of Marxism-Leninism on this question. Most of these studies imply that Mao's turning to the peasantry was based on actual situational requirements, rather than on any innovative breakthrough. See, for instance, Teng Wensheng and Jian Chunfeng, "Realistically Sum Up Historical Experiences—Reading Comrade Zhou Enlai's 'A Study of the Party's Sixth National Congress,' " *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 2, Jan. 16, 1981, pp. 16–21, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 77697, Mar. 30, 1981, pp. 22–30. See also Shi Zongquan and Yang Zenghe, "Zhou Enlai on Mao Zedong Thought," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 2, 1981, pp. 8–11.

[7] On Mao's willingness to accept aid from the United States in 1939, see *Mao Zedongji* (Collected Works of Mao Zedong), ed. Takeuchi Minoru, Tokyo, Hokubosha, 1970–72, Vol. VII, pp. 15–16. Wang Ming's memoirs, *Polveka KPK i predatel'stvo Mao Tsze-duna* (Half a Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong), were published in Russian in 1975; the relevant extract is translated by Wilson (p. 221) in his biography of Mao, reviewed here. On Mao's invitation to American intervention in 1944, see Joseph W. Esherick, Ed., *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service*, New York, NY, Random House, 1974, pp. 295–307.

Yet there is no way in which one can wish away Mao's role in the making of modern China. At each point, and more so in periods of acute personal letdown, he withdraws for a moment but returns with a majestic sweep. All through, he revels in striking back at his opponents with a shocking tenacity, and succeeds in the end in wresting top honors from his somewhat reluctant colleagues.

There is no way in which social science methods can be used to unravel the mysteries of this man's success. Nor is there any means of knowing why a confirmed adversary like Wang Ming, who was never really enamored of Mao's leadership qualities, should have apparently surrendered to Mao in 1940 with an abject slogan like "Learn from Mao Zedong," or why a self-confident member of the party elite like Liu Shaoqi, who saw no great merits in Mao's writings by 1941, should have turned around in a few years' time and hailed Mao as the greatest theoretician and scientist in Chinese history. Was it Mao's charisma, changes of heart on the part of his adversaries, or dirty political deals? Or was someone from somewhere else pulling some strings?

In the intriguing world of Chinese politics, one does not know whether to read between the lines or beneath them. Mao's greatest hour of glory, the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945, which promoted his thought as "the guiding principle in the Party's *entire* work,"[8] appears in retrospect as the weakest link in Mao's final ascent to power. There is no way of determining, but one suspects that he was really "kicked upstairs" and began to be treated as a "dead ancestor" right after this congress. As China was coming under Communist control and even as he was being applauded as the supreme architect of this development, he remained a tense witness to China's slow degeneration into a bourgeois-revisionist state. An unfettered intellectual addicted to a lawless approach to Marxism, he was to see his own texts mutilated into the uncomfortable straitjacket of an alien orthodoxy. A fighter to the core, having challenged his would-be Russian masters and their native disciples many a time before, he was to mutely deny himself the little luxury of eating fish and soup together only because of some stray Soviet newspaper or journal article.

This is the pre-1956 Mao upheld in China's press today. China's lavish praise of this Mao for his many brilliant victories still does not ring bells of credibility, for there is something vitally missing in this half-truth. Mao was in his true element only when he was fighting to transform *his* vision into Chinese reality. In post-1949 China, he did so at a time and with an intent that stand discredited today, but it is not too difficult to see behind Mao's many struggles against the "returned students" before 1949 the same passion, the same obstinacy, and the same recklessness that he displayed in his struggles against his entrenched associates thereafter.

Structurally, there is no difference in these two Maos. As a protagonist, he stands almost alone in each struggle, but "crowds" can be discerned in his shadow. The Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution symbolize a search for a new life-style and an alternative developmental model, and the anarchy and the absurdity that such a search must entail. Some may see madness; others may see courage in such experiments. But they come in a package deal that cannot be negotiated.

---

[8] The phrase is from the General Program of the Constitution of the CCP, adopted by the Seventh National Congress in 1945. Emphasis added. It was also repeatedly employed in the report delivered by Liu Shaoqi to this congress. See *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i, 1945–1957*, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1969, pp. 10, 26, 96.

Women and Revolution: China and Vietnam

by Jayne Werner

ELISABETH CROLL. *Women in Rural Development: People's Republic of China*. Geneva, International Labor Organization, 1979.

K. H. FAN and K. T. FAN. *From the Other Side of the River*. New York, NY, Doubleday, 1975.

PHILIP C. HUANG, Ed. *Chinese Communism and Rural Society, 1927–34*. Berkeley, CA, Center for Chinese Studies, 1978.

NGUYEN THI DINH. *No Other Road to Take*. Trans. by Mai Elliott. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 102, 1974.

MAI THI TU and LE THI NAM TUYET. *Women in Vietnam*. Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978.

KATHLEEN GOUGH. *Ten Times More Beautiful*. New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1978.

IT IS APPARENT that despite arguments put forward by Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, full emancipation of women has not automatically ensued from socialist revolution. Nor, even, has the goal of women's equality necessarily been a priority objective of socialist movements. This seems to be as true for revolutions in China and Vietnam as for the Soviet precursor.

Marx saw women in bourgeois society as serving the function of commodity exchange, as mere instruments of production. Women in the bourgeois family were defined by their roles as daughter, wife, and mother. Their exploitation, as that of working-class women, stemmed from the class basis of society. Once that basis was removed, female oppression would come to an end. Unlike Marx, Engels did recognize the existence of a sexual division of labor within the family. But he assumed that the family—the basis of women's oppression—would disintegrate when capitalism disappeared.[1]

Socialist movements on the road to power have sought to mobilize women on the basis of these arguments. Although in different cultural and religious settings "women's equality" may have meant different things to different people, the term has generally, and minimally, implied improvement of women's status vis-à-vis men. But other goals have invariably taken precedence over women's liberation, whatever meaning it may have assumed, and women's emancipation has often been used to further other goals. Improvement of women's condition has rarely been seen as an end in itself. In Soviet Central Asia, for instance, the Bolsheviks mobilized women in order to weaken the patriarchal authority of the Muslim family and to consolidate Communist Party control over the region.[2] In China before 1949, the Communists mobilized women to advance the anti-Japan struggle and the revolution against Chiang Kai-shek—to break the power of the landlords, not to bring women's liberation as such.[3] In Vietnam, mobilization of women has occurred at times of peak war mobilization and has tended to decline during periods of less intense crisis.[4] Of these three socialist revolutions, the Chinese seems to have placed the greatest emphasis on women's emancipation for its own sake, possibly because of the strong egalitarian features of Maoism. The Soviets and the Vietnamese, while holding up the banner of women's emancipation, appear not to have displayed intense concern about the woman question in the absence of war, party-building, or social pressures.

One reason for the less than salient role of the women's movement in each of these revolutions has been the reluctance of socialist theorists and revolutionaries to acknowledge that a sexual division of labor exists in society, or that it is as fundamental a division as the division by class. Yet increasing evidence suggests that the sexual division of labor can be treated as an "independent variable," that it has "non-class" origins and probably differs with the national culture. Moreover, the sexual division of labor can probably survive into the socialist period and indeed even up until the "full flowering of communism." If there exist specific cultural features which complement the system of sex roles in particular societies, this division of labor might be a unique "national" characteristic which persists even in socialist societies.

---

[1] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Woman Question*, New York, NY, International Publishers, 1951.

[2] Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat, Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974.

[3] Delia Davin, *Woman-Work, Women and the Party in Revolutionary China*, London, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 138–40.

[4] Jayne Werner, "Women, Socialism, and the Economy of War-Time North Vietnam, 1960–75," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Summer/Autumn 1981.

Existence of a sexual division of labor with cultural expressions that trace their roots to the origins of society could go far toward explaining the difficulty that socialist societies have experienced in achieving full women's equality. The Chinese, in effect, acknowledged the independent impact of culture on society when during the Cultural Revolution, they attempted to promote women's equality and advance the women's movement by *ideological* means. Similarly, the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign of 1973–74, which was in part focused on male-female relations, attempted to change the continuing nonequal character of these relationships by encouraging the adoption of new attitudes.[5]

A GROWING literature on the women's movement in China and in Vietnam provides some insight into the factors that impede the achievement of full social equality by women in socialist societies. While such studies have by and large taken the form of trip reports, short analytic pieces, or translated vignettes from the personal histories of women who participated in the respective revolutions, those on China in particular are becoming broader and more analytic. Although this expanding literature is still groping for a frame of reference and adequate comparative perspective, three issues of historical and comparative interest have emerged: (1) the relationship between the women's movement and the Communist party, (2) the question of how sex roles change during revolutionary struggle, and (3) the relationship between women's equality and the process of socialist development.

Each of the works reviewed here sheds some light on one or more of these issues. Elisabeth Croll's *Women in Rural Development: People's Republic of China* is an important analysis of rural women and socialist development in China. It establishes a perspective that is relevant to the Vietnamese case, and indeed to nonsocialist societies as well. K. H. Fan and K. T. Fan's *From the Other Side of the River* consists of translations of writings by Chinese women themselves on the impact of socialism on their life experiences. Kathy Walker's contribution to the volume edited by Philip C. Huang discusses the women's movement in relation to early Communist party-organizing in rural China. For Vietnam, we have Mai Elliott's translation of the poignant and detailed memoirs of Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, the former Deputy Commander of the People's Liberation Army in southern Vietnam. *Women in Vietnam* is a recent, abridged English translation of an earlier work by a North Vietnamese historian, Le Thi Nham Tuyet. It is the most comprehensive study on women published to date by Hanoi.[6] Finally, Kathleen Gough's *Ten Times More Beautiful* is an account of a North American's personal encounter with the Vietnamese women's movement during a trip to socialist Vietnam.

THE WALKER article shows how the women's movement influenced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) early in its history, playing a significant role in the development of base areas of the Provisional Soviet Government formed in South China in 1931. Women's work within and outside the party was stressed because the CCP needed the support of the peasantry in the base areas as the party experimented with a new rural strategy. Women were involved in production and in land reform. They were also encouraged to participate in local government (and did so in large numbers). The concrete policies thus developed not only contributed to raising the status of women but also laid down an outline for women's liberation to be carried forward in the future. Of course, the women's programs were not the only ones developed by the CCP, nor was the women's issue given top priority. Nevertheless, the women's movement appears to have made an important contribution to the early fortunes of the CCP.

In the Vietnamese case, a similar promotion of the women's movement had to wait until the early 1950's, during the land reform. In fact, during the 1930's the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP—the predecessor of the Vietnam Communist Party) ignored mass work among women. Although there was a Women's Union, women were not permitted to join "mass" organizations (*hoi quan chung*).[7] Le Thi Nham Tuyet alludes to the neglect of women's work during the peasant uprisings of the early 1930's (p. 115). During the wars against Japan, France, and the US, however, the mobilization of women in Vietnam followed more closely the experience of the Chinese.

---

[5] Croll, p. 39.

[6] Le Thi Nham Tuyet's original volume was *Phu Nu Viet Nam Qua Cac Thoi Dai* (Women in Vietnam Throughout History), Hanoi, Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1973.

[7] Tran Van Giau, "The Ebbing and Recovery of the Revolutionary Movement: 1932–1935," *Hoc Tap* (Hanoi), November-December 1958, p. 69.

THE SECOND ISSUE of concern here is the relationship between women and revolution. The revolutionary situation, as illustrated by Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh's memoirs, suspends in time, as it were, societal expectations about sex roles, and therefore modifies the sex roles themselves. Participation in national liberation wars frees women from traditional norms and duties and allows them to perform tasks which would be considered "improper" in other times. In revolutions, women are allowed, and even encouraged, to assume roles outside family circles, with social approval. From this experience they gain both social prestige and new-found personal confidence. They perform various political, paramilitary, and military functions—participating in mass organizations, planning demonstrations, propagandizing among enemy soldiers, serving as party cadres, performing liaison duties and carrying arms, and serving as army combatants. Not only did Nguyen Thi Dinh and other party and nonparty women carry out missions that women were thought incapable of performing, they even often climbed to positions of high responsibility.

The importance of the contribution of women's mobilization to the success of the revolutionary struggle tended to convert temporary "suspension" into permanent modification of cultural values. When "improper" behavior—such as attending midnight meetings or going on long political organizing trips with male cadres—became essential to the revolution, "respectability" was redefined, and consciousness about women's roles and capabilities changed in the minds of young and old alike. The liberation struggle, with its focus on oppression by the class enemy, also has tended to bring new sensitivity to the traditional oppression of women.

A THIRD MATTER relates to the position of women once the revolutionary regime turns to the "building of socialism." Does socialist development advance women's equality, or does the process discriminate against women? The development experience of the Soviet Union has shown that full equality for women does not necessarily accompany the process of socialist industrialization. By contrast, China's post-1949 experience at least seemed to suggest that through conscious public policy, women's liberation could be achieved *during* rather than *after* socialist development and that policy might be a more important determinant of women's position than the level of socialist development per se.[8]

Certainly, the development of socialism in China offered women great opportunities for personal transformation, as the vignettes in *From the Other Side of the River* attest. Yet, there is growing evidence that socialist development and women's equality have not advanced at equal pace in China either. Continuing patterns of differentiation of roles by sex can be observed, and it may be that occupational differences by sex in China will come to mirror certain aspects of those in the Soviet Union.

Development specialist Croll, in the study reviewed here, provides considerable information about social, economic, ideological, and organizational obstacles to the full achievement of equality for women in China. For example, the "double burden" of full-time work by women at a place of employment and their performance of a "second shift" of unpaid domestic labor at home—well known in the socialist societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—appears to exist in China as well. In China, the impact of the "second shift" is somewhat ameliorated by existence of the extended family. As Croll points out, were it not for the child care performed by grandmothers, it would be difficult for Chinese women to participate in collective labor in large numbers. In fact, where there are not grandmothers, women tend to stay at home and raise the children themselves.[9]

As development has proceeded and the division of labor has expanded in China, men have tended to fill nonagricultural jobs, while women have stayed behind in agriculture (Croll, *Women in Rural Development*, p. 27). This process, called the "feminization of agriculture," has been noted in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania;[10] as we shall see below, it has occurred in Vietnam as well, during times of war mobilization.

Where both men and women engage in agricultural work in China, women have been assigned "lighter" work (which is awarded fewer work points), and the men, "heavier" work. While this may be designed in part to protect women, the unquestionable result has been inferior earnings for women.

The structure of the Chinese rural household and the relationship of the household to production have also presented obstacles to the full emancipation of women. Although women received title to land during the land reform and in the commune draw pay individually for their collective labor (rather than see it go to the head of the household), they still do not have full economic independence. The household unit continues to organize labor allocation and to dispense income to its members. Although women are valued for their contribution to the household budget, the male head of the household tends to dominate the "family" decision-making. Domestic labor, which helps maintain the household unit, is performed almost exclusively by women and is unpaid. Furthermore, because of the time demands of such domestic responsibilities, women members of the household unit end up performing less remunerative jobs in the collective sector.

---

[8] See, for example, Elisabeth Croll's earlier work, *Feminism and Socialism in China*, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, and New York, NY, Schocken, 1980.

[9] In rural communes, half or more of preschool children are at home with their grandmothers (Croll, *Women in Rural Development*, p. 33).

[10] Celia T. Castillo, "The Changing Role of Women in Rural Societies: A Summary of Trends and Issues," Seminar Report No. 12, New York, NY, Agricultural Development Council, February 1977.

Since the more workers the family can supply, the greater the family's resources, the goal of the family (and, hence, of the woman) is to produce a large number of workers. Sons are particularly valued, for they are able to make more work points and also because they will stay in the family and upon marriage provide additional workers, their wives and their children. Under the persisting marriage rules of village exogamy and patrilocal residence, daughters leave the family and are thus not as much of an economic asset.[11] Hence, Chinese rural families still express preferences for early marriage, for sons, and for marriage gifts for daughters-in-law. As a result, women have found their participation in the economic and political affairs of the village circumscribed. Communes have made their plans for training, education, and work programs on the assumption that girls will leave for another commune upon marriage; hence, girls have not received the same attention and benefits from the commune as boys have.

In sum, the obstacles to full equality for women in China appear to stem from the sexual division of labor in society, the cultural expressions of this division, and the household structure.

ALTHOUGH the data now available on Vietnam hardly compare with those on China in the Croll study, it is clear that the development process in Vietnam lags considerably behind that in China. It appears that many of the same problems with regard to women are present in Vietnam. Socialism has given women in Vietnam unparalleled opportunities for work outside the home, increased self-confidence, and increased public participation, but women's equality has not yet been fully achieved.

Kathleen Gough's report demonstrates the remarkable advances that women have made in Vietnam, but the author notes some familiar patterns as well.[12] There is a preference for large families, and for boys over girls. The birthrate has yet to decline to a level that permits women to pursue effective work careers. Child care is often assumed by grandmothers in households where mothers work, and the problem of mother-in-law domination of young wives persists. There is a pronounced sexual division of labor within the household, with minimal male domestic responsibilities. Although Gough claims otherwise (p. 87), there appear to be different pay scales for men and women in agricultural work, as in China.[13] Moreover, the feminization of agricultural work was accelerated in Vietnam in 1965–73 during the war with the United States, to the point that 60 percent or more of agriculture became the responsibility of women. The Vietnam Communist Party's line is that there are women's activities and men's activities and that women are responsible for the home and the family. Women form the majority of workers in light industry, trade, medical work, and education, whereas men predominate in heavy industry, transport, mining, and communications. This pattern is also found in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

IS THE DOUBLE BURDEN of women in the developed socialist countries of the USSR and Eastern Europe, then, being re-created in China and Vietnam? The question is important, for the early stages of socialist development may lay the groundwork for future social patterns.

Socialist transformation undoubtedly creates conditions conducive to the liberation of women. Women in China and Vietnam have experienced revolutionary changes in their marital conditions, their status within the family, and their ability to earn their own income. They have achieved legal and political rights. However, before women can engage fully in collective labor, these underdeveloped socialist countries must probably achieve industrialization, in order to be able to provide comprehensive child-care facilities, medical care, and household conveniences.[14]

---

[11] Norma Diamond, "Collectivization, kinship and the status of women in rural China," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (Claremont, MA), January-March 1975, pp. 25–33.

[12] It should be noted that the Gough study is not primarily meant to be a comparative and historical analysis of the women's movement in Vietnam as such, but rather is a North American's search for understanding of the impact of US military actions on Vietnam.

[13] Articles in Vietnamese periodicals have mentioned this problem. See, for instance, an article by Dang Duc Cuong, a district party secretary in Ha Tay Province, "Concentrate on Training Female Labor," *Phu Nu Viet Nam* (Hanoi), Nov. 1, 1968, pointing out the problem of unequal pay scales for men and women engaged in agriculture in the district.

Yet, even the process of socialist development—itself not necessarily prejudicial to women's equality—may nonetheless bring about a sexual division of labor. To be sure, public policy may provide a means of correcting imbalances and inequalities incurred during industrial and agricultural transformation, and if the socialist state intervenes and consciously pursues the equal participation of men and women in the development process, women's concerns need not necessarily be neglected. At present, however, both China and Vietnam are pursuing an erratic pattern of state intervention in this regard.

---

[14] In Vietnam, only a minority of families appear to have access to child-care facilities. Even in the mid-1970's in the largest textile mill in the North, where women constituted 80 percent of the labor force, most of the women had to arrange for child care at home because of poor facilities at the factory. Although there were purportedly 13,500 child-care centers in the North in the 1960's, only a few model provinces had such facilities in up to 50 percent of their agricultural cooperatives. See "Promote the Functional Role of the Women's Association in the Management of Child-Care Houses," *Phu Nu Viet Nam*, June 16, 1970.

Social Inequality in the USSR

by Basile Kerblay

ALASTAIR McAULEY. *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality*. Madison, WI, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

VINOD MEHTA. *Soviet Economic Policy: Income Differentials in USSR*. New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1977.

WALTER D. CONNOR. *Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

MURRAY YANOWITCH. *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: Six Studies*. White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977.

JERRY G. PANKHURST and MICHAEL PAUL SACKS, Eds. *Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociological Perspectives*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1980.

WE ALL consider ourselves different from our fellow men yet continuously compare ourselves with, measure ourselves against, them. Any inequality seems an injustice. According to the socialist school of thought, inequality is economic in origin. But has state appropriation of the means of production in the USSR lessened inequality there? This is a question raised in all the works reviewed here. Although the approach varies from author to author, the measured tone of the various analyses reflects a common concern: to try to understand the facts before passing judgment on them. For this reason, they rely heavily on the latest publications by Soviet sociologists and economists, in order (particularly in the books by Walter Connor and Murray Yanowitch) to familiarize the reader with the different models of social stratification proposed by researchers in the Communist countries.

As a first pass at the problem, we have Alastair McAuley and Vinod Mehta, who set out to measure quantifiable inequalities using official data. Their works examine somewhat different periods from different comparative perspectives. Mehta looks at the half century between 1922 and 1970 and draws his comparisons to India. This leads him to more favorable estimates than those of McAuley, who concentrates on recent decades and uses the developed industrial countries as his reference model. McAuley's research is more rigorous, because it goes beyond statistics on wages in various sectors and attempts to determine disposable income per capita, taking into account payments in kind, welfare transfers, and the number of wage earners and dependent children per family. He also tries to calculate regional variations in living standards in relation to the demographic situation and the proportional share of the rural population in the total population of each republic. He finds that

> *By international standards regional inequality—measured by the coefficient of variation in personal consumption—in the USSR is quite modest: it is almost twice that found in such sparsely populated developed countries as Australia or New Zealand but only two thirds of that found in the USA and approximately half of that found in Japan or France.* (p. 115)

This does not mean that life is pleasant at the lower end of the scale. Starting from what he calls the "minimum material satisfaction budget," which from Soviet calculations was 51.40 rubles a month per capita in 1967, McAuley concludes that in the same year, per capita monthly earnings were below this poverty threshold in Belorussia, Azerbaydzhan, and the Central Asian republics. In 1967, not only some 12 million kolkhozniks but also 32 percent of urban families (two thirds of urban families with only a single wage earner) earned less than 50 rubles a month per capita. Of course, this estimate is based on a "normative budget," which, McAuley emphasizes, is relative over time (pp. 17–18, 77, 306).

At the other end of the scale are the industrial managers and intellectuals. In 1964 in the mechanical engineering industries, the salary of the director of the largest firm was five times as great as the base pay for a worker (67 rubles), while a physician could earn a maximum of 4.25 times the minimum wage (40 rubles). Although, as McAuley notes, "nothing is published on salaries of the central bureaucracy," he manages to offer a distribution of per capita income for the Soviet population by decile for 1967 and 1968. This yielded a decile coefficient (the ratio of per capita earnings of the top 10 percent to those of the lowest 10 percent) of 3.14–3.21, which, McAuley points out, "is a moderately unequal distribution of income . . . inequality in the USSR is less than in the UK and substantially less than in the USA" (p. 66).

Nonetheless, this wage range does not take into account "the standard of living of the Soviet elite—250,000 persons—entitled to extensive fringe benefits . . . ([which] include chauffeur-driven automobiles, dachas, priority in the purchase of performance tickets, the right to buy in closed retail establishments scarce high-quality goods at reportedly favorable prices) impossible to measure in money terms" (p. 67). Indeed, almost one third of the sales in the USSR retail business in 1960 were in stores reserved for special customers.[1] I might add that besides these legal privileges—which exist, if not in the same forms, in other countries as well—there is in the USSR a sphere of illegal inequalities created by the "second economy." In Moscow, it is the butchers and persons responsible for allocating apartments who seem to be the wealthiest, although their wages are very modest. (These nouveaux riches reveal themselves through their expenditures rather than through their nominal incomes.)

McAuley and Mehta agree that over the several decades since the death of Iosif Stalin, inequalities in the USSR have tended to diminish. Between 1956 and 1970, average income grew by 66 percent, whereas incomes in the first (lowest) decile increased by 135 percent, thanks to increases in base pay, particularly for kolkhozniks. (This increase in base pay, however, was not enough to eliminate pockets of poverty. It proved necessary to institute family allowances for households lacking minimum resources and to increase retirement pensions.) McAuley's analysis notes that these improvements were due not only to the government's social policy but also to market forces. Labor shortages have brought competition among firms in the labor market, to the benefit of the workers.

On the other hand, the managers have taken advantage of the rights granted them in 1965 to recover lost ground with respect to wages, by increasing their own bonuses. Between 1961 and 1970, when the base pay of engineering and technical workers increased by only 9 percent, bonuses in this category increased by 198 percent (p. 239)! Thus, the policy of reducing inequalities cannot be assessed accurately without taking account of the capacities of various social forces to circumvent it.

TO COMPREHEND the real nature of inequality in the Soviet Union, however, one must delve beneath the first, i.e., the purely economic, layer of this "matrёshka." The Soviet and East European sociologists whom Connor and Yanowitch discuss all turn essentially to production structures and the division of labor in explaining current differences in income levels and elaborating upon official classifications of social groups. But in so doing, they ignore such determining factors as privilege and power.

Indeed, differences in income levels alone do not necessarily mean that social stratification exists. It is necessary (1) that these economic inequalities be combined with other kinds of inequalities, and (2) that an individual from a given level have fewer opportunities during his career than do persons from other strata to become a member of a higher stratum. If there is complete social mobility, privileges may be justified as incentives to reward merit.

We have already seen some indication of the exercise of privilege and power in Soviet society. What is the situation with respect to mobility?

While recent research in the USSR points up the progress achieved in making secondary education more widely available, it also demonstrates the difficulties that the children of workers and peasants encounter in obtaining a higher education, which is mandatory for entering the bourgeoisie. There is an ongoing debate between the proponents of aptitude-based selection (e.g., M. N. Rutkevich), which is justified in the name of a meritocracy (however illusory), and those who (like V. N. Shubkin) advocate egalitarian measures such as "preparatory departments at *vuzy* [higher educational institutions]" because the "selection of the best prepared for advanced schooling will inevitably mean the selection of disproportionate numbers of youngsters from families of professional strata" (Yanowitch, p. 95). I might add that the existing inequalities are even more striking if one examines the social origins and academic background of the staff at research institutes, particularly in Moscow.[2]

---

[1] S. S. Vasil'yev et al., *Ekonomika torgovli* (The Economics of Trade), Moscow, Politizdat, 1962, p. 158.

[2] M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, Eds., *Vysshaya shkola kak faktor izmeneniya sotsial'noy struktury razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (Higher Education as a Factor in Changing the Social Structure of a Developed Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, pp. 250–54.

The combination of expanded opportunities in secondary education and limited access to higher education has had perverse effects in the enterprises, where a large number of young people must be satisfied with positions that do not meet their expectations. This has produced a reexamination of personnel relations within the firm from the perspective of management science. However, while the leadership has been willing to give more freedom to directors, it has thus far refused to give the rank-and-file workers the right to elect their manager or to participate in decisions on plan directions, apparently for fear that democratization of power would undermine centralism. At most what is envisioned is allowing production teams a certain degree of autonomy. Yanowitch describes such attempts in agriculture (the short-lived Akchi experiment), but it is in industry where the system of autonomous teams has actually become more widespread—in a form which, in the guise of self-management, has ended up increasing collective control over worker discipline.[3] Yanowitch is astute in raising the problem of power within the firm, for Poland today shows what impact this issue can have on societies that find themselves under the dictatorship of a Communist party.

Educational level and power are closely linked in contemporary Soviet society, as Richard B. Dobson demonstrates in his chapters "Socialism and Social Stratification" and "Education and Opportunity" in the volume edited by Jerry Pankhurst and Michael Sacks. This analysis prompts one to ask whether the Soviet Communist Party has not become the club of the new Soviet bourgeoisie.

The Pankhurst and Sacks collection illuminates numerous other dimensions of Soviet society today with similar clarity and perception. Mark Field's contribution, for example, probes into the workings of the party. While he finds the party membership to include representatives of different social elements that compete with one another in determining priorities—which is consistent with Jerry Hough's functionalist interpretation[4]—he observes that the final decision is accepted as dogma, "as a secular faith." Hence, application of the "church or religious model" to study of the party helps explain the totalitarianism of the regime. As Field puts it, "the process of [social] differentiation is slowed by the totalistic nature of the value system" (Pankhurst and Sacks, p. 164). No group can emerge as an independent pressure group. Moreover, by reactivating nationalism, the official Soviet ideology tends to inhibit expression of frustrations and to focus resentment on foreign enemies.

But whether this "national communism" is compatible with the continued existence of diverse nationalities and religions in the Soviet Union is another question. The responses of Ralph Clem (regarding nationalities) and of Jerry Pankhurst (concerning religions) are nuanced but inconclusive. Do advances in education lead to a decline in ideology and a resurgence of ethnicity, or do social and economic inequalities among national groups cause such a resurgence? Is the persistence of religious practices a reaction against secularization and materialism, or simply a vestige of traditional society? These important questions remain open.

A key repository of Russian social traditions has been rural society. As Roy D. Laird and Ronald A. Francisco show in the Pankhurst-Sacks book, some aspects of the ancient régime endure in the countryside, even if the names have changed. For example, the family plot—which provides the basics of the peasant's livelihood—persists, and the state has simply replaced the landlord. Today, moreover, as in the past, flight to the city is the only recourse for the ambitious. Consequently, rural society has been gradually drained of its vitality, and the village is no longer the "hotbed" of insurrection that it once was.

Examination of inequalities in the Soviet Union would be incomplete without the chapters on the status of women in the USSR by Paul Sacks and Murray Yanowitch in their respective volumes. Both note the limitations on the ability of Soviet authorities to cope with long-standing customs which have established behavioral patterns that are very comfortable for the male population. To be sure, women have gained equality of access to education, which has expanded job opportunities (it also has modified female behavior, as seen in the declining birthrate). Yet, it will probably be a long time before a woman becomes a member of the Politburo.

THESE AUTHORS have unquestionably enriched our knowledge of life in the Soviet Union. They are not to blame that our curiosity remains unsatisfied on a number of counts regarding social stratification and inequality.

Field research by outsiders remains authorized only in very exceptional cases, which restricts the possibility of clarifying certain points. Nonetheless, three types of research deserve more attention than they were given in these books. Let me enumerate them in brief.

---

[3] "The Brigade Team," *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 3, 1978, pp. 159–67; P. Bunich, "The Brigade Team," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 11, 1981; and A. Dubnov in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1981.

[4] See Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977.

1. Comparative studies. The comparative approach is the only one that permits us to sort out what is common to all industrial societies, what is characteristic of Communist regimes, and what is specific to conditions in the USSR. The reviewer knows perfectly well that this principle is easier to state than to put into practice. McAuley and Connor have shown the substantial methodological difficulties that must be overcome in order to make valid comparisons. Even when it is only the "socialist" countries that are involved, the person making the comparisons is faced with a tangled skein of hierarchic models and national traditions that calls for prudence. This explains why all too often it is necessary to settle for vague generalizations such as "all society [sic] must confront the same problem inherent in multiethnicity" (Pankhurst and Sacks, p. 59). Yet on just this point, the reader would wish for a more systematic comparison between, say, the USSR and the US in the area of ethnic homogenization.

2. Consideration of changes over the long term. Recourse to history is productive, but not because of any inevitable laws. To be sure, Maurice Allais has shown an astonishing parallelism in income distribution rights in Greece in the fourth century, B.C., Rome in 22 B.C., England in 1086, the United States in 1918, and France in 1982,[5] which might lead us to believe in some immutable process in the distribution of wealth. But it is not clear that economic growth is necessarily accompanied by increased inequality, as occurred in the early stages of capitalism. Indeed, we observe today an inverse situation: inequalities are greatest in the less-developed countries, for scarce resources cannot be redistributed easily.

Without denying the impact of objective economic conditions on social change, I would submit that history's particular contribution lies in its emphasis on the cultural constraints on change that are rooted in very slowly evolving national traditions. Recent Polish developments are instructive, for they show that, despite the existence of a certain similarity to the Soviet Union with respect to political systems and economic structures, nationalist feeling and the vitality of the Catholic Church in Poland have generated an alliance of workers and intelligentsia calling for democratic reforms. By contrast, could not one attribute the stability of the Soviet system, despite its inequalities, to a historically recognizable sort of connivance between the populace and the regime?

The authors of the books at hand all note the irreversible effects of the evolution of Soviet society, but they may have underestimated one change that I consider fundamental. The intelligentsia (in the broad sense of the term used by the Soviets), which remained on the margins of, even hostile to, power under the ancien régime, today embodies this power or is integrated into its exercise. This explains why the prevailing ideology is based on a putative meritocracy that justifies existing inequalities, just as Protestantism served as a moral justification for the accumulation of wealth in the early days of capitalism. It also explains why management science could be adopted so easily: the ideology matches the ideals of a technocracy of varied social origins.[6]

3. Investigation of social values. The prevailing ideology and political culture, which attracts many analysts' attention, should not be confused with social values. By social values, I mean the deep, underlying motives for behavior, which determine the real nature of social relations. In 19th-century Europe, the ideology of the ruling classes was never adopted by the working classes, who were imbued with a very different set of values than was the bourgeoisie.

What is the situation in the USSR today? Should we heed those like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who say that the official ideology is dead and only a ruthless police dictatorship prevents the Russian people from breaking their chains, that the dissident intellectuals are loudly proclaiming what everyone is thinking in private? Or should we believe A. Zinoviev, who stresses that Soviet society itself has spawned the current regime because it meets that society's basic needs for security.[7]

The books analyzed here do not answer this question, because they strive to remain on the solid ground of objective research, seeking to explain social facts by social factors. In so doing, they neglect the irreplaceable contributions made by contemporary Soviet literature, whether published in the USSR or abroad. Literature is far superior to coefficients of social mobility as a means of understanding whether inequalities are perceived as such or how different managerial styles affect the attitude of the workers—in short, whether a collective self-consciousness is emerging among workers.[8]

---

[5] Maurice Allais, "Inequalities and Civilization," in *Science économique et conscience de la société—Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron* (The Science of Economics and Knowledge of Society—A Collection in Honor of Raymond Aron), Vol. 2, Paris, Calman Levy, 1971.

[6] On this point, see Judith A. Merkle, *Management and Ideology*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980.

[7] See A. Zinoviev, *L'avenir radieux*, Lausanne, l'Age d'Homme, 1978 (published in English as *The Bright Future*, New York, NY, Random House, 1981); idem, *Nous et l'Occident* (The West and Us), and *Le communisme comme réalité* (Communism as Reality), published in 1980 and 1981 respectively by l'Age d'Homme.

[8] Such matters are discussed in a broader context in A. S. Tannenbaum, *Hierarchy in Organization: An International Comparison*, San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1979.

IF IT IS TRUE that collective utopias do not develop outside the individual but spring from his hopes for more security and especially for a better life for his children, that if these utopias relieve one of his personal responsibilities and substitute an external ideology to resolve the disorder of his contradictions, then perhaps the social sciences have a nobler mission than that of fueling "religious" war. It is to show that despite certain undeniable inequalities and differences, all men share the same fears, the same loneliness, the same desire for genuine communication in which distinctions between superior and inferior are eliminated. This would presuppose some preliminary effort at demystification, to which the present authors have contributed, perhaps involuntarily. Because of their analysis of Soviet society, it is no longer possible to believe that a system of coercion is required if one is to lessen inequalities (for inequalities were greatest during the Stalinist era), or that socialism compensates individuals solely on the basis of their work. Unfortunately, history also teaches us that the dreams of abundance and future equality fade slowly from the collective psyche, especially for those who are not benefiting from the present.

CORRECTIONS

On page 1, footnote 1 of the article "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1981), the date of Giles Fletcher's *Of the Russe Commonwealth* should be 1591.

• • •

The caption of the photo on page 17 of the November-December 1981 issue incorrectly identifies the Korean People's Army as belonging to North Vietnam. The KPA is the military force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

BACK ISSUE ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

ORDER FORM

Please enter my subscription to PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) for one year (six issues) @ $14.00 domestic or $17.50 foreign.

Number of subscriptions ____________.

Enclosed is $ ________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No. ____________

VISA®

master charge

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City   State   ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

ORDER FORM

Please send the following back issue(s) of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) @ $3.25 domestic or $4.10 foreign.

Date(s) of issue(s) ____________.

Enclosed is $ ________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No. ____________

VISA®

master charge

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City   State   ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last five) issues of *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single-issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURRENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $13.00 each; outside the US, $16.25 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $2.75 each; outside the US $3.45 each. A 25 percent discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services, ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49–65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Microfilming Corp. of America
1620 Hawkins Avenue, Box 10
Sanford, NC 27330

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

Problems of Communism

2

MARCH-APRIL 1982 VOL XXXI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editoral matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 Poland's Economic Crisis
By Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl

22 Soviet Decision-Making and Poland
by Richard D. Anderson, Jr.

BOOKS

37 Baltic Identity and Sovietization
by Romuald J. Misiunas

42 Yugoslavia's "Self-Management" on Trial
by Cyril A. Zebot

50 Dissenting French Communists
by Victor de Stankovich

58 Dissent in China
by Merle Goldman

63 China's Place in World Politics
by Samuel S. Kim

NOTES & VIEWS

71 Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts
by Richard F. Staar

77 Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"
by Wallace Spaulding

83 Correspondence

Cover: Polish miners near Katowice in the coalfields of Upper Silesia. Photo by Christian Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.
SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT)
David E. Albright
SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT)
Wayne Hall
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
William E. Freeman
Sophia Sluzar
DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
Linda A. Wray
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Gwenette Worthington

IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Poland's Economic Crisis
Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl

Poland's economic crisis has assumed almost epic proportions since the appearance of its first symptoms in the late 1970's. Its causes lie deep in the Soviet-type economic system imposed on Poland, and half-measures will not solve it—not those suggested even when real reform seemed possible nor those floated through since the imposition of military rule in December 1981. On the contrary, the military situation may well lead to even greater economic difficulties.

Soviet Decision-Making and Poland
Richard D. Anderson, Jr.

Different perceptions of their best interests led Soviet Politburo members to advocate different options for resolving the Polish situation. As a consequence, the Politburo twice ordered preparations for external military intervention in Poland but then called off such an undertaking. Maneuverings by individual Politburo members also led to the replacement of those officers in high Soviet commands mostly likely to have pressed for a Polish intervention.

• • •

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts
Richard F. Staar

This list, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982), identifies 96 Communist parties apparently recognized by Moscow today, plus 10 major Soviet international front organizations. Data provided concerning each party include the population of the country in which it exists, its estimated or claimed membership, its showing in the most recent national elections, its legal status, and its general orientation within the international Communist movement.

Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"
Wallace Spaulding

A listing of countries, parties, and movements that Moscow views as part of the world "national liberation movement"—which, next to the ruling and nonruling Communist and workers' parties, is the most significant force in the world revolutionary process in Soviet eyes. Data provided include the participation of these elements in the congresses of certain Communist parties, in the work of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the official journal of Moscow-oriented Communist parties), and in the activities of the Moscow-sponsored World Peace Council.

• • •

(Continued on back cover)

Essay-reviews

Baltic Identity and Sovietization
Romuald J. Misiunas

Resistance to Sovietization continues to characterize the societies of the Baltic republics of the USSR. It takes the form of efforts to nativize the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Communist parties and of cultivating a national culture and a Western life-style. While this resistance is at present muted, there is little doubt that the right catalyst could transform it into overt opposition to the Soviet system.

Yugoslavia's "Self-Management" on Trial
Cyril A. Zebot

Yugoslavia's serious economic problems stem from political-administrative meddling in what was supposed to be a truly autonomous "self-managing" economy and, more fundamentally, from distrust among Yugoslavia's national groups. There are indications that these problems will be given serious consideration at the party congress set for June 1982. The key, however, will be whether changes in economic self-management will be accompanied by political liberalization.

Dissenting French Communists
Victor de Stankovich

France affords a particularly interesting milieu in which to observe the process of involvement and then disillusionment with institutionalized communism. The experiences of a number of Frenchmen who have gone through this process suggest that, despite differences in age, background, and probably temperament, they have shared common impulses of idealism and realism and a very highly developed sense of liberty. The last, which reflects a sturdy reality of France for a long time, seems to have been the most powerful factor in their breaks with the party.

Dissent in China
Merle Goldman

Dissent exists in the People's Republic of China, just as it does in the West and in the Soviet Union. However, it takes forms that owe much to the Chinese tradition of dissent. It occurs primarily under official sanction. Dissenters establish alliances with political factions in the establishment or capitalize upon opportunities available when the leadership, for its own political purposes, countenances dissent.

China's Place in World Politics
Samuel S. Kim

There is a new "reality" to China's place in the world: its more active participation in the world state system and global organizations, and, correspondingly, its increasingly evident global outlook. Unfortunately, even recent works on Chinese foreign policy do not capture this reality, for they still bear the marks of the "Sinocentric" approach of an earlier era.

Poland's Economic Crisis

By Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl

The imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, seems to have closed another chapter in the postwar history of Poland. Once again it has been demonstrated that it is impossible to create "communism with a human face." Whether the reforms come from within the Communist party, as in Czechoslovakia, or from the mass of workers and wide circles among the population, as in Poland after August 1980, they sooner or later stumble upon such problems as censorship, free elections, human rights, and the leading role of the party. Even when membership in the Soviet bloc is not openly questioned and alliance with the Soviet Union is accepted, there are certain boundaries no East European country is allowed to overstep.

The resort to a military solution, which General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the military junta had obviously prepared well in advance, instead of a political settlement, clearly demonstrates the bankruptcy of the regime in Poland. After 36 years with a monopoly of power, the regime has not been able to fulfill its economic promises. It has had to use security troops against workers, whom it is supposed to represent, and against young people, in whom it has made every effort to inculcate loyalty toward the official ideology. For all practical purposes, the Communist party (Polish United Workers' Party—PUWP) has ceased to function, except as a club of military and security leaders, top bureaucrats, and various party functionaries. Nonetheless, despite all the apparent gains achieved by Solidarity and the losses suffered by the party, despite economic disarray, administrative paralysis, negotiations, and promises of "renewal," the state security apparatus remained intact and untouched, carefully observing, preparing to strike at the right moment. After 16 months of hesitation and inaction, all liberal pretence was dropped, and a reign of terror of a new kind began.

The extent of martial-law violence is not yet fully known in the West. But even official sources give some indication of the scope of the security forces' actions. On December 17, according to official sources, the breaking of a strike at the Wujek coal mine near Katowice resulted in seven persons killed and 39 civilians and 40 security police wounded. On the same day, during disturbances in Gdansk, 164 civilians and 160 security police were wounded. At the end of December, a sit-in strike at the Piast coal mine near Katowice lasted two weeks, and many arrests were made after strikes were broken at the Institute of Nuclear Research (near Warsaw), in the Ziemowit coal mine (near Katowice), and in the Zeran automobile factory (near Warsaw). By January 12, again according to official sources, more than 4,900 persons had been interned. On January 30, six civilians and eight security police were wounded, and 205 persons were arrested, during attempted demonstrations in Gdansk. On February 13, 194 persons were arrested during attempted demonstrations in Poznan. At the end of February, during a massive operation conducted over two days by the security forces and militia, some 51,000 stores and warehouses, 60,000 trucks and cars, and 3,500 private residences were searched. Obviously, many other incidents went unreported, especially in the smaller cities and countryside.[1]

It is perhaps too early to see the full implications of martial law and the crackdown on Solidarity. Clearly, though, it is preeminently in the economic sphere that

Mr. Fallenbuchl is Professor of Economics at the University of Windsor (Ontario, Canada). He is the author of many works on the Soviet and East European economies, most recently as coeditor (with Carl McMillan) of Partners in East-West Economic Relations, *1980, and contributor to such journals as* Soviet Studies, Canadian Journal of Economics, *and* Canadian Slavonic Papers.

---

[1] For events in Poland since the imposition of martial law, see generally *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*; for official information on the events described above, see *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Nos. 2, 3, and 5, 1982; and *Przekroj* (Warsaw), Feb. 28, 1982, p. 2.

the military solution does not promise satisfactory results. Highly trained and loyal professional security units can be used to break strikes and to take over factories and mines. Workers can be forced, under martial law, to report to work. The workweek can be extended by decree. It is impossible, however, to ensure that production tasks will be properly performed, especially in modern industry, where high-quality and technically complex goods can be produced only with the special attention, understanding, and cooperation of highly motivated and disciplined workers. It is impossible to increase labor productivity and to improve the overall efficiency of the economy—precisely the conditions for recovery from the present economic crisis.

These assumptions are confirmed by recent news from Poland. Poland's indebtedness to the West is still huge—now more than US$27 billion—and the military regime has made no progress toward reducing it. Production continues to decline. In 1982, it is estimated, industrial production will again show a negative rate of growth, farmers are reportedly holding agricultural produce off the market, and the economy as a whole is racked by shortages, particularly of intermediate goods and spare parts.[2] As usual, consumers are bearing the brunt, and long lines are commonplace, just as before December 13. Jaruzelski earlier manipulated the question of the economy for his own purposes—indeed, he used the economic crisis as the justification for imposing martial law[3]—but he is now, in a sense, a captive of the economy.

But what of the future? Observers, governments, and perhaps even factions in the Polish leadership differ over what will happen next. Is martial law only a temporary phenomenon, and will there be a return to something like the pre-December period? Or is it merely the beginning of a long period of stultifying repression, much as has been the case in Czechoslovakia since 1968? All observers agree, however, that the economy remains the regime's most intractable problem. Indeed, when the real causes of the current economic crisis are examined, it becomes apparent that neither the present military regine, nor any likely successor regime, can provide a viable solution to Poland's profound economic difficulties.

The Nature of the Crisis

It is necessary first to reject the notion that Poland's economic crisis was brought on simply by muddled policies, by the mistakes, incompetence, and corruption of the leadership and its planners and administrators.

---

[2] See "January 1982—An Information Guide by the Central Statistical Office," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 5, 1982.

[3] For the text of Jaruzelski's declaration, see *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1982.

Symptomatic of economic dislocation in Poland, customers queue up in the rain outside a butcher shop in Warsaw in September 1981. The signs read: "Meat products" and "Meat."

—Jean Pierre Laffont/SYGMA.

Some such explanation has always been the official line after an economic catastrophe. After the collapse of the Six-Year Plan (1950–55), the "Stalinists" were blamed. After Wladyslaw Gomulka fell from power in December 1970, his economic policies were criticized. Now, it is Edward Gierek and his advisers that are at fault. To be sure, all these leadership groups did in fact greatly contribute to the economic difficulties, through their arbitrary decisions, their unwillingness to listen to criticism, and their sheer incompetence. However, the real roots of the crisis go much deeper than mere failure of leadership.

Similarly, Solidarity cannot be held responsible for the crisis. The crisis was not caused by the strikers and labor unrest; on the contrary, the strikes and the establishment of free labor unions grew out of a rapidly accelerating economic crisis with which the government and party leaders were unable to cope.

The real causes of Poland's economic crisis lie in the system itself. This Soviet-type economic system has been implanted in Poland since the late 1940's and early 1950's, and its salient features are well known.

One feature has been the overcentralization inherent in the Soviet-type command economy. The command economy has many advantages. It can enforce a high degree of mobilization of resources, it can ensure full utilization of those resources, and it can direct the allocation of resources toward the fulfillment of selected quantitative targets. But it cannot ensure efficiency.[4]

Another feature has been the Soviet development model, with its strong element of autarkism. This development strategy concentrated on the expansion of industry, especially those branches that produced producer goods required for the domestic investment program. But these priority industries were all capital-, energy-, and material-intensive ones which required imports at a time when no viable export sector had been created. The development strategy played down agriculture, consumer goods, and the socioeconomic infrastructure (the so-called nonproductive sphere).[5] Thus, some traditional Polish exports produced by low-priority sectors were neglected, and several traditional markets were lost. A potential balance-of-payments crisis was inherent from the very beginning.[6]

A third feature has been the reorientation of Poland's foreign economic relations toward the Soviet Union. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Poland's trade with the West declined dramatically, both relatively and absolutely, and trade with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, with the other countries of Eastern Europe increased. The result was an added emphasis on producer goods, regardless of profitability, and a further deemphasis of consumer goods.[7] Under Soviet pressure, Poland had to withdraw from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD)—it was one of the original members—and to reject Marshall Plan aid. Thus, the capital required for postwar reconstruction and industrialization could not be obtained from abroad, at the very time there was a net outflow of capital from Poland and other East European countries to the Soviet Union.[8] Poland was increasingly isolated from the world economy.

---

[4] The author has discussed the Soviet-type economic system in "How Does the Soviet Economy Function Without a Free Market?" *The Queen's Quarterly* (Kingston, Ontario), No. 4, 1964, reprinted in M. Bornstein and D. R. Fusfeld, Eds., *The Soviet Economy: A Book of Readings*, 4th Ed., Homewood, IL, Irwin, 1974, pp. 3–16; and (in an abbreviated version) in R. T. Gill, *Economics: A Text with Included Readings*, Pacific Palisades, CA, Goodyear, 1973, pp. 80–84.

[5] For a more detailed discussion of that strategy, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Communist Pattern of Industrialization," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 4, 1970, pp. 451–78.

[6] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Policy Alternatives in Polish Foreign Economic Relations," in M. D. Simon and R. E. Kanet, Eds., *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981, pp. 329–69.

During the first industrialization drive of the early 1950's, then, the combined impact of the overcentralized economic system, the development strategy, and the redirection of economic relations put a distinctive stamp on the Polish economy, much as was the case with the economies of the other East European countries. To use recent Soviet and East European terminology, an "extensive" pattern of development emerged, in which rates of growth depended primarily on increases in the quantity of inputs rather than on increases in the productivity of inputs.[9] A top-heavy industrial structure arose, geared to extensive development and a relatively high degree of autarky. Iron and steel, heavy machinery, metalworking, chemicals, transport equipment, and other branches typical of 19th-century industrialization were given priority, as Poland's economic planners tried to imitate the Soviet industrial structure.[10] Such "new branches of industry" as electronics and petrochemicals (including synthetic fibers and plastics) were neglected.[11] Much of Poland's industrial output consisted of goods which are profitable only if produced on a large scale and which are sensitive to technological progress and must therefore be continuously modernized.[12]

The result was high operating costs, which made many plants and entire industries unproductive. Although the distorted price system concealed the true picture, it is clear that a few profitable sectors, mainly consumer-goods industries, agriculture, and coal mining, had to subsidize unprofitable sectors. In this way, the amount of capital that the profitable sectors could have generated for their own expansion and modernization was reduced. This kind of inefficiency was perhaps the inevitable consequence of imposing a Soviet-type economic system and development strategy and forcing an unnatural reorientation of trade patterns on a country that differs greatly from the Soviet Union in terms of size, self-sufficiency, and political, social, and cultural traditions.

Serious disturbances in the Polish economy appeared within a few years, by the mid-1950's. They resulted in workers' riots in Poznan in June 1956 and a change in party leadership in October 1956. The new PUWP first secretary was Wladyslaw Gomulka, whose ascendancy led many Poles to hope for a more liberal regime.

In the economy, certain changes were pushed through straightaway. Grains and foodstuffs were imported on Western credits in order to improve the standard of living, which had fallen during the industrialization and collectivization drive. The rate of investment was reduced, and some investment was redirected toward agriculture, consumer-goods industries, and infrastructure. Some bold proposals for systemic modifications were discussed, but no significant and lasting reforms followed, other than the decollectivization of agriculture and some decentralization and rationalization of economic decision-making.

In the event, palliatives were not sufficient to improve the overall efficiency of the Polish economy. Moreover, after a temporary period of readjustment after 1956, the same development strategy was continued. A new industrialization drive started in 1961, which built on and extended the industrial structure created during the 1950's. Gomulka's plan was to restructure and modernize the economy on the basis of domestic accumulation (forced saving). But this approach failed badly. By the late 1960's, the economy was again caught in a vicious circle of stagnation.[13]

---

[7] On the effect of the pattern of intrabloc trade, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Commodity Composition of Intra-Comecon Trade and the Industrial Structure of the Member Countries," in *Comecon: Program and Perspectives*, Brussels, NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs, 1977, pp. 103–34.

[8] P. Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with East Europe: 1945 to the Present," in S. Rosen and J. Kurth, Eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath, 1974; and P. Marer, "Soviet Economic Policy in Eastern Europe," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 135–63.

[9] The author has discussed this pattern of development in "East European Integration: Comecon," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, pp. 79–134.

[10] J. Kleer, *ZSSR—pol-wieku przemian gospodarczych* (The USSR—A Half Century of Economic Transformations), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1969, pp. 26–27.

[11] J. Kleer, *Reformy gospodarcze w krajach socjalistycznych* (Economic Reforms in the Socialist Countries), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Zwiazkowe CRZZ, 1969, pp. 126–28.

[12] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Industrial Structure and the Intensive Pattern of Development in Poland," *Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas* (Munich), 1973, pp. 223–54.

[13] The author has discussed the situation at the end of the 1960's in "The Strategy of Development and Gierek's Economic Manoeuvre," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Nos. 1–2, 1973, reprinted in A. Bromke and J. W. Strong, Eds., *Gierek's Poland*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1973, pp. 52–70.

After the riots of December 1970 forced a change in the party leadership, the new PUWP first secretary Edward Gierek and his advisers tried to achieve economic modernization through a "new development strategy." Its key was large-scale import of capital and technology from the West. Its essence was that an increase in investment was necessary to restructure and modernize the economy but that a simultaneous increase in consumption was necessary to create incentives, without which it would be difficult to expect improvements in labor productivity.

Gierek and his planners had high expectations. They hoped to increase the export of some high-quality manufactured goods, which would be produced in new or newly modernized plants with the help of Western machines and equipment and according to Western specifications, in some cases on the basis of Western licenses or even in cooperation with Western firms. The result would soon be an excess of exports over imports, and the debt would be repaid quickly. Moreover, exports to other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), to the less developed countries, and to the advanced countries of the West would increase the scale of production. This, together with a modernized capital stock and increased labor productivity, would ensure an intensive pattern of development.[14]

There were many flaws in the implementation of this ambitious strategy. The rates of investment were too high, and the investment front was too wide. Increases in personal income, badly needed after a prolonged period of stagnation at very low levels, were too large for the investment effort, even with large doses of imported capital. In industry, imports of investment goods and intermediate goods were excessive, and foreign licenses were purchased in numbers too big to be absorbed by the economy within a short period of time.[15] In agriculture, discrimination against the relatively more efficient private sector reduced agricultural exports, made imports of grain necessary, and thus contributed to balance-of-payments difficulties. In foreign trade, the way in which the planners tried to insulate the economy from the impact of the worldwide stagflation contributed to significant difficulties, primarily by increasing price distortions and inefficiency throughout the economy.[16]

Above all, the inflexible command system, only slightly modified by the WOG (large economic organizations) reform of 1973, made it too difficult to implement the "new development strategy."[17] Profitable exports to the nonsocialist countries proved very difficult to expand. Potential export items were selected from above by central planners who had no adequate information about world market conditions or even about real domestic production capacities. Price distortions made it impossible to calculate the profitability of various export alternatives. The inflexibility of the system rendered it difficult to make quick adjustments. The quality and prompt delivery of intermediate goods could not be ensured. At the same time, imports began to grow very rapidly, for arbitrary investment decisions and distorted prices had made the economy even more capital-, energy-, and material-intensive.[18]

When serious internal and external disequilibria appeared in the mid-1970's, Gierek and his advisers withdrew the limited systemic modifications of 1973 and returned to the old ways—to a high degree of centralization and a greater use of administrative commands. Instead of a gradual reduction of the trade deficit with nonsocialist countries in such a way that the transfer of Western technology would not be interrupted and investment projects could be completed at a slower pace, there were drastic cuts in imports from the West. The impact of the resulting bottlenecks was magnified by the operation of the supply multiplier.[19] Not only were the long-run prospects for further development damaged, but there was also a decline in the current level of output, including production for export. Attempts to export at any cost created losses and diverted some basic consumer goods and even producer goods from the domestic market, and shortages were further aggravated.[20]

---

[14] For a more detailed analysis of this policy, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970's," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 816–64.

[15] See Z. M. Fallenbuchl, *Technology Transfer in East-West Economic Relations: The Case of Poland, 1971–80*, DSTI/SPR/81.4, Paris, E/OECD, 1981.

[16] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Impact of External Economic Disturbances on Poland Since 1971," in E. Neuberger and L. Tyson, Eds., *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980, pp. 280–304.

[17] For more details, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economic Assessment*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 33–71. For discussion of the WOG system, see also Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970's," loc. cit.; J. Staniszkis, "On Remodelling of the Polish Economic System," *Soviet Studies*, No. 4, 1978, pp. 547–52; and P. T. Wanless, "Economic Reform in Poland 1973–79," ibid., No. 1, 1980, pp. 28–57.

[18] W. Trzeciakowski, "Problems of Planning and Management in Polish Foreign Trade," *Handel zagraniczny* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1980, pp. 9–12; J. Soldaczuk, "Foreign Trade, Economic Growth, and Economic Efficiency," ibid., pp. 5–9; W. Rydygier, "Illusions and Reality," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 41, 1980, pp. 3–4; and A. Budnikowski and J. Misala, "Polish Export in the 1970's," *Handel zagraniczny*, No. 2, 1981, pp. 20–23.

[19] On the foreign trade–supply multiplier, see F. D. Holzman, *Foreign Trade Under Central Planning*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 126–35.

[20] For a more detailed discussion, see Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's."

Table 1: Selected Polish Economic Indicators, 1961–81, and 1982 Plan Variants

(percent annual growth, in constant prices[a])

	1961–1970	1971–1975	1976–1980	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981 mod. plan	1981, est.	1982 plan variants[b]		
											Min.	Prob.	Max.
Domestic net material product:[c]	6.1	9.9	1.4	6.8	5.0	3.0	−2.3	−5.4	−15.1	−14.5	−8.3	−1.4	2.1
of which, by sector:													
All industry	8.3	10.8	3.0	9.3	7.7	2.5	−1.7	−3.0	−20.4	−18.7	n.a.	−3.3	n.a.
Socialist industry	8.5	11.0	2.7	9.4	7.5	2.3	−2.0	−3.5	−20.8	−19.0	n.a.	−3.5	n.a.
Construction	6.7	13.4	−2.6	2.5	1.0	−0.3	−6.2	−10.5	−15.3	−19.8	n.a.	−2.9	n.a.
Agriculture	0.9	1.0	−1.8	1.1	−0.2	8.5	−3.2	−14.0	−4.1	−4.2	n.a.	4.3	n.a.
National net material product:[d]	5.8	12.0	0.2	7.0	2.7	0.7	−3.4	−5.9	−14.0	−13.4	−15.5	−4.5	−1.1
of which:													
Expenditure on consumption from personal income	4.8	8.5	5.2	8.7	6.6	1.0	3.2	6.4	−14.4	−6.0	−12.2	−4.8	−3.4
"Collective consumption"	8.5	9.8	4.5	9.8	7.8	5.4	2.4	−2.7	4.1	4.1	0.7	1.8	2.9
Investment ("accumulation")	7.4	19.0	−11.6	3.7	−5.3	−1.4	−18.0	−37.0	−26.0	−56.0	−72.3	−13.2	12.0
Foreign trade, total:													
Exports	10.3	10.7	4.1	4.4	8.0	5.7	6.8	−4.3	−8.5	−13.5	−0.5	6.4	10.8
Imports	9.2	15.3	1.5	9.6	−0.1	1.8	−0.9	−2.8	−4.0	−8.2	−21.3	−3.8	1.0
Trade with socialist countries:													
Exports	9.9[e]	12.0	3.0	−3.0	10.6	7.5	9.6	−9.6	−1.5	−6.8	0.0	4.1	4.1
Imports	10.3[e]	8.3	5.5	7.6	12.1	4.7	1.7	1.6	8.1	4.2	−18.8	−7.8	−3.1
Trade with all other countries:													
Exports	8.9[e]	8.4	5.1	12.3	4.1	2.8	2.1	4.0	−16.1	−20.7	−1.0	9.4	19.3
Imports	6.2[e]	26.4	−2.5	11.4	−10.5	−1.2	−3.9	−8.4	−18.7	−23.2	−26.8	2.4	7.3
Capital-labor ratio (net)[f]	4.9	4.6	5.9	7.1	9.4	10.6	9.7	9.5	8.9	8.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Productivity of "productive" fixed capital stock[g]	1.8	3.8	3.0	1.0	−1.1	−2.6	−4.3	−5.6	−9.6	−11.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Productivity of labor[h]	6.9	8.6	9.0	8.2	8.3	7.7	5.0	3.3	−1.5	−4.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Difference between growth rates of labor productivity and of capital-labor ratio	2.0	4.0	3.1	1.1	−1.1	−2.9	−4.7	−6.2	−10.4	−12.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Share of investment ("accumulation") in national net material product:	25.0	33.0	28.0	34.1	31.5	30.8	26.2	17.5	14.0	8.7	2.9	10.2	10.0
of which:													
Net fixed investment	17.7	24.3	24.0	26.7	27.2	26.1	23.2	16.7	16.7	11.8	n.a.	9.0	n.a.
Change in inventories	7.3	8.7	4.0	7.4	4.3	4.7	3.0	0.8	2.2	−2.2	n.a.	2.1	n.a.

[a] In the case of multiyear periods, average annual growth; in the case of the share of investment in national net material product, the figures are absolute percents of annual NNMP or of total NNMP for indicated period.

[b] Figures are from the original 1982 plan; the new figures of December 1981 were not fully available to the author.

[c] Or "produced national income"—for definition, see text.

[d] Or "distributed national income"—for definition, see text.

[e] Data are for 1966–1970 only.

[f] The value of "productive fixed assets" per person employed.

[g] Domestic net material product per unit value of "productive fixed assets."

[h] Domestic net material product per person employed in material production.

SOURCES: *Rzadowy raport o stanie gospodarki* (Government Report on the State of the Economy), Warsaw, July 1981, p. 120; Central Statistical Administration, *Rocznik statystyczny handlu zagranicznego 1980* (Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade, 1980), Warsaw, 1980; *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 41, 1980, p. 4, No. 38, 1981, p. 4, and No. 43, 1981, p. 2; and the author's own calculations (there are some differences as to the expected 1982 figures in various sources).

Table 2: Poland's Balance on Current Account and Indebtedness, Transactions with Nonsocialist Countries Only, 1971–82

(billions US$, current prices)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981, modified plan	1981, est.	1982, planned
CURRENT ACCOUNT													
Export of goods and services	2.3	2.6	3.4	5.1	5.7	6.1	6.8	7.4	8.4	9.8	8.9	8.6	9.3
Import of goods and services	2.0	2.7	4.8	7.2	8.7	8.9	8.6	8.9	10.3	10.2	9.1	8.7	8.8
Balance	0.3	−0.1	−1.4	−2.1	−3.0	−2.8	−1.8	−1.5	−1.9	−0.4	−0.2	−0.1	−0.5
Net interest payments	−0.0	−0.0	−0.1	−0.3	−0.5	−0.6	−0.9	−1.1	−1.6	−2.4	−2.7	−2.7	−3.6
Balance on current account	0.3	−0.1	−1.5	−2.4	−3.5	−3.4	−2.7	−2.6	−3.5	−2.8	−2.9	−2.8	−4.1
INDEBTEDNESS													
End-of-year debt	1.2	1.5	2.8	4.8	7.6	11.2	14.3	16.9	23.1	27.0	n.a.	28.8	32.3
Debt service	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.1	3.1	4.5	6.3	8.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Debt service ratio, in percent[a]	*17.4*	*15.4*	*14.7*	*19.6*	*26.3*	*34.4*	*45.6*	*60.8*	*75.0*	*81.6*	*n.a.*	*n.a.*	*n.a.*

[a] Debt service/exports.

SOURCES: *Rzadowy raport o stanie gospadarki* (Government Report on the State of the Economy), Warsaw, July 1981, p. 124; *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 18, 1981, p. 2, No. 28, 1981, p. 11, and No. 44, 1981, p. 2.

By the late 1970's, it was evident that the Polish economy was moving rapidly toward a major crisis. The rate of growth of national product fell to only 3.0 percent in 1978 and −2.3 percent in 1979. The pattern of development became not less but even more extensive (see Table 1, particularly the decline in capital productivity and the difference between labor productivity and capital-labor ratio). The net hard-currency indebtedness increased from US$14.3 billion in 1977 to US$16.9 billion in 1978 and US$20.5 billion at the end of 1979 (see Table 2). At the same time, the nominal net personal income grew rapidly—by 9.1 percent in 1978 and 9.9 percent in 1979—even as drastic shortages of consumer goods were being experienced.[21] By the second quarter of 1980, the crisis was severe, aggravated by difficulties in foreign trade and the resulting shortages of materials. The plan for the second half of 1980 had to be revised downward, and an attempt was made to enforce an improvement in the balance of trade, whatever the difficulties. The cost was even greater deterioration in the domestic consumer market.[22]

The leadership seemed helpless in the face of such a collapse. At the Eighth PUWP Congress, held in February 1980, it had been clear that the party and government leaders had no economic program. Instead, they had held to the same policy of attempting, through direct administrative command, to reallocate resources from investment to consumption, and to expand exports and severely restrict imports.[23]

Moreover, in the annual plan for 1980, prepared at the end of 1979, the planners had been unable to effect even a purely formal balance between the monetary demand and the supply of goods and services. Many material balances were achieved on the basis of unrealistic assumptions.[24] The "produced national income" (domestic net material product—DNMP—the value of all goods produced and of some services connected directly with their production) was expected to increase by 1.4–1.8 percent, trade with nonsocialist countries was to be balanced, and the "allocated national income" (national net material product—NNMP—which differs from DNMP by the balance of exports and imports) was expected to remain unchanged at the 1979 level. Industrial production was to rise by 3.0–4.0 percent, even though in 1979 "sold industrial production" (the value of industrial production actually sold to wholesale organizations or other enterprises, calculated at constant prices) had increased by only 1.9 percent and net industrial production (industry's contribution to DNMP) had declined by 1.7 percent. Such an increase assumed—unrealistically—(1) a rise of 4.4 percent in labor productivity (in 1977, productivity measured in terms of gross production increased by only 2.7 percent, and that measured in terms of net production declined by 1.8 percent), and (2) a 1.2 percent reduction in material cost per unit of output. The planned targets for agriculture were based on the unrealistically optimistic assumption that after a decline in 1979, agricultural output would rise.[25]

---

[21] *Rzadowy raport o stanie gospodarki* (Government Report on the State of the Economy), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, July 1981.

[22] "Problems and Tasks of the National Socioeconomic Plan for 1981," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1981, p. 61.

[23] Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's."

[24] "Problems and Tasks of the National Socioeconomic Plan for 1980," loc. cit., p. 61.

Merely trying to muddle through, however, could not give satisfactory results this time. The efficiency of the economy could not be improved, and the country's indebtedness could not be reduced, without far-reaching economic reform and a carefully prepared stabilization plan.

Proposals for Economic Reform

But the conditions for serious economic reform were created only by the events of the summer of 1980. The wave of strikes in August and September forced a change in party and government leadership. Gierek was ousted, and Stanislaw Kania replaced him, as PUWP first secretary. The strike movement also gave rise to the independent labor union Solidarity, which grew so rapidly that within months it could claim to represent more than 9 million of Poland's 13 million workers.[26] An air of liberalization prevailed, not only in society but also among many members of the party rank and file.

Under pressure from Solidarity, the Sejm (parliament), and public opinion in general, the new government agreed to prepare a proposal for economic reform, a report on the state of the economy, and a stabilization and recovery program. But it did not seem prepared to rush into a sweeping economic reform. PUWP leaders, preoccupied with reestablishing party unity and achieving some credibility, seemed more anxious to circumscribe and undermine Solidarity than to deal seriously with the economic crisis. In the meantime, as production continued to decline and the hard-currency debt continued to grow, the economy deteriorated even further. Almost a year would be wasted without the introduction of any viable policy for economic recovery and stabilization.

Directions of Economic Reform: A Proposal. This document, in which the new government offered its initial proposals for economic reform, was the first of the three documents to appear. It was drawn up by a Committee for Economic Reform, a large and cumbersome body of 500 members (with 11 specialized teams of experts), appointed in September 1980 by the PUWP Politburo and the Council of State. The initial version of the proposal came out in January 1981, in a shorter, milder, and vaguer form than one published in October 1980 by the Polish Economics Association.[27] After sharp criticism from several quarters—the free labor unions, the press, and the Polish Economics Association (at its general meeting in March 1981)—a revised version appeared in July 1981. This version, entitled *Directions of Economic Reform: A Proposal,*[28] was discussed at the PUWP Ninth Extraordinary Congress in July 1981, where Premier Jaruzelski promised that the government would act quickly to introduce it.[29]

A key question was the timing of reform. The reform proposal in its final version clearly stated that there was a great danger in introducing economic reform during a crisis with serious internal and external disequilibria, that there would be a considerable social cost in making all the necessary changes in the economic structure (including closing down unprofitable enterprises), and that the positive results of the reform would appear only gradually. Nevertheless, the document warned, the risks must be taken. On the one hand, "the discouragement, or even an incomplete introduction, of reform would burden society with far greater social costs, which could have tragic consequences." On the other hand, "the introduction of reform would contribute to the activation of a mechanism favoring the recovery and maintenance of economic stability." It would lead to "domestic market stability, to a stronger currency, and in the long run—together with increased overall economic efficiency and an improved balance-of-payments position—currency convertibility."[30]

The wording of the final version represented a defeat for the economic "conservatives." Many officials, although not opposing the reform (nobody seemed to be against it at the time), wished to postpone it, contending that reform should not be attempted until economic stability had been achieved through direct administrative measures. But by July 1981, the committee officially came around to the view that reform was a necessary condition for stabilization and recovery. The reform proposal clearly stated that "the reform will be carried out on a comprehensive scale in the shortest possible time," because "the traditional mechanism had ceased to work, the ability to control the economy had been considerably limited, and the effectiveness of the economy was rapidly declining."[31]

---

[25] "The National Socioeconomic Plan for 1980," *Gospodarka planowa,* No. 1, 1980, pp. 1–5.

[26] See *The Washington Post,* Oct. 30, 1981.

[27] *Podstawowe zalozenia reformy gospodarczej* (Basic Principles of Economic Reform), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, January 1981; cf. "Meeting of the Economists," *Zycie gospodarcze,* No. 12, 1981, pp. 14–16.

[28] *Kierunki reformy gospodarczej—projekt* (Directions of Economic Reform—A Proposal), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, July 1981.

[29] *Express wieczorny* (Warsaw), July 20, 1981, p. 3; *Zycie gospodarcze,* No. 30, 1981, p. 3.

[30] *Kierunki reformy,* pp. 5, 8.

Could an immediate and comprehensive economic reform have had much chance for success? Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, it should be noted, was introduced on January 1, 1968, after careful preparation, when the pressure on the economy had been reduced, reserves had been accumulated, and personnel had been prepared. It would have been relatively easy to introduce a comprehensive reform in Poland at the beginning of the 1970's, when foreign capital could have been used to reduce disequilibrium, decrease pressures, and build reserves. Instead, foreign capital was used to stimulate investment in an attempt to achieve unrealistically high rates of industrial growth. At the time, the economy seemed to be developing very successfully, and Gierek was not prepared to admit that the success was due to the large inflow of foreign capital. Thus, there was no pressure to change the system. Why modify something when it gives impressive results?

In 1980–81, however, it was too late to wait until careful preparations for reform could be made. The old system had disintegrated under the impact of the rapidly deepening economic crisis. A "systemic vacuum" appeared, as nothing arose to take the old system's place. The organs of economic administration were virtually paralyzed. There were increasing difficulties of obtaining imported materials and other supplies. The well-established horizontal cooperation links among enterprises had been destroyed by attempts to restructure the economy through administrative measures and to change the enterprises' product mix in accordance with the changed priorities—i.e., toward export and domestic consumption and away from "production for produc-

Inside the Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw on March 27, 1981, during a four-hour warning strike called by Solidarity. The Ursus plant was one of a number of facilities involved in the plans of the Edward Gierek regime to import technology from the West to produce goods for domestic and export markets.

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

---

[31] Ibid., p. 52.

IX NADZWYCZAJ
ZJAZD PZP

Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski, left, and Polish Premier and Minister of Defense Wojciech Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), at the July 1981 Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP, which discussed the regime's reform proposal and accepted the government's report on the state of the economy and its stabilization and recovery program.

—Interpress via EUPRA and Lehtikuva via Photoreporters.

tion." The result had been discontinuation of the production of many intermediate goods.[32]

Nonetheless, the proposal of economic reform envisaged significant systemic modifications, to be introduced in stages. Society was to play a greater part at various levels of the planning process. The Planning Commission was to have a reduced role in the day-to-day operations of the enterprises. The "branch ministeries," which are generally recognized as the centers of vested interests of individual sectors, were to be reduced in number and stripped of some of their powers. The state enterprises and local authorities were to have greater autonomy, based on self-financing supplemented by credits from the banking system. The economy was to be controlled from the center indirectly, with the help of centrally determined "economic instruments," such as prices, interest rates, taxes, exchange rates, and various norms, whose role would gradually increase while that of direct administrative commands would decrease. In short, the system was to be decentralized, and "economic parameters" were to take the place of direct administrative commands, but market forces would not really be introduced.

It is doubtful that the fine tuning implied by the method of "parametric steering" would have given satisfactory results. In the 1970's, attempts to manipulate prices so as to control private agriculture—its overall output, product mix, and use of inputs—often brought confusion, unnecessary fluctuations in production, and dislocations, all of which greatly contributed to the agricultural crisis at the end of the decade. This same method could hardly be any more successful when applied to the whole economy.

In 1981, moreover, the economy was in disarray. There were catastrophic domestic and external disequilibria. There was an accumulation of purchasing power in the hands of the population, and a backlog of unsatisfied demand. Reserves were dangerously low throughout the economy, inflationary expectations were high, and the public had lost confidence in the ability of the central authorities to manage the economy.

Above all, the reform proposal did not seem to take into consideration the fact that as a result of heavy foreign indebtedness, the Polish economy had become an open economy. In order to expand exports to the West, repay the debt, and secure imports of needed materials, parts, and machines, the Polish economy would require greater flexibility throughout and better operating market signals than could be achieved with the proposed system.[33]

---

[32] W. Bojarski et al., *Kryzys gospodarki polskiej* (The Crisis in the Polish Economy), Warsaw, Instytut Wydawniczy Zwiazkow Zawodowych, 1981, p. 24.

[33] The author has discussed official and other proposals for economic reform in "Poland: Command Planning in Crisis," *Challenge* (New York, NY), July-August 1981, pp. 5–12; in "The Need for Radical Changes in Economic Policy and in the System of Planning and Management," *Odnowa* (London-Rome), January 1981, pp. 5–11; in "Comments on Proposals for Economic Reform," ibid., April 1981, pp. 75–85; and in "The Origins of the Present Economic Crisis in Poland and Various Proposals for Economic Reform," a paper presented at a Roundtable Conference on Poland, Glendon College, York University, Toronto, May 1981.

Government Report on the State of the Economy.[34] The other two documents promised by the government—the report on the state of the economy and the stabilization and recovery program—appeared later and were of different bureaucratic provenance. Both were originally drawn up by the state's Planning Commission and, in April 1981, presented to the Sejm's Commission on the Economic Plan, Budget, and Finances. Criticized by the media and Solidarity, both were rejected as "unsatisfactory." After some revision by an ad hoc committee of experts appointed by the premier, the two documents were again submitted to the Sejm, this time successfully. In July 1981, they were officially accepted, by both the Sejm and the Ninth PUWP Congress, as the basis for Polish economic policy.

The government report on the state of the economy presented a gloomy picture of a continuing downward spiral in the Polish economy. Its main conclusion as to the nature of the economic crisis was:

> *In 1980, these difficulties (the acceleration of inflation, rapid growth of indebtedness, increasing shortages of materials and parts, and production disproportions) reached such a scale and reinforced one another with such strength that a sharp deepening of the crisis became inevitable. A drastic reduction in 1980 agricultural production caused by adverse climatic conditions has had an additional negative impact. Current sociopolitical processes, which have begun to overcome the deformations in sociopolitical and economic life, have had negative economic consequences in the short run.*[35]

Government Stabilization and Recovery Program.[36] This document, 56 pages long, presented "the current position and intentions of the Government concerning actions toward a way out of the current economic crisis." Of the three documents, it seemed the most broadly conceived. Its "starting point" was the "diagnosis of the economic system given in the government report on the state of the economy." Unlike the reform proposal, it was concerned not only with economic reform but with the whole question of recovery. As a kind of synthesis of the other two documents, it should have been the most authoritative document of the three. In reality, though, the stabilization and recovery program was little more than a general outline. It was not meant to be an economic plan; rather, it was an "internally consistent compilation of the methods of economic policy." Its more concrete forms were to have been the annual economic plans for the years 1981–85, resolutions of the Council of Ministers, and enterprise plans.

On a general level, the government stabilization and recovery program outlined actions to be taken in six basic directions: (1) the reversal of production declines; (2) improved supply of consumer goods; (3) cuts in the state budget; (4) the normalization of investment and of the research and development base; (5) work-force relocations; (6) debt repayment and export stimulation.

It is significant that the question of foreign economic relations—the reestablishment of the external equilibrium of the economy and closely related pro-export structural changes—was relegated to last place. Yet the balance-of-payments disequilibrium still plays a key role in the present crisis. The national product has been declining mainly because Poland cannot get sufficient imports of raw materials, intermediate goods, components and spare parts, and complementary machines and equipment. As a result, the production facilities created, enlarged, or modernized during the investment drive of the first half of the 1970's are utilized only to a fraction of their capacity, either because they are excessively import-intensive or because the planners overestimated their potential role as exporters to the West. At the beginning of 1981, only 60 percent of the productive capacity in industry, and no more than 50 percent of new production facilities, were being utilized. Fifty billion zlotys worth of machinery, including 33 billion zlotys worth of imported machinery (US$1 billion and US$660 million, respectively, at the "foreign exchange coefficient" used by the Polish planners in 1980), had not been installed because of a lack of complementary machines and equipment or because investment projects remained unfinished.[37]

As Ryszard Karski, then Minister of Foreign Trade, pointed out at the Ninth PUWP Congress, "the lack of sufficient import can choke all industry . . . as the result of the creation of a highly import-intensive structure of economy during the last decade." Imported goods and materials now make up 23 percent of the total value of goods produced, and many enterprises depend on certain specific imports from the West that cannot be replaced by imports from socialist countries. This, according to Karski, explains why Poland's industrial production declined by 12 percent in the first half of 1981 despite an increase in imports from socialist countries by 6 percent.[38] It has been calculated that because production is so dependent on imports, a reduction of exports by one zloty and a corresponding reduction in imports leads to a production decline of 2.0–2.5 zlotys.[39]

---

[34] *Rzadowy raport. . . .*

[35] Ibid., p. 17.

[36] *Rzadowy program przezwyciezania kryzysu oraz stabilizowania gospodarki kraju* (Government Program for Stabilization and Recovery), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, July 1981.

[37] "The Way out of the Crisis," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 6, 1981, p. 13.

[38] A. Lubowski, "Diplomacy and the Economy," ibid., No. 3, 1981, p. 4.

It can be argued, therefore, that in the summer of 1981, any viable stabilization and recovery program should have begun with the question of foreign trade. A determined attempt to secure sufficient imports should have been made in order to increase production. This, in turn, would have required the expansion of exports and the restructuring of production, especially when only relatively small investment outlays were involved. Thus, the government recovery program suffered from the same weakness as did the proposal for economic reform. Instead of regarding foreign indebtedness and the balance-of-payments deficit as Poland's key economic problem, the stabilization and recovery program discussed the question of reform as if the Polish economy were a closed economy; the question of foreign economic relations was treated as a special problem, almost as an afterthought.

On a more specific level, the stabilization and recovery program presented a series of measures designed to (1) expand agricultural production; (2) ensure more efficient use of raw materials; (3) increase the domestic production of raw materials and fuels, especially coal; (4) reduce imports, especially from nonsocialist countries, and encourage exports; (5) recover and recycle by-products, waste, and used materials; (6) encourage small producers, such as local industry, cooperatives, and handicrafts; and (7) improve transportation facilities, the lack of which was and still is a very serious bottleneck.[40]

Each measure reflected a policy mix of organizational changes, incentives, financial measures, and administrative directives. Some—for example, agricultural policy—were not only essential but seemed quite realistic. Others—for example, improvements in transportation—appeared to be little more than a list of desirable objectives. Still others—such as the recycling of used materials—could have been useful but were of only marginal importance.

Certain of these measures, however, may have been ineffective, or even harmful to economic recovery and further economic development. Once again, a prime example may be found in the question of foreign trade—namely, the reduction of imports and the expansion of exports.

First, the main instrument for export expansion was to be enterprise foreign exchange funds, which were to have been established, according to the program, in the second half of 1981 and which seem to be in operation in 1982. Enterprises producing for export to nonsocialist countries are authorized to form a fund by depositing a fixed percentage (but no more than 50 percent) of the hard currency they earn from their exports. They are able to draw on the fund to purchase imports necessary for production purposes, modernization, and replacement of productive capacities. They are also permitted to transfer part of their fund to other enterprises that supply them with materials, parts, and the like.

Such typically bureaucratic solutions were tried during the WOG reform in 1973–75. They failed then, and there is no reason to believe that they will succeed now. The belief that if only norms and incentives were properly calculated and this or that enterprise fund were established, exports would rise, costs would be cut, and efficiency would be improved was a central point of Soviet and East European proposals for systemic modifications during the late 1960's and the 1970's. But the situation in Poland is radically different now. The measures envisaged by the stabilization and recovery program tend to retain a high degree of bureaucratic control and interference. They will not increase the flexibility of the economy, which is now absolutely necessary for economic recovery and the repayment of Poland's huge foreign debt. As such, they will be not only ineffective but dangerous.

Second, the stabilization and recovery program envisaged the continuation of "central steering" of imports of raw materials and other producer goods, the use of administrative commands to halt the import of investment goods from capitalist countries, and the cancellation of contracts that had already been negotiated. As of January 1, 1982, excessively import-intensive production was to have been stopped, again by administrative command, unless its import content could be replaced by domestic production.

This "central steering" could lead to disaster. It has not been uncommon for Poland to lose important foreign markets because it attempted to save on scarce foreign exchange. For example, a good produced on an expensive foreign license and meeting all other necessary specifications has often failed to meet standards because of a relatively insignificant part made out of an inferior, domestically produced material.

Finally, the stabilization and recovery program stressed import substitution, "whenever economical." However, this is exactly the same policy that created the high-cost, inefficient industrial structure in Poland during the 1950's and early 1960's, it was one of the main weaknesses of the investment program during the 1970's, and it was a factor in the collapse of the "new development strategy." It is extremely doubtful that the results will be any different now. The pattern of devel-

---

[39] Ibid.

[40] *Rzadowy program . . .*, pp. 19–32.

Workers photographed in the autumn of 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, a major producer of foreign exchange for Poland's economy.

—Jean Gaumy/Magnum.

opment will more likely become not less but more extensive, which will again seriously limit the possibility of improving the standard of living. Moreover, unless market signals (prices, costs, and the rate of exchange) are made meaningful, it will not be possible to calculate which import-substitution projects are economical and which are not.

As for the proposed actions in other directions, the stabilization and recovery program represented the same combination of desirable and rational measures and bureaucratic measures. The presence of the latter did not guarantee much improvement. Under the circumstances, bureaucratic measures might even have led to a further deterioration in the economic situation and, in consequence, to a political explosion. Optimists, however, could take some hope from the very fact that some desirable and rational measures had been officially accepted.

Grounds for Optimism?

The party emerged from its Ninth Congress, therefore, with three basic economic documents: an unrealistic and internally inconsistent reform proposal, a reasonably accurate report on the state of the economy, and an unimaginative and unimpressive stabilization and recovery program. They were clearly not sufficient to deal with the economic crisis. Each had been prepared, discussed, modified, and rushed through the congress against continuous but only half-explicit opposition by party hard-liners, dogmatic economists, and some bureaucrats.[41] But the documents, and the measures they proposed, were meant to be only the first steps toward other, more far-reaching reforms. If conditions remained favorable for reform, there were perhaps some grounds for optimism.

---

[41] See, for example, reports on the meetings of the Committee for Economic Reform in Zycie gospodarcze, No. 6, 1981, p. 12; No. 14, 1981, p. 3; No. 22, 1981, p. 4; and No. 28, 1981, p. 4; also M. Mieszczankowski, "Suggestions for the Proposal," ibid., No. 7, 1981, pp. 7-9, and No. 8, 1981, pp. 8-9.

The leadership clearly did not encourage optimism. In contrast to the "propaganda of success" which dominated the 1970's, it began to paint a very bleak picture of not only the short-run but also the long-run future. In addition, the government stabilization and recovery program envisaged only slow improvements. In agriculture, the highest precrisis level was expected to be achieved in crop production in two to three years, and in animal production in three years at the earliest. In industry, the precrisis peak was to be reached in three to four years, and in national income (DNMP), in five to six years. Foreign indebtedness was to be reduced beginning only in six to seven years. By 1985, industrial production was expected to be only 5 percent above the 1980 level. However, the structure of industry would be changed to some extent. Production for the domestic consumer market was to exceed the 1980 level by 11 percent in 1985, and it was to be less fuel- and material-intensive. At the same time, income distribution was to be less differentiated, even though the stabilization and recovery program also envisaged "the strengthening of the principle of remuneration according to the quantity and quality of work."[42]

At the same time, according to the government program, several factors could significantly accelerate the pace of recovery: (1) increased output of coal and other raw materials, (2) more favorable conditions for agricultural production, (3) successful implementation of economic reform, (4) closer cooperation with the socialist countries, and (5) more favorable conditions for export expansion and more favorable terms of trade.[43] Another factor of great importance was the cooperation of society. According to the program, recovery, even a slow and modest recovery, would depend on social acceptance, because the level of economic activity was expected to fall before starting to rise again, and a considerable dose of austerity would be required. This last point should be noted, for the declaration of martial law has made social acceptance of the government's recovery program very problematic.

Before December 13, it appeared that the party and government leaders were finally prepared to move toward an effective stabilization and recovery policy. Jaruzelski's meeting with the leaders of the Catholic Church and Solidarity in early November seemed to be the first step toward cooperation between the authorities and society, including the workers. Poland's application for readmission to the IMF and World Bank also raised hopes. A stabilization loan would help strengthen Poland's position in relation to its Western creditors. Further rescheduling of the debt and the negotiation of new foreign and international credits, even in small quantities, would help to move workers from the lines in front of empty stores into factories, to supply materials and parts for fuller utilization of existing productive capacities in industry, and to secure certain essential production goods and services for individual farmers. A viable stabilization program could be prepared in cooperation with international experts, and austerity measures would have a better chance of acceptance when recommended by international organizations. It is important to remember that Solidarity always maintained that it would accept an austerity policy if that policy were an integral part of a viable stabilization and reform program.[44]

It was possible, at least, to outline an optimistic scenario. A solution to Poland's economic crisis would have depended, of course, not only on the goodwill and cooperation of international financial institutions, foreign governments, and foreign banks. It would also have had to rely on a high sense of responsibility on the part of government and Solidarity leaders and, above all, on a favorable domestic and international political climate.[45] In this scenario, there would have been further reforms, additional liberalization and opening of the economy, and establishment of a socialist market economy. Such changes could have led to greater overall economic efficiency and repayment of Western debts through the expansion of exports rather than through the continued limitation of imports. All this need not have endangered Soviet interests in Poland, or spelled the end of socialism in Poland, if the party and government leaders were able to muster the requisite political ability, flexibility, and vision. On the contrary, East-West economic relations might have been strengthened, and the political climate in Europe improved.

Toward a Neo-Stalinist Economy

Nevertheless, even as discussion of economic reform and liberalization continued during the second half of 1981, there were also grounds for pessimism. The government reform program may not, after all, have been taken seriously by the inner circle within the leadership.

---

[42] *Rzadowy program . . .*, p. 53.

[43] Ibid.

[44] See, for example, "Economic Reform and the Conditions of Social Agreement," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 2, 1981, p. 2; and J. Osiatynski, "Solidarity's Position on Economic Reform," *Solidarnosc* (Warsaw), No. 7, May 17, 1981, p. 10.

[45] A scenario along these lines was set forth in Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Poland: A Way Out," a paper presented at the session organized by the Association for Comparative Economic Studies at the annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations, Washington, DC, December 1981.



Polish army majors Wojciech Mowoczyk and Marian Szady converse with farmers receiving coal, fertilizer, and feed in exchange for pigs in the Plock area near Warsaw in November 1981. The two officers were members of a "regional operational group" attempting to cope with a breakdown in the flow of supplies between the countryside and the cities.

—Interpress via Gamma-Liaison.

The economic documents had been prepared under pressure from Solidarity and public opinion. The leadership may have thought it necessary to embrace reform publicly, even if they regarded the reform proposals as meaningless concessions, to be withdrawn at the first opportune moment. At the same time, various economic measures were introduced that indicated the leaders were searching for quite a different solution. Arbitrary cuts were made in imports and investments, production was modified by administrative fiat in accordance with new priorities, and materials were allocated directly. This policy, now combined with "administrative paralysis" and badly organized and inadequate rationing of basic foodstuffs, represented a continuation of basically "the same line as those which led . . . to the crisis."[46]

In early August, a special task force, the "Anticrisis Operational Staff," was formed to coordinate the activities of various central administration departments and agencies. Using direct administrative methods, it prepared new balances for fuels and electrical power and a new allocation of materials and foreign exchanges among enterprises. It selected six so-called protected areas—food, pharmaceuticals and health items, basic clothing and shoes for children, electric power and fuels, exports, and agriculture—as priority areas for which allocations had to be secured, no matter the cost.[47]

This approach came into immediate conflict with the very concept of economic reform, which was scheduled for introduction on January 1, 1982. First, it represented a strengthening of the administrative command system and a drastic limitation, instead of a broadening, of enterprise autonomy. Moreover, since the system of priorities did not cover the production of various intermediate goods, some serious problems immediately arose. A lack of some relatively insignificant materials or parts often halted the production of priority items, once again demonstrating that "the economy is not divisible, that priority production always collapses because of the lack of a small detail, a machine or an intermediate good, which is produced in the low-priority sector."[48] This was the lesson of the Stalinist Six-Year Plan (1950–55)[49] and of direct administrative allocation of resources at the end of the 1970's.[50] It is surprising that the experts from the Anticrisis Operational Staff had forgotten it.

Subsequently, nine "operational programs" were formulated to replace the six "protected areas." These programs were designed to ensure the supply of (1) fertilizers and pesticides, (2) machines, tools, and transport equipment (including spare parts) for agriculture and the food industry, (3) milk, (4) pharmaceutical and medical products and surgical equipment, (5) basic health items, (6) children's clothing and shoes, (7) coal, (8) rolled steel products, and to secure (9) the "dynamization of export." In order to obtain resources on a priority basis, enterprises would have to become involved in the production of goods and services singled out by the nine operational programs, as formulated in the Annual Central Plan for 1982. In all, some 85 groups of products were to be balanced, and 70 groups were to be centrally allocated in the plan.[51]

---

[46] J. Pajestka, *Polski kryzys lat 1980–1981* (The Polish Crisis of 1980–81), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1981, p. 103.

[47] E. Bieniasz-Stepien and T. Kierczynski, "Protected Areas," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 44, 1981, pp. 1, 4.

[48] "Priorities and Reality," ibid., No. 38, 1981, p. 4.

[49] One of the first of many studies of the adverse effects of excessive allocation of resources for the priority sectors and shortages of goods originating in the low-priority sectors is A. Karpinski, *Zagadnienia socjalistycznej industrializacji Polski* (Problems of the Socialist Industrialization of Poland), Warsaw, Polskie Wydawnictwo Gospodarcze, 1958, pp. 71–105.

[50] Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's," pp. 49–50; R. Malinowski, "Who Should Be Responsible for Spare Parts?" *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 36, 1978, p. 8; and T. Wojciechowski, "Can Material Supply Be Less Troublesome?" ibid., No. 7, 1978, p. 3.

[51] *Zasady dzialalnosci przedsiebiorstw panstwowych w 1982 roku* (Principles of the Operation of State Enterprises in 1982), Warsaw, December 1981, pp. 2, 13, 15, 20.

In this same period, various administrative reorganizations, expansion of the list of priorities, campaigns, and "operational programs" spread additional confusion throughout the economy. For example, some enterprises, unable to obtain materials needed for operation at capacity, decided to produce agricultural machines or equipment, even if inefficiently and at high cost, simply in order to participate in the "everything for agriculture" campaign. They got the materials they wanted, but in so doing they often wasted their productive capacities, which may not have been suited to this type of production and which could have otherwise been used to expand export production.[52]

Price distortions also led to inefficiency, particularly to a breakdown in interenterprise cooperation and to stoppages of production. A price reform for producer goods had originally been projected for July 1981. But the preparatory work took more than a year. The Central Price Commission had to publish about 200 price lists, several million pages in all. Before publication, each list had to be discussed with various administrative departments and agencies and, subsequently, with the enterprises. A change of even a single price sometimes required changes in several other price lists.[53] This gigantic, laborious, and time-consuming process was to be completed in time for the introduction of new prices on January 1, 1982.

Moreover, such price reform seemed ill conceived. As soon as new prices were established, they would gradually become obsolete, misleading to both producers and users. The inflexibility of the system would make frequent adjustments impossible. No economy subjected to such a burden could increase its efficiency and expand its world market exports. In accordance with the reform proposal, some prices would be centrally determined; others, controlled; and still others (those for less important goods), determined by the enterprises. Without introducing all elements of the reform, however, it was difficult to leave any part of the price-determination process to the enterprises.

---

[52] K. Fronczak, "A Thoughtful Enthusiasm," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 18, 1981, p. 5.

[53] *Z Czeslawem Bobrowskim o gospodarce* (Conversations with Czeslaw Bobrowski About the Economy), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1981, p. 32.



Zbigniew Krasinski, left, Poland's Minister for Price Reform, and Marian Krzak, right, the Minister of Finance, discuss the issue of cigarette price increases with Lech Walesa, leader of the independent labor organization Solidarity, during Solidarity's autumn 1981 congress.

—Interpress via EUPRA.

Even in October 1981, Wladyslaw Baka, the minister responsible for economic reform, returned to the concept of "provisional systemic solutions" at a meeting of the Committee for Economic Reform. While reassuring the committee that the government would not abandon the reform, he pointed out that the catastrophic economic situation would necessitate the continuation of rationing and administrative allocation of resources, and that this would make the functioning of the new system impossible.[54]

All these developments in the fall of 1981 suggested that in practice, the Polish leadership would have maintained a high degree of centralization and extensive use of administrative controls and allocations—even in the absence of military action. But military rule was imposed, and the fate of economic reform became even more problematic.

Under Martial Law

In the three months since December 13, it has become increasingly clear that martial law has made the solution of Poland's economic crisis even more difficult than before. The crackdown on Solidarity, the arrests and purges, and the brutality of the security forces have made it virtually impossible for the government to think of winning popular support and whole-hearted worker cooperation—on which, as the government's own program emphasized, a viable recovery program must depend. Military action has also created unfavorable conditions for economic decentralization, self-management, and market forces—all of which are essential to genuine economic reform. Martial law has thus had a highly adverse impact on the economy: as the first post-martial law figures indicate, current production is down, short-term projections of economic improvement are being scaled down, and the long-term fate of Poland's economic reform—which was officially promulgated on January 1, 1982—has been put into serious question.

As might have been expected, Poland's overall economic output declined significantly in December and January. In industry, the value (in constant prices) of production sold in December 1981 was 25.4 percent below that of December 1980. (The November 1981 figure was down 9.4 percent from November 1980 but up 4.2 percent over October 1981).[55] The January 1982 figure was down 13.6 percent from January 1981 and 17.5 percent from December 1981.[56] Such figures suggest that there had been some modest signs of recovery in industry before martial law, but that military action again destabilized industrial production for at least the first six weeks and perhaps longer.

In agriculture, there was a reported increase in the purchase of slaughter animals from December 1981 to January 1982—from 143,300 tons to 188,400 tons. However, the December 1981 level was 28.3 percent lower than the December 1980 level (232,300 tons), and purchases for the first 11 months of 1981 were 20.6 percent below those for the first 11 months of 1980. Taken together, purchases in the period December 1981–January 1982 were 27.0 percent lower than during the corresponding period in 1980–81. In absolute terms, this was a decline of 122,600 tons—a very serious shortage by any measure.[57]

To some extent, at least, agricultural shortfalls such as these reflect the Polish farmers' lack of confidence in the authorities. As early as December 20, the Military Council for National Salvation, which had been established as the de facto supreme authority a few hours before the imposition of martial law, declared that agricultural policy would not be changed.[58] But the farmers apparently do not believe that the authorities, who have dissolved Rural Solidarity, will accept the private sector as a permanent and legitimate feature of the agricultural economy and will not again discriminate against it in the future. Moreover, Polish farmers are not likely to sell their produce for money that cannot be used to buy consumer goods in any sufficient volume or even certain absolutely necessary agricultural inputs. In all probability, therefore, agricultural investment, yields, and output will fall. Furthermore, if the government reintroduces obligatory deliveries, it may have to use force. The result would undoubtedly be a complete disruption of agricultural production, with adverse repercussions lasting for years.

For the time being, the authorities have attempted to use the incentive of higher prices. On February 1, the prices for agricultural produce purchased by the state agencies were increased. On February 15, however, prices of agricultural machines and other equipment were raised, by an average of 119 percent. The Ministry of Agriculture announced that these price changes would increase the farmers' outlays from 160 billion to 324 billion zlotys and the value of agricultural sales from 449 billion to 632 billion zlotys—for a net increase of 23 billion. In reporting this information, however, *Zycie gospodarcze* commented that the ministry had failed to explain how it had made its calculations, thus implying some skepticism as to their accuracy.[59]

---

[54] K. S. "Consultation," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 43, 1981, p. 3.

[55] This calculation is based on data published in *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 2; No. 3, 1982, p. 1; and No. 4, 1982, p. 4.

[56] *Przekroj*, Feb. 28, 1982, p. 2.

[57] This calculation is based on data from the sources cited in fn. 55.

[58] *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 2.

In the meantime, a number of other agricultural problems have arisen. The newly established Council for the Food Economy has announced that there are drastic shortages of seeds, seed potatoes, and pesticides and that because of a lack of spare parts, only about 60–70 percent of Poland's agricultural equipment is usable.[60] This is where Western sanctions will undoubtedly hurt—in addition to the adverse effect they will have on meat and poultry production.

Martial law has also made any economic improvement improbable in the near future. In the face of passive resistance and widespread opposition and resentment, even Polish planners admit that it will now be difficult to avoid a further decline in production. Originally, the central economic plan for 1982 was prepared in three variants: the minimum, the maximum, and the most probable. Each variant was based on a different assumption as to coal production. The minimum variant assumed a figure of only 155 million tons for 1982, as compared with 164 million for 1981 (the actual figure, as it turned out, was 163 million), 193 million for 1980, and 201 million for 1979. The maximum variant assumed 175 million tons, and the most probable variant, 168 million tons. Depending on the output of coal, the rate of growth of domestic net material product (DNMP) would range between −8.3 percent (the minimum variant) to 2.1 percent (the maximum variant), with −1.4 percent the most probable (see Table 1).

It was probably because of slight increases in both coal and industrial production that on December 11, the Planning Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers a revised central plan for 1982. The minimum vari-



An impromptu memorial to seven miners killed by security forces in a clash in mid-December 1981 at the Wujek coal mine near Katowice—the heart of Poland's coal industry.

—Polfoto via Photoreporters.

---

[59] Ibid., No. 5, 1982, p. 2.

[60] Ibid., No. 2, 1982, p. 2.

ant, now regarded as too pessimistic, was dropped. The revised plan had only two variants. The lower variant projected an annual coal output of 170 million tons, a 1 percent growth in industrial production, and a 2 percent growth in gross agricultural production. The higher variant projected 175 million tons, 4 percent, and 3 percent, respectively. If the latter targets were met, national income would increase by 0.5 percent.[61]

Even before December 13, however, several factors made such projections seem overly optimistic. The miners were complaining bitterly about food shortages. Excessive exploitation and inadequate maintenance of the mines during the 1970's had led to various technical problems. Above all, the "flight from money" had discouraged work for money wages and made special high rates for Saturday work ineffective.

After the imposition of martial law, such projections were even more problematic. The authorities quickly moved to "militarize" the miners—i.e., they have temporarily enrolled the miners in the military and have put the mines under the direct command of military officers. Their strategy here is clear. As is consistent with the plan, they have recognized the key importance of the mining sector for economic stabilization and recovery. At the same time, they expect military-style methods to give good results, because the product is relatively homogeneous and therefore more easily managed.[62] But the forced liquidation of the protest strikes in the mines, the security troops' brutal treatment of the miners, and the ensuing casualties must have had far-reaching adverse effects on miners' attitudes.

The results of this strategy have so far been somewhat ambiguous. The Polish press has reported that coal production increased from 13.2 million tons in December 1981 to 13.4 million tons in January 1982. This figure was touted as a sign of progressing normalization. However, the average monthly output during the first 11 months of 1981 had been 13.6 million tons, and output in November 1981 had been 13.9 million.[63] In this sector, too, it appears that some stabilization had occurred during the three months preceding martial law, mainly because of an increase in the labor force, which expanded by 19,800 between January and October 1981 and by 7,300 in November 1981.[64]

Polish Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski meets with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in early March 1982 to discuss means of coping with Poland's economic crisis.

—Novosti via Gamma-Liaison.

Since the imposition of martial law, moreover, the annual plan has been discarded and replaced by a plan for only the first quarter of 1982 (but with certain implications for likely rates of growth during the second quarter). Quarterly plans are expected to be the rule for some time to come. Zbigniew Madej, the chairman of the Planning Commission, defended the new procedure on the grounds that any time horizon longer than one quarter was too uncertain.[65]

The new quarterly plan assumed a first-quarter coal output of 44.3 million tons and a decline of 8–10 percent in industrial production.[66] However, in early February, the plan was revised. In the new version, there are changes in the projected industrial production, which is now expected to decline by 10–11 percent, but no changes in the targets for coal. Nevertheless, the new version raises the target for oil refining from 2.8 million tons to 3.5 million tons—a step which probably reflects Poland's recent agreement with the Soviet Union—and increases the targets for slaughter animals from 410,000 tons to 432,000.[67]

In the final analysis, though, all these adjustments do not strike at the heart of the crisis. Even Madej himself, who apparently has been criticized for his "too simplistic model of economic growth, which was based mainly on the output of one raw material" (i.e., coal), clearly admits that the main barrier to recovery lies elsewhere:

---

[61] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Dec. 12/13, 1981, p. 1.

[62] J. Paszkiewicz, "What Has to Be Done Immediately?" ibid., No. 22, 1981, p. 3. It is important to remember here that the ambitious targets imposed by Gierek's planners earlier resulted in a high proportion of rocks and dirt mixed in with the coal, which often caused serious damage to furnaces and thus even brought interruptions in the supply of electricity.

[63] This calculation is based on data from the sources cited in fn. 55.

[64] *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 3, 1982, p. 1. The shortage of labor in recent years was an important factor in the difficulties experienced by coal mining. Other sectors of Poland's overheated economy exerted a strong pull on the labor force in mining.

[65] "In a New Situation: An Interview with the Chairman of the Planning Commission, Z. Madej," ibid., No. 1, 1982, p. 3.

[66] "Main Assumptions of the Proposed Plan for the First Quarter of 1982," ibid., No. 1, 1982, p. 3.

[67] "Changes in the Plan for the First Quarter of 1982," ibid., No. 3, 1982, p. 2.

> *Today the main limiting factor is something else. It is the availability of inputs from outside the economy, namely, raw materials, components, and other intermediate goods for production, which have to be imported from the capitalist countries. In other words, we have a lack of foreign exchanges. The inflow of foreign exchanges, which had declined in the second half of the 1970's, became very small last fall. And this very small stream has practically stopped in the last weeks.*[68]

Because of their lack of realism in dealing with the balance-of-payments deficit, the authorities have not been able to arrest the downswing brought on by drastic cuts in imports from the West. Their unwillingness, or inability, to communicate with Poland's creditors and their delay in approaching the IMF and the World Bank have resulted in a real catastrophe. Martial law cannot help here: on the contrary, it only makes a new approach to the West more difficult, especially as a result of Western sanctions.

Martial law has also had an adverse impact on the long-run prospects for economic reform—even though economic reform was officially introduced on January 1, 1982. The official declarations have emphasized the great significance of economic reform. Jaruzelski has stressed his commitment to reform, and the PUWP Central Committee, which met on February 24–25, emphasized that the introduction of socioeconomic reform is one of the most important tasks at present.[69] Even those economists skeptical of introducing reform during a period of serious economic disequilibrium now believe that reform is a necessary condition for recovery and must be introduced without delay.[70]

In practice, however, the government's actions have not been so reassuring, for the administrative measures introduced under martial law have tended to completely contradict the reform proposal officially accepted by the PUWP Congress in July 1981 and by the Sejm. On December 17, the Military Council for National Salvation confirmed its determination to implement "a deep and comprehensive economic reform in the direction approved by the Sejm." At the same time, however, it "instructed the government to adjust the economy quickly to the conditions of martial law."[71] On the following day, the Council of Ministers accordingly issued

Polish armored vehicles that seized control of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk three days after martial law was declared in Poland on December 13, 1981.

—SYGMA

---

[68] "In a New Situation . . . ," loc. cit., p. 1.

[69] *Przekroj*, Mar. 7, 1982, p. 2.

[70] See, for example, "From Yesterday to Tomorrow: An Interview with Professor C. Bobrowski," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 4.

[71] *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 2.

"instructions for the management of the economy under martial law and for the implementation of those elements of economic reform which are not inconsistent with the state of martial law."[72]

At the enterprise level, these administrative measures have not left much of the original reform proposal intact. All forms of workers' self-management, even the old, purely decorative workers' committees, have been suspended. The principle of one-man management has been strengthened, with the managers subordinate only to the state. The central plan has also been made even more binding. All these measures are compatible neither with the "principles of the operation of the state enterprises in 1982," which the Council of Ministers had issued on November 30, 1981,[73] nor with the workers' participation agreement negotiated with Solidarity.

The picture is much the same above the enterprise level. To be sure, in accord with the proposed reform, industrial associations—the severely criticized intermediate level of management—have been abolished. But voluntary groupings of enterprises—envisaged by the reform proposal if approved by the workers' self-governing bodies involved—have not been allowed, on the grounds that there is now no workers' self-government. Instead, the ministers have been authorized to appoint commissioners (or plenipotentiaries) for groups of enterprises in areas where the reform proposal envisaged obligatory groupings (for example, in mining) as well as in those where only voluntary groupings were to be formed.[74]

This measure has been widely interpreted as an attempt to maintain the old associations but under a different name. Many former managers of associations have been appointed as commissioners and are again supervising the same enterprises. Moreover, the personnel previously in the associations' offices are now staffing the commissioners' offices. Apparently, old habits are difficult to break. In practice, it would seem, enterprise autonomy has been effectively limited, and the associations may be returning through the back door.[75]

At the central level, the "operational programs" (and the principle of direct administrative allocation of resources which they embody) are even more inimical to enterprise autonomy. The number of programs has now been increased from 9 to 14, each under the command of a special commissioner. They also involve large and important portions of the economy. In the plan for the first quarter of 1982, for example, more than 60 percent of all available coal was earmarked for the operational programs, and during revision of the plan, this figure was increased. Here, too, it is feared that in practice, direct administrative commands, only in a new guise, are covering a large and increasing part of the economy.[76]

Even at the planning level, enterprise autonomy has been circumscribed. An essential part of the proposed reform was to have been a lesser role for the annual plans—and their operative administrative commands—and a greater stress on five-year plans. But the introduction of quarterly plans represents a move in the opposite direction—quarterly plans have not been seen in Poland since the Stalinist era.

At all levels, therefore, it appears that the economic reform has not been introduced in practice—all official declarations to the contrary. Moreover, the administrative system that has been created under martial law does not seem compatible with economic reform in any meaningful sense.

Conclusion

From all indications, then, it seems that from an economic point of view, Poland's present leaders have got themselves into a hopeless situation. The imposition of martial law and the return to a rule of terror will unavoidably lead to the resurrection of a neo-Stalinist economic system and thereby to dependence on extensive patterns of development. Far from helping to reduce the economic crisis, martial law will aggravate it and prevent recovery for some years to come.

In all likelihood, too, the political consequences of Poland's economic crisis will be apparent for some time to come. Unless there is a major change in Poland's party and government leadership and unless there is a complete reversal of policy, both political and economic, another decline in national product will be unavoidable in 1982, and a prolonged period of very low per capita income is likely to follow. Thus the political situation in Poland will remain potentially explosive. This, and Poland's inability to repay its hard-currency debts, will exert an adverse impact on East-West economic relations and on the world political situation in general. The military crackdown of December 13 may therefore continue to have very serious consequences, and not only for Poland.

---

[72] Ibid.

[73] "The Beginning of the Reform: An Interview with the Commissioner for Economic Reform, Professor W. Baka," ibid., No. 2, 1982, p. 1; and "The Next Few Months Will Decide: An Interview with Deputy Commissioner for Economic Reform, Professor Z. Sadowski," ibid., No. 5, p. 3.

[74] "The Next Few Months . . . ," loc. cit.

[75] S. Lipinski, "Attention to the Back Door," ibid., No. 5, 1982, p. 11.

[76] "The Next Few Months . . . ," loc. cit.

Soviet Decision-Making and Poland

By Richard D. Anderson, Jr.

The declaration of martial law in December 1981 by General Wojciech Jaruzelski culminated a 16-month search by the Soviet leadership for a way to restore control in Poland. While Jaruzelski's crackdown had Polish domestic roots—including his personal ambitions—it also accomplished the objective that the Soviet leadership had had in mind since the late summer of 1980.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Politburo ever considered allowing events in Poland to take their own course. At the same time, signs do point to differences within the Politburo over how to bring the situation in Poland under control. Initially, when strikes broke out in July 1980, Soviet leaders seemed confident that a firm stance by the Polish First Secretary, Edward Gierek, would end the labor unrest. But as the strikes spread throughout Poland, the prospects that Gierek could keep the lid on grew dimmer, especially since he also seemed no longer able to master the Polish Communist party apparatus. In these circumstances, by late August 1980 the Soviet Politburo was manifesting differences over how best to deal with the Polish problem.

Some advocated the abandonment of Gierek and the installation of Stanislaw Kania as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) in the hope that Kania could successfully carry out a more flexible policy toward the free trade union Solidarity, whose existence had been ratified by the Polish Communist authorities under the Gdansk agreement of August 31, 1980.[1] Kania's backers in Moscow clearly did not intend flexibility to result in a genuine accommodation with Solidarity. Rather, they viewed a confrontational policy as a temporarily unworkable option and thought that Kania might accomplish a gradual restoration of control. It seemed preferable to them for domestic Polish authorities to contain the situation rather than for the USSR to engage in a direct military intervention.

Nevertheless, it was not certain then—nor is it now—that the preferred strategy would work. Indeed, within months of Kania's installation, even his supporters in Moscow began to concede that he lacked the political strength to keep Solidarity effectively within the bounds to which the Soviet Politburo had agreed at the time of Gierek's ouster. There could be no turning back to Gierek or to one of his associates after his record had been publicly brought into disrepute. This also discredited the Polish Communist party apparatus, so that—no matter who headed it—it was incapable of acting as a reliable instrument of Soviet policy. Those Soviet leaders who were skeptical of Kania's conciliatory line had few options left. One option which they did retain was Soviet military intervention.

In fact, the Soviet Union undertook the costly preparatory process for intervention twice during the Polish

Mr. Anderson is staff specialist for defense policy to US Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis.). He has also worked as a professional staff member of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and as an analyst of Soviet military policy for the US Central Intelligence Agency. The author wishes to thank George Breslauer, Sidney Ploss, and Harriet Fast Scott for their help and encouragement in the preparation of this article.

---

[1] On Aug. 31, 1980, *Pravda* (Moscow) published a TASS dispatch on an article by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States. This dispatch contained not only the first mention in *Pravda* of "strikes" in Poland (as opposed to "unrhythmic labor"), but also the first statement blaming the existing leadership (i.e., Gierek) for the crisis. Thus, it implied that the Soviet leadership was giving up on Gierek.

But not all Soviet leaders agreed. A. P. Kirilenko headed a Soviet delegation that met Gierek in the border town of Bialowieza. (*The Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1980, and *The New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1980. The *Post* story came from Moscow, and the *Times* story from Warsaw; and their sources were different.) Kirilenko urged firmness on Gierek. On Sept. 6, however, Gierek was replaced by Kania, who was associated with the Gdansk agreements that Gierek had opposed. Kania, not Gierek, introduced the negotiators of the Gdansk agreements to the Polish Central Committee when it met to approve their work (*The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1980). In contrast to Kirilenko's actions, Brezhnev immediately endorsed Kania by sending a telegram congratulating him on his election as First Secretary.

Soviet Groups of Forces and Military Districts


Commands in the Vicinity of Poland
U S S R
Leningrad
Baltic
Belorussian
Carpathian
Moscow
Kiev
Odessa
North Caucasus
Trans Caucasus
Volga
Ural
Siberian
Central Asian
Turkestan
Transbaykal
Far East
Riga
Leningrad
Minsk
L'vov
Kiev
Moscow
Rostov
Kuybyshev
Sverdlovsk
Novosibirsk
Chita
Khabarovsk
Tbilisi
Tashkent
Alma-Ata
F.R.G.
Aust.
Poland
NGF
GSFG
Norway
Sweden
Finland
Turkey
Syria
Iraq
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan
Pakistan
China
Mongolia
North Korea
South Korea
LEGEND
KIEV -- name of military district
GSFG -- Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
NGF -- Northern Group of Forces
CGF -- Central Group of Forces
SGF -- Southern Group of Forces
• -- headquarters of group of forces or of military district

SOURCE: Prepared for *Problems of Communism* by the Cartographic Services Laboratory, University of Maryland (College Park, MD), from 'Soviet Union: Military Districts', U.S. Department of State map No. 504880, December 1981, and from the map of 'Soviet Military Districts and Groups of Forces' in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980–81*, London, 1980, p. 95.

crisis. The USSR reached a state of near-readiness for intervention in December 1980 and again in March 1981. (In this context, it should be remembered that the USSR does not maintain a ready capability for military intervention on the scale needed to control Poland. Preparations for such an intervention therefore require extensive preliminary mobilization of reservists as well as deployment of military units.) Both times, however, the heightened state of readiness was called off.

To understand the motivations behind these decisions, it is essential to look closely at the actions of Leonid Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues. Such an investigation suggests that individual Soviet leaders maneuvered to bring about decisions which they preferred. Indeed, one gets the firm impression that in deciding what to do in Poland, the political leaders of the USSR were guided more by personal calculations about their own particular best interests—that is, by power relationships within the Politburo—than by considerations of international repercussions arising from their actions.

Moreover, when intervention became an issue on the Politburo agenda, a factor was introduced which had probably figured less directly in more exclusively political decision-making, such as that relating to the ouster of Gierek. This factor is the Soviet military high command. According to established procedure, the commanders of Soviet Ground Forces would be consulted on the feasibility of invading Poland and, in all probability, on its advisability.[2] From a careful reading of the Soviet press and a study of the unusual changes in high command assignments around the time when the Soviet Politburo was arriving at its decisions concerning Poland, it would appear that the Soviet military leadership played a complex role in the political decisions. This role differed in important respects from that which recent Western literature on civil-military relations in the USSR might lead one to expect.

Reshuffling the High Command

The most telling evidence of conflict in the Politburo over the military intervention in Poland is the thoroughgoing reshuffle of the Soviet Ground Forces high command which took place in December 1980 and January 1981. Ground Forces divisions would have the chief role in any operation to subdue Poland. The divisions of this service are subordinated to 20 territorial commands—called "military districts" inside the USSR and "groups of forces" in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (see map on p. 23). Each district or group is led by a commander. Of his deputies, the senior one is not the first deputy for military operations but the deputy who bears the title of "member of the military council and chief of the political directorate." In the two months under discussion, six generals commanding districts or groups, four generals heading political directorates, and three higher-ranking generals of the Ground Forces were reassigned—a total of 13 command changes (see Table 1).

These changes were not routine. Soviet military regulations do not provide for periodic turnover at this top level of command. Furthermore, the reassigned generals had had quite varied tenures in their commands. The two with the longest tenure had served 13 years in their posts as of November 1980, while the two with the shortest tenure had served only two years.[3]

Location and timing connect the transfers to the Polish crisis. Of the 10 top posts in the five commands bordering on Poland, five changed hands. This rate of turnover in two months was three times the average annual turnover for all posts at the military district level or higher during 1970–76 (the most recent period for which statistics have been compiled).[4] The reassignments started as the mobilization of ground forces around Poland was nearing its peak. On December 7, the US government announced that Soviet mobilization had reached full readiness to invade (an announcement that was probably premature).[5] The first reassignment transfer became public knowledge on December 4.[6] The general in question was Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, trans-

---

[2] "Before taking this or that decision on questions of military development, the Central Committee of the Party [and] the Politburo thoroughly study the situation in the army and fleet, take counsel with the high command of the armed forces, with the most significant specialists." M. G. Sobolev et al., *Partiynopoliticheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhënnykh Silakh* (Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, p. 103.

On the high command's role in encouraging military intervention during other crises, see Jiri Valenta's *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

[3] I. G. Pavlovskiy and S. P. Vasyagin took their posts at the head of the Ground Forces in late 1967. V. I. Petrov went to the China frontier in December 1978, at which time he and two other generals were congratulated by Brezhnev on their promotions. D. T. Yazov took command in Czechoslovakia on Jan. 16, 1979. See US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials*, CR 80-11888, Washington, DC, April 1980; and *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Dec. 29, 1978.

[4] The rate for 1970–76 is calculated from a table in Timothy Colton, *Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 182–83. Colton, it should be noted, includes posts above the military district level. These posts change hands less frequently. Thus, the comparison overstates the unusualness of the transfers around Poland in 1980–81. The overstatement is offset, however, by Colton's inclusion of turnover due to death and illness, which did not figure in the transfers near Poland in 1980–81.

[5] *The New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1980.

[6] East German party chief Erich Honecker held a reception for the departing commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy and his successor, General M. M. Zaytsev, on Dec. 4, 1980. See Petr Kruzhin and Bruce Porter, "New Soviet Commander Takes Over in East Germany," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 464/80, Dec. 5, 1980.

Table 1: Key Transfers in Soviet High Command, December 1980–January 1981

Officer	Post vacated (last mention in post)[a]	New post (first mention in post)[a]
Gen. of Army I. G. Pavlovskiy	Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces (Dec. 2, 1980)	Main Inspectorate (Dec. 9, 1980)
Gen. of Army S. P. Vasyagin	Chief, Political Directorate, Ground Forces (Dec. 12, 1980[b])	Main Inspectorate (Dec. 18, 1980[b])
Gen. of Army Ye. F. Ivanovskiy	Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany—GSFG (Dec. 4, 1980[c])	Commander, Belorussian Military District (Dec. 14, 1980)
Col. Gen. D. T. Yazov	Commander, Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia)	Commander, Central Asian Military District (Jan 9, 1981)
Col. Gen. M. M. Zaytsev	Commander, Belorussian Military District	Commander, GSFG (Dec. 4, 1980[c])
Gen. of Army V. I. Petrov	(China border command)	Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces (Dec. 2, 1980[b])
Gen. of Army V. L. Govorov	Commander, Moscow Military District (Nov. 21, 1980)	(China border command) (Dec. 27, 1980[d])
Col. Gen. P. G. Lushev	Commander, Central Asian Military District	Commander, Moscow Military District (Dec. 11, 1980)
Maj. Gen. V. F. Arapov	First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, North Caucasus Military District	Chief, Political Directorate, Central Asian Military District (Jan. 9, 1981)
Lt. Gen. G. Borisov	(Unknown)	Commander, Central Group of Forces (Jan. 14, 1981)
Col. Gen. M. D. Popkov	Chief, Political Directorate, Central Asian Military District	Chief, Political Directorate, Ground Forces (Jan. 15, 1981)
Col. Gen. I. A. Gubin	Chief, Political Directorate, Baltic Military District (Dec. 26, 1980)	Chief, Political Directorate, GSFG (Feb. 20, 1981)
Col. Gen. I. S. Mednikov	Chief, Political Directorate, GSFG (Jan. 16. 1981)	Chief, Political Directorate, Baltic Military District (Mar. 17, 1981)

[a] Except where noted, the date given is the date of publication of information specifically identifying the officer in the post at an event on the preceding day.

[b] Occupancy of the post is to be inferred by the place of the officer in question among signers of an obituary published on the indicated date.

[c] The specific day on which GDR leader Erich Honecker met with the departing and succeeding commanders-in-chief of the GSFG.

[d] Govorov's post was to be inferred by his place among signers of an obituary on the indicated date. However, Lushev's appointment to Govorov's former post by at least Dec. 10, and Petrov's vacating by Dec. 11 of the post that Govorov was to occupy, strongly suggest that the latter's new assignment took place no later than Dec. 11.

SOURCES: Daily issues of *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow) for the period in question, plus ADN International Service in German (East Berlin), Dec. 5, 1980, as trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC), Dec. 5, 1980, p. E/1.

ferred from commander in East Germany to the headquarters of the Belorussian Military District. The highest-ranking officer involved in the transfers was General I. G. Pavlovskiy, commander of the Ground Forces and deputy minister of defense. His last public act was reported on December 2.[7] General V. I. Petrov replaced him and was already in Moscow on December 10. General V. L. Govorov succeeded Petrov in the command the latter had held on the China border, and General P. G. Lushev assumed Govorov's command in Moscow Military District.[8] Pavlovskiy's deputy for political affairs, General S. P. Vasyagin was relieved sometime between the 11th and the 18th of December, and other changes continued until late January 1981.[9]

Each of the five primary beneficiaries of these reassignments had a tie to Brezhnev. Petrov had enjoyed the unique honor of being received personally by Brezhnev, according to *Krasnaya zvezda*, on the occasion of his assignment to the new China frontier command in December 1978.[10] Govorov had spent the pre-

---

[7] Pavlovskiy was among the deputy defense ministers seeing off Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov at the airport for his trip to a Bucharest conference of Warsaw Pact defense ministers. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 2, 1980.

[8] Lushev attended the Moscow Military District party conference instead of Govorov on Dec. 10. Ibid., Dec. 11, 1980. Govorov had been transferred to Petrov's China border command, where his presence was first noted when he attended the party conference at Far East Military District headquarters—but not as the district commander. See ibid., Dec. 27, 1980. Petrov signed the obituary of General V. M. Mikhalkin (ibid., Dec. 12, 1980) in the spot reserved for the Ground Forces commander.

Although Petrov's assignment to a command covering at least part of the China border was never made public by the Soviets, his name appeared as author of an article on military service in the Far East and Transbaykal districts. Ibid., Mar. 9, 1979. Since the commander of a district normally signs such articles when they concern a single district, Petrov's signature indicated that he commanded both. His assignment to the China border was confirmed when he was elected as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet from Irkutsk. *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, devyatiy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ninth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1979, p. 349.

Govorov's posting to this China border command was finally confirmed by the Soviets. See *XXVI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskiy otchët* (26th Congress of the CPSU: Stenographic Record), Vol. 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p. 332.

[9] Vasyagin signed the obituary of General Mikhalkin in the spot for the deputy commander of the Ground Forces. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 12, 1980. He signed the obituary of General S. A. Andryushenko after Pavlovskiy, probably indicating he had been made a "military consultant" to the Minister of Defense. Ibid., Dec. 18, 1980.

[10] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 29, 1978. To my knowledge, this is the only instance where Brezhnev figured publicly in the announcement of military appointments.



Some of the officers with ties to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev who benefited from an unusual reshuffling of Soviet commands in late 1980 and early 1981, clockwise, from lower left: General of the Army V. I. Petrov, who became Commander of Soviet Ground Forces; Col. Gen. V. L. Govorov, who succeeded Petrov in a major command along the Chinese border; Col. Gen. M. M. Zaytsev, who became Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; and Col. Gen. P. G. Lushev, who became Commander of the Moscow Military District.

—Sovfoto, *Sovetskiy voin*, *Znamenonosets*, and *Sovetskiy voin*.

vious eight years in Moscow, where he would have developed close personal ties with the political general K. S. Grushevoy, who had been Brezhnev's family friend for at least 45 years—a friendship emphasized by *Krasnaya zvezda*.[11] General M. M. Zaytsev, who took over the plum of Soviet regional commands when he moved to East Germany, had first reached the level of military district commander in 1976, after Brezhnev's installation of D. F. Ustinov as the Minister of Defense.[12] Lushev, the new Moscow Military District commander, and General M. D. Popkov, the new Ground Forces political deputy, were plucked from the obscurity of the Central Asian Military District. The party *kharakteristika*, which, according to procedure, would be prepared in connection with their promotions, would thus have been signed by D. A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan and a Brezhnev protégé who runs Brezhnev's old political fief there.[13]

The most striking difference between the winners and the losers in the reshuffle was that the losers had not recently had a beneficial intervention by Brezhnev in their careers. Prominent losers were Pavlovskiy and Vasyagin, both in the same posts for 13 years; and, Ivanovskiy and his political deputy, General I. S. Mednikov, in Germany since 1972 and 1971, respectively. Ivanovskiy's loss of status equalled Zaytsev's gain when they exchanged Belorussia and East Germany, and Mednikov similarly lost ground to General I. S. Gubin, with whom he exchanged the political directorate of East Germany for that of the Baltic Military District.[14]

---

[11] Ibid., Feb. 5, 1981. This article is interesting not only because it mentioned that Grushevoy had worked with Brezhnev's father but also because Grushevoy emphasized in it Brezhnev's readiness to forgive mistakes.

[12] Six of the 20 military districts and groups of forces changed hands in 1976, in the wake of Ustinov's appointment in April. Among the officers promoted at the time were Zaytsev, Petrov, and V. A. Belikov.

[13] Popkov missed the Ground Forces conference, where the deputy chief of the political directrate spoke instead. Ibid., Dec. 27, 1980. Popkov was first mentioned as being in his new post in an account of a party conference of the Kiev Military District. Ibid., Jan. 15, 1981. Kunayev's ties to Brezhnev are treated in Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, New York, Viking Press, 1970, pp. 514–15.

These signs of patronage might not seem especially marked when compared to patronage for political posts. It must be remembered, however, that we know little or nothing about the assignments of military commanders before they reach the military district level. Also, political patronage in military promotions has to be different from patronage in civilian organizations, for politicians usually do not have the experience of heading military organizations. Thus, the chain of associations in posts from oblast to republic to all-Union level—so visible within the Soviet political elite—does not manifest itself in the same way between the political leaders and the military high command and possibly is not as important in military careers.

Preparing for Intervention

That this pattern of winners and losers was not coincidental is strongly suggested by a combination of considerations. To begin with, postings at the military district level and above presumably are on the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee, so it would follow that the series of reassignments grew out of Politburo decisions. Moreover, there is at least circumstantial evidence that the personnel actions were related to decisions concerning Poland—specifically, to the decisions to mobilize for a military intervention and then to refrain from intervening.

The peak of readiness attained in December 1980 necessarily followed a period of preparations—calling up reservists, deploying their units out of garrison, assembling civilian trucks, providing refresher training, and bringing war reserve equipment to readiness for use. We have no way of knowing how long this process took, but American officials commenced briefing reporters about military preparations along the Polish frontier during the last week in November.[15] Logically,

---

[14] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 14, 1980. The command in East Germany is unique among the Soviet military districts and groups of forces in rating the title of "commander-in-chief" instead of plain "commander." It has been a stepping stone to higher posts for men such as Marshals Grechko and Kulikov.

Mednikov last appeared as chief of the political directorate of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany at a party conference of the group where he was severely criticized. Ibid., Jan. 16, 1981. However, his transfer to the Baltic Military District was not disclosed until the Mar. 17, 1981, issue of *Krasnaya zvezda*. Gubin first appeared in East Germany at a meeting celebrating ties with East Germany's National People's Army (NVA). See ibid., Feb. 20, 1981. However, Mednikov's transfer followed shortly or even immediately after the earlier party conference. *Kommunist Vooruchënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 4, February 1981, p. 95, records that Mednikov's deputy gave the main report at a meeting of the military council sometime in January. This journal was sent to press on Feb. 1, so Mednikov's transfer must have occurred between the 16th and 31st of January.

[15] The first briefings came during the week of Nov. 23–30, 1980. *The New York Times* reported on Nov. 27 that "officials said that Soviet forces along the border with Poland had conducted maneuvers and that armored equipment had been fueled and kept more ready for operations than usual." However, at this time a press spokesman for the US Department of State said: "We don't see any evidence that any Soviet troop action is imminent." See also the *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 29, 1980, and *The Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1980. By Dec. 2, extensive preparations had been revealed. See *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Dec. 3, 1980.

Apparent losers in the shake-up of Soviet military commands in late 1980 and early 1981, from left to right: General of the Army Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, who was transferred from the command of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany to the headquarters of the Belorussian Military District; General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskiy, removed as commander of the Ground Forces; and Col. Gen. S. P. Vasyagin, removed as chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces.

—*Neues Deutschland*, Sovfoto, and *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, vos'moy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Eighth Session), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1970.

the US government must have received evidence of the preparations before starting such briefings, and a Soviet decision to mobilize must have preceded the first observable signs of military preparations. By this reasoning, the date of the Soviet decision must have been no later than mid-November. This supposition is supported by signs in the Soviet press that intervention was being discussed and that the issue was causing conflict. On November 17, a *Pravda* article on the Russian civil war contained the following: "differences of opinion between the commander-in-chief and the commands of the fronts" had been resolved in favor of "mobilization . . . urgent measures for strengthening the army."[16] There are, of course, arguments for and against reading statements on historical matters as applicable to contemporary politics. However, it is undeniable that one advantage of historical material for political figures making an appeal for allies in a factional conflict is that the publication of an article on party history is hardly sufficient grounds for an accusation of factionalism. Furthermore, the November 17 article contained fairly obvious contemporary analogies: Brezhnev is commander-in-chief,[17] and "fronts" are what military district headquarters would become in a combat operation.[18]

The *Pravda* article, if it did indeed have relevance to the mobilization that soon became noticeable around Poland, did not intimate whether the commander-in-chief had overcome the opposition of the front commanders or they had overcome his. However, there were other signs. On November 14, an obituary for a deputy minister of defense appeared in *Pravda* without the signature of Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov. This was the first time in years that his name had not been affixed to the obituary of an officer of this rank.[19] Just as striking, the names of the heads of the two Central Committee departments most deeply involved in oversight of military affairs appeared among the deputy ministers of defense instead of immediately after the first deputy ministers and ahead of the other deputy ministers, as is usual.[20] It seemed that they and Suslov had suffered some kind of political setback.

On November 16, furthermore, D. D. Lelyushenko, a retired general of World War II fame, published an article in *Krasnaya zvezda* on the 1920 Polish-Soviet war. Normally, this war is mentioned only in passing in the Soviet press, since it is awkward to discuss past wars with countries whose present relations with the USSR are close. Consequently, the very publication of the article probably reflected a more somber assessment of the Polish situation by at least a part of the Soviet hierarchy. If the article did represent the views of just one faction, the author was a good choice as public spokesman. His prestige would tend to shield him from retribution if what he said turned out to be at odds with the eventual decision. His post was largely ceremonial; thus, little would be gained by bureaucratic retaliation against him. At any rate, Lelyushenko's comments on the 1920 situation were pertinent to the 1980 crisis in Poland. He summarized his point of view with a quotation from V. I. Lenin: "War with Poland is forced upon us."[21]

Lelyushenko's article did not contain internal evidence to reveal on whose behalf it had been written. Although experience suggests that a general writing in *Krasnaya zvezda* is a spokesman for other generals, this rule is not firm enough to exclude the possibility that in this instance General Lelyushenko might have been voicing Brezhnev's views. Brezhnev's activities in late November, however, seem inconsistent with his favoring intervention in Poland.

One of the classic uses of diplomacy is to influence a domestic debate by scheduling meetings with foreigners carefully chosen to supply information favorable to one side of the debate, and Brezhnev's diplomacy at this time tended to stress the potential costs of an intervention. On November 26, he met Senator Charles Percy, soon to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate, who intimated that the new Reagan administration had authorized him to convey its interest in reviving negotiations on arms control, suspended when President Jimmy Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from ratification procedures in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Percy explicitly warned that an invasion of Poland would shatter any hope for new agreements.[22] Also in late November, Brezhnev confirmed that he would visit India. The invasion of Afghanistan was creating internal and diplomatic difficulties for the Indians, and Brezhnev could count on them to complain about the continuing presence of Soviet troops there in preparatory discussions for his

---

[16] *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1980.

[17] Brezhnev's title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was first disclosed by G. V. Sredin, then first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate, in *Voyenniy vestnik* (Moscow), No. 10, 1977, p. 10.

[18] A "front" in the Soviet military organization is the equivalent of an "army group" in the US Army, i.e., a headquarters commanding two or more armies.

[19] Obituary of General N. N. Alekseyev.

[20] The two were N. I. Savinkin and I. D. Serbin, heads respectively of the Administrative Organs and Defense Industries departments. Savinkin was in his regular place in the earlier obituary of General M. N. Chistyakov and recovered it in the obituary of General D. S. Leonov. Cf. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Sept. 17, 1980, and Jan. 14, 1981.

[21] Ibid., Nov. 16, 1980.

[22] Senator Percy traveled to Moscow on the pretext of a "personal invitation" from then US Ambassador Thomas J. Watson. The Soviet decision for Brezhnev to receive him was a sudden one. Percy had only two hours' notice. *The New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1980. The next day Percy met Defense Minister Ustinov and told him: "If, for instance, anything happened in Poland with the use of force, probably in our lifetime no major agreements would be possible." *The Washington Star*, Nov. 28, 1980.

Then First Secretary Stanislaw Kania addresses a December 1980 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw.

—De Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

visit.[23] Since Soviet military propaganda had referred to Afghanistan and Poland as part of a Western imperialist pincers movement, such complaints would have inevitable overtones regarding Poland in Soviet minds.

Diplomacy has been a touchy subject between Soviet political and military leaders over the years. For example, the late Marshal A. A. Grechko, as Defense Minister, regularly differed with Brezhnev over the relative weight of diplomacy and military power in bringing Western states to see the virtues of détente.[24] In the context of past disagreements over diplomacy, it is noteworthy that *Krasnaya zvezda* chose to warn of the risks of diplomacy while Brezhnev engaged in his round of meetings. The newspaper cited Friedrich Engels as the authority for the view that "military movements are not to be subordinated to the wishes and plans of diplomats, but to their own rules which cannot be violated without endangering the whole expedition."[25] *Krasnaya zvezda* also reported a speech by General M. M. Kozlov, a long-time associate of Marshal V. G. Kulikov, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. At a ceremony where Kulikov was the senior officer present, Kozlov denounced "fawning on foreign 'authorities.'"[26]

The juxtaposition of Brezhnev's meetings with military complaints about diplomacy is not meant to suggest that hopes for arms control negotiations or concern about Indian sensitivities were major issues in the Soviet deliberations over Poland. Rather, the argument is that diplomacy was Brezhnev's means of signaling his Politburo supporters to resist pressures for intervention. Such signals were necessary because of Brezhnev's style of leadership. He himself has not taken firm positions on controversial issues. It is reported that he hears out the views of other Politburo members and then sums up the consensus.[27] To achieve his wishes, given his low-profile manner, he needs some indirect method of communicating what he really wants.

---

[23] In fact, Indian concerns about Afghanistan were expressed at the banquet on the opening day of Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8). President Sanjiva Reddy asked for a Soviet withdrawal "without delay," but did not mention Afghanistan by name. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 9, 1980. When such state visits are held, diplomats prepare them thoroughly. Thus, it is likely that Reddy's tactful reticence had been negotiated beforehand.

[24] Grechko invariably credited the growth of Soviet military might with compelling the West to seek détente. In contrast, Brezhnev put military might lower on the list of factors that had influenced Western realists to accept détente. For instance, Brezhnev laid greater stress on the effectiveness of the peace program adopted at the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1971.

[25] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Nov. 27, 1980. The appearance of the article right after the Brezhnev-Percy meeting is particularly telling.

[26] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1980. The occasion was a commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of the 18th-century Generalissimo A. Suvorov. Gen. Kozlov, who served as Kulikov's deputy in East Germany, was promoted to the key post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff when Kulikov was Chief of General Staff, a post he lost after Kulikov was reassigned to a less important position in 1977. Kozlov also was the only figure who failed to join in lauding Brezhnev for his role as Chairman of the Defense Council when this was an important element of Brezhnev's personality cult at the time when Ustinov rather than Kulikov was elevated to Minister of Defense in 1976.

[27] This description was provided in an interview by Valentin Falin, deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department, in *The Washington Star*, July 15, 1979.

Thus, the mid-November decision to mobilize may not have represented an outright defeat for Brezhnev. Instead, it may have been his way of satisfying the generals and worried Politburo members who were using Kania's evident weakness to make a case for a shift to a tougher policy, while Brezhnev mobilized a countervailing body of opinion.

Reversing Course

Whatever the give and take inside the Politburo, the first days of December brought a series of concerted moves which defused the pressure for intervention. On December 1, a Polish party plenum which had been expected to install reform Communists on the Politburo wound up strengthening the hand of conservatives instead.[28] On the same day, Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov went to a meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Bucharest that lasted until December 3. The tenor of the discussions at the meeting was such that TASS reports about it used the standard formulas indicating discord: "in a businesslike atmosphere . . . in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding."[29] There is no way of determining whether Ustinov sided with the Czechoslovaks and East Germans, who were for intervention, or with the Hungarians and Romanians, who were not,[30] but it is suggestive that while the defense ministers argued in Bucharest, the Romanian foreign minister, Stefan Andrei, flew to Moscow for a meeting with Brezhnev on December 2. Brezhnev presumably heard the Romanian reiterate President Nicolae Ceausescu's long-standing objections to Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. Brezhnev was able to provide assurances sufficient at least to bring Ceausescu to Moscow for a Warsaw Pact summit that convened without prior announcement on December 5. Whether Brezhnev could already guarantee that the summit decision would be against intervention or whether he urged Ceausescu's attendance so that the anti-intervention case would be strongly represented is a matter of conjecture.[31]

Meanwhile, measures were being taken to assure the outcome of the Warsaw Pact summit. As indicated earlier, the reshuffle of military commanders had begun with Ivanovskiy's recall on December 4. The removal of Pavlovskiy and thus the other immediate changes (involving Petrov, Govorov, and Lushev) may have been decided at the same time—that is, about December 2.[32] Furthermore, the Soviet participants in the summit meeting were chosen from among the opponents of intervention. Party Secretary Suslov was included despite his setback at the time of the decision to mobilize. In contrast, Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko was excluded, even though he had been playing an active role in East European affairs. In early September, he had secretly met Polish leader Gierek in a last ditch effort to overturn the just-signed Gdansk agreement, which opened the way for establishment of Solidarity. In October he had visited Czechoslovakia, where officials were urging Soviet intervention in Poland.[33]

As a result of these efforts, the Moscow summit endorsed a political solution to the Polish crisis, encompassing support for the Polish Communist party. By implication, external military intervention was rejected.

---

[28] ". . . Observers are watching to see if the reformist faction is strengthened by the inclusion of such men as Tadeusz Fiszbach, the party chief in Gdansk, or Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the editor of the weekly magazine *Polityka*." *The Washington Post*, Dec. 1, 1980. Instead, two conservatives, Mieczyslaw Moczar and Tadeusz Grabski, were added to the Politburo. Fiszbach received only nonvoting status, and Rakowski was not moved up at all. Kania disguised the import of these moves by ousting four former Gierek supporters who may have been hard-liners but were discredited in Soviet eyes.

[29] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 4, 1980.

[30] The Romanian attitude can be described as one of disapproval and anxiety over both the reform movement and the possibility of intervention in Poland. On a state visit to the Scandinavian countries in November 1980, President Ceausescu stated during press interviews that the Polish problems should be resolved by the Poles themselves and Polish political forces, primarily the PUWP. See *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Romania/17, Nov. 25, 1980. The Hungarians indicated that Polish problems should be solved by Poles and publicly merely praised the efficacy of their own economic reforms.

The Czechoslovak leadership was most vocal in condemning the Polish reform movement and early on drew parallels to 1968. A good example of the Czechoslovak attitude was Vasil Bilak's speech at the plenum of the Czechoslovak Central Committee on Oct. 9, 1980, in which he suggested that events in Poland had characteristics of a counterrevolution. Ibid., Czechoslovakia/247, Oct. 20, 1980. The East Germans strongly seconded the Czechoslovak line. Compare, for example, the *Pravda* report on Kania's speech at the Oct. 6, 1980, Polish plenum and Erich Honecker's article in the same issue. *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1980.

[31] There appears to have been some waffling on the part of the Romanian government with respect to the Polish crisis, but Ceausescu had boycotted similar summits before the intervention in Czechoslovakia, in which Romanian forces did not participate. Moreover, there are reports that Ceausescu agreed to attend the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow three days after Andrei's meeting with Brezhnev only on the assurance that the final communique would be mild. Certainly, Ceausescu at the summit joined Hungary and Bulgaria in arguing against military intervention, and Romania's opposition to intervention in Poland became firmer after the summit. See *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1980; *The Washington Star*, Dec. 18, 1980; and *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Dec. 15, 1980.

It would seem, however, that the issue of whether to intervene in Poland or not still remained open when Brezhnev met Andrei. On the same day that this meeting took place, the Czechoslovak and East German premiers met, presumably to coordinate the arguments for invasion that they presented at the Moscow summit. That such was the purpose of their meeting is reinforced by the timing of the announcement of their intention to confer. The announcement came on November 27, the day after Brezhnev's discussion with Percy. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1980.

[32] The likelihood that Pavlovskiy's ouster came during the first days of December, rather than after the Moscow summit on December 5, is suggested by a curious omission. When Ustinov left Moscow for Bucharest, the press listed by name Pavlovskiy and the other deputy ministers of defense who accompanied Ustinov to the airport. When Ustinov returned, the names of deputy ministers who met him were not given. Cf. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 2 and 4, 1980.

[33] On Kirilenko's efforts in Poland, see fn. 1. His trip to Czechoslovakia is reported in *Pravda*, Oct. 23–26, 1980.

It is obviously possible to argue that the decision at the Moscow summit did not represent a change of course. According to some analysts, the mobilization around Poland was never intended to be a preparation for an actual military intervention. Instead, the troop movements were part of a plan to increase political pressure on the Polish leadership.

While one cannot eliminate such a possibility entirely, a variety of considerations weigh against it. Before the Warsaw Pact summit on December 5, East German officials had been directed to brief Western journalist Tad Szulc to expect invasion by the end of December.[34] At that juncture, to be sure, the Szulc interview could have been a step in a pressure campaign, but East German officials repeated essentially the same information after the Moscow summit, when doing so would no longer have served such a purpose. Specifically, they told a Western correspondent that the Soviet leadership had considered intervention in late November only to reject it—exactly the timing suggested by the ouster of Pavlovskiy, Brezhnev's diplomacy, and the moves preparatory to the Moscow summit.[35] Furthermore, a Polish general who defected in August 1981 said that Soviet forces were ordered to be ready to move by December 15.[36] It has also been suggested that the Soviets were in fact not ready to move when the Moscow summit convened.[37] Yet the buildup around Poland would have been politically more convincing if the summit had been timed to coincide with completion of military preparations. Thus, the Moscow summit looks more like an effort to prevent a decision in favor of invasion than a concerted pressure campaign to exploit the military threat.

The signs of political disagreement likewise weaken the argument that the Soviets were attempting to build pressure on the Poles rather than actually getting ready for intervention. The supposition of disagreement is reinforced by the subsequent lukewarm endorsement of the Moscow summit decisions by the Soviet Politburo. This suggests that some members of the leadership thought that the decisions adopted there were inadequate.[38] If the idea had been to intimidate, why confuse the message? On the other hand, if the Soviets had some kind of "good cop, bad cop" strategy in mind, why be so indirect about it? Finally, the most telling flaw in the proposition that the Soviets intended to apply only political pressure is that it does not account for the sudden reassignment of top commanders.

A more plausible interpretation is that Brezhnev had indeed suffered a setback during the decision to mobilize; however, he may have camouflaged it by go-

A summit meeting of leaders of Warsaw Pact countries convened in Moscow on December 5, 1980, to consider events in Poland. The Soviet delegation, including Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov, Premier N. A. Tikhonov, President and CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the late CPSU Secretary M. A. Suslov, and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko are seated along the rear wall. At the far right is Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, whose attendance may have lent weight to those opposing a military intervention in Poland at that time.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

---

[34] *The Washington Star*, Dec. 7, 1980.

[35] *The New York Times*, Dec. 24, 1980.

[36] *The Washington Post*, Dec. 28, 1981.

[37] *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1981, published stories based on a report from US Congressman Les Aspin. "Though Aspin did not say so publicly, it is known that one factor behind his analysis is the Soviet tendency to exercise its entire invasion force before using it." *The Times* further noted that "some analysts" inside the government "agree with Mr. Aspin. . . ."

[38] See *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1980. The usual formula is to approve the activity of delegations headed by Brezhnev "completely and in full" (*tselikom i polnost'yu*), a phrase absent from the Politburo endorsement of the Moscow summit.

READEX FICHE

ing along gracefully with the decision. As indicated earlier, the mobilization decision appears to have cost him some control over the press and the temporary downgrading of two officials (the party's defense overseers) long associated with him. It is hard to explain why Brezhnev would want these developments. Far more plausible is the proposition that Kirilenko backed generals pressing for intervention in Poland and that *Pravda*'s suggestion that they had overcome Brezhnev's opposition represented an effort to capitalize on a political victory.

Mobilization Problems

The reason for Brezhnev's resurgence probably lies in a factor that was not known in the West until February 1981. A correspondent in Moscow received a report of extraordinary disorders accompanying the mobilization in the Carpathian Military District, one of three along the Polish frontier. Reservists called up for the crisis had supposedly deserted in numbers too large to punish, and units had moved back and forth in a disorganized fashion.[39] If true, this report explains much. The troubles would strengthen the hand of political leaders opposed to invasion, since the Soviet army's ability to defeat Polish resistance would be lowered if its troops were unreliable. The troubles would also discredit some advocates of invasion. Pavlovskiy was personally accountable for mobilization readiness of the Ground Forces. While various Politburo members might defend him if Brezhnev objected to his having counseled an invasion of Poland, he could not expect defenders if he was seen to have neglected the mobilization system.

Reports of mobilization problems in the Soviet armed forces should obviously be treated with some skepticism; nevertheless, there is adequate confirmation from official Soviet sources that something went wrong. In late December, *Krasnaya zvezda* stepped up its attention to military readiness. While criticisms of readiness are routine in this military newspaper, the criticisms become directed at a higher rank of officers and more important institutions when something is particularly amiss. On January 7, 1981, an account was published of a conference at which the Minister of Defense made recommendations for improving the "quality of work of the General Staff and the whole central apparatus" of the armed forces. Although the report of the meeting was fairly bland, this kind of blandness often conceals quite sharp exchanges, and the Chief of the General Staff was quoted as conceding that "we will have to sharply raise the level of all organizational work, the efficiency and operativeness of all command echelons."[40]

A week later, *Krasnaya zvezda* carried a sharp critique of the top-level command in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The main speaker at the party conference there was reported to have blamed "serious deficiencies in the work of the military councils" for various shortcomings, including the failure of "half of the battalions and one third of the companies" to maintain top readiness.[41] Because military councils are found only at army, military district, and higher headquarters, this remark was in effect a personal attack on Ivanovskiy, who had been reassigned in December, and on Mednikov, the political officer and "member of the military council" whose reassignment followed within two weeks.

The criticisms in *Krasnaya zvezda* appeared mainly in reports on party conferences at military district headquarters, which are customarily held in December. This time, however, a second round of conferences took place in January, to prepare for the 26th Congress of the CPSU. Brezhnev's reassignment of command personnel had paved the way for the voicing of unusually sharp criticisms at these meetings. Normally, when party conferences at military headquarters reveal few shortcomings, Soviet sources tend to raise suspicion of collusion between commander and political deputy to conceal shortcomings for which both are answerable.[42] The series of reassignments had the effect of putting every operational commander around Poland in harness with a new political deputy.[43] Trust sufficient for collusion takes time to form. If Brezhnev wanted to un-

---

[39] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 13, 1981.

[40] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Jan. 7, 1981.

[41] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1981.

[42] See, e.g., Maj. Gen. A. Overchuk, "Party Conference," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil*, No. 21, November 1976, pp. 43–51. Collusion between commanders and political deputies is a major theme in Timothy Colton's *Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority*.

[43] Of the five Soviet commands bordering on Poland—the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian military districts—only the last escaped turnover in commander and/or chief of the political directorate. (A new chief of the political directorate had been installed there in August 1980.)

Exclusion of the Carpathian Military District from the shakeup, it should be noted, raises a problem for my interpretation that the mobilization disorders gave Brezhnev an opening to organize the ousters of Pavlovskiy and other generals. The Carpathian was the district from which the disorders were reported. Thus, the retention of its commander, General V. A. Belikov, may seem inconsistent.

One interpretation of Politburo decisions regarding top military appointments ascribes decisive weight to a general's performance. However, another explanation could be offered—namely, that politics makes the difference. Such an explanation seems to fit here.

Belikov had been among those, like Petrov and Zaytsev, advanced in 1976 (see fn. 12), and as the reshuffle progressed in December 1980, it seemed that he too would lose his post. Like the two losers Vasyagin and Mednikov, Belikov was represented by his deputy at a meeting that he should have attended, the party conference of his district headquarters.

(Continued on next page)



Engineer troops of the Warsaw Pact member forces accomplish a river crossing during maneuvers in Poland in late March 1981.

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

cover evidence of military readiness problems, then shaking up the pairings of commander and political deputy was an adroit way of doing so.

From Brezhnev's point of view, it should be stressed, launching a military readiness campaign would have had several distinct advantages. First, it would encourage correction of whatever failings it uncovered. Intervention in Poland might still become necessary, and it would benefit no one in the Politburo if intervention failed. Second, the clear desirability of correcting any problems in the army would make it difficult for other Politburo members to oppose such a campaign. Third, if some military commanders had been pressing for intervention in Poland, the criticisms of readiness would serve to direct their attention to the defense of their own performance and away from attempts to influence the Politburo. Finally, continuing criticism of military readiness would help deflect pressure for a new mobilization around Poland, for it would tend to establish an awareness of the risk factors in an intervention. All these results did seem to flow from the readiness campaign of January and February 1981.

See *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 26, 1980. But in Belikov's case, *Krasnaya zvezda* on Jan. 20, 1981, pointedly let it be known, without the justification of a scheduled ceremony, that Belikov had retained his post. Moreover, in short order, the theme of forgiveness of errors of military cadres was given modest play in army propaganda, arguably in order to justify Belikov's retention.

The forgiveness theme surfaced in the context of articles commemorating the centennial of Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov's birth. On Feb. 4, 1981, *Krasnaya zvezda* noted that Voroshilov had "temporarily joined 'the military opposition'" and had been "sharply and justly criticized. . . . Profoundly realizing his mistakes, Voroshilov knew how to draw the right conclusions from the party criticism and in the future actively struggled for the accomplishment of Lenin's instructions." On Feb. 5, 1981, Marshal K. S. Moskalenko (in *Pravda*) also mentioned Voroshilov's dissenting views (without linking him explicitly to the "military opposition"), and Brezhnev's friend General K. S. Grushevoy (in *Krasnaya zvezda*) recorded Brezhnev's forgiveness with respect to erring cadres.

That Voroshilov's "errors" (and redemption) were of more than historical interest and, indeed, were likely being manipulated for contemporary purposes is suggested by the absence of any mention of the late marshal's membership in the military opposition in a biography of him authored by Moskalenko and signed to press on Dec. 22, 1980 (i.e., before the conference that Belikov did not attend). See Moskalenko, "Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1981, pp. 53–54. This earlier biography of Voroshilov instead warned of the dangers of the military becoming "fenced off" from the party leadership—just as did two articles in *Krasnaya zvezda* the next day which mentioned party-military conflict. Thus in December, when Belikov's status was in doubt, the press emphasized troubles between the party and the armed forces; after Belikov's retention had become known, the line switched to forgiveness.

The Aftermath

When a new Soviet mobilization effort was made in March 1981, the link between criticism of readiness and the Polish crisis became visible again. For example, General A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate, which publishes *Krasnaya zvezda*, signed an article evidently intended to end criticisms of readiness. Although his own first deputy had earlier published a warning of the harm done by neglecting problems, Yepishev avoided mention of any flaws.[44]

The US government announced on March 26 that the Soviets were fully ready to intervene,[45] but in the interval, Yepishev's Main Political Directorate had been ordered to publish a decree demanding "further improvements in the methods of leading troops, and in assuring precise and coordinated working of all command echelons."[46] As is usual for decrees of the Main Political Directorate, this one triggered a new round of meetings at military district headquarters. The meetings disclosed flaws in troop training in Belorussia and East Germany, two commands vital to the success of any operation against Poland.[47]

Again, the Soviet leadership called off the mobilization. Subsequently, Brezhnev headed a delegation to the Czechoslovak party congress, and Suslov, to the East German congress. The choice of the leading Soviet advocates of restraint as representatives to the party congresses of the two major advocates of intervention cannot have been coincidence. It is also worth noting that these were the two countries from which the Soviet commanders had been recalled in the December reshuffle.

That readiness had been less than satisfactory was confirmed in July. The concluding section of a *Kommunist* article by Marshal N. Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, dwelt at length on the need to improve mobilization capability. Although mobilization is one of the responsibilities of the General Staff, attention to mobilization problems by the Chief of the General Staff in *Kommunist* is most unusual.[48] He called for better cooperation between military commanders and local civilian authorities. Lack of coordination between the two sets of officials would explain why deserting reservists might have been able to avoid punishment in the Carpathian Military District.

Conclusion

Having examined in some detail the specifics of the decisions in late 1980 to move toward military readiness to intervene in Poland and then to refrain from intervening, it is worthwhile to look at the implications of this investigation. Analysis of Soviet policymaking has usually begun with the assumption that the interests of the Soviet regime determine Politburo decisions. The twists and turns of Soviet deliberations on military intervention in Poland, like other conflicts over policy in the Politburo, suggest that this commonly held assumption is too generalized for a satisfactory explanation of the Soviet decision-making process.

First, the Politburo cannot always, and perhaps even often, be in agreement about its collective best interests. For example, even when the mobilization revealed troubles in the armies near Poland, advocates of intervention could argue that the urgency of restoring control over events there outweighed the added risks stemming from inadequate military readiness. There is even some evidence that this argument was made. On December 8, already after the Moscow summit of the Warsaw Pact but while troops were still poised around Poland, TASS reported assaults by Solidarity members on loyal Communists in the Polish town of Kielce. The strike during which the assaults supposedly occurred had taken place months earlier. This dispatch must have been controversial. TASS canceled it on the next day, and it never ran in Soviet newspapers.[49] Then, on December 12, TASS picked up a dispatch from the Polish army newspaper, *Zolnierz wolnosci*, which stressed Poland's location athwart "the transit routes and lines of communication" to East Germany.[50] Although this formulation could have appeared in

---

[44] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Mar. 10, 1981. Contrast Yepishev's description of the Soviet soldier as "patriot, internationalist, ready to overcome any difficulty" with the view of his deputy, Gen. G. V. Sredin, that "a soothed, relaxed position is harmful" to readiness. Ibid., Jan. 21, 1981.

Yepishev's complicity in the advocacy of intervention in Poland is indicated by his descent in the order of obituary signers. In the Alekseyev obituary in November, Yepishev held his traditional place, third among the first deputy ministers of defense after Kulikov and before S. L. Sokolov. On Feb. 18, 1981, however, Yepishev signed the obituary of the former minister of the aviation industry after three deputy ministers of defense; he signed two other obituaries below Sokolov, last among the first deputy defense ministers. Ibid., Feb. 10 and Mar 24, 1981.

As head of the Main Political Directorate, Yepishev was accountable for Vasyagin, who was removed, and Mednikov, who was blamed for lack of readiness in East Germany. Yepishev could also have been blamed for "political errors" on the part of Pavlovskiy.

[45] *The New York Times*, Mar. 27, 1981.

[46] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Mar. 18, 1981.

[47] Ibid., Mar. 19, 1981.

[48] N. Ogarkov, "Safeguarding Peaceful Labor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91. Since becoming Chief of the General Staff in January 1977, Ogarkov had written one other *Kommunist* article, in issue No. 7, May 1978. The subject was introduction of new technology into the armed forces.

[49] *The New York Times*, Dec. 10, 1980.

[50] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 12, 1980. This item read: "Through Poland run the transit routes and lines of communication from the Soviet Union to the GDR. Poland is located in the immediate rear of the line dividing the two different military-political systems."

Zolnierz wolnosci for any number of reasons, its editors had had visits from the Soviet Main Political Directorate, headed by Yepishev.[51] Both dispatches could have originated with advocates of intervention.

Second, even when benefits of a policy seem to be applicable to the entire Politburo, these benefits may be so unevenly distributed that powerful individuals may actually consider them to be costs instead. For instance, most specialists would agree that access to Western credits is of substantial value to the whole Soviet Politburo. From the perspective of the Politburo as a collective, the substantial risk of a sharp reduction in access to Western credits would be a cost associated with invading Poland. Yet, this represented a greater cost to Brezhnev than to some of his colleagues. The policy of attracting Western credit through *kompensatsionnyye sdelki* (barter deals), such as the pipe-for-gas swap with West Germany, has been associated with Brezhnev. Some members of the Politburo have opposed such barter deals in the past, basing their case on the risks inherent in mortgaging the Soviet patrimony to foreigners.[52] An invasion of Poland would have led to the cancellation or at least a delay in the pipeline deal. In this sense, it would have involved a setback for Brezhnev and a vindication of those who have opposed deals like the pipeline. Kirilenko might even have perceived such an outcome as an outright benefit, for it might have forced the Politburo to transfer energy investments from laying pipe for natural gas to building up the electrification sector, which Kirilenko controls.[53] Thus, whether the risk of cancellation of the West German pipeline agreement increased or decreased the attractiveness of military intervention in Poland depended on which Soviet leader was examining the option.

Third, Politburo members have a variety of instruments available to them with which to manipulate perceptions of what represents Soviet interest. They can, for example, exaggerate the benefits and minimize the costs of policies that they favor, and give a reverse twist to policies that they oppose. The Soviet press is valuable for assessing Soviet policy debates precisely because powerful figures use it in this fashion. For instance, in the midst of the Polish crisis, one *Pravda* author suggested that the Soviet Union could make do without importing American grain.[54] Since a reduction in American grain sales to the USSR had followed the invasion of Afghanistan and a total grain embargo could reasonably be expected after an invasion of Poland, the suggestion that American grain imports were not needed minimized the potential price of a Polish invasion. Another *Pravda* writer recommended that those who refused to work be dealt with by the time-tested methods of reduced food rations and assignment to manual labor.[55] At a time when Lech Walesa was advocating passive resistance in case of Soviet invasion, this article implied that Walesa's threats could be handled and thus need not deter Soviet action.

Fourth, participants on occasion manipulate decisions by engaging in activities only loosely connected, or even unconnected, to the substance of the issue at hand. In raising the issue of intervention, its advocates knew that routine procedure would obligate Brezhnev to consult with commanders in the relevant military headquarters who, the proponents of intervention confidently expected, would strongly urge an invasion. Brezhnev's countermove was to turn to an alternate group of military experts who, having benefited from his patronage in the past, had formed expectations of further benefits in return for their cooperation. By promoting such generals—Petrov, Zaytsev, Govorov, Popkov—Brezhnev converted the Ground Forces headquarters from a center of champions of intervention to a center of opposition to it. But the promotion of these generals, in itself, had little to do with the merits of intervention in Poland.

In sum, it would appear that in Soviet decision-making the benefits of a policy to the Politburo as a whole are less important than the advantages or disadvantages it brings to individual members. Moreover, the individuals tend to make up their minds on policy issues largely on the basis of personal calculations. While each of them must take into account the need to maintain the power of the Politburo as a whole, policy issues capable of significantly affecting the Politburo's collective standing must be rare. Furthermore, the collective interest is only one element, and apparently not the key one, in the calculations of individual members.

In Brezhnev's case, personal interests in the Polish crisis would consistently have favored delaying intervention as long as alternative methods showed any sign of working. Brezhnev's interest in delay can be deduced from reports that Brezhnev had given Kania until the summer of 1981 to restore order—reports which were lent credibility by the Soviet-sponsored coup attempt against Kania in mid-summer and the eventual transition to Jaruzelski.[56]

---

[51] Such a visit is described in ibid., Mar. 27, 1981. *Krasnaya zvezda* correspondents are officers of the Main Political Directorate. Contacts between them and the Polish Main Political Directorate, which publishes *Zolnierz wolnosci*, are mentioned in ibid., Mar. 14, 1981.

[52] See Christian Duevel, "Kosygin at Odds with Brezhnev on Economic Policy," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (Munich), RL 375/74, Nov. 6, 1974.

[53] Kirilenko gave the main speech at a meeting held at the Central Committee in June 1980 on problems of electrification. *Pravda*, June 4, 1980. In this speech and in an article in *Kommunist* (No. 12, August 1981, pp. 3–16), Kirilenko emphasized development of atomic power for the European USSR and of coal from Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk for the rest of energy growth. His references to gas were limited to noting that expansion required special high-pressure, large-diameter pipe—which the Soviet Union cannot produce. In the same issue of *Kommunist*, Gosplan official A. A. Lalayants stressed that the electrical energy sector in the USSR is based wholly on the fatherland's (otechestvennoye) equipment. . . ." Lalayants also discussed the need to reduce the share of gas and fuel oil in electricity generation, a share that reached over 40 percent in 1970. Construction of the pipeline and commitment of gas supplies to Europe does nothing to solve problems Kirilenko is charged with and may make success more difficult.

[54] *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1980.

[55] Ibid., Dec. 5, 1980.

This is not to say that Brezhnev sympathized with the Polish reform process. His record hardly suggests ideological or personal proclivities toward reform communism. My argument is simply that permitting the Polish reform movement to go on for a time was preferable to intervention from Brezhnev's viewpoint.

Rumors circulated in earlier years that Brezhnev had opposed the invasions of both Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. There was justified skepticism about such reports. Yet perhaps we have overestimated Brezhnev's control over Soviet policy while underestimating his political skill, a vital feature of which is the ability to recognize the implications of issues for his personal authority and to maneuver for favorable outcomes. One reason why he might resist intervention as a policy tool is suggested by a study of American uses of military force for political ends:

> *In one sense the fact that a discrete use of the armed forces has taken place in itself indicates a failure of policy. . . . In effect, a discrete use of the armed forces is a belated attempt to make clear a policy intent or military capability which . . . has come into question.*[57]

Having conducted policy toward Eastern Europe himself, through such devices as the annual Crimean summit meetings and the direct telephone line that links each Eastern European capital with Moscow party headquarters, Brezhnev would bear the principal responsibility for policy failure there. The effect of failure to maintain control over Poland became visible promptly in Brezhnev's inability to resist pressures for Soviet mobilization. But as long as he had a chance to resolve the crisis by other means—like Jaruzelski's crackdown—Brezhnev could shrug off the Polish unrest as a stumble in the steady advance of Soviet power. If a military occupation had been necessary, he would have had far more to answer for.

From the point of view of ambitious colleagues—such as Kirilenko, whose age is working against him—pushing for intervention made sense in several respects. Forcing Brezhnev into the position of having to explain to the Politburo why an invasion might be necessary to correct his conduct of policy in Poland might well justify taking even quite substantial international risks. The Polish crisis also presented an opportunity to attack Brezhnev by casting doubt on the wisdom of making détente a centerpiece of foreign and domestic policy. For instance, the Polish crisis had been blamed on overreliance on Western credits, and if that crisis could be dealt with only by military force, it would demonstrate the prescience of those who had argued from the beginning that détente carried with it grave risks. The Polish crisis made a powerful case against détente, for the difficulties in absorbing Western technology that had undermined the Polish economy existed in the USSR as well. It was no bar to criticism of Brezhnev's policies—as a first step on the road to succeeding him—that a new General Secretary would presumably later want to return to pursuit of Western credits.

Finally, my analysis of the decision-making process resulting in the rejection of military intervention as a solution to the Polish crisis leads to the conclusion that the role of the Soviet high command—both in relationship to Brezhnev specifically and to political activities generally—is not fully covered by the statement that "the marshals and generals are left to act as executants"[58] of policy decided above their heads. Rather, members of the high command appear to have a firm sense of what policies will further their interests, as well as the will and the opportunity to push policy in the direction they desire. Political leaders try to control the generals' advocacy of unwelcome policy by offering to other generals inducements for loyalty through the Central Committee's control over assignments. Members of the high command react by seeking attachments to individual politicians. Politicians welcome such ties because the military commanders can be of help in furthering their own political ambitions. Rivalries inside the Politburo thus offer scope for political maneuvers by the generals. At least some of the time, and even on issues as important as the Polish crisis, policy is a byproduct of these maneuvers.

---

[56] "Some reports suggest that Mr. Brezhnev told Mr. Kania, when the two met in Moscow on Oct. 30, that the Soviet Union would give the Polish leadership until next summer to get its house in order." *The New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1980.

[57] Barry N. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1978, p. 11.

[58] William E. Odom, "The Party Connection," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1973, p. 25. See also his "Who Controls Whom in Moscow," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), No. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 109–23.

Books

Baltic Identity and Sovietization

By Romuald J. Misiunas

TÕNU PARMING and ELMAR JÄRVESOO, Eds. *A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

THOMAS REMEIKIS. *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania, 1945–1980.* Chicago, IL, Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980.

ROLFS EKMANIS. *Latvian Literature under the Soviets, 1940–1975.* Belmont, MA, Nordland Publishing Co., 1978.

EDWARD C. THADEN, Ed. *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981.

SINCE THE 1970's, there has been a noticeable rise in general awareness of the multinational nature of the Soviet Union, and the three Baltic republics have received a share of this heightened attention. The books under review present recent major contributions to the body of scholarly literature on the Baltic region.

The collection of articles edited by Tõnu Parming and Elmar Järvesoo is the widest in scope. Thirteen authors have contributed specialized articles on a broad spectrum of contemporary Estonian life. These include studies on the interaction of demography, nationalism, and politics; on economic and societal processes; and on several facets of the republic's cultural life and educational system. While some of the individual contributions might strike a reader as being overly narrow in focus, they collectively offer perhaps the most extensive survey available in a Western language of any of the 15 constituent republics of the USSR.

Thomas Remeikis studies national and political opposition in postwar Lithuania, from the period of underground armed resistance in the 1940's to the *samizdat* age of today. Nearly 400 pages of the book are devoted to documents relating to the national and religious opposition movements. On the basis of these documents, Remeikis categorizes the opposition along distinct lines of intellectual orientation, ranging from national Catholic to national leftist. Questions can be raised about this approach on two grounds. There is not enough information available about the precise origins of some of the documents, and it is unclear whether they represent the views of more than small groups. Nevertheless, the book is a comprehensive overview of the Lithuanian *samizdat* material—much of it nowhere else available in English translation—which has reached the West.

Rolfs Ekmanis limits his extensive and well-documented presentation to a survey of cultural policy as reflected in literature. But in view of the close interconnection in the USSR between cultural developments and national self-expression, his work can be taken as a study of postwar Latvian nationalism.

The scope of the book edited by Edward C. Thaden is somewhat different from the other three, for it covers a period when different territorial and political arrangements prevailed. The introductory essay by Thaden surveys the policies of the Tsarist government in the northwest region of the Russian empire. The four subsequent essays focus on the impact of these policies on each of four ethnic groups in the area: Baltic Germans, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns. As a study of the interaction between Russification and the development of national consciousness in Tsarist times, the volume provides historical perspective on the contemporary situation.

TODAY the three Baltic republics form a unique area within the Soviet state. Historic and recent developments have imparted qualities which clearly distinguish them from other areas of the USSR. All three have a strongly developed cultural identification with Europe. Their sense of modern statehood emerged as a result of successful movements for national independence, and it became entrenched during two decades of recognized membership in the world's community of independent states. This memory of political independence still remains quite vivid. The actual circumstances of their occupation and absorption into the USSR—made possible by Iosif Stalin's temporary rapprochement with Adolf Hitler—continue to be too widely known to permit the Soviet regime to distort them successfully. And the continuing nonrecognition of their incorporation into the USSR by the United States and other Western powers serves as an added reminder of those circumstances.

When the Baltic states were occupied and incorporated into the USSR in 1940, they were neither emerging nations nor underdeveloped societies. All three had predominantly literate populations with strongly developed national and cultural identities. Latvia and Estonia, moreover, had already significant industrial bases. Thus, a rapid expansion of the economic infrastructure could be undertaken with minimal investment in Latvia and Estonia and even in Lithuania, although the latter had not been greatly industrialized before the war. The three republics continue to maintain their position as the most developed region of the USSR.

Such historical and cultural distinction belies claims that the Soviet order is the only harbinger of economic and cultural modernization. It brings into question the official interpretation that the period of independence was a mistake because national survival as well as economic progress of the three peoples can be assured only through the reestablishment of their old connections with Russia. Thus, the task of gaining legitimacy and acceptance from the Baltic peoples is a difficult one for the Communist authorities.

From the perspective of the first three works under review, resistance to Sovietization forms a major element in the history of postwar Baltic society. In the immediate postwar years, as Remeikis details, armed guerrilla activity was especially pronounced in Lithuania. After the death of Stalin, however, resistance in all three republics became more passive. It can be described as a constant struggle to preserve a distinct national identity in the face of Soviet policies of social and cultural integration of all non-Russian areas of the USSR with its Russian core.

ON THE POLITICAL level, this resistance has largely consisted of efforts to nativize the ruling party *apparats* in the republics. Until the 1950's, not joining the Communist party was an expression of resistance to the Soviet government, but after Stalin's death, political perceptions began to change. Membership in the party became more attractive to the younger generation, as a means both of furthering personal ambition and of wielding some real power on the local level.

Nevertheless, even to this day, the percentage of ethnic Balts in the three parties remains considerably lower than their percentage of the population in each respective republic. While there seems to be a positive correlation throughout the USSR between technological and educational advancement and membership in the party, this is not the case in the Baltic republics.[1]

Of the three, Lithuania has been the most successful in nativizing its party. Even in Stalin's time, its leadership was home-born. The long tenure of Antanas Snieckus as First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party from prewar days in the underground to his death in office in 1974, and his reputedly close

Reviewers in this Issue

ROMUALD J. MISIUNAS—Research Associate, Concilium on International and Area Studies, Yale University (New Haven, CT); coauthor of *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence*, forthcoming, and coeditor of *The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917–1945*, 1978.

CYRIL A. ZEBOT—Professor Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer, Department of Economics, Georgetown University (Washington, DC); commentator and author of many works on Yugoslavia, most recently as a contributor to Aloysius Balawyder, ed., *Cooperative Movements in Eastern Europe*, 1980.

VICTOR DE STANKOVICH—Journalist and former English-language commentator for the NATO Radio Service; now living in semi-retirement near Paris; contributor of articles on a wide range of subjects to English-, German-, and Hungarian-language periodicals.

MERLE GOLDMAN—Professor of History, Boston University (Boston, MA), and Research Associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA); author of *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent*, 1981.

SAMUEL S. KIM—Professor of Political Science, Monmouth College (West Long Branch, NJ), and Senior Fellow, Institute for World Order (New York, NY); author of many works on Chinese foreign policy and world order, including *The Quest for a Just World Order*, 1982. The preparation of this essay was supported by a faculty creativity grant from Monmouth College.

---

[1] Rein Taagepera, "Dissimilarities between the Northwestern Soviet Republics," in A. Ziedonis, R. Taagepera, and M. Valgamäe, Eds., *Problems of Mininations*, San Jose, CA, Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1973, p. 82.

personal friendship with Mikhail Suslov, contributed to the effective metamorphosis of the Lithuanian party into his personal fief. During the relative decentralization of the Khrushchev *sovnarkhoz* period, the Lithuanian party machine was able to exercise considerable local autonomy. By the time of his death in 1974, Snieckus had acquired a measure of genuine acceptance from Lithuanians as a successful mediator and defender of Lithuania's interests in the Kremlin. His successor, Petras Griskevicius, however, has not proven as capable of playing this role.

Nativizing the Estonian and Latvian parties has been considerably more difficult because a preponderant number of the leading party personnel came from the Russian republic during the 1940's. Although they were ethnically Latvian or Estonian, they had not lived in their republics before the coming of the Soviets. Furthermore, in both Estonia and Latvia the contingents of Russian immigrants were much larger than in Lithuania, and they contributed disproportionately to the party memberships. Nevertheless, the proportion of natives in the parties of both republics continues to grow.

Moreover, as Rein Taagepera shows in his essay in the Parming-Järvesoo volume, Johannes Käbin, who immigrated from Russia and was First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party from 1950 until his retirement in 1978, managed to achieve a stature in Estonia similar to that of Snieckus in Lithuania. He also came to be regarded by local society as a successful mediator between the pressures of the Kremlin and those of the republic. (However, his successor, Karl Vaino, like his colleague Griskevicius in Lithuania, does not as yet perform the same role.) In addition, a quiet re-Estonianization seems to occur among much of this immigrant element. Their pride in their republic's being at the forefront of modernity in the USSR apparently leads them to seek greater identification and reintegration with their ethnic origins.

The process has made least headway in Latvia, where the party has had a less stable leadership. The Latvian party suffered a heavy blow during the purges of 1959–60, which affected all levels of its membership. Apparently, several thousand members were expelled at the time. As a result, the nativization of its leadership and cadres, which had been quite marked during the late 1950's, received a setback, and the percentage of indigenous party membership has continued to be lower in Latvia than in the other two Baltic republics. Although Arvids Pelse, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, is a Latvian, he, like Käbin and Vaino, was a post-1940 immigrant into Latvia. So is August Voss, who took over as First Secretary of the Latvian CP upon Pelse's departure for Moscow in 1966.

THE CULTIVATION of a Western life-style constitutes a significant and popular aspect of the assertion of cultural distinctiveness by the Baltic nations. Estonia, the republic with the highest standard of living in the USSR, also seems to exhibit the most modernistic life-style. Its role in the Soviet system as a "laboratory republic" for experimenting with social and economic development has been used by the native population to pursue an imitation, insofar as possible, of the life-style of nearby Scandinavia. Even official party publications have a modernistic format which is absent elsewhere in the USSR. Similar trends are discernible in Latvia and Lithuania, though not to the same degree.

Development of a Western life-style is nurtured through foreign ties, which are, by Soviet standards, particularly extensive for the Baltic peoples. The existence of prosperous émigré communities in the West fosters such contacts on the individual level. There also are special summer programs for offspring of wartime émigrés as well as various academic exchanges.

Estonia is again in the forefront of the three. The large Estonian community in Sweden is geographically close. Furthermore, a ferry connection between Helsinki and Tallinn, severed in 1940, was reestablished in 1965. The stream of weekenders from Finland has created virtually a permanent presence of foreigners in the Estonian capital. Moreover, with some effort, Estonians can understand the Finnish language, and most of northern Estonia is reached by Finnish television programs.

Poland has played an analogous role for Lithuania. The stream of visits between Warsaw and Vilnius during the 1960's and 1970's brought Lithuania closer to Europe. The developments in Poland since 1980, however, appear to have virtually stopped such personal contacts. Nevertheless, Polish TV can be seen in two thirds of Lithuania, though one wonders whether the 1982 "normalization" in Poland will leave anything worth watching for its Lithuanian audience.

RESISTANCE to Sovietization and conscious attempts to preserve a national culture are especially marked in the domain of artistic expression. The Ekmanis book and the articles of George Kurman and Mardi Valgamäe in the Parming-Järvesoo volume underscore the close relationship between political and cultural developments in a Soviet national setting.

During the last years of Stalin's rule, the requirement that all previous cultural contacts with the West be negated and that all ties, historic as well as contemporary, with Russian culture be glorified, effectively put a stop to most artistic expression of any merit. But Stalin's death and the succession struggle which followed brought a general relaxation in not only the political sphere but the cultural as well, and the various policy shifts introduced in Moscow rendered it difficult for local Communist authorities to gauge what was permissible in the cultural domain. Such confusion made possible the publication of significant works of literature. More broadly, one may say that a cultural renaissance occurred in all three republics, for a much greater latitude in both content and style could be exercised and still pass the censorship. For example, the long poem "The Unfinished Song," by the Latvian Harijs Heislers, published in late 1956, was one of the first works in Soviet literature to be devoted to the theme of the Gulag.

In spite of periodic attacks, condemnations, recantations, and calls for renewed ideological vigilance, the cultural life of the three republics has not been set back to its moribund Stalinist state and serves as an effective vehicle in promoting national distinctiveness. Of the three republics, Lithuania enjoyed perhaps the widest limits of the permissible during the late 1960's—a fact no doubt related to that republic's successful nativization of its party apparatus. While these limits have contracted somewhat during the 1970's, there has been no return to the earlier requirement of total uniformity.

THE FEAR of demographic extinction or of being swamped by Russian immigrants, which had been particularly acute in Latvia and a shade less so in Estonia during the 1950's and 1960's, seems to have abated during the 1970's. Even though the 1979 census indicates a decrease in the percentage of the native population in all three Baltic republics, the rate of decrease has slowed. In 1959, Estonians made up 75 percent of the population of Estonia. In 1970, this had fallen to 68 percent, and in 1979, to 65 percent. In 1959, Latvians formed 62 percent of the population of their republic. The figure dropped to 57 percent in 1970 and to 54 percent in 1979. As for Lithuania, the proportion rose from 79 percent in 1959 to 80 percent in 1970; then it fell by a fraction in 1979, although it still is about 80 percent.[2]

The pool of potential Russian immigrants has contracted, and the capacity of the local economies to absorb more of them is also smaller. Moreover, the vast majority of recent immigrants into Estonia and Latvia are so-called "ruble immigrants," who seek lucrative jobs. It is estimated that by 1980, 90 out of every 100 did not stay permanently.[3]

WHILE THE BALTIC peoples have in the foregoing ways managed to preserve their national identities, the pressures of Russification have also increased in recent years. That the regime fosters Russification seems to be an indication of its continued inability to rely on the loyalty of the non-Russian population of the USSR. The mass media have been promoting ideas and practices intended to lead to a transfer of loyalties from the local to a wider Soviet entity. Efforts to wean the Baltic societies away from their native cultures and traditions and to inculcate "international" melting-pot values—often little more than vulgarized versions of Russian customs, or at least perceived as such by the Baltic population—have been continuous since 1940.

Imposition of the use of the Russian language in an increasing variety of official and private situations is perhaps the most evident aspect of this process, and resistance to its use has emerged as a sort of barometer of Baltic national consciousness. Latvia and Estonia, with their large urban populations of immigrants from Russia, are the primary targets. In the cities, the use of Russian has become a daily necessity, and it is consciously fostered in education, in public meetings, and in the media. During the 1960's, the local authorities managed to win some concessions on language. The maintenance in the three republics of an 11-year system of primary-secondary education (as opposed to 10 years elsewhere in the USSR) was justified by the need for more instruction in the local languages. Whether such an exception will be tolerated in the 1980's remains to be seen.

The latest wave of Russification, which began in the late 1970's, does not appear to be aimed at the Baltic area specifically; rather, it seems to be part of an all-Union effort designed both to elicit more support for the regime from the Russians and to cope with the effects of a population explosion in Central Asia on the Soviet manpower pool. Its pursuit, however, irritates local feeling and is constantly decried in Lithuania's extensive *samizdat* press. Evidently some activities, such as those of ethnographic preservation societies, which are significant from the point of view of nurturing national consciousness, have been circumscribed. Officials have begun to insist that the societies devote more attention to "Soviet" ethnography—for example, the study of revolutionary traditions of their Communist parties or the collection of wartime stories and songs celebrating the Red Army.

---

[2] See R. Taagepera, "Baltic Population Changes, 1950–1980," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (San Jose, CA), Spring 1981.

[3] According to Rein Taagepera, migration reported in the 1970 census yields an immigration-emigration ratio of 0.56 for Estonia, 0.69 for Latvia, and 0.91 for Lithuania. Indications are that the 1979 census is likely to show considerably higher ratios. Ibid., p. 45.

Teaching of Russian has been introduced at the kindergarten level, but it is too early to judge the precise effects of such a move. The 1979 census, however, did show one surprising development. While knowledge of the Russian language among ethnic Lithuanians rose from 45 percent to 57 percent and among ethnic Latvians from 36 percent to 53 percent, it unexpectedly dropped among Estonians from 29 to 24 percent. There is no ready explanation for this decline. It could be a demonstration of local resistance to the pressures of Russification, but it could also be related to variations in census methods. For example, Lithuanian *samizdat* has charged that census data collectors in Vilnius were instructed to ascribe knowledge of Russian to every one who had completed a secondary education in Soviet times, regardless of the respondent's actual answer. During the 1970 census, there had apparently been cases where some who claimed to have no knowledge of the Russian language were identified elsewhere in the questionnaire as instructors of Russian.[4]

To all appearances, efforts at Russification have not yielded the desired results. A Soviet, as opposed to a national, loyalty has not developed, nor has the primacy of the Russian language been accepted. Russians continue to be the butt of popular humor, and their interaction with the local populations is limited.

ON THE SURFACE, the Baltic nations, while continuing to resist Sovietization, appear to have resigned themselves to its reality. But it would be a mistake to think that accommodation to a reality imposed by force and circumspection in open opposition mean acceptance of that reality. The openly anti-Russian sentiments which reportedly were expressed during the disturbances in Kaunas in 1972 and in Tallinn in 1980 show a strong tendency to blame all shortcomings on the Russians and on the system which they have introduced. While the quality of life in all three republics is high by Soviet standards, shortcomings, especially in the availability of food products, have apparently become endemic since the late 1970's. Although expectations have been rising since the 1950's, their satisfaction seems to be beyond the regime's capacities.

In certain respects, the problems which the Kremlin faces today in the Baltic republics resemble those which confronted the prerevolutionary authorities. Then, as today, this strategically important part of the empire formed its most developed part. Then, as today, Russification was seen by some elements in the central government as the only way of cementing the area to Russia. And then, as today, such a policy has failed to yield the results expected of it.

As Toivo Raun, who contributed the study on Estonia in the Thaden book, notes, the paradoxical effect of Tsarist Russification efforts was not to transform Estonians into Russians but to heighten Estonian national identity. Taken collectively, the essays in the Parming-Järvesoo book point to a similar conclusion about the contemporary situation. The picture presented by Ekmanis of the resilience of Latvian letters in the face of varied pressures from local quislings as well as from the Kremlin indicates that even in this republic—which has perhaps experienced more severe Russification than the other two and where the indigenous ethnic population makes up just slightly over 53 percent of the total population—the spirit of national resistance remains a potentially significant force. The survey by Remeikis of Lithuanian *samizdat* literature, greater in volume per capita than among any other nationality of the USSR, underscores the continued vitality of Lithuanian resistance.

One of the questions naturally raised by the Polish events of the last two years is their possible impact on neighboring states. Many parallels with Poland can be found in the Baltic republics. They, too, have an imposed political system which has been transplanted from an alien cultural setting, which has failed to secure genuine support, which is widely perceived as culturally inimical to national well-being, and which has demonstrated marked ineptness in raising the standard of living. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, were a chance to present itself, the Baltic nations would seek to rid themselves of the system. A successful metamorphosis of a state or nation in the Soviet bloc into a pluralistic entity could be a catalyst for transforming the largely quiescent, though by no means moribund, national resistance among the Baltic nations into overt opposition.

---

[4] See the Lithuanian underground publication Ausra, No. 15, 1979.

Yugoslavia's "Self-Management" on Trial

By Cyril A. Zebot

EDVARD KARDELJ. *Smeri Razvoja Politicnega Sistema Socialisticnega Samoupravljanja* (Directions of Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-Management). Ljubljana, CZP Komunist, 1978.

MARTIN SCHRENK, CYRUS ARDALAN, and NAWAL A. EL TATAVY. *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism—Challenges of Development.* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

JOHN H. MOORE. *Growth with Self-Management: Yugoslav Industrialization, 1952–1975.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON. *The Yugoslav Economic System and Its Performance in the 1970's.* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980.

LJUBO SIRC. *The Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

ELLEN TURKISH COMISSO. *Workers' Control Under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-Management.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1979.

BRANKO HORVAT, MIHAILO MARKOVIC, and RUDI SUPEK, Eds. *Self-Governing Socialism,* 2 Vols. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975.

JOSEPH OBRADOVIC and WILLIAM N. DUNN, Eds. *Workers' Self-Management and Organizational Power in Yugoslavia.* Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh, University Center for International Studies, 1978.

JOSIP Broz Tito, who passed away in May 1980, and his trusted philosophical mentor, Edvard Kardelj, who died in February 1979, left behind a complex and difficult legacy. The regime they created in Yugoslavia is Leninist in character, with the "leading role" reserved for the Communist party—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Party dominance, however, coexists with a decentralized and multitiered system of government and socioeconomic institutions, all organized on a federal basis. This Tito-Kardelj system has customarily been referred to as "self-management socialism."

Under Tito, these decentralized structures were not tested seriously. Tito's unquestioned authority, exercised through the party apparatus within them, kept their pluralizing and democratic tendencies in check. But the party's new collective leadership—now the only feasible pinnacle of power in "self-managing" Yugoslavia—lacks that authority. Recent events, such as the massive demonstrations of April 1981 and later in Kosovo (in which the local Albanian ethnic majority has demanded a full-fledged republic equal in status to Yugoslavia's six other republics), indicate that the leadership may not be able to maintain as pervasive a control as in the past.

In addition, the Tito-Kardelj legacy is burdened by an interlocking set of grave economic problems. Yugoslavia's inflation rate is about 50 percent, the highest in Europe by far.[1] Unemployment is more than 16 percent and still rising; the current unemployment figure does not take account of a similar number of Yugoslav "guest workers" in Western Europe or overemployment in many Yugoslav factories, farms, and government institutions.[2] The foreign debt is more than US$18 billion, which, on a per capita basis, exceeds that of Poland.[3]

---

[1] Between 1970 and 1980, retail prices in Yugoslavia increased by 456 percent. In the first 10 months of 1981, they rose by another 58 percent—and this "under conditions of government control over prices." *Ekonomska Politika* (Belgrade), Dec. 28, 1981, p. 22.

[2] Ibid., Feb. 15, 1982, p. 16.

[3] See *The Economist* (London), Aug. 1, 1981, p. 52; and a dispatch from Belgrade by Elizabeth Pond, in the *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Dec. 15, 1981, p. 1.

Post-Tito Yugoslavia is thus quite likely to see an increasing assertion of the diverse interests and pressures that have been contained within the decentralized structures created by Tito and Kardelj. Only an effective anticonstitutional recentralization, carried out by means of a surprise coup by a well-organized group of top party hard-liners from all the republics in connivance with the armed forces, could forestall such a development. But in a confederated, multinational Yugoslavia outside the Soviet sphere, any such coup would be improbable. It is much more likely that changes will be made in the "self-management" system to accommodate the rising pressures. As we shall see, the discussions preceding the coming LCY Congress, to be held in June 1982, indicate that the party leadership may be considering such steps.

THE ORIGINS of Yugoslav self-management go back as far as the Stalin-Tito split in the period 1947–49. After Stalin failed to either subdue or remove him, Tito moved to attenuate the Stalinist characteristics of Yugoslavia's Communist system. But the implementation of de-Stalinizing reforms was at best halting and uneven, both economically and politically.

In the economy, the first (1950) law on self-management remained purely declaratory, even with meager modifications, until the initial operational provisions were passed in 1952–53. Then followed an endless zigzag of constitutional, legislative, and other changes and reversals. The resulting economic "system" has been characterized more by deviations from its enshrined principles and changing procedures than by the observance of either.[4]

In government, by contrast, decentralization, although initiated even more slowly than economic self-management, made substantial progress through a series of constitutional amendments between 1967 and 1971. The jurisdiction of the central government, once virtually unlimited, has now been reduced to maintenance of the constitutional system and the conduct of national defense, foreign affairs, and certain limited economic policies. Even in the areas still under central jurisdiction, the advance participation or consent of Yugoslavia's constituent units is necessary. Yugoslavia's hierarchy of assemblies and executive organs, including the two presidencies (of the federal government and the party), is organized on a federal basis, with equal representation from each republic.[5]

It is important to understand why Yugoslavia's twin decentralizing reforms met such unequal fates. For one, the very concept of "workers' self-management" was an ideological improvisation, an attempt to counter the Stalinist model of the command economy.[6] Political decentralization, by contrast, was the result of persistent and mounting pressures from the multinational grass roots of Yugoslavia. Moreover, while autonomous economic self-management would be inconsistent with the "leading role" of the party, the decentralization of government only shifted the locus of the party's political domination. From its original all-encompassing center in Belgrade, political domination migrated to each of Yugoslavia's eight constituent units and from them, by way of "consensus," back to the center.

Since the incipient confederal reorganization of the late 1960's, then, the Yugoslav economy, formally "self-managed," has in fact been increasingly controlled politically within each individual republic. This change was obscured by the purge of republic leaders in 1971–72 and by Tito's ensuing attempt to recentralize the LCY.[7] But shortly after Tito's death, the true nature of things became clear—and with a vengeance—as we shall see.

---

[4] The point was first dramatized in the Yugoslav media in "Practice Bypassing Law," *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 3, 1977. This new theme of the de facto vs. the de jure economy has since been belabored in a wealth of articles, speeches, and resolutions. By mid-1981, as the post-Tito "stabilization policy" was faltering, the controversy assumed broader proportions. Not only specific economic policies, but also "systemic" laws and regulations were attacked, including the 1976 Law on Associated Labor. Only the two constitutional principles of "social ownership" of and "self-management" of the means of production were spared. It was claimed that implementation had been inconsistent with the objective of creating a socialist market economy.

For examples of mounting party criticism of Tito's system after his death, see A. Bajt, "The Economic System and the Efficiency of Socialist Self-Management," *Socializam* (Belgrade), No. 6, 1981; a presentation by Kiro Gligorov (a top party political economist), at a meeting of the LCY Central Committee, published in *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 5, 1981; M. Korosic, "For a Return of Confidence," ibid., Nov. 2, 1981, pp. 25–27; idem, "Programmed Accumulation and Programmed Personal Incomes," ibid., Feb. 8, 1982; L. Madzar, "Expanded Reproduction and Regulation," ibid., Jan. 11, 1982; idem, "Associated Labor and Expanded Reproduction," ibid., Feb. 1, 1982; and idem, "Associated Labor, Self-Management, and Accumulation," ibid., Mar. 8, 1982, pp. 25–27. The editors of *Ekonomska Politika* contributed to the debate with several major articles of their own. See particularly the issues of June 8 and Dec. 28, 1981, and Jan. 18 and Feb. 15, 1982.

[5] "The Federation as a community of equal nations . . . and a self-managing community of working people and citizens . . . as a function of the statehood and sovereignty of each republic . . . should exercise only those rights and duties which the republics . . . transferred to it. The republics . . . must have a decisive influence . . . and responsibility for the Federation's policies." President Josip Broz Tito, proposing to the Federal Assembly a change in the constitution of Yugoslavia, on Dec. 14, 1970, quoted in *Yugoslav Assembly* (Belgrade), May 1980, p. 12.

[6] Milovan Djilas recalls that it was he who first came up with the idea of workers' self-management. See *The Unperfect Society*, New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969, pp. 220–23. Tito was skeptical but eventually came around, and Kardelj took it from there. In a personal conversation in 1968, Djilas told me that without Kardelj, the idea might not have become the trademark of Tito's socialism. That Tito's sudden espousal of "workers' self-management" was indeed an unexpected ideological about-face, which occurred when it became obvious that Stalin would not retract his condemnation of Tito, is amply confirmed in the most authoritative "official" history of postwar Yugoslavia. See Dusan Bilandzic, *Istorija socijalisticke federativne republike Jugoslavije* (History of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Zagreb, Skolska knjiga, 1978, pp. 109–19 and 164.

[7] Claiming that the just-begun (June 1971) federal reorganization of Yugoslavia had already degenerated into "nationalistic" excesses in Croatia and "liberal" aberrations in other republics, Tito suddenly reversed the liberalizing trend that had evolved between 1965 and 1971. From December 1971 through 1972, sweeping purges of party leaders and party cadres were carried out in the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Macedonia. In 1972, the party apparatus was recentralized in Belgrade, and its modus operandi was re-Leninized. The party old guard, once largely on the sidelines, was back in control.

It is against this background of Yugoslavia's postwar evolution that one has to view Tito—as founder and unquestioned ruler—and to examine the deep structural imbalances that have been revealed, with unexpected swiftness and intensity, since his death. It is against this background, too, that one must look at recent scholarship on Yugoslav "self-management."

THE BOOKS under review concentrate on the economy of Yugoslavia, especially its "self-management." All were written before Tito's death. In reviewing them, however, one has to judge them by their accuracy or inaccuracy not only about the functioning and performance of Yugoslavia's "system" while Tito was still alive, but also by their foresight, or lack of it, concerning the fate of post-Tito Yugoslavia.

The volume by Edvard Kardelj is an ideological tract, an official elaboration on a subject on which Kardelj was the regime's chief authority. Six years after Tito's crackdown in 1971–72, the 1978 LCY Congress was still preoccupied with the question of how to strengthen party dominance within the constitutional framework of expanded republic autonomy and decentralized self-management structures. To resolve the question, Kardelj wrote *Smeri Razvoja,* which was accepted as the basis of the congress's discussions and as the party's platform for the future.

The book describes an elaborate and all-encompassing "self-management" system, political as well as economic, within which the diverse interests in the Yugoslav economy and polity are to be increasingly asserted and harmonized. Kardelj stresses this "pluralism of self-management interests" as the central characteristic of an evolving "socialist self-management democracy." But in essence he glosses over the dilemma. Even in this putative system of the future, initiatives can come only through the "socio-political organizations," which are structured as transmission belts for the party. Yet, without an effective and equitable pluralism, one that allows independently organized initiatives and alternative proposals, there can be no democratic decision-making.

At least Kardelj admits that the "future development of democracy in our self-management socialist society . . . depends on . . . the assurance of the unquestioned leading role of the socialist forces. . . . A socialist society needs democracy in socialism, not democracy as a weapon against socialism" (p. 83). Later he adds, "For us the central question now is how to ensure that the activity of the League of Communists within the system of delegations and delegates [in the self-management and government structures] will be such as will make it a component part and moving force of this system" (p. 199). It is hard to see any great difference between Kardelj's party platform of 1978 and his frankly hard-line stance during and after the 1971–72 purges in the republics. Only the wording is softer.

Growth with Self-Management, by John H. Moore, and *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism,* by Martin Schrenk et al., are highly technical treatises on Yugoslavia's economic growth and development. Both draw heavily on statistical data and analysis, Schrenk's World Bank study having the extra advantage of access to privileged information from the Yugoslav government. Both authors sense weaknesses in the Yugoslav system, but Moore is more outspoken than the diplomatic proprieties of Schrenk et al.'s international institution permit them to be. Moore leaves no doubt about party control over Yugoslavia's self-management system. He also points out how the Tito government's relatively easy access to Western aid and capital eased the domestic burden of Yugoslavia's unnecessarily high development costs. In this, Moore presages what has since been revealed as a major problem in post-Tito Yugoslavia: heavy foreign indebtedness in the face of continuing balance-of-payments deficits.

Laura D'Andrea Tyson's short (112 pages) book on *The Yugoslav Economic System* is a more readable presentation on the same subject. It concentrates on the 1970's and therefore places more emphasis on the autarkic fragmentation of the economy. Yet, it leaves the impression that such fragmentation was a sinful aberration ("ethnic prejudices and suspicions") rather than a manifestation—under conditions of reversed liberalization—of Yugoslavia's irreducible multinational reality. Like Schrenk et al., Tyson takes the new (1976) method of comprehensive "self-management planning" too seriously. Even now, this method has yet to be applied, and, judging by its Kardeljian reliance on a plethora of institutions, it seemed reasonable from the outset to expect that it would be politically short-circuited into the familiar pattern of overblown government "plans" which have been honored more in the breach and from which actual performance has consistently deviated by wide margins.[8]

---

[8] "Not one of our social plans [five-year development plans] since 1961 has been realized. . . . evidently the philosophy of our planning is on the wrong track. . . ." *Ekonomska Politika,* Dec. 7, 1981, p. 30. On January 11, 1982, the Federal Executive Council adopted a proposal to amend the 1981–85 plan. "The proposal suggests a . . . narrower selection of development priorities because prospects are less favorable than . . . predicted. . . . [The change will be made] by the same procedure in

The other books, too, make useful contributions. Ljubo Sirc's work on the *Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management* is an interesting attempt to document the shortcomings and contradictions of the Yugoslav system on the basis of more critical Yugoslav sources, particularly the semiofficial *Ekonomska Politika*. In this sense, the book is almost a preview of the increasingly voluble Yugoslav self-criticism of 1981, which began seriously to question the very system of "self-management" as it had been repoliticized in the 1970's. However, Sirc tends to agree with Tyson that cost (wage) push was the chief culprit in Yugoslavia's high and chronic inflation—even though Yugoslav wages have remained low as a percentage of national income. In fact, since the publication of the books under review, real personal incomes in Yugoslavia have actually fallen by almost 15 percent, thus returning to their 1970 level.[9] This and other evidence suggest that other factors—high enterprise taxes and bail-out subsidies, excessive and misdirected investments, and extravagant political overhead costs—have been the main source of inflation.

Workers' Control Under Plan and Market, by Ellen Turkish Comisso, is primarily a study of self-management at the enterprise level (a machine-tool plant in Zagreb) as observed in a rare on-the-spot case study by a foreign scholar. Comisso makes several interesting points. One is that "firms, after paying a crushing tax burden and allocating required monies to the proper funds, had little left to distribute" (p. 65). This does not sound like a "wage push." Another is her attribution of the pressures for the 1965 economic reform and the 1971–74 political federalization to the situation in the early 1960's, when Yugoslavia's dwindling General Investment Fund could not accommodate multiplying regional investment priorities. Tracing the retreat of economic self-management through the halfhearted 1965 reform, the ensuing constitutional changes, and the 1971–72 reversal of political liberalization, Comisso points out that political-administrative intervention almost completely replaced self-management autonomy, with the republics gaining the upper hand in the process (p. 88). Increasingly, "the League proved unable to contain the fragmentation it brought about" (p. 135).

The remaining two books are collections of selected readings on self-management. *Self-Governing Socialism*, edited by Branko Horvat et al., traces the idea back to early Marxist thought, mainly in philosophical and theoretical writings. Only a few contributions deal with current Yugoslav practice. A. Bajt's article on "Social Ownership—Collective and Individual" (Vol. 2, pp. 151–63) is perhaps the best attempt to clarify the meaning of "social ownership," the vague concept on which Yugoslavia's self-management is ideologically based.[10]

Workers' Self-Management and Organizational Power in Yugoslavia, edited by Joseph Obradovic and William Dunn, is more pertinent to the actual Yugoslav system. It is a somewhat dated selection of articles (most of which were written in Yugoslavia before the 1972 crackdown), by Yugoslav authors and mainly on the sociological realities of Yugoslavia's self-management. What commends this collection is the expertise of most contributors as well as the outspokenly critical attitude of some. The essay by F. Bucar on "Participation of State and Political Organizations in Enterprise Decisions" (pp. 416–34) is particularly illuminating. It focuses on the practice of "self-management" as a triangular tug of war among the "self-managers" (workers), the "technostructure" (managers), and the "bureaustructure" (state and party), with the last remaining ultimately in control by virtue of its entrenched "vanguard" position. As Bucar's closely reasoned analysis reveals, Yugoslav "self-management" is more a veil of "legitimacy" than a reality.

Unfortunately, few of the authors represented here have managed to pierce the veil. After close examination, it must be concluded that none of the books under review really makes any concentrated effort to penetrate the welter of events, shifting policies, changing institutions, and technical analyses of the 30-year Yugoslav "experiment." This accounts for the lack of foresight concerning the difficulties that have accumulated in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Tyson, at least, could have arrived at critical conclusions similar to those that have since been pouring out from leading economists in Yugoslavia itself. However, even these recent, more incisive Yugoslav analyses stop short of the underlying root cause, which is fundamentally political and therefore off limits to the party-controlled domestic self-criticism. This is an added reason why independent foreign scholars who analyze a politically manipulated economy such as Yugoslavia's

---

which the plan was adopted. The Federal Executive Council will send the proposal to the executive councils of the Republics and Provinces. Their proposals will then be submitted to the [Federal] Assembly." Belgrade TANJUG, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EE*), Jan. 12, 1981, p. I/50.

[9] The share of net personal incomes in national income shrank from about 50 percent in 1970 to less than 41 percent in 1980. Moreover, the largest part of the national income ended up in the budgets of governmental and quasi-governmental institutions. From 1976 to 1980, such budgets increased from 250 billion dinars to 627 billion dinars. *Ekonomska Politika*, Dec. 28, 1981, p. 21.

[10] For an official view, see Edvard Kardelj, *Les contradictions de la propriété sociale dans le systeme socialiste* (Contradictions of Social Property in the Socialist System), Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1976.

should pay special attention to the impact of key political factors.

ONE KEY FACTOR has been administrative meddling in Yugoslavia's "self-managed" economy. According to the economic reform of 1965 and the constitutional changes of 1971–74, there was to have been a progressive expansion of market relations and self-managing economic integration. But the purges of 1971–72 and the ensuing reversal of liberalization brought increased political interference.[11] As noted, this Leninist retrogression was contained within the boundaries of the republics and autonomous provinces. Since the 1971 constitutional amendments had irreversibly confederalized the operative structure of government, the pervasive administrative interference with economic self-management became largely compartmentalized within each of Yugoslavia's eight constituent units. Even though the post-purge political leaders in the republics were more or less handpicked by the reestablished party old guard, they soon came under irresistible grass-roots pressures to pursue the autonomous economic development of their own individual republics.[12]

The economic consequences of such "federalism without liberalism" have been far-reaching. One major problem area has been investments. Because investment decisions involve local and republic politics, investments have often been misdirected into autarkic "white elephants" and the ubiquitous "political factories," primarily for local employment and tax purposes. Moreover, duplicative investments have soared, primarily in the processing industries (which account for more than 70 percent of Yugoslavia's total industrial output).[13] As a result, the investment component of Yugoslavia's "social product" has been around 35 percent for years—and will probably remain at comparable levels until investment decisions are made by individual enterprises on the basis of real savings and interest rates more reflective of the true scarcity of capital.

Yugoslavia's aggregate investment expenditures have systematically exceeded meager real domestic savings. They have been financed by domestic "credits" at negative real interest rates[14] and sustained by imports purchased with hard-currency foreign credits. These imports, it should be noted, include not only technologically advanced machinery but also semifinished goods, parts, raw materials, and even agricultural produce, many of which could have been produced competitively in Yugoslavia itself had not certain basic industries been held back for the sake of "faster" industrialization.

This, in turn, has had major implications for Yugoslavia's foreign trade, where deficits have piled up. In 1979, for example, as Yugoslavia's hard-currency imports soared, its exports fell to only about 30 percent of its imports—the result of low product quality, high production costs, an inflation rate several times that of Yugoslavia's Western trading partners, and a much overvalued currency to boot.[15] Such chronically high trade deficits are no longer tolerable, for the servicing of Yugoslavia's accumulated hard-currency debt is now approaching the "red zone" (25 percent of export earnings).[16]

The choices here are difficult. Yugoslavia cannot afford to sacrifice those hard-currency imports essential to continued domestic production. The only rational option would seem to be to base foreign trade on a real (open-market) rate of exchange. Only then will Yugoslavia's potential exporters find it more profitable to develop sustainable hard-currency exports rather than gingerly sell high-cost and low-quality products at home or in inferior, clearing-type trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

---

[11] Kiro Gligorov, the newly appointed (October 1981) chairman of the working group charged with preparing yet another "new stabilization program," characterized the 1981 Yugoslav economic system as "a hybrid half-market system, formally one of self-management, but essentially administered." *Ekonomska Politika*, Apr. 6, 1981, p. 10. Bogdan Crnobrnja, formerly the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington and now a leading member of the Federal Assembly, said that after 1971–72 "we constructed our federalism . . . and attempted to construct self-management. . . . [In fact, however] we established a federalist statism rather than self-managed federalism." Ibid., July 13, 1981, p. 18.

[12] "The League of Communists . . . the entire organization and its leaders place themselves . . . in the service of various partial . . . interests, becoming their arbiters. One should not wonder, therefore, why . . . there is . . . so much localism, regionalism, republicanism and nationalism." R. Komatina, at a meeting of the LCY Central Committee, Sept. 30, 1981, as reported in *FBIS-EE*, Oct. 2, 1981, p. I/14. But given the repoliticization of economic decision-making after 1971–72, this was to be expected. In his report to the 1974 LCY Congress, Tito pointedly reaffirmed the constitutional autonomy of the individual republics: "The fact that the worker in associated labor controls the resources and results of his labor permits each nation [republic] to make free use of the earned surplus . . . and to decide on the conditions of its economic, cultural, and social development. . . ." *Yugoslav Assembly*, May 1980, p. 9.

[13] Autarkic duplications of industrial capacities and the exclusionary fragmentation of Yugoslavia's "unified market" have occurred even in the technologically most demanding and expensive industries. For example, "all republics and provinces . . . push their own ambitions in electronics. They make such decisions by identifying themselves with those who have succeeded . . . but the real possibilities are not identical. It is because of this that [autarkic] tendencies and partitions of the Yugoslav market have developed—to make it easier to sell in one's 'own' market." A. Stipanic, president of the managing board of *Iskra* (Ljubljana), in an interview in *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 5, 1981, p. 22.

[14] "In conditions of the fastest inflation [ours] in Europe, we have not changed interest rates and have kept them the lowest in Europe." Milan Kovacevic, *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 19, 1981, p. 28. During the period 1976–80, the interest rate on credits amounted to only one third of the rate of inflation. See ibid., Jan. 25, 1982, p. 17. In February 1982, the National Bank doubled the symbolic rates on its direct credits. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1982, p. 9. But these rates were still far short of past and expected inflation rates.

[15] Mladen Kovacevic of the University of Belgrade has pointed out that the rate of growth of exports, which exceeded 16 percent in the period 1955–60, has been declining ever since. It registered only 3.9 percent in the period 1976–80, which "contrasts with . . . the norm whereby the share of exports grows with the level of development. . . . The Yugoslav system of investments does not promote an export strategy. I know of no country in the world at a similar level of development which has been investing as irrationally as Yugoslavia." Ibid., Nov. 9, 1981, p. 15. "Over the last 15 years the share of exports in the social product has been reduced by one half," that is, from 20 to 10 percent. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1981, p. 22.

[16] It is estimated that the annual payment of principal and interest on Yugoslavia's foreign credits in 1982 will be US$5 billion, which will absorb 50 percent of the country's export earnings. See ibid., Dec. 28, 1981, p. 21. *The Economist* puts the figure at US$5.5 billion (Feb. 20, 1982, p. 79).

Obviously, large trade deficits have had a severe impact on Yugoslavia's balance of payments. As a consequence of the unresolved structural disproportions among, and even within, the autarkically developing economies of Yugoslavia's republics, Yugoslavia has been sliding from one balance-of-payments deficit to another. In 1980, Yugoslavia's hard-currency indebtedness reached US$15 billion.

In a move of near desperation, the Yugoslav dinar was officially devalued by 30 percent a month after Tito's death. But rampant inflation followed—39 percent in 1980 and 49 percent in the first half of 1981—and has already offset the export-stimulating effects of devaluation.[17] By mid-1981, as noted above, Yugoslavia's hard-currency indebtedness had risen to US$18 billion, and—given the ongoing balance-of-payments deficit—it must now be approaching or even exceeding US$20 billion.[18]

Finally, the private sector has been so greatly affected by political meddling that it has been unable to supplement the socialized sector adequately. Private handicrafts and services are still subject to lingering ideological discrimination against independent work.[19] Until they are freed from it, it is unlikely that they can greatly reduce the mushrooming illegal "second job" sector ("gray economy"), which escapes taxes and operates at the expense of, and further impairs productivity in, the socialized sector. More than one half of all personal earnings originate outside the socialized sector, mostly in the "gray economy."[20]

Family farms—a particularly sore chapter in the history of postwar Yugoslavia—provide a similar example. Despite the Stalinist-type collectivization drive of 1949–50, the de facto political disenfranchisement of the peasant population, three decades of economic neglect and discrimination, and the massive outflow of younger generations, Yugoslavia's peasants (still more than 30 percent of the population) continue to hold on to about 83 percent of all arable land, and their tiny farms still manage to produce most of the country's agricultural output—some 63 percent of the wheat and 90 percent of the livestock. Unless these resilient family farms are rehabilitated and unless discredited ideological fictions are dropped, post-Tito Yugoslavia will continue to increase its agricultural imports and further aggravate its foreign trade deficits.[21]

In sum, post-Tito Yugoslavia is facing a number of deep-seated economic ills. The revised self-management system that came out of the 1971–74 constitutional changes and the 1976 codification of self-management rules is neither functionally effective nor operationally efficient. Ever-increasing administrative interventions and intensified political manipulation since 1971–72 have emasculated the autonomy of "self-managing" institutions, impaired their economic performance, and socialized the resulting losses while excessively nationalizing their earnings. If Yugoslavia is to overcome these ills , major changes are needed in the Tito-Kardelj legacy.

ULTIMATELY, Yugoslavia's economic troubles stem from an even more fundamental defect—which autarkic meddling has further aggravated—the visceral distrust among Yugoslavia's confederated republics and autonomous provinces.[22]

As is well known, Yugoslavia's various territorial units have diverse national histories and cultures. In interwar Yugoslavia, this diversity was turned into active antagonism by Serbian-dominated centralism. With Yugoslavia's disintegration in 1941, the romantic concept of a "South Slavic" ethnic affinity among greatly differing peoples, which had served as the country's tenuous political rationale, was all but buried. With the wartime occupation and civil war, some of the prewar antagonism was twisted into mutual hatred and killings, especially in the south-central mountain regions.

---

[17] A crash increase in exports coupled with a severe restriction of imports in the second half of 1981 (just to stay out of the "red zone") was so heavily subsidized that it could not possibly be sustained for long. Just as the reimposition of administrative price controls in mid-1981 forced the statistical rate of inflation for 1981 to stop below 50 percent, so the emergency measures in foreign trade in the second half of 1981 prevented the 1981 hard-currency payments deficit from exceeding the already unsustainable level of US$1.4 billion. For the domestic economic consequences of these steps, see *Ekonomska Politika*, Feb. 8, 1982, p. 16.

[18] Ibid., Feb. 8, 1982, pp. 16–17, and Feb. 22, 1982, p. 14.

[19] In 1975, there were 191,295 independent artisans in Yugoslavia, but in 1979, only 115,477. *Delo* (Ljubljana), Oct. 10, 1981, p. 21. "Even today there is a strange fear of individual work which is perceived as endangering the socialist sector. This is but one more proof of the weakness of the socialized sector . . . not of the strength of the small peasant and artisan." Kiro Gligorov in *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 5, 1981, p. 20.

[20] Dusan Dragosavac, president of the LCY Presidium, at a foreign press conference in Belgrade, as reported in *FBIS-EE*, Mar. 12, 1982, p. I/6.

[21] There is an expert estimate that agriculture in Yugoslavia could feed from 80 to 100 million people (Yugoslavia's population is under 23 million). But "we have completely neglected agriculture." Todor Todorov in *Ekonomska Politika*, Nov. 9, 1981, p. 22.

[22] Judging by authoritative commentary in the fall of 1981, deep distrust among the republics remains unabated. For example, "We have . . . lived for a long time with considerable structural problems and have found no way of resolving them by joint efforts. . . ." V. Djuranovic, President of the Federal Executive Council, in an address to the Federal Assembly on Oct. 1, 1981, as reported by *FBIS-EE*, Oct. 5, 1981, p. I/12. "The only thing on which we have reached an agreement within the [1981–85] plan . . . was that we still have not reached an accord on solving the problems. There were five or six problems at the time of the adoption of the plan . . . [they] have now grown into many more problems." M. Ribicic, former President of the Federal Executive Council, in an interview with the daily *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Sept. 18, 1981, pp. 3–4. "The League of Communists has for some time lacked . . . the strength to oppose . . . attempts at jeopardizing our togetherness . . . the republics and provinces were closing within their borders more rapidly than ever. . . ." Radio Belgrade, Oct. 3, 1981, as reported in *FBIS-EE*, Oct. 6, 1981, p. I/12.

In postwar Yugoslavia, all the old antagonisms resurfaced. Instead of being reduced and contained by a prompt and honest federalization, as Tito had promised during the war, they were exacerbated by the 1945 imposition of a centralized Stalinist regime, with the slogan of a resurrected Yugoslavia as a new "socialist community of nations and nationalities." After the Tito-Stalin break, the new slogan was gradually transformed into an all-embracing myth of "self-management," reinterpreted so as to include the much-belated decentralization of government. Had federalization occurred at least simultaneously with the 1965 economic reform, the latter might have succeeded, and a realistic self-management system might have emerged within a politically decentralized framework with a rationally coordinated economic development program. Instead, the Tito legacy was burdened not only with a large shortfall from the inconsistent economic reform of 1965 but also with the consequences of the post-1971 political retrogression.

The consequences of this retrogression should not be underestimated. Given Yugoslavia's irreducibly multinational composition, a confederation of sovereign republics is the tightest political framework that will allow the peoples of Yugoslavia to live in cooperative coexistence, and even that will not function successfully without continuing trust among the confederated peoples. After many years of disappointment, Yugoslavia finally approached its natural confederal arrangement in June 1971. Yet, this hard-won beginning of mutual trust was shockingly shattered by Tito's sudden reversal of liberalization in December 1971.

Because of the relapse into Leninism, Yugoslavia's newly confederated republics (and two autonomous provinces), purged of their popular and respected younger leaders, have yet to agree on a joint, mutually beneficial program of development, based on economic complementarity, an unrestricted common Yugoslav market, and international trade at a realistic rate of exchange. Instead, with renewed political distrust, the republics embarked on largely autarkic courses of economic development. In the process, their economic complementarity has been administratively restricted, so that Yugoslavia's internal trade across the borders of individual republics has come to resemble international trade, frequently to the point where payment in foreign exchange is demanded. Unless the republics can break this pattern and truly agree on a mutually complementary development program, structural imbalances within and among their autonomous economies will not be corrected, autarkic practices will continue, self-management will remain essentially inoperative, and both interrepublic and international trade will continue to shrink toward barter proportions.

WILL THIS accumulation of difficulties provoke a showdown in 1982? Toward the end of 1981, when it had become apparent that the post-Tito regime's "stabilization policy" had failed to come to grips with Yugoslavia's grave economic problems, and while the problem of Kosovo also remained unresolved, the LCY leadership apprehensively began preparing for the coming party congress in June 1982, the first since Tito. In unprecedented self-criticism staged within party-controlled forums, two contrasting approaches have emerged.

An apparent majority in the LCY leadership, as well as among professional economists, seems to favor a thorough overhaul of the Tito-Kardelj "system." Specifically, they wish to eliminate the "systemic" elements that permit or facilitate the pervasive political-administrative distortions of what was supposed to be a self-managed market economy and to limit supplementary government economic policies to those that would make the system work as intended by the 1974 Constitution. An unidentified minority in the party, whose existence is revealed by the polemical overtones present in the post-Tito reform discussions, appears to want a "strong-arm" central government to suppress economic "nationalism" in the republics and to replace the "unworkable self-management."[23] The formal showdown between the two opposing currents may come at the 1982 LCY Congress.

But will the LCY Congress tackle the fundamental question of distrust among Yugoslavia's constituent nations? Obviously, the key will be resumption of the liberalization that was reversed in 1971–72.[24] Analytically, liberalization within a Communist system may be viewed in reference to the Leninist principle of the "leading role" of the Communist party. The range of political liberalization would therefore extend from the given degree of control by the party to the outright elimination of the "leading role" principle, which would result in a multiparty democracy.

---

[23] Stane Dolanc, an influential member of the LCY Presidium, stated in an interview that "I can say that we are under pressure by certain dogmatic forces which are trying to exploit the present complex conditions to prove that only a bureaucratic centralist statist system can eliminate certain social contradictions; they are trying to prove that we can carry out economic stabilization only with a centralist policy, with statist decisions and administrative actions and not by developing the socialist self-managing relations and through accords and agreements. . . . Even some public information media have begun to negate the role of the republics and provinces. They see a solution for the present difficulties in centralization and consider the federal system a misfortune. I believe that reducing the republics to some kind of administrative units . . . would be the greatest misfortune and a direct attack on Yugoslavia's integrity. . . ." *Delo*, Dec. 31, 1981, p. 4. See also the sources mentioned in fn. 4.

In the given Yugoslav context, resumed liberalization is not likely to bring such political democracy, in which non-Communist political parties would be free to compete with the ruling LCY in the electoral arena. But it might result in more extensive human rights, in reaffirmation of the confederal structure of government, in the reassertion of autonomy for the republic Communist parties, in a fuller implementation of the proclaimed autonomy of self-management institutions, in a stronger private economic sector, and perhaps in opening the way toward independent labor unions and farmers' auxiliary cooperatives (only hinted at so far).

Judging by past experience, even such a measured process of liberalization may have uncertain prospects. Yet, there is no Tito now to block or reverse it again.

Clearly, however, the stakes are enormous. On the one hand, a renewed liberalization, even limited in scope, would bring a more broadly based, self-confident, and respected leadership to power in the republics. This, in turn, would result in more willing economic cooperation among republics on the basis of mutually recognized complementary interests. On the other hand, the longer reliberalization takes, the worse Yugoslavia's troubles will get. Even in the short run, real interrepublic agreements are necessary to make Yugoslavia's foreign debt manageable until structural disproportions are corrected. Failing any liberalizing political change, the nations of Yugoslavia may soon come to a pervasive doubt as to whether the accumulating costs of their troublesome coexistence may not already exceed the benefits.

---

[24] It is important to have an analytically solid and realistic concept of "liberalization" in order to avoid unwarranted optimism or pessimism. The former is reflected, for example, in the latest report by the US Department of State on human rights in Yugoslavia. See *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, esp. pp. 916–17, on "Freedom to Participate in the Political Process." Much of the material in the State Department report is contradicted even by the recent semiofficial self-criticism in Yugoslavia itself. A more accurate assessment can be found in Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia*, London, 1982, esp. pp. 1–6.

Dissenting French Communists

By Victor de Stankovich

PIERRE DAIX. *J'ai cru au matin*
(I Believed in the Dawn).
Paris, Laffont-Opera Mundi, 1976.

PHILIPPE ROBRIEUX. *Notre génération communiste, 1953–1963* (Our Communist Generation, 1953–1963). Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, 1977.

PAUL NOIROT. *La memoire ouverte* (The Open Memory). Paris, Editions Stock, 1976.

ROGER GARAUDY. *Le marxisme* (Marxism). Paris, Editions Seghers, Collections Clefs, 1977.

LOUIS ALTHUSSER. *Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le parti communiste* (That Which Can No Longer Go on in the Communist Party). Paris, Librairie François Maspéro, 1978.

I BELIEVE it may be said, without running counter to cold statistics, that the year round not one minute of the day passes without someone somewhere leaving a Communist party in disappointment and bitterness. The two things tend to go hand in hand. Indeed, it is almost a routine feature of Communist defections that breaches of loyalty and comradeship, perpetrated at the behest of a dehumanized, bureaucratic party leadership, become unbearable when the faith in the intrinsic truth of the doctrine is no longer there.

At the same time, one must remember that disillusionment with communism is only the reverse side of the coin. Many millions of fairly intelligent individuals are still fanatic believers in "scientific socialism" as codified by Karl Marx and developed in theory and practice by his innumerable followers. Their collective faith is one of the major forces which must be taken into account to understand our contemporary world.

The sociological landscape of France makes it a particularly interesting country in which to observe the ebb and flow of the forces of communism. This is true essentially for two major reasons. First, the French mind—no matter how hackneyed the statement may appear in the eyes of the literati—is addicted to formalized, if not Cartesian, logic. Hence, Marxist theory has appeal as a self-contained, scientifically valid system of social salvation.

Second, there is the historically fascinating phenomenon of the unfinished revolution of 1789. This revolution, the most monumental one in modern European history, sought to emancipate man from the tyranny of his fellow humans under the banner of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," but it was not until after the outbreak of World War II 150 years later that the country began to translate into fact more than the first element of this triple slogan. And even liberty—liberty of thought and expression, liberty from arbitrary deprivation of freedom—had been realized only after multiple interruptions, such as the royal restoration and the two Bonapartist imperial adventures, and in an imperfect manner. Indeed, there was little recognition of the need to provide some equality of opportunities for economic and social betterment for those emancipated from the shackles of feudalism, and even that modicum of fraternity which had existed under the paternalistic ancien régime was eradicated by the juggernaut of the industrial revolution. That revolution's proud flower, the Third Republic, seemed to perpetuate a rigid class system, headed by and run for the benefit of a more or less wealthy bourgeoisie. This group's rule was slightly shaken only once before the outbreak of World War II—during the ephemeral government of the Popular Front in the middle 1930's. When the pendulum swung back to the right once more, the wealthy bourgeoisie could manage only to lift into the saddle a government which declared war on Adolf Hitler but thereafter proved incapable of protecting the country from the onslaught of his victorious hordes.

IT WAS during the period of the Popular Front that young Pierre Daix, on the threshold of his 17th year, entered upon the political scene. He had only just passed the first half of his *baccalaureat,* the matriculation exam from secondary school, when Edouard Daladier brought back "peace in our time" from Munich. To Daix, this development meant that he would soon have to go to war. And indeed, he writes in the book under review, "a year later, once the war had been declared, in order to fight it truly against Hitler, I joined the Communist Party, which the 'Munichois Government' had disbanded only a short while before." "Subconsciously also," he adds, "I was thus opposing my father, a former member of the constabulary [*gendarmerie*] who had emerged from the previous war, the Great One, a pacifist and a socialist, firmly believing that while there was peace, there was also hope."

According to a jaded wisecrack attributed to Franz Kafka, "eternity takes an awfully long time, but the worst of it is its terminal phase." Pierre Daix remained a militant intellectual member of the French Communist Party for 36 years; however, for nearly 24 years he was in the process of snapping out of it. As regards this exceedingly lengthy process of extricating himself from Stalinism, he has no apology to offer—only an explanation:

> *Stalinism exceeds by far the influence of Stalin's sole person. It is a complex process of the labor movement running haywire. It is experienced as the logic, as the very rationality of the science of class warfare, whereas in truth it reveals itself as one of the most effective trickeries by which historic violence is able to mask its face from the sight of man.*

After many a nagging doubt, Daix suffered his first real shock on the occasion of the notorious trial of Rudolf Slansky et al. in 1952, when practically the entire Czechoslovak Communist leadership was charged with "conspiracy against the socialist state." Daix was particularly concerned about the trial, for one of the principal figures among the 14 accused—one of only three to escape hanging—was Arthur London. London, married to a French Communist girl, had, under his refugee cover name of Gérard, been Daix's elder-brotherly protector at the Nazi death camp of Mauthausen. But by 1952 it was no longer a good thing to have been Arthur London's close associate way back in 1942. Hence, Daix remembers watching and catching himself ruminating:

> *Why am I trying to justify that period of which heretofore, in all my life as a militant communist, I had been most proud—the way I'd behaved at Mauthausen? Something is going to pieces within me!*

Further he dared not go in his soul-searching.

> *For if the Slansky trial had its doubtful aspects, so must it have been in the other show trials—the Rajk, the Kostov, the Zinoviev, the Bukharin trials . . . and thus everything goes to pieces all along the line. No, one just has to stand firm and not yield to the songs of the bourgeois sirens.*

But it was not so much the "bourgeois sirens" that kept torturing Pierre Daix as the formidable challenge that learning about the Gulag system, as revealed by *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* presented to him. This book was published in the Soviet Union under the authority of Nikita Khrushchev, and Pierre Daix was authorized by his party leadership to write the foreword to the French edition. In this foreword, he spelled out the—to him—terrible truth: "to my mind there is no substantial difference between Ivan Denisovich's camp and the average Nazi concentration camp." Thus, he felt he had to conclude "that the Soviet Union is not a socialist country and nothing foretells that it will ever become one."

Yet Maurice Thorez, the old and venerated Stalinist party leader, sent Daix word that he agreed with Daix's foreword. Moreover, he made public his approval by sending Daix to the Marxist Book Fair in the fall of 1963 to autograph copies of the French edition of *Ivan Denisovich.* That sort of gesture made Daix hang on for many more years, against his better judgment. His motivation is likely to be familiar to many a disillusioned Communist:

> *I shall stay on board the same old ship even if she is due to sink. After all, in her holds is all my family. I was born at Yvry [part of the "red belt" of the Paris suburbs]; I'm a chip off the old Commie bloc—desperate, yet faithful.*

The execution in 1958 of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter, head of government and chief of the armed forces respectively of Hungary's national uprising of 1956—a blatant repudiation of all promises that they would not be put to death—came as yet another dreadful shock. Hence Daix's outcry: "The Soviet revolution must have run aground; she cannot be made to float again. Everything has to be begun anew."

And what about all those who, like himself, had paid lip service to the "big lie" for so long? Had they been accomplices or idiots? "Accomplices because of your idiocy," a wise old Czech Communist told him. Therefore, as a warning to those of his compatriots who might feel tempted to fall for the same old idiocy in the future, Daix counsels:

> *If you want to build socialism the French way, you must recognize that it will run up against merciless hostility from the Soviet party bu-*

reaucracy, just as did attempts in East Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague, where the people tried to debunk false "Gulag socialism." That is the logic of Russia as a paramount power, which has nothing to do with philosophy. It expresses itself in terms of thousands of tanks, airplanes, rockets, and megatons. Moreover, that formidable arsenal is not held by socialist hands. Such is the truth, faced with which the French Communist Party is wavering still.

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE on the passage from Communist militant to disenchanted defector is provided by Philippe Robrieux. He was a card-carrying member of the French Communist Party between 1953 and 1968, during part of which period he also functioned as General Secretary of the very orthodox Union of the Communist Students of France (UECF).

Robrieux's political autobiography is, first of all, a fascinating exploration of the psychological springs that caused post–World War II youth in France to tick feverishly to the Communist rhythm—and still do so up to a point. The book is not wildly sensational. It describes how a Paris boy, coming from a decent middle-class home, got through a still largely traditional secondary education, continued at university, made a number of good pals among his male and female contemporaries, played football passionately, but finally got caught in the dazzling vortex of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist *Zeitgeist*. This last development was primarily, it seems, the result of the groundwork of some of his lycée masters (the French call them *professeurs*), who must have been remarkable Marxist thinkers. His exposure to such individuals was pretty typical of French secondary education throughout most of the Third and Fourth Republics.

Robrieux himself points to the outstandingly interesting facets of his story. He, as distinct from those French Communists who had lived through the heroic days of the resistance, knew practically nothing of the war and Nazi occupation, having barely been a toddler when it all began. His life as a schoolboy really commenced at the return of peace, "when I used to kick footballs on the Champ-de-Mars, living an adolescent's life that had every chance of being peaceful and happy." The "apparently prosaic circumstances of my enlisting," he suggests, "can therefore reveal, in a state of almost chemical purity, the mechanism involved in making a youngster from a thoroughly bourgeois environment join the Communist Party." What Robrieux wants to show the uninitiated, with great sincerity and in a lively manner, is "how a university student, a young intellectual of bourgeois origin becomes a Stalinist, thereafter a 'permanent,' that is, a paid full-time party political worker, and finally how he ceases to be both."

The whys and hows of Robrieux's ceasing to be first an apparatchik, then a simple party member, and finally a Communist altogether, provide the second remarkable feature of his story. Here again, as in Pierre Daix's case, "the terminal phase of eternity" was the longest and the most painful—seven years out of a total of 15 as a Communist. His fall from grace began with an article which the unsuspecting young zealot wrote in December 1960 to set the stage for the Fourth National Congress of his Union of Communist Students. Taking enthusiastic advantage of Nikita Khrushchev's open debunking of Stalinism at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress, Robrieux dwelt on the students' urge to learn the truth about the ways in which "in Stalin's time, and prior to the 20th Congress, the Soviet Communist Party could have been perverted." (Up till then, French Communists had not been told anything precise about the contents of Khrushchev's so-called "secret report" of 1956.) Robrieux then quoted Louis Aragon, the leading poet and editorialist of the French Communist Party, who had flamboyantly written:

> *the radical and audacious extirpation, as with a red-hot poker, of the errors and crimes which were allowed to proliferate under the socialist flag, characterizes today the victory of the self-same socialism. It marks the radiant morrow of a new epoch which must be identified—without committing an act of the cult of personality—with the man who has initiated it: Nikita Khrushchev.*

At the time the article appeared, the pseudo-genial old tyrant of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, was still secretary general. As is well known, he had never been able to live down the fact that while the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was still in force, he and his deputy, Jacques Duclos, had deserted an embattled France to take shelter in tranquillity, if not in luxury, in the Soviet Union and had stayed there until the end of the war. One cannot be sure, but it would seem that Thorez's guilt complex sometimes made him turn—otherwise unaccountably—against faithful old party stalwarts and, in the course of a carefully engineered persecution campaign, crush them under a fake charge. Thus, two high-ranking members of the party leaderhip, the brilliant Laurent Casanova, member of the Political Bureau and supreme supervisor of the Communist Students' Union, and Marcel Servin, in charge of organization in the party Secretariat, were arraigned for one of French communism's mortal sins during that epoch—"fractionalist group conspiracy," alleged to have been aimed in this particular instance at a secret convenant with the arch-enemy, Gaullism. Thanks to the article that he had written and also because he had in a way been a subordinate of the two "culprits," Robrieux became entangled in their purge. Eventually, after a prolonged calvary, he was evicted from the party.

Reminiscing about these events, Robrieux makes two observations, both of them carrying tragic overtones. First, about the principal accused, Casanova and Servin, he musingly wonders:

Who could guess the profound motives that made those men shoulder the role of scapegoat? Particularly considering that in France—the Communist Party not being in power—neither torture nor the sanction of capital punishment could be applied to them. How could those two men be compared with an Arthur London [one of the principals in the Slansky trial] or the Hungarian Laszlo Rajk [the one-time Foreign Affairs Minister hanged in the late 1940's], when the suffering of intolerable, though purely moral, pressure sufficed to cause them to collapse and make their fake confessions?

The second observation emerges from the Epilogue of the book, in which Robrieux—who is quite obviously an affectionate person, capable of profound loyalties—bemoans the fate of former friends and party comrades whom the manifold, abject trickeries of the "apparatus" had driven into disillusionment and, alas, frequently suicide. In one of his concluding paragraphs, he quotes Karl Radek, once Lenin's Commissar for Education and Cultural Affairs (and later hanged by Stalin). When, in a conversation about the many deplorable misdeeds of the new revolutionary regime, somebody came up once more with the hackneyed cliché, "But you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs," Radek retorted: "Yeah, that may be so, but where is the omelet?"

THE PATH of Paul Noirot was traced for him by a peculiar convergence of circumstances surrounding his birth. His mother came from a Ukrainian family, all of whose children, he says, "had been involved in the adventure of revolution. My mother had preserved of the October Revolution madly romantic reminiscences, as well as a profoundly nostalgic yearning for her native Ukraine." France's defeat in 1941 and the ensuing German occupation, just when he was on the threshold of manhood, almost automatically pushed him toward Communist militancy as the most natural form of endogenous resistance. (Only an infinitesimal fraction of the French people, at home or abroad, chanced to hear General Charles de Gaulle's appeal of June 18, 1941, from London.) Hence, in 1943 at the age of 19, Noirot joined the clandestine French Communist Party, which the last government of the Third Republic had disbanded in 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. To Noirot and his like-minded contemporaries, this action meant "enrolling in the great international army of communism." Hence, the USSR—despite what was thought of its temporary tactical collaboration with Nazi Germany—remained, in the vision of Paul Noirot and his comrades-in-arms, "the first fortress conquered from the enemy, the land of the victorious workers and of socialism which now could begin being built." As Noirot observes,

it is only too facile today to disavow that identification which we claimed and glorified for decades on end. To pretend that we have nothing to do with the Stalinist tragedy—as do the present leaders of the French Communist Party—makes the French Communists' own history inexplicable.

Nevertheless, Noirot admits that he shared the reaction of Jean, the son of Maurice Thorez, when he learned at the family dining room table in 1956 the revelations made by Nikita Khrushchev in his "secret report." Jean exclaimed: "We are all murderers, all of us!" Noirot adds:

The questions we asked ourselves about the crimes committed by "our people," combined with the resolve to turn back from the blind alleys into which we had stumbled, could give rise to two distinctly different attitudes. You could give up the fight and retire to cultivate your garden. Or you could carry on whilst trying to wrench from the bowels of history a minimum of its essential "why"'s and "what for"'s.

Like so many others, Noirot was caught by the Gestapo and dumped at Buchenwald, one of the cruelest and deadliest Nazi concentration camps, set in the bucolic, sylvan proximity of Goethe's Weimar. He lived there from December 1943 until April 1945, "under conditions that others have described." During that period, he saw hundreds of his fellow inmates drop dead by his side from one moment to the next. He attributes his own survival to the arrival at the camp, only a few days after him, of one of his revered former party instructors, a certain comrade Château, "who confirmed my quality as a full-fledged party member to the clandestine authorities of the camp." For at Buchenwald, as at most of the other Nazi concentration camps, political prisoners had by that time gained ascendancy over the criminal detainees, who had previously made up the prison staff. Consequently, Communists enjoyed greater chances of survival. The secret organization of the camp, having acquired some measure of a hold even on the official agents of the internal administration, protected its militant elements.

The "most painful terminal phase" of Noirot's Communist Party membership began with the famous 20th Congress of the Soviet party in October 1956, at which Khrushchev's "secret report" created a tremendous sensation. It proved to be the starting point of a tug-of-war between, on the one hand, the protagonists of de-Stalinization, who were numerous in the French Communist Party as well as the Soviet one, and, on the other hand, the ruling clique of Maurice Thorez, the genial giant, the charismatic leader.

Despite a continuous show of boisterous self-assurance, Thorez had never been quite able to overcome the embarrassment of having deserted war-torn France for the relative safety of Stalin's hospitality. He therefore initially tried, with all the means at his disposal, to hide from his French followers the truth about Stalin's misrule and, particularly, the blood-curdling details of the dictator's end and the murderous scramble for his succession. Paul Noirot, however, on an official trip to Moscow, got an authentic eye-witness account of it all from his old and trusted friend, Giuseppe Boffa, Moscow correspondent of the Italian Communist Party's official daily *l'Unità*. Indeed, Boffa gave Noirot a most realistic rendering of what Noirot later came to dub "Shakespeare in the land of Peter the Great."

In these circumstances, two diametrically opposed lines evolved within the French Communist Party leadership. There was the line of those who, like Waldeck Rochet, Benoît Frachon, Laurent Casanova, and Marcel Servin, increasingly felt the need of settling accounts with Stalinism, and there was the line of Thorez, who opposed de-Stalinization with all his might because he felt personally involved in the underlying drama and was fearful of the consequences of "stirring the quagmire." Noirot, by now the deputy editor of the party monthly *Démocratie Nouvelle*, was by virtue of his personal experience and his entire intellectual baggage bound to drift into the de-Stalinization camp and thereby become the "objective" enemy, as the Communists would say, of the party leader. The final clash was touched off by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact powers in 1968. Although Noirot had been given to understand that he had the blessings of Jacques Duclos, the chief editor (*directeur*), in bringing out a special issue on Czechoslovakia that was strongly critical of "a grave event which means nothing less than the crushing of one socialist nation by a group of other socialist nations," the party leadership nevertheless decided to "suspend the publication" of *Démocratie Nouvelle*.

Noirot thereupon launched what looked to be a highly promising, Communist-but-nonparty, left-wing intellectual magazine christened *Politique Aujourd'hui* (Politics Today). Five of its issues survived the cross fire of a number of party cells. In his own cell, Noirot carried the day, obtaining a two-thirds majority in favor of continuing publication despite the menacing presence at the cell meetings of Henri Fiszbin, then chairman of the Paris Party Federation and member of the Central Committee and at present the leader of some 30 dissenters from the Communist Party who have joined forces with President François Mitterrand's Socialist majority. Thereupon, the Paris Federation, the section to which the "guilty" cell belonged, called an emergency meeting, resolved to dissolve Noirot's cell, and expelled him from the party "for having inveigled his cell into an act of resistance."

Despite the ignominy that he suffered at the hands of his fellow Communists after more than a quarter of a century of faithful militancy, Noirot remains what can best be called "a rogue Communist"—an outcast of the herd, but a Communist all the same. Still, he has hatched some unorthodox ideas of his own. Thus, he does not believe

> *that it is possible to run a socialistic society in a developed country, subjected to the leadership and supervision of an apparatus endowed with a bureaucratic structure. . . . Direct democracy, of which so many are dreaming here and there, has so far demonstrated only its impotence, even at group level. But I am sure that if no attempts are made at associating by institutional means ever growing numbers in the decision-making process and if the delegation of powers is not reduced to a barest minimum, we shall never be able to get rid of the sterile antagonism between manipulating organization and impotent spontaneity.*

THERE CAN BE little doubt, particularly since the incarceration of Louis Althusser in a criminal lunatic asylum for having murdered his wife, that Roger Garaudy, although expelled from the party in 1969 and repeatedly rebuked at open party congresses, continues to be the profoundest philosophical thinker of contemporary French Marxism. His marvelous, though frighteningly dense, *Le Marxisme* radiates cantankerous self-assurance, as one of the happy few who have correctly understood Karl Marx down to his finest shades of meaning (the latter, by the way, is in Garaudy's opinion the founder *not* of Marxism but of futurism [*prospective*]—that is, the discipline concerned with exploring the future).

Garaudy feels that only by constructing a theoretical model of contemporary capitalism may the new strategy and tactics of socialism be hammered out in this final quarter of the 20th century. To him, political economy, of course, can never be neutral. That is, there can be no "economic science" independent of either the individualistic project of allowing free rein to the strivings for profit and power by a small number or, alternatively, the communal project subordinating production and distribution to the requirements of the development of *all*, in a manner worthy of human beings.

By combining political economy with historical materialism—the latter being construed not as a philosophy of history but as a method with which to impart a certain orientation to history in the making—Marx has powerfully contributed, in Garaudy's words, to the "defatalization" of history. From this follows—again according to Garaudy—that Marx, in his concept of socialism, places himself at the very antipode of all kinds of authoritarianism and centralization. Garaudy recalls that to Marx's mind "the form [i.e., the ideal organization] at long last found" was that of the Paris Commune of 1871, which Garaudy describes as "resolutely anti-Jacobin, oriented toward self-management [hark here to the anticipation of Titoism], direct democracy, and decentralization." And there follows a subordinate clause which adds to our understanding of why Garaudy has for a long time been so unpopular with the orthodox bureaucracy of the French Communist Party—indeed, with institutionalized communism in general. He speaks of "the state, which is there to serve revolution *only as a temporary expedient*, so long as there is need for it to fight counterrevolution."

Garaudy insists strongly that Marx was anything but a dogmatist. According to Garaudy, Marx never mistook the image of capitalism as presented by economic analysis at one or another phase of capitalism's development for the essence of capitalism *at all times*. He even foresaw that his followers would probably have to go beyond his teachings. To Garaudy, the problem is how to give fresh impulses to the movement inaugurated by Marx, "how to release the energy of its dialectics, stifled by long years of dogmatism. Marxism is not a doctrine crystallized once and for all: *Marxism is a task waiting to be accomplished.*"

In Garaudy's eyes, Marx's ideas have so little in common with what is generally dubbed "Marxism" that Garaudy repeatedly quotes the Master's dictum to Monsieur Lafforgue in 1882: "If that is Marxism, then one thing is certain, namely, that I am *not* a Marxist." Garaudy emphasizes that Marx's thinking "is critical, historicist, and antidogmatic." Hence, it is nonsensical to regard Marxism either as the supreme academic exegesis of an immutable text written in the mid-19th century or as the motor of militant action for the creation of socialist society in the last quarter of the 20th century despite the fact that it is based on an analysis of 19th-century British capitalism. It is in this sense that Garaudy opposes his "evolutive Marxism" to the tragic Althusser's "determinist caricature of Marxism."

FOR THE BENEFIT of those who are not day-to-day observers of the French scene, let us briefly recall at this juncture that after a prolonged series of attacks of nervous depression, Louis Althusser has finally succumbed to what seems an incurable condition of paranoia after first killing his wife in their flat at the world-famous teachers' college of the Ecole Normale Supérieure on the rue d'Ulm in Paris. During the last years of his productive working life, however, Althusser found himself at odds with the leadership of the French Communist Party and, consequently, out of official favor. The volume under review, one of his last pamphlets, represents a slight rewrite of four articles that initially appeared in the daily *Le Monde*. The party's official daily newspaper, *l'Humanité*, was not allowed to accept the articles for publication, because of the party leadership's ban on any kind of free discussion of different, to say nothing of heterodox, political ideas in its "tribunes."

The pamphlet is, on the one hand, a post mortem on the catastrophic defeat of the French Union of the Left in the March 1978 parliamentary elections and, on the other hand, a flaming indictment of the French Communist Party leadership for the errors which brought about that defeat. Although a Central Committee meeting had reputedly discussed the issue, no verbatim or even summary report of the proceedings was issued. All that militant party members were allowed to take cognizance of was—as Althusser bitterly complains—a report by Secretary General Georges Marchais. Thus, they were reduced to the passive role of "studying the conclusions of a debate which had been concluded" without them.

Althusser's criticism of the Marchais report is devastating as regards both content and presentation. The terms in which the senior Communist philosopher of France tears to pieces the cheap trickery of Marchais's pamphleteering make astounding reading indeed—they might as well have been written by a rabid right-winger. Althusser particularly castigates Marchais's "hotchpotch techniques." This, Althusser fumes, consists of inventing fictitious arguments and criticisms, mixing them up with real objections raised against Communist policy, and then proceeding to discredit the latter ones by demolishing the former ones. These fictitious arguments, Althusser declares, "are so absurd and unthinkable coming from a Communist that one must ask oneself on what refuse dump he picked them up."

Genuine contempt for Marchais and rancor against the party "machine" permeate the entire pamphlet. Althusser profoundly disapproves of the way the party's organization is working. "The workers of France cannot be victorious in their class warfare without the Communist Party, but they are even less likely to win with *this* Communist Party as it is today." There is no percolation of ideas from base to top, only the other way round. Also, groups of members are hermetically separated from one another by what Althusser calls "perpendicular partitioning." Militant members of the base can have contact only with members of their particular cell, unless their cell delegates them to attend higher-echelon sectional or federal meetings. All attempts at establishing "horizontal" relations are branded as "fractionalism" and looked upon as grave offenses.

Althusser's critique comes within a hairline of calling the Directorate of the French Communist Party a downright dictatorship. He observes that gaps in its ranks are filled by co-optation, never by electoral process.

This explains how the leadership is able to survive unharmed, through all sorts of strategic and tactical vicissitudes and errors. The reverse of the coin shows the constant leakages in the rank-and-file membership, that unceasing hemorrhage which necessitates that the reservoir be filled up with fresh blood all the time. With new generations who do not know the battles and turmoils of the preceding 5, 10, or 20 years and can therefore be thrust into the hand-to-hand fighting on the strength of untried theories or promises, to be burnt up in turn. From recruiting campaign to recruiting campaign, the party leaders get themselves new rank-and-file militants, but the leadership remains unchanged.

The cliché of "collective leadership" does in fact, according to Althusser, disguise a secret pact which, on the one hand, binds its members to each other and, on the other hand, segregates them from the militant base and perpetuates their power.

Differences or divergences are settled under the law of absolute discretion. Also, it is understood that he whose views remain in a minority will carry out the policies of the victorious majority without batting an eyelid. Which is of course hardly conducive to engendering a sense of personal responsibility in the leaders.

A special category of stalwarts consists of a corps of long-term, professional, full-time functionaries. Althusser describes them as being "bound to the party by an iron law which demands of them unconditional loyalty, in return for a breadwinning job, the latter being all the more needed as the incumbent either never had a skilled trade or lost his ability to practice it in the course of all those years."

Coming to reflect on the crushing defeat suffered by the Union of the Left in March 1978 (which has now been offset by the victory of the Socialists in the May-June 1981 presidential and parliamentary elections and their offer of four portfolios in the government to senior members of the Communist Party), Althusser feels that instead of moaning about a mythical "buffer" which prevents the winning of support from more than a limited if faithful fraction of the working-class electorate, French Communists had better look for the fault in their own house. Not only is their image tarnished by the memory of the Soviet government's massacre and deportation of millions of recalcitrant peasants, dubbed "kulaks," and the camps and all the other repressive measures which still continue in the USSR more than a quarter of a century after Stalin's death, but there are also the conditions prevailing within the French party itself. Do its members really believe, asks Althusser,

that the French people have such short memories as to have forgotten how the Communist leadership, scorning liberty and truth, crushed and morally ground to dust loyal party members under the weight of wholly fabricated charges, calculated to dishonor them? They were subjected to regular Moscow-type trials, except that the convicts could not be executed in the end. Albeit you can disgrace people by torturing them with faked accusations of being "police informers," "crooks," or "traitors," and by coercing their old comrades-in-arms unanimously to condemn them as such.

All these misdeeds, and others galore, Althusser charges, were perpetrated in France during the last 30 years or so while the Communists were out of power, "yet not one word was ever said so as to recall, regret, or repair those abominations, for which the party leadership alone was responsible."

French Communist psephologists need no longer search for the causes of the party's inability to conquer the allegiance of the entire working class in one fell swoop. In what now appears as Althusser's last will and testament, he has enlightened them more outspokenly than any of their adversaries could have done. Indeed, Althusser's pamphlet is so palpably replete with bitter disillusionment and violent recrimination that one is tempted to see these as at least a partial explanation of the author's subsequent mental derangement.

TO TRY to reduce to a common denominator the motivations, the inner turmoil that led to the falling out of such a random sample of intellectuals with institutionalized communism would—to say the least—be artificial, indeed strained. Nevertheless, because they are all Frenchmen, they have more than one thing in common, despite their differences in age, background, and probably temperament.

The first of the impulses most of them appear to share—strange as it may seem—is idealism. As mentioned at the outset, there is acute consciousness among French political thinkers that the second and third elements of the motto of the Revolution of 1789 are still unfulfilled. After nearly 200 years, it is felt, much remains to be done to achieve "equality" in economic terms. As for "fraternity"—which, of course, is practically impossible to institutionalize by rules and regulations—many an enthusiastic young man's prayers seemed to be answered by the readiness to sacrifice and the voluntary militancy that undoubtedly emanated from the rank and file of the Communist Party in earlier years.

At the same time, all demonstrate the opposite characteristic as well—namely, realism. This provided the mental catalyst that gradually corroded their faith, as they observed the Soviet and East European scene, that communism could keep its promises to better the condition of man.

Last but not least, they all have a very highly developed sense of liberty—that first element of the great revolutionary motto which has been a sturdy reality in France for a long time. This probably constituted the most powerful factor in their breaks with the party. For whoever is prepared to shoulder minor, or sometimes even major, inconveniences for the sake of speaking *his* or *her* truth will always find, at the end of no matter how long an evolutionary process, that they are unable to wear forever the straitjacket of the Communist way of life.

Dissent in China

By Merle Goldman

JOHN BERNINGHAUSEN and TED HUTERS, Eds. *Revolutionary Literature in China: An Anthology.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977.

HUALING NIEH. *Literature of the Hundred Flowers.* 2 vols. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.

ARNOLD CHANG. *Painting in the People's Republic of China: The Politics of Style.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980.

MARTIN EBON, Ed. *Five Chinese Communist Plays.* New York, NY, The John Day Co., 1975.

KAI-YU HSU, Ed. *Literature of the People's Republic of China.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980.

KAI-YU HSU. *The Chinese Literary Scene: A Writer's Visit to the People's Republic.* New York, NY, Vintage Books, 1975.

GEORGE KAO, Ed. *Two Writers and the Cultural Revolution: Lao She and Chen Jo-hsi.* Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1980.

CHEN JO-HSI. *The Execution of Mayor Lin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978.

DAVID S. G. GOODMAN. *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China's Democracy Movement.* London, Marion Boyars, 1981.

THE BOOKS under consideration here reveal that political dissent, loyal opposition, nonconformity, and even the quest for individuality exist in China as they do in the West. Although such activities do not represent the mainstream and have evolved in a different context, their presence in China demonstrates that they are not unique to Western societies.

The dissent that has appeared periodically in the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, owes as much to the Chinese tradition of dissent as to the Western example. Semi-official opposition was inherent in Confucianism. The Confucian literati were obliged to criticize when the government deviated from Confucian ideals. It was not so much a right, as in the West, but a responsibility to point out government misdeeds—a responsibility to be carried out regardless of personal risk of punishment or even death. Although some literati did become martyrs, most criticized only when they had patrons and protection within the top leadership. Moreover, they could get a hearing only when they had allies in positions of power. This was most likely to happen during periods of factional conflict, when literati were used in the political struggle. In the process of articulating their patrons' positions, some literati inserted views and values that differed not only from the prevailing orthodoxy but sometimes from those of their political patrons. A similar process occurred in the PRC when intellectuals used the opportunity of political factionalism not only to espouse their patrons' causes but also to shape policies in ways the leadership did not intend.

For brief periods, then, intellectual groups in China have been able to express their own views. However, they have been stopped abruptly when their proposals diverged too far from the views of their political patrons and galvanized the opposing faction into action.

This mode of dissent has not been unique to China. It also appeared in the USSR after Iosif Stalin's death, when Nikita Khrushchev used dissident writers in his struggle with the Stalinists. The dissidents in turn used Khrushchev. Not only did they attack the Stalinists; they also demanded the right to express themselves on other political issues, a right Khrushchev soon denied them.

Nonetheless, the major way to express dissent in the Soviet Union has been to go outside the system, to the underground and the foreign press. While underground protests became important in the PRC in 1978–79, the chief approaches to the expression of dissent there have remained either forming alliances with political factions in the establishment or capitalizing upon opportunities available when the leadership itself has allowed dissent for its own political purposes. Dissent in present-day China, as in traditional times, occurs primarily under official sanction.

Not only the traditional model but also the traditional methods of intellectual dissent resonate in the PRC. Since in the post-1949 era as well as earlier there have been no institutional or legal safeguards, intellectuals have not spoken out directly. Because the appearance of consensus is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of a Chinese regime, as Lucian Pye has pointed out, controversial issues have been discussed obliquely and debated subtly, in order to mobilize support without ostensibly upsetting the consensus. Even with high-level protection, direct opposition has entailed enormous personal risks, for Mao, like the emperors of old, and the party, like the Confucian bureaucracy, had extraordinary charismatic appeal and political power.[1] Thus, in literature, poetry, art, theater, and discourses on history and philosophy, intellectuals have long used the indirect means of allusions, symbols, and allegory to discuss current political issues, and their modern representatives, with more pressure for subtlety, have employed these methods deftly.

DISSIDENTS in the People's Republic of China have also been heirs to the May Fourth movement of the early decades of the 20th century, which sought to create a new Western culture as a solution to China's social, political, and economic plight. Though the precise remedy was new, the method of cultural regeneration as a key to survival was traditional. The May Fourth writers regarded their writings as tools with which to fight social and political ills and shape political consciousness. However, these writers of the 1920's and 1930's differed from the traditional literati in that they expressed themselves with new styles, symbols, and concepts that helped prepare the way for revolution.

John Berninghausen and Ted Huters, in *Revolutionary Literature in China,* have selected some representative works of these May Fourth writers. As the editors note, the literary expression of protest against injustice had long been part of Chinese tradition, but in the May Fourth period it emerged as the *mainstream* of Chinese literature. It also became consciously revolutionary in style and content.

Despite its political thrust, this literature ranges from escapist froth to Mao Dun's description of the moral ambiguities of urban youth to Qu Qiubai's and Guo Moro's militant revolutionary treatises. Moreover, the collection shows the change in the May Fourth period itself from earlier romantic individualism and avant-garde experimentation to later preoccupation with rural poverty and Kuomintang bureaucracy.

This collection reflects the variety and diversity of the May Fourth era, when intellectuals were free to respond in their own individual ways to the events of the time. Though it contains a few stories that represent the May Fourth spirit after 1949, most May Fourth writers stopped writing when the party came to power and imposed political controls over intellectual and creative life.

The May Fourth spirit revived briefly in the Hundred Flowers period of 1956 and the first half of 1957. But the Hundred Flowers was more in the mold of the traditional, semi-official form of dissent than the more spontaneous, Westernized form of protest of the May Fourth era. Mao allowed and even encouraged intellectuals to criticize party officials in order to expose and rectify the officials' bureaucratic ways. He also granted intellectuals a relative degree of intellectual freedom in the expectation that they would help the regime in its modernization drive.

Hualing Nieh has collected, in the *Literature of the Hundred Flowers,* the major stories, poems, and literary debates that appeared in response to Mao's relative liberalization. Most writers accepted the framework of Marxism-Leninism, but they demanded a separation of intellectual and creative activity from political direction, and a lifting of bureaucratic controls over their work. Like the May Fourth writers, they wanted to express themselves in a style and with a content of their own choosing. Some participants went further than Mao had anticipated; they criticized not only the party's bureaucratic control but the party itself. Faced with this challenge, the regime launched the Anti-Rightist campaign in June 1957 against these critics.

Nieh's collection also includes some of the party's rebuttals to its critics. Among the rebutters were people like Yao Wenyuan, later to become one of the infamous "gang of four." His attack on famous writers in this campaign made possible his swift rise in the cultural hierarchy. Ideological campaigns, in short, were vehicles not only for political indoctrination but for political opportunism as well.

THE REGIME has tried but failed to separate intellectual areas of endeavor during such campaigns. Because scientists are crucial to China's modernization, they are the first to feel the benefits of a relaxation, yet the relaxation inevitably spreads to the nonscientists. Similarly, the nonscientists are the first to experience the harshness of a campaign, but most scientists are inevitably affected by the repression.

---

[1] Lucian Pye, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), March 1978, pp. 221–46.

However, different areas are hit with different degrees of harshness. Because literary intellectuals more directly reach a wide audience and influence public opinion, they are treated the most harshly. Artists, perhaps because their medium is less directly political, are generally treated less severely. Whereas in literature from late 1957 until the early 1960's professional writers were denigrated and amateur, collective creativity was praised, many fairly traditional landscape paintings in traditional styles, as Arnold Chang observes in *Painting in the People's Republic of China: The Politics of Style,* appeared alongside the amateur artistic works of the masses after a brief suppression in 1957.

It could be that these landscapes were permitted because they expressed one's love for one's homeland. Moreover, some of them were untraditional in that they expressed not so much harmony with nature as man's efforts to change nature. Nonetheless, in a society so highly politicized as the PRC, nonpolitical art is a political statement. It is a protest against party direction of creative activity.

IN THE EARLY 1960's, there was another relaxation in all areas of China's intellectual life as the regime sought to win the cooperation of intellectuals in repairing the great damage to China's economy done in the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950's. However, this relaxation differed from the Hundred Flowers. Since the party leadership could not resolve its differences over what course China should take in the aftermath of the Great Leap debacle, the contending political factions, as in traditional times, used intellectual groups to argue their positions indirectly in the public arena. One group of Westernized intellectuals associated with the party bureaucracy contended—through historical discourse, literary criticism, and the Peking Opera—that Mao's methods of mass campaigns and ideological mobilization were no longer applicable to a modernizing Chinese society, and they advocated more conventional economic practices. A group of younger intellectuals under the patronage of Mao and his wife Jiang Qing countered these arguments and upheld Mao's policies by using similarly indirect methods. One of their ploys was to demand radical reform of the Peking Opera so that it could no longer be used as a vehicle to criticize Mao's policies. They also endeavored to revolutionize the creative arts completely in order to impose a new culture and destroy the old one.

Thus, in the first half of the 1960's, Jiang Qing and her associates began to devise revolutionary operas that would become the main, and at times the only, culture of the period from the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to Mao's death in 1976. Martin Ebon has collected representative examples of these model revolutionary works in his *Five Chinese Communist Plays.* Ebon urges the reader to treat these works with sympathy, for he claims that they are heirs to a great tradition. But to what tradition is he referring? Although these model works used some of the techniques of the traditional opera, they were for the most part cultural hybrids that incorporated the most banal and conventional devices of Soviet socialist realism. Indeed, the socialist realist emphasis of these model works was imposed on all areas of creative activity. Arnold Chang points out that all art sank to the low level of propaganda. The model productions were not an evolution of China's great tradition, but a rejection of it.

Kai-yu Hsu's *Literature of the People's Republic of China,* a selection of literary works of the Communist era and a description of their authors, also seeks to understand the new culture that the radicals were creating. Despite Hsu's effort, his approach is implicitly critical. He points out that the proletarian heroic culture which the radicals promoted in the guise of mass culture had little to do with the kind of folk literature the masses enjoyed—the picaresque, the supernatural, and even the erotic. Moreover, his discussions with his old teachers and classmates on a visit to the PRC in the early 1970's, reported in *The Chinese Literary Scene,* revealed that most of them were no longer creating. The famous May Fourth writer Shen Cungwen had gone into museum work because, as he explained, "A different kind of fiction is in demand now. I can't deliver."[2]

Another famous May Fourth writer, Lao She, had tried to write after 1949, but although he produced a few works, none measured up to his pre-1949 writings. Several of his best pre-1949 works appear in George Kao's *Two Writers and the Cultural Revolution: Lao She and Chen Jo-hsi.* Lao is an example of a writer who sought to conform to the party's dictates, but, as he himself explained during the Hundred Flowers movement, his conformity had destroyed his creativity: "My writing tends to be empty and thin—for I am writing about things with which I am not very familiar."[3] He poignantly described why he and his May Fourth colleagues were no longer able to create under the regime they helped bring to power:

---

[2] Kai-yu Hsu, *The Chinese Literary Scene: A Writer's Visit to the People's Republic,* p. 134.

[3] Hualing Nieh, Vol. I, p. 46.

"A writer who is always scared stiff of overstepping set principles or doing damage to the revolution is certain to find himself bound hand and foot and incapable of writing boldly."[4]

Chen Jo-hsi, the other writer whose works are included in Kao's collection and the author of *The Execution of Mayor Lin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,* had to write her pieces about China from abroad. The fact that she was born and educated in Taiwan and spent only seven years in China, from 1966 to 1973, does not mean that she cannot be considered a genuine PRC writer. Her stories that implicitly expose, ridicule, and criticize the excesses and absurdities of the Cultural Revolution are biased against the regime. But they express the feelings of an intellectual who was immersed in the May Fourth culture and was subjected to persecution, the fate of most intellectuals in present-day China. Her characters, like those in May Fourth literature, despair over their situation and are alienated from certain aspects of the society, yet seek to support and play a part in that society. Some approved short stories written after Mao's death were even more condemnatory of the Cultural Revolution than Chen's pieces but lacked the sardonicism and subtlety of several of her stories.

A DIFFERENT type of dissent is expressed in David S. G. Goodman's *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China's Democracy Movement.* Goodman analyzes and reprints the poems used in the protests, unofficial journals, and wall posters of the Democracy Movement that surfaced from late 1978 until the spring of 1979.

These unofficial acts and the dissenters' contacts with foreign journalists during this period resemble the unofficial form of dissent in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there was also an element of semi-official approval involved. For a short time in 1979, Deng Xiaoping allowed these underground groups to function above ground, in order to use them in his factional struggle with the remnants of Mao's followers in the Politburo. The dissenting groups' condemnation of Mao's policies as detrimental to modernization overlapped with Deng's. But once the purge of the remaining Maoists had taken place and the Democracy Movement called for more democracy as a prerequisite for modernization, the dissenters were forced to go underground again.

Like Soviet dissident movements, the Democracy Movement was unorganized and diverse, although most dissenters accepted party leadership and Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, like Soviet dissidents, the dissenters wished to achieve greater cultural and political freedom, the same demands made officially in the Hundred Flowers movement. Specifically, they spoke out for human rights, attacked official privileges, and called for radical change of the political system.

The Democracy Movement also differed from previous dissent in that it was not led by intellectuals and students but by workers. However, these workers would have been intellectuals except for the Cultural Revolution. They were children of middle- and upper-level cadres and intellectuals, who had been deprived of a university education and sent to work in factories during the Cultural Revolution. Some had known one another as Red Guards; others met at their place of work. They had little expectation of education and were working in jobs not commensurate with their aspirations.

Most intellectuals in China disparage the protests of such individuals, probably because they fear that the protests will provoke the authorities into revoking the limited freedom they themselves have been granted. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the underground actions of these dissenters will do much to change the regime. Nevertheless, the politicization of youth in the Cultural Revolution and the organizational skills that they learned as Red Guards could be a catalyst for the organization of workers. A workers' movement in China similar to the one in Poland is not beyond the realm of possibility. China has a tradition of intellectuals and workers joining together in protest, as in the May Fourth movement of 1919 against warlords and in the Tiananmen protest of April 5, 1976, against the gang of four and in commemoration of Zhou Enlai. Goodman calls these youthful dissenters the "underprivileged privileged," an apt phrase to describe the potentially most revolutionary group in any system.

DESPITE THE PUBLICITY it has received, however, the underground movement is today marginal and limited. Though it has many sympathizers, the number of active participants is no more than 200. Many of these have been imprisoned.

As throughout Chinese history, then, change in the present Chinese system will probably be generated more by the traditional form of semi-official dissent than by underground dissent. For as long as the party needs to use the intellectuals for modernization, there will continue to be periods of relaxation as well as of repression.

To be sure, the party, as in the past, will encourage debate and criticism only within certain limits and under its direction. Yet once these forces are unleashed, they cannot be fully controlled. In the Hundred Flowers, what started out as an officially approved criticism of political practices turned into a demand for democratic rights which led to questioning of the party's role and even of communism. Again, in the relative relaxation of the early 1960's, officially sanctioned criticism of the Great Leap Forward and Mao's policies turned into demands for a more open society.

---

[4] Ibid., p. 47.

Since there are still no institutional or legal guarantees to protect those who express dissident ideas or seek intellectual or individual autonomy, the intellectuals who do so, unlike their counterparts in the West, risk their lives as well as their careers. Indeed, some of the people discussed in the books under review were persecuted and even killed in retaliation. Nevertheless, some of the ideas they articulated were adopted as party policy at a later time. For example, the demands made during the 1961–62 relaxation, for decision-making based more on economic and scientific than ideological criteria and for the rejection of charismatic leadership, have been incorporated into present-day policy.

As long as the party seeks to maintain its authority over most aspects of China's life—and its current emphasis on discipline and orderly administration does not suggest that it will abandon control—there is always the possibility that it will end relaxation if criticism from intellectuals threatens its authority. This is true whether the criticism comes from radicals or from Westernized intellectuals needed to modernize the country.

Yet history never repeats itself. Mao, with his particular animus toward intellectuals, is gone. Therefore, while the cyclical party policy toward intellectuals will continue, the shifts may be more moderate. Though the regime is now criticizing individual intellectuals, the relaxation period that began with Mao's death in September 1976 has been more open to the outside world and lasted longer than any previous relaxation. There has been an influx of Western learning and scholars and an efflux of Chinese to the West. It is unlikely that nationwide ideological campaigns will be carried out with the fervor and intensity of the past, because they are so disruptive to economic modernization.

Perhaps more important, the expression of official and unofficial dissent over the last decade makes it improbable that the party will again be able to impose the kind of monolithic ideological control that existed in the early years of the regime. The intermittent official relaxations, with their accompanying dissent, have undermined the ideological consensus that this regime, like every regime in Chinese history, has believed necessary in order to rule effectively.

China's Place in World Politics

By Samuel S. Kim

MELVIN GURTOV and BYONG-MOO HWANG. *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy.* Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.

J. D. ARMSTRONG. *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER. *China's Global Role.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

A. DOAK BARNETT. *China's Economy in Global Perspective.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1981.

JOSEPH CAMILLERI. *Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath.* Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1980.

GREG O'LEARY. *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

GRANT F. RHODE and REID E. WHITLOCK, Comps. *Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1978: An Annotated Compilation.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980.

IN THE 1970's, a series of dramatic events and developments signaled a significant transformation of China's place in the world. At the start of the decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had diplomatic relations with only 47 countries; by the end of the decade, it had increased that number to 120. In the meantime, and most important, it had established friendlier ties with both Japan and the United States. In 1972, the PRC gained recognition from Japan as the "sole legal government of China," and in 1978, the two countries signed a treaty of peace and friendship. In 1972, the PRC and the United States established de facto diplomatic relations, and in 1979, formal diplomatic relations. As the Sino-American rapprochement moved from détente toward unofficial entente, the PRC became as much an integral part of the new cycle of Soviet-American political rivalry (Cold War II) as the Sino-American rupture of 1949 was an integral part of Cold War I.[1]

The PRC has also taken an increasingly active part in the various domains of the global system as a whole. It joined the United Nations in 1971, and since that time it has steadily increased its visibility not only in the UN but also in all the UN specialized agencies, in UN-sponsored global conferences, and in a variety of nongovernmental organizations. In 1980, it made a much-heralded entry into the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; clearly, its emerging reintegration into the global economic system will have profound implications for both its own modernization drive and the world economy.

Finally, it is by now apparent that the post-Mao Chinese leadership has significantly changed its image of China's place in the international system. It now employs a vocabulary in which terms like "global interests," "global perspective," and "global view" figure prominently. In his interview with American journalists in Beijing in January 1979, for example, Deng Xiaoping noted that both the United States and China saw the negotiations leading to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations from a "global viewpoint" and that there is "much in common between us on matters of global strategy and on political questions." China also used a globalist rhetoric in attempting to justify its invasion of Vietnam in early 1979.[2]

TO WHAT EXTENT has Western scholarship caught up with and captured this new "reality" of China's place in the world? That question can perhaps best be answered first in general terms, and then more specifically, with reference to several recent works on Chinese foreign policy.

---

[1] For further analysis of this point, see Samuel S. Kim, "The Sino-American Collaboration and Cold War II," *The Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), No. 1, 1982.

[2] See *Beijing Review*, Jan. 12, 1979, pp. 17–18; and *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), June 19, 1980, p. 6.

Unfortunately, neither the West in general, nor the United States in particular, has ever had a notably accurate perception of China. As Harold R. Isaacs has written in his classic account, American images of the Chinese have shifted from the imperial exoticism and splendor reported by Marco Polo to the resourceful and enduring peasantry of Pearl Buck, from the demonized Genghis Khan (a Mongol, after all) to the revolutionary Mao Zedong.[3] Presumably, of course, the real China lies somewhere between the extremes of America's "love-hate" encounter with China. Yet, few have been immune from emotional and perceptual swings. President Richard M. Nixon readily embraced one of the extremes—the cold war orthodoxy of the 1950's and 1960's—when he called "Communist China" "the greatest threat to the peace of the world" in his Guam Declaration of July 25, 1969 (the so-called Nixon Doctrine). But only a few years later, there he was inside the Forbidden City, opening a new chapter in the annals of Sino-American relations.

But neither has the scholar, any less than the statesman, been able to escape swings of emotion, perception, and even fashion. In purely quantitative terms, the result was until recently a rather modest scholarly output on Chinese foreign policy. As Allen S. Whiting put it in a report to the US Social Science Research Council: "Neglect begets neglect. . . . Thus, when President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to Peking suddenly reawakened American interest in China, only a handful of studies on Chinese foreign policy were on hand as compared with a burgeoning literature on various aspects of Chinese society and culture."[4] That the study of Chinese domestic politics enjoyed more generous financial support and made greater theoretical advances even during a period when the US government was preoccupied with putative Chinese expansionism is indeed a revealing commentary.

In qualitative terms, the study of Chinese foreign policy was held back by the persistence of methodological orthodoxy—by what one might call "Sinocentrism." The dominant Sinocentric approach was excessively parochial, and therefore unable to provide a clear perspective for making prudent judgments about developments in China. The Sinocentric approach was also too isolated from the methodological rigor of research on social science in general and research on international relations and comparative foreign policy in particular. Instead, it was descriptive, as if "social reality" could be captured merely through an accumulation of raw data and a narration of events.[5] Chalmers Johnson has rightly characterized such a method as "intelligence-collecting rather than social science research";[6] in itself, it can serve only as a low-level guide to social reality. Finally, the Sinocentric approach was too atheoretical, conceptually too disparate and fragmented. Theory, the bête noire of Sinology, provides an analytical device for selecting, categorizing, ordering, simplifying, and integrating the raw data of knowledge. As such, it is no more than a necessary instrument that will help us better describe, explain, and (one hopes) predict China's place in the world. But Sinocentrism paid little attention to general theoretical and normative problems.

However, with the emergence of China as a significant global actor in the 1970's, many of the constraints that used to plague Western scholarship on Chinese foreign policy have been removed. Now that China has become virtually a de facto ally of the United States, the center of normative gravity has shifted correspondingly. What was unsafe or unpopular to say during Cold War I may have become unsafe or unpopular not to say in the current cycle of Sino-American entente. Yesterday's penalty is today's payoff. The normative constraints of one era have been removed—if only to be replaced, to a significant extent, by newer and more subtle constraints.

It is now possible to liberate the study of Chinese foreign policy from its Sinocentric straitjacket. The Sinocentric approach has always tended to accept uncritically—and often to amplify positively or negatively—what the Chinese say. We would do well to heed China's own advice about Soviet foreign policy—that we should not only listen to what the Soviets say (socialism) but also, and more important, observe what they actually do (social imperialism).

---

[3] Harold R. Isaacs, *Images of Asia: American Views of China and India*, New York, NY, Capricorn Books, 1962.

[4] Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy: A Workshop Report," *SSRC Items*, No. 31, March-June 1977, p. 1.

[5] For more detailed and diverse criticisms from various normative and methodological persuasions, see Davis B. Bobrow, "Old Dragons in New Models," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), January 1967, pp. 306–19; Roger L. Dial, Ed., *Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy*, Halifax, Canada, Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1974; James C. Hsiung, "The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: An Essay on Methodology," in James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, Eds., *China in the Global Community*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1980, pp. 1–15; Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship," *World Politics*, January 1965, pp. 256–71; Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 3–15; Andres D. Onate, "The Case for the Integrity of Social Science Research in Chinese Studies," *Asian Forum* (Tempe, AZ), Spring 1976, pp. 50–72; Jonathan D. Pollack, "Interpreting China's Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1980, pp. 84–88; and Whiting, loc. cit., pp. 1–3.

[6] Johnson, loc. cit., p. 257.

Given the discrepancies between pronouncements and performance in both traditional and Maoist Chinese foreign policy, the case for a *behavioral* analysis is all the more compelling.

The data for a more rigorous empirical and behavioral analysis of Chinese foreign policy are now available. Before 1971, no such analysis was possible (except, of course, by extrapolation from bilateral relations), since no patterns of behavior could be distilled from China's limited participation in the various domains of the global system. But there is now a large and ever increasing repertory of "empirical and behavioral referents" generated by the "target parties" of China's expanding diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, technological, and legal practices. The Chinese language is no barrier, for much of this repertory is available in English. Nor does the paucity of statistical data remain an insurmountable impediment. In mid-1979, for the first time in two decades, China began to release national statistics on key aspects of its political economy.

THE DRAMATIC increase in Western scholarly monographs on Chinese foreign policy in the 1970's attests to a renewed quest to redefine and reexplain China's place in world politics. The seven books under review, in particular, afford a point of departure for a disciplined inquiry into China's actual or perceived place in the world. They provide a sample of contending approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy, and they will certainly aid our search for a master road map (or paradigm) that will help us better understand the old and new China and better describe, explain, and predict China's changing role in global politics.

In terms of empirical and theoretical rigor, Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang's *China Under Threat* and J. D. Armstrong's *Revolutionary Diplomacy* stand out. The two books are similar in several ways. Both are remarkably free of traditional Sinocentric and anti-Communist biases. Both begin with an explicit formulation of theoretical models or operational hypotheses. Both subject their respective models or hypotheses to rigorous empirical testing in specific case studies. Both are concerned mainly with *explaining* Chinese foreign policy behavior. And both go a long way toward bridging the wide gap between research on Chinese foreign policy and research on international relations.

Gurtov and Hwang first formulate six operational propositions based on the assumption that Chinese foreign policy is the externalization of domestic politics. They then assess these propositions in light of China's behavior in five crises—the Korean war (1950), the Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the Sino-Indian border war (1962), Vietnam (1965), and the Sino-Soviet border clashes (1969).

Armstrong begins by conceptualizing two alternative explanatory models—the united front model and the alliance model. The united front model derives essentially from Mao's ideological notions. It thus stresses the influence of ideology (or Maoism) as the determinant of Chinese foreign policy behavior. This model carries with it the implicit assumption that the "internal" environment is the dominant foreign policy motivation. The alliance model is a "national security interests" model, or what some call a "reactive model." It is designed to explain the extent to which China's foreign policy behavior is determined by Beijing's security concerns and interests. This model, in short, assumes the dominance of the "external" environment in shaping China's foreign policy behavior. Having set forth these two models, Armstrong then proceeds to appraise their applicability through case studies of China's bilateral relations with Indonesia (1961–65), Pakistan (1954–71), Cambodia (the Sihanouk era, 1954–70), and Tanzania (1961–early 1970's).

Still, the two books differ in some ways. For one, each looks at a different side of the same coin. Gurtov and Hwang concentrate on the input side (the decision-making process in a crisis), and Armstrong focuses on the output side (observable behavior in a normal situation). Moreover, each reaches a different conclusion. For Gurtov and Hwang, each crisis was *defined* by the threatening behavior of the two superpowers, but China's *response* was determined largely by Chinese domestic politics. Armstrong's conclusion is a mixed one—that China's policies in Indonesia "were strongly influenced by the [united front] doctrine, its policies towards Cambodia and Tanzania rather less so, and its relations with Pakistan not at all" (p. 238).

While both studies make an important contribution, it is questionable whether their conceptual frameworks and conclusions are valid for Chinese foreign policy behavior in general (or China's role in world politics). Armstrong would probably agree, since he characterizes his study as "a detailed attempt to assess the *specific* impact of *specific* ideological principles on *specific* policies" (p. 239, emphasis in original). Gurtov and Hwang might agree too, since they add an "apologetic epilogue" to their concluding chapter, an epilogue that superbly and tantalizingly delineates some of the major changes and shifts in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. One might also challenge their approach even within its own frame of reference, however, for having overstated the impact of domestic politics and understated the impact of international politics. To be sure, the picture of a *rational* decision-making process under threat goes a long way toward dispelling the Genghis Khan image of Chinese expansionism during the period of cold war orthodoxy. But the authors seem to have overcompensated. The reader might do well to read this book together with another important study of Chinese decision-making, by Davis Bobrow, Steven Chan, and John Kringen.[7]

AS IMPLIED by the titles, John Franklin Copper's *China's Global Role* and A. Doak Barnett's *China's Economy in Global Perspective* promise to paint a larger picture of post-Mao China in global politics. Unfortunately, Copper has little to say about either global politics or China's changing global role. Instead, his basic objective is "to measure China's national power capabilities, using time-tested measures of national power together with the most widely accepted quantitative data available on China" (p. xiv). Thus, Copper assesses China's "muscle power" in terms of six categories—geography and population, natural resources, economic strength, military power, political system, and science and technology—providing no fewer than 77 tables in this slim volume.

The question of China's place in the contemporary international system seems deceptively simple and elementary, yet it has defied an easy answer. Copper's China is not even at the top of the second-rank powers (p. 133). But Jonathan D. Pollack's China is a "superpower candidate," and Ian Clark's China is already a great power in a tripolar international system.[8] Who is right?

I would argue that Copper's ranking of China's place in the world today is wide of the mark. The kinds of comparative measurements and assessments Copper presents in the book are not useful unless they are linked conceptually and analytically to the foreign policy objectives of a given actor and to the influence structures of world politics on a given issue. Copper seems unaware of the well-established principle that in global politics, perception defines reality. Gross quantities of capabilities cannot be equated with effective influence because of the discrepancies between an actor's objective capabilities and the subjective perceptions other global actors have of those capabilities. In a word, whether China is a power of the first rank, second rank, or third rank is a question that is partly empirical (objective) and partly perceptual (subjective).

Chinese global politics is the art of the possible. In the domain of global geopolitics, Chinese leaders constantly cultivate the perception that no other state possesses the will or capability that China does to recast the global strategic balance. Indeed, China seems to have succeeded in assuming such a role for the moment, for both superpowers act as if China had already become a key variable in their respective strategic thinking. In the domain of the global political economy, by contrast, post-Mao China made a sudden U-turn in late 1978—from giving aid and projecting its own model, it began to seek aid and search for other models.[9]

However, Copper does not attempt to follow all the twists and turns in Chinese global policy initiated by the post-Mao leadership in its "catching up" politics of modernization (drive for status). As a result, he conveys a false impression of continuity and stability in China's global role. While Copper's many statistical tables broaden the data base for our empirical inquiry, his study lags too far behind the actual evolution of China's role.

Fortunately, *China's Economy in Global Perspective* provides a more comprehensive and up-to-date (to mid-1980) picture of the political economy of post-Mao China. No other American scholar on Chinese affairs has displayed such intellectual growth as has Barnett in his more than 20 years of prodigious output, which covers virtually all aspects of the Chinese polity, both domestic and foreign. In his latest work, Barnett takes another giant step forward in providing an encyclopedic treatment of such key issues as trade, technology transfer, energy, and food. He superbly delineates the emerging reintegration of China into the world economic system and their reciprocal impact. More significant, he moves beyond the anachronistic Sinocentric framework to a "global" framework. Like a Picasso painting, Barnett's book captures all the changes and shifts—and their nuances and complexities—in the changing landscape of the post-Mao Chinese political economy. It is not possible to sum up this monumental book—actually five books in one and probably the largest volume yet written on recent Chinese politics. Suffice it to say that this is the one book to read on post-Mao China!

It can safely be said that Barnett has no particular academic or political axes to grind. He writes in the tradition of a philosopher-king for the larger "attentive public" of China scholars, intelligent laymen, journalists, and Washington policymakers. Consequently, he neither resorts to academic jargon nor casts his book in any explicit theoretical or conceptual framework. Much of his style is the "descriptive/analytical" style of first-class journalism. But I would argue that Barnett has taken a "political economy approach"—to be more precise, the Western liberal model of the global political economy, or the complex interdependence school à la Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.[10] Indeed, gone is his "cold war rhetoric" of the mid-1960's (recall his advocacy of "a policy of containment but not isolation" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966).

---

[7] *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1979.

[8] See Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Potential as a World Power," Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, P-6524, July 1980; and Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 139–42.

[9] The normative and other changes in the global policy of post-Mao China are analyzed further in my "Normative Foreign Policy: The Chinese Case," *International Interactions* (Chapel Hill, NC), Nos. 1–2, 1981, pp. 51–77, and "Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy?" *International Organization* (Ithaca, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 433–65.

Nevertheless, Barnett still links himself too closely to the latest American standard version of China. The last part (Part V), where one would hope to find Barnett's main conclusions or theses, merely reviews the economic dimension of US-China relations. In a sense, the entire book is a thorough and comprehensive background brief for American corporate and geopolitical managers. That may make his book all the more influential among policymakers and all the more attractive to the mainstream of China scholars in the United States. But I doubt whether the book will have a global appeal. Its conceptual and normative framework is still too Western.

Because of this Western frame of reference, Barnett misses a crucial opportunity to use the development of the Chinese political economy as a test case to directly confront the assumptions and arguments of both the *dependencia* approach (Cardoso, Frank, Amin, Galtung, etc.)[11] and the world-system approach (Wallerstein)[12] or to systematically examine China's changing global role in the Third World's elusive quest for system transformation (New International Economic Order). Post-Mao China's normative shift from self-reliance and, implicitly, from the *dependencia* model to the Western model, with a capitalist Center, is paradoxical. China's open door to the trilateral countries and corporations seems to legitimize the Center model at the very moment the model is not only under attack from without but also experiencing a "legitimacy crisis" within the Center itself. That some significant elements within the capitalist world no longer regard the Center model as potent enough even to muddle through is clearly delineated in *The Global 2000 Report to the President*, the most comprehensive set of projections ever developed by US government agencies on "what will happen to population, resources, and environment if present policies continue."[13] The practical and normative implications of post-Mao China's approach to the global political economy deserve, I believe, more careful attention than Barnett has given in this monumental volume.

BOTH Joseph Camilleri and Greg O'Leary promise to apply an alternative and more "radical" normative framework in analyzing Chinese foreign policy. Those who have read Camilleri's excellent book *Civilization in Crisis: Human Prospects in a Changing World*[14] may find his *Chinese Foreign Policy* disappointing. Camilleri's main objective is to study "China's role in the world system." Yet he takes a historical and descriptive approach, giving a chronological narrative of China's changing relations with the two superpowers, much as if his were the first book on the subject. As a text for the introductory student, the book is superb. However, it offers nothing new or startling to specialists on Chinese foreign policy. Only in the epilogue (pp. 248–60) do we find a most stimulating, but all too brief, discussion of the global implications of the policy and normative changes initiated by the post-Mao leadership.

Some of Camilleri's main themes or arguments are worth noting. Camilleri conceptualizes China's national interest as a product of history, geography, and ideology. He explains China's foreign policy behavior in terms of "a subtle interaction of internal and external factors" (p. 121). He rebuts the central thesis of Gurtov and Hwang by arguing persuasively that "the periodic fluctuations between radicalism and moderation were determined not so much by turning points in domestic politics as by changes in the international political situation" (p. 24). He also provides a tantalizing glimpse into the changing style of China's drive for status and into the shift in Chinese foreign policy from an emphasis on class relations to an emphasis on interstate relations. However, Camilleri's periodization of the history of the PRC's foreign policy into three phases—the revolutionary phase of 1949–68, the transitional phase of 1969–73, and the postrevolutionary phase since 1973—is puzzling. Why the postrevolutionary phase should begin in 1973, not in 1978, is not entirely clear.

---

[10] *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1977.

[11] For a sample of *dependencia* theory, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Towards Another Development," in Richard A. Falk et al., Eds., *Toward a Just World Order*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 343–58; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1979; Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" and "On the Mechanisms of Imperialism: The Case of Brazil," in Robert I. Rhodes, Ed., *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader*, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1970, pp. 4–17, 89–100; idem, *Reflections on the World Economic Crisis*, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1981; Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*, trans. by Brian Pearce, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1976; Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2, 1971, pp. 81–117; and idem, "Conflict on a Global Scale: Social Imperialism and Sub-Imperialism," *World Development* (London), No. 3, March 1976, pp. 153–65.

[12] See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, New York, NY, Academic Press, 1976, and *The Capitalist World Economy*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1979. For a description and analysis of the world-system approach from the perspective of international relations research and theory, see W. Ladd Hollist and James N. Rosenau, Eds., *World System Debates*, special issue of *International Studies Quarterly* (Minneapolis, MN), March 1981.

[13] *The Global 2000 Report to the President*, Vol. 1, *Entering the Twenty-first Century*, Vol. 2, *The Technical Report*, Vol. 3, *Documentation on the Government's Global Sectoral Models: The Government's "Global Model,"* all Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980–81. The citation in the text is in Vol. 3, p. iii.

[14] J. A. Camilleri, *Civilization in Crisis: Human Prospects in a Changing World*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1976.

In *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy*, O'Leary proposes to analyze the input (the formulation) rather than the output (the practice), on the assumption that Chinese foreign policy "is formulated in accordance with an ongoing analysis of the world predicated upon a set of Marxist-Leninist principles" (p. 8). His method is primarily an exegetic analysis of Chinese policy pronouncements, and his emphasis is on the changing Chinese definition of contradictions in the world. In his eyes, Beijing's perceptions of these contradictions at any given time determine its foreign policy.

"To the vast majority of authors who have written in the area of Chinese foreign policy," O'Leary declares at the outset, "I owe very little" (p. 10). We are also told that the author's knowledge of the Chinese language is limited but that this is not as important as a deficiency in Marxism-Leninism. At least the author makes his normative framework and conceptual challenge explicit.

O'Leary's central argument is that "the world's principal contradiction underlying the formulation of China's foreign policy during the period of the Cultural Revolution was formally abandoned at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and was abandoned in practice over the ensuing two and a half years" (p. 271). O'Leary cites Lin's 1965 programmatic essay on "People's War" as evidence that China saw the *principal (zhuyao)* contradiction as that "between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States." (p. 271).

This argument stands on shaky ground. It would be more accurate to say that China in the 1960's was in a state of conceptual and normative confusion as Mao groped for a definition of China's place in the rapidly changing international system. Mao's own thinking was in a state of flux, as a result of which he saw too many contradictions in the world without making any clear distinction between the principal and secondary ones. This ambiguity is revealed in his interview with a visiting French parliamentary delegation (January 1964) as well as in his interviews with M. M. Ali of Zanzibar (June 18, 1964) and a visiting Japanese Socialist delegation (July 10, 1964). More significant, Mao, in responding to Edgar Snow's question on precisely this issue (January 9, 1965), confessed that he had not reached a conclusion as to what constituted the principal contradiction in the contemporary world.[15]

In other respects, the O'Leary book, however well conceptualized, is a poorly executed piece of scholarship. Even to those who are committed to normative analysis of Chinese foreign policy, it may come as a source of embarrassment. As Lin Biao once said of U.S. "imperialism" (quoted in the book at p. 95), it is "a mad bull dashing from place to place," as the author seems most interested in picking out certain prominent specialists in Chinese foreign policy for target practice (Harold Hinton, Allen Whiting, and others). For a sensitive normative analysis of Mao's changing world-view, one has to rely on a study like John Gittings's *The World and China, 1922–1972*[16]—interestingly, O'Leary clearly places Gittings among "those few who have sought to drag the study of China's foreign relations from the mire of Cold War propaganda into which it was propelled by Western governments and their compliant academics" (p. 10).

Moreover, O'Leary's book has all the earmarks of an undisciplined and unedited doctoral dissertation. It is one of the most poorly written books on Chinese foreign policy I have encountered in many years. Many of its passages are simply undecipherable. The book also suffers from O'Leary's inability to use Chinese-language sources, which is a serious handicap for the textual analysis he undertakes. To cite one specific example, O'Leary could not use the two-volume *wansui* documents, perhaps the most important primary source for his contradictions analysis and a source of the strength of Gittings's book.[17]

Last but not least, the book suffers from anachronism. It makes little sense for a book published in June 1980 to cut off in 1973, with merely a brief "Postscript: 1973–78." In 1974, China's long journey to define and redefine its place in the world finally culminated with the pronouncement of Mao's "three worlds" theory at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. In 1977, the Chinese press was saturated with articles extolling Mao's "three worlds" theory, and on November 1, 1977, in the most elaborate and comprehensive foreign policy statement issued by China in recent years, the editorial department of *Renmin Ribao* devoted its entire issue (six pages) to an essay on "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism." In the last few years, however, Chinese press coverage of, or even reference to, Mao's "three worlds" theory has been greatly reduced. O'Leary has little to say about any of these developments. For O'Leary's chosen subject, approach, and period, Gittings's book remains the first, and perhaps the last, word.

---

[15] See Edgar Snow, "Interview With Mao," *New Republic* (Washington, DC), Feb. 27, 1965, p. 18; *L'Humanité* (Paris), Feb. 21, 1964, p. 3; *Renmin Ribao* editorial, Jan. 21, 1964, p. 1; *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought), n.p., August 1969, pp. 515, 535. For further elaboration and documentation of my argument here, see Samuel S. Kim, "Mao Zedong and China's Changing World View," in Hsiung and Kim, op. cit., pp. 16–39.

[16] John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922–1972*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1974.

[17] *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui*, 2 Vols., n.p., 1967, and August 1969. For a discussion of the authenticity of these documents, generally referred to as the *wansui* documents, see Stuart Schram, "Mao Tse-tung: A Self-Portrait," *China Quarterly* (London), January/March 1974, pp. 156–65.

FINALLY, let us turn to *Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1978,* compiled by Grant F. Rhode and Reid E. Whitlock. As any casual observer can see, "law and order" has returned to post-Mao China. A "Planning Conference on the Study of Law," which was convened in Beijing in March 1979, adopted an eight-year plan for the study of law. At the same time, a major "scholarly" article on international law appeared in *Renmin Ribao*—another novelty, for the paper had not published any "academic" articles on international law since the Cultural Revolution. This article argued that China's backwardness in international legal research is incongruent with "China's status in the world today."[18] Moreover, Chinese activism in the legal domain of world politics has become increasingly evident in the last few years.

Unfortunately, *Treaties of the People's Republic of China* has nothing to say about these recent developments. Instead, the editors provide us merely with the English texts of 33 treaties in five subject categories (friendship, boundary, commerce and navigation, consular, and dual nationality treaties), all signed between 1950 and 1965. As if to justify the lack of analysis and annotation, they argue that "the political, economic, and ideological currents that shape the course of international relations are reflected in treaties and other forms of international agreements" (p. 6). As if to rectify the obvious anachronism, they add (in Chapters 6 and 7) the English texts of the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship as well as the texts of the 1972 Shanghai Communique and 1979 Sino-American Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Even the editors' introductory essay is completely out of touch with current Chinese legal practice, for it relies essentially on Chinese publications of the 1950's.

Even for a historical study of China's evolving treaty practice, Rhode and Whitlock's compilation is a poor guide. For the documents themselves, we must still refer to *Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949–1967: A Calendar,* by Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu.[19] For analysis of the documents, we must still look to *People's China and International Law,* by Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu.[20] For China's legal practice in international forums, we have in English the official records of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN General Assembly and such important UN-sponsored global conferences as the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the annual volume *Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions,* and the UN *Treaty Series.*[21]

WHITHER post-Mao Chinese foreign policy? Whither Western research? How can we close the gap between the two?

In quantitative terms, there has been a rapid proliferation of scholarly monographs on Chinese foreign policy in recent years. Indeed, it can even be claimed that the study of Chinese foreign policy has reached another "advancing and contending" stage in its checkered history.

But post-Mao China has been changing with a speed—and in so many dimensions—few outside China specialists would have thought possible only a few years ago. How many books on Chinese foreign policy can be said to have survived these dramatic changes? Of the books under review, only Barnett's book—thanks in part to the remarkably expeditious production process at the Brookings Institution and thanks in part to its very recent publication date (June 22, 1981)—has managed, at least for the moment, to avoid being so quickly and mercilessly outdated by another unexpected turn in Chinese foreign policy. Thus, the burgeoning Western literature provides no reliable or consensual basis to say with confidence what place China occupies in world politics today or what kinds of interactions are taking place between China and the world at large.

---

[18] Wang Tieya and Wei Min, "International Law Research Must Be Strengthened," *Renmin Ribao,* Mar. 30, 1979, p. 3.

[19] Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu, *Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949–1967: A Calendar,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968.

[20] Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, *People's China and International Law,* 2 Vols., Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974.

[21] The UN *Treaty Series*—a collection of texts of treaties and international agreements—is published to satisfy a UN Charter (Article 102) obligation. There is a cumulative index, each volume of which covers 50 or 100 volumes of the *Treaty Series.*

In qualitative terms, the anomalies of the dominant Sinocentric paradigm are now fully exposed, if not completely rejected. That is, the dominant Sinocentric paradigm can no longer provide explanations for the changing reality of post-Mao China's foreign policy. Yet, no new or alternative paradigm seems to have gained general acceptance as the way to liberate the field from the maladies that have plagued current lines of inquiry.[22] Given the complexity, elusiveness, and volatility of Chinese politics, we should perhaps proceed on the assumption that many paths lead to Beijing.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the globalization of international relations and China's increasing involvement in global politics in the 1970's, the old dialogue of the deaf still persists between China scholars and world politics analysts. Judging from the recent books in the two fields, international relations research appears to have made some impact upon Chinese foreign policy research. But there is as yet no discernible evidence that the study of Chinese foreign policy has made any impact upon the study of international relations. The *exotica sinica* image dies hard.

In substantive terms, the current lines of inquiry have produced an uneven state of knowledge about China's role in world politics. China's bilateral relations with individual countries or regions, in particular with the two superpowers, have received thoroughgoing treatment. But China's changing relationship with the Third World as a whole (that is, as a collective global actor) constitutes a gaping hole in the literature. By and large, too, the "functional" domains of Chinese foreign policy remain unexplored. In this respect, Barnett's book, though somewhat restricted in its analytical and normative thrust, is a first major step in the right direction. But we still know little about the actual role China is playing in such realms of global politics as disarmament, human rights, information, ecology, science and technology, international law, and international regime change or construction. To suggest one specific and potentially fruitful line of research, China's participation in the protracted negotiations at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea—or its participation in the international monetary regime—could easily generate a variety of broad questions and general propositions capable of expanding the frontiers of our knowledge about China's changing role in world politics.

We live in an age of rapid change and disruption. Our normative assumptions, methodological tools, and theoretical concepts for the study of Chinese foreign policy therefore call for periodic reassessment and restructuring. Today more than ever, there is a compelling need for a more holistic conceptualization and a more comparative behavioral analysis of Chinese foreign policy. Without them, our search for China's place in the world cannot go too far. While great progress has been made in conceptually and empirically linking China's domestic and foreign policy, the same cannot be said about reciprocal interactions between Chinese foreign policy and global politics. The search for a theory that would help us better understand the elusive and changing nexus between China and the world presents a worthy challenge for future research on Chinese foreign policy.

---

[22] For a classic formulation of paradigm change (in the context of scientific revolutions), see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd enlarged ed., Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1970. For a thoroughgoing critique of the dominant realist paradigm in international relations research, see Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.

Notes & Views

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981

EDITORS' NOTE: As a service to scholarship, we present, by arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, a "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts." This Checklist continues the series presented in the Hoover *Yearbook on International Affairs* (hereafter *YICA*) since 1976, and jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1982 edition of the *YICA*. We also present, for the first time, a companion "Checklist of Elements in the National Liberation Movement," prepared by Wallace Spaulding, a long-time Washington-area specialist on international Communist affairs. These two lists together comprise the political parties and movements that Moscow views as the critical elements in the world revolutionary process. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

By Richard F. Staar

Soviet party and state leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, announced in his speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) early last year, that there were Communist parties operating in 94 countries of the world.[1] Since Moscow apparently recognizes two parties in Sweden, this would mean a total of 95 parties. The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, resurrected at a congress in May 1981, presumably became a 96th Communist party to be recognized by Moscow. The Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981, that follows below enumerates these 96 parties, listing them by "country,"[2] and indicating the initials of those parties which do not go by the name "Communist Party of . . ." To the maximum extent possible, the body of the Checklist is devoted solely to these 96 parties. In a number of countries, the Moscow-recognized "Communist party" is not necessarily the most significant Marxist-Leninist group on the scene. A number of these exceptions are mentioned in the footnotes to the Checklist.

The Checklist provides information on the population of the countries, membership of the Communist parties, the parties' fortunes in the most recent elections, their

Mr. Staar is on leave of absence for public service as US Ambassador and head of delegation to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna, Austria, from his position as a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA). A fourth, revised edition of his book Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe *has just appeared.*

---

[1] Brezhnev's Feb. 23, 1981, speech was published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[2] In five cases, Puerto Rico, West Berlin, and three overseas departments of France (Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion), the local Communist party does not represent a sovereign country, but is still treated as an independent party by Moscow.

legal status, and their general orientation within the world Communist movement. The population estimates are as of mid-1981.[3] Communist party membership figures listed here are either numbers reported or claimed by the given party or—where no reported

CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND FRONTS

Africa and the Middle East	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percent of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Algeria (PAGS)	19,422,000	450 est.	(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Egypt	43,300,000	500 est.	(1979)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Iran (Tudeh)	39,958,000	1,500 est.	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Iraq	13,575,000	2,000 est.	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Israel (RAKAH)	3,948,000	1,500 est.	3.4 (1981); 4 of 120	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Jordan	3,443,000	500 est.	(No elections since 1967)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Lebanon	3,097,000[b]	2,500 est.	— (1972); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Lesotho	1,365,000	Negligible	(1970 elections nullified)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Morocco (PPS)	21,590,000	2,750 est.	— (1977); 1 of 264	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Nigeria (SWPP)	79,682,000	Unknown	(1979)	Proscribed[c]	Pro-Moscow
Réunion	518,000	2,000 est.	—(1981); none in Paris[d]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Saudi Arabia	9,686,000	Negligible	(No elections scheduled)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Senegal (PIT)[e]	5,834,000	1,000 est.	1978	Legal	Pro-Moscow
South Africa	29,313,000	Unknown	(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Sudan	19,312,000	1,500 est.	(1980)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Syria	9,107,000	5,000 est.	3.0 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Tunisia	6,663,000	100 est.	2.1 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	309,813,000	21,300			

The Americas	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percent of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Argentina	28,130,000	80,000 claim	(No elections scheduled)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Bolivia	5,490,000	500 est.[f]	(1980 elections voided)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Brazil	124,800,000	6,000 est.	(1978)[g]	Proscribed[c]	Pro-Moscow
Canada	24,200,000	2,500 est.[h]	0.05 (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Chile	11,162,000	20,000 est.	(Elections promised)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Colombia	25,217,000	12,000 est.	1.9 (1978); 3 of 311	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Costa Rica (PVP)	2,332,000	3,200 est.	2.7 (1978); 3 of 57	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Cuba	9,800,000	434,000 claim	— (1981); all of 499	In power	Pro-Moscow
Dominican Republic	5,855,000	4,500 est.[i]	— (1978); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Ecuador	8,275,000	1,000 est.	3.2 (1979); none[j]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
El Salvador	4,610,000	800 est.[k]	(1976)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Guadeloupe	304,000	3,000 est.	38.6 (1981); 1 of 3 In Paris[d]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Guatemala (PGT)	7,310,000	750 est.	(1974)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Guyana (PPP)	857,000	Unknown	20.4 (1980); 10 of 65	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Haiti (PUCH)	5,923,000	350 est.	(1973)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Honduras	3,940,000	1,500 est.	(1980)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Jamaica (WPJ)	2,268,000	Unknown	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Martinique	302,000	1,000 est.	6.4 (1981); none in Paris[d]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Mexico (PUSM)	69,100,000	112,000 claim	5.4 (1979); 18 of 400[l]	Legal	Independent
Nicaragua (PSN)[m]	2,559,000	250 est.	(Election promised, 1985)	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Panama (PPP)	1,928,000	550 est.	— (1978); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Paraguay	3,268,000	3,500 est.	(1973)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Peru	18,119,000	3,000 est.[n]	2.8 (1980); 4 seats[o]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Puerto Rico[p]	3,258,000	125 est.	— (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
United States	229,700,000	11,000 est.	0.01 (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Uruguay	2,944,000	7,000 est.	(No elections since 1971)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Venezuela	17,913,000	4,500 est.	1.4 (1978); 1 of 195[q]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	619,554,000	713,025			

---

[3] The estimates were provided to the author by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce.

Asia and the Pacific	**Mid-1981 population (est.)**	**Communist party membership**	**Percentage of votes; seats in legislature**[a]	**Status**	**Orientation**
Australia (SPA)[r]	14,800,000	1,500 est.	—(1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Bangladesh	90,680,000	2,500 est.	— (1979); 1 of 300	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Burma (BCP—White Flag)	35,289,000	3,000 claim	(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
China	1,041,500,000	39,000,000 claim	— (1981); all of 3,202	In power	Pro-Beijing
India[s]	692,400,000	150,000 est.	2.6 (1980); 11 of 525	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Indonesia[t]	154,300,000	50 est.	(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Japan	117,700,000	440,000 claim	10.4 (1980); 29 of 511	Legal	Independent
Kampuchea (KPRP)[u]	5,774,000	5,000 est.	99.0 (1981); all of 117	In power	Pro-Moscow
Laos (LPRP)	3,518,000	15,000 claim	(No legislature)	In power	Pro-Moscow
Malaysia	14,330,000	3,000 est.[v]	(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing
Mongolia	1,700,000	76,000 claim	99.0 (1977); all 354	In power	Pro-Moscow
Nepal	15,338,000	1,500 est.[w]	— (1981); none[x]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
New Zealand (SUP)[y]	3,117,000	200 est.	0.5 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
North Korea (KWP)	19,000,000	2,000,000 claim	100.0 (1977); all of 579	In power	Independent
Pakistan	90,439,000	300 est.	(1979 elections postponed)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Philippines[z]	50,100,000	200 est.	(1978)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
Sri Lanka	15,172,000	6,000 est.	1.9 (1977); none[aa]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Thailand	48,787,000	1,000 est.[bb]	(1979)	Proscribed	Pro-Beijing[cc]
Vietnam	55,100,000	1,480,000 est.	97.9 (1981); all 538	In power	Pro-Moscow[dd]
TOTAL	2,469,226,000	43,185,250			

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union	**Mid-1981 population (est.)**	**Communist party membership**	**Percentage of vote; seats in legislature**[a]	**Status**	**Orientation**
Albania (APL)	2,700,000	122,600 claim	99.9 (1978); all 250 to Democratic Front	In power	Independent
Bulgaria	8,900,000	825,876 claim	99.9 (1976); all 400 to Fatherland Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Czechoslovakia	15,300,000	1,538,179 claim	99.9 (1981); all 350 to National Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
East Germany (SED)	16,800,000	2,172,110 claim	99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Hungary (HSWP)	10,700,000	812,000 claim	99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Poland (PUWP)	35,900,000	2,734,000 claim	99.5 (1980); all 460 to National Unity Front	In power	Pro-Moscow
Romania	22,400,000	3,004,336 claim	98.5 (1980); all 369 to Socialist Unity Front	In power	Independent[ee]
USSR	267,900,000	17,480,000 claim	99.9 (1979); all 1,500	In power	Pro-Moscow
Yugoslavia (LCY)	22,500,000	2,199,444 claim	— (1978); all 308 to Socialist Alliance	In power	Independent
TOTAL	403,100,000	30,888,545			

Western Europe	**Mid-1981 population (est.)**	**Communist party membership**	**Percentage of vote; seats in legislature**[a]	**Status**	**Orientation**
Austria	7,509,000	25,000 est.	0.96 (1979); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Belgium	9,900,000	10,000 est.	2.3 (1981); 2 of 212	Legal	Independent
Cyprus (AKEL)	636,000	12,000 est.	32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Denmark	5,100,000	9,000 est.	1.2 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Finland	4,798,000	47,000 est.	17.9 (1979); 35 of 200	Legal	Pro-Moscow
France	54,000,000	500,000 est.	16.2 (1981); 44 of 491	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Great Britain	56,000,000	18,500 claim	0.05 (1979); none	Legal	Independent
Greece[ff]	9,671,000	33,500 est.	10.9 (1981); 13 of 300	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Iceland (AB)[gg]	231,000	2,200 est.	19.7 (1979); 11 of 60	Legal	Isolationist

Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts

Western Europe (cont.)	Mid-1981 population (est.)	Communist party membership	Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a]	Status	Orientation
Ireland	3,400,000	500 est.	— (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Italy	57,200,000	1,715,890 claim	30.4 (1979); 201 of 630	Legal	Independent
Luxembourg	400,000	600 est.	5.0 (1979); 2 of 59[hh]	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Malta	370,000	150 est.	— (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Netherlands	14,200,000	13,000 est.	2.1 (1981); 3 of 150	Legal	Independent
Norway[ii]	4,100,000	500 est.	— (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Portugal	9,996,000	187,000 claim	16.7 (1980); 41 of 250	Legal	Pro-Moscow
San Marino	22,000	300 est.	25.0 (1978); 16 of 60[hh]	Legal	Independent
Spain	37,700,000	140,000 est.	10.6 (1979); 23 of 350[hh]	Legal	Independent
Sweden (VPK)	8,324,000	18,000 claim	5.6 (1979); 23 of 349[ii]	Legal	Independent
(APK)		Unknown	— (1979); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Switzerland (PdA)	6,390,000	5,000 est.	1.5 (1979); 3 of 200	Legal	Pro-Moscow
Turkey	46,700,000	Negligible	(1977)	Proscribed	Pro-Moscow
West Germany	61,666,000	48,856 claim	0.2 (1980); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
West Berlin (SEW)[kk]	1,894,000	7,000 est.	0.7 (1981); none	Legal	Pro-Moscow
TOTAL	400,207,000	2,793,996			
Grand Total	**4,201,900,000**	**77,802,116**			

Soviet international front organizations	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Number of affiliates	Countries[ll]
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	1957	Cairo	No data	87	
Christian Peace Conference	1958	Prague	No data		At least 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	1946	Brussels	Ca. 25,000		Nearly 80
International Organization of Journalists	1946	Prague	Over 180,000		Over 120
International Union of Students	1946	Prague	Over 10,000,000	Ca. 118	
Women's International Democratic Federation	1945	East Berlin	Over 200,000,000	129	114
World Federation of Democratic Youth	1945	Budapest	Over 150,000,000	Over 250	Over 100
World Federation of Scientific Workers	1946	Paris	Ca. 450,000	Ca. 33	
World Federation of Trade Unions	1945	Prague	Ca. 200,000,000	Ca. 71	
World Peace Council	1949	Helsinki	No data	Over 135	

[a] A dash "—" indicates that the vote percentage was not available. The date of the latest election (through December 1981) is indicated in parentheses.

[b] No allowance is made for the possible impact of civil war on the population.

[c] "Proscribed" is not an entirely satisfactory term; the local Communist party may more accurately be said to fail to meet constitutional requirements for participation in national elections.

[d] An overseas department of France, entitled to elect three deputies to the French National Assembly.

[e] The PIT is the renamed and legalized former clandestine branch of the PAI; it continues to enjoy Moscow's recognition.

[f] The PCB is only one of a number of leftist organizations; others include the PCB—Marxist-Leninist, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Revolutionary Party of Bolivian Workers, and various Trotskyist groupings.

[g] At least five Communists were elected under other party labels.

[h] Membership estimate is for all leftist groups, the pro-Beijing CPC—Marxist-Leninist being stronger than the CPC electorally, getting 0.13 percent of the vote in 1980.

[i] The membership estimate is for all of a dozen or so Marxist groups.

[j] The Maoist radical MPD won 4.8 percent of the vote and one seat.

[k] Membership estimate is for combined political and guerrilla strength of the PCES. This party is one of five leftist groupings comprising the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front conducting civil war against the El Salvadoran government.

[l] The 5.4 percent figure reflects more recent data than available last year. The Mexican CP won 18 of 400 (not 300) seats in 1979.

[m] This party restricts its activities to the domestic scene. The Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) represents Nicaragua at Communist meetings abroad. The pro-Beijing Communist Party of Nicaragua claims 1,200 members.

[n] Pro-Beijing groups total another 1,500 members. Also, there are other Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist parties.

[o] The data are for the United Left—an electoral coalition of the Peruvian Communist Party-Unidad and the Socialist Revolutionary Party—which won two seats in the Senate and two seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

[p] The Puerto Rican Socialist Party is also pro-Moscow and about the same size as the PCP.

[q] Overall, the Venezuelan Left garnered 9.0 percent of the vote in 1978. The Movement to Socialism (MAS) won 11 seats; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), 4; the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), 3; the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1; and the Communist Vanguard, 1. The slight change in the 1978 vote percentage for the Venezuelan CP from that reported last year reflects the interpretation by the *Yearbook* contributor of conflicting published data.

[r] The Independent Communist Party of Australia has an estimated 2,000 members.

[s] The Independent Communist Party (Marxist) has an estimated 100,000 members. In the 1980 elections, it won 6.2 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the Lok Sabha.

[t] A pro-Beijing faction numbers an estimated 250 members, mostly in exile.

Checklist footnotes (continued)

[u] The KPRP, which at a "Fourth" Congress in May 1981 resurrected an organization forced underground in the early 1960's, is not to be confused with the pro-Beijing Kampuchean Communist Party and guerrilla forces associated with Pol Pot, which continue to fight a guerrilla war against the Hanoi-backed KPRP regime.

[v] The membership estimate is a combined total for party members and guerrilla forces in Malaya. There is also evidence of a 200-member pro-Beijing Communist Party of North Kalimantan in Northern Borneo.

[w] The membership estimate is a combined total for all Communist parties, including pro-Chinese.

[x] Under terms of December 1980 constitutional adjustments, the 1981 elections to the National Assembly were on a nonpartisan basis.

[y] The pro-Beijing Communist Party of New Zealand has an estimated 300 members and is legal.

[z] The pro-Beijing Communist Party of the Philippines—Marxist-Leninist has an estimated 3,000 members and is proscribed.

[aa] In a January 1981 by-election, the SLCP won one seat in the 168-member parliament.

[bb] There are also an estimated 10,000 insurgents in the pro-Beijing Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces.

[cc] There are indications student intellectuals and lower-level party officials are advocating a more pro-Vietnam, pro-Moscow orientation.

[dd] The VCP possibly showed a degree of independence from Moscow by attending the 8th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor in November 1981.

[ee] Romania's "independence" vis-à-vis Moscow within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is clearly relative and may be moderating under the impact of increasing economic dependence on the USSR.

[ff] The independent KKE-Interior claims some 4,800 members.

[gg] The People's Alliance (AB) is a coalition of leftist elements in which organized Communists are dominant.

[hh] Disparity between the vote percentage reported here and that reported last year reflects the interpretation by the *Yearbook* contributor regarding conflicting published data.

[ii] The Norwegian Communist Party is the weakest of Norway's three leftist parties. The Socialist Left Party, with an estimated 2,000 members, is the largest; in 1981, it polled 4.9 percent of the votes and won 4 of 155 seats. The third party is the pro-Beijing Workers' Communist Party.

[jj] Three of these seats were garnered in by-elections since the 1979 polling.

[kk] Western observers consider the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) to be a subsidiary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany.

[ll] In some cases, countries are represented by individuals rather than by affiliated associations.

SOURCES: Population estimates are from the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce. Figures on membership claimed are from party newspapers, journals, or radio broadcasts. Membership estimates, vote percentages and seats in legislature, and information on party legal status and orientation are from the individual party profiles provided by contributors to Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982, and/or US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook, 1982,* Washington, DC, 1982 (in draft). Figures for the Soviet front organizations are from last year's Checklist as updated by information in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 27, 1981; *New Times* (Moscow), No. 51, 1980; World Peace Council, *List of Members 1980–1983,* Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., p. 2; and *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, pp. 121–22.

figures are available or where claims seem exaggerated—estimates by contributors to the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. In a few cases, the information on party membership is so sketchy that the best that can be provided is a rough estimate for *all* "Communist" groups, whether recognized by Moscow or not.

The total worldwide membership for all the Communist parties recognized by Moscow reportedly is "more than 77 million."[4] This figure obviously includes—despite the estrangement between Moscow and Beijing—the 39 million members claimed by the Chinese Communist Party.[5] It is interesting to compare this global figure with the total in the current Checklist, 77.6 million—itself an increase from the 76.7 million estimated in the 1980 checklist published last spring.

At the end of 1981, Communists ruled the same number of countries as at the end of 1980 (16, a figure which excludes Afghanistan). The Communist parties are proscribed or not certified for participation in elections in 25 countries (10 in Latin America, 8 in Africa and the Middle East, 6 in Asia and the Pacific, and 1 in Western Europe). The overwhelming majority of the parties remain pro-Moscow in orientation. Some 25 of these parties—plus a new Suriname party—held congresses during 1981 (see Table 1 on page 76).

Looking at trends by region, we find that the situation in Africa and the Middle East remains essentially unchanged. In the case of Senegal, membership estimates were decreased to reflect the fact that Moscow had recognized the smaller clandestine (rather than the less radical, legal) branch of the African Independence Party (PAI). The Moscow-recognized group has recently renamed itself the Party of Independent Labor (PIT) and now also enjoys legal status. In general, information on Communist parties in these regions is difficult to obtain.

In the Americas, the estimated total increased some 7,000 from the 1980 Checklist. Increases in estimates occurred for Argentina, Canada, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Decreases are noted in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (In a number of cases, the decline reflects not so much a change in Communist fortunes as a tightening of definitions to include, wherever possible, estimated memberships of Soviet-recognized movements only.)

Turning to Asia and the Pacific, it should be noted that Afghanistan has not been included in the 1981 Checklist. Although Moscow sees the country as being socialist in orientation, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has not yet been accorded the honor of acceptance among the parties recognized by Moscow as "Communist."[6] Similarly, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), not recognized by Moscow, has been excluded from the totals here. The Moscow-recognized Communist Party of India makes a highly inflated claim of 466,483 members,[7] but non-Communist estimates are about 150,000. The Chinese movement reportedly gained 1 million members over the past year. Estimates for the movements in Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam have been lowered. New figures released by North Korea show an increase. On balance, but for the increase in China, the total for the region as a whole would have remained relatively stable.

---

[4] See Boris Vesnin, "The Communists and Peace, Détente, Disarmament," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 49, December 1981.

[5] Reported by Hu Yaobang, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman, in a speech on July 1, 1981, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Broadcast in English by Beijing Xinhua on July 1, 1981, and transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), July 1, 1981, p. K/51.

Table 1. Communist Party Congresses in 1981[a]

Country[b]	Number of congress	Date
Albania (APL)	8th	Nov. 1–7
Argentina	9th National Conference[c]	June
Australia (SPA)	4th	Oct. 2
Bulgaria	12th	Mar. 31–Apr. 4
Czechoslovakia	16th	Apr. 6–10
East Germany (SED)	10th	Apr. 11–16
Ecuador	10th	Nov. 26–29
Finland	19th	May 22–24
Great Britain	37th	Nov. 14–17
Iceland (AB)	Conference	Nov. 20–22
Israel (RAKAH)	19th	Feb. 11–14
Jamaica (WPJ)	2nd	Dec. 18–21
Kampuchea (KPRP)	4th[d]	May 26–29
Mexico (CPM)	19th	Mar. 9–14
	20th	Oct. 15
(PUSM)	National Unification Assembly	Nov. 5–7
Mongolia (MPRP)	18th	May 26–31
Nicaragua (PSN)	12th	July 3
Norway	17th	Dec. 4–6
Poland (PUWP)	9th, Extraordinary	July 14–20
Réunion	Special	Mar. 29
Senegal (PIT)	Constituent	ca. Aug. 8
Spain	10th	July 28–31
Suriname[e]	Founding	July 24
Sweden (VPK)	26th	Nov. 20–24
USSR	26th	Feb. 23–Mar. 3
West Germany	6th	May 29–31
West Berlin (SEW)	6th	May 15

[a] Five Communist party congresses held during 1980 were omitted from the listing of congresses in that year published in the March-April 1981 issue of *Problems of Communism*, because the information became available after that issue went to press. These were the CP of San Marino (10th Congress, Dec. 6–7, 1980), the CP of Sri Lanka (11th Congress, Mar. 26–30), the CP of Syria (5th Congress, May 29–31), the CP of Venezuela (6th Congress, Aug. 8–11), and the APK in Sweden (26th Congress, Apr. 4–7).

[b] Where the local party is not named "Communist Party of . . .," initials of the party name are provided in parentheses.

[c] This conference was "tantamount to a congress" according to *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, p. 27.

[d] The newly constituted KPRP, by calling this congress its "Fourth," laid claim to the heritage of a like-named organization that was driven underground in the early 1960's.

[e] This party was formed by a merger of a rudimentary Suriname Communist organization and the Revolutionary Liberation Movement of Suriname. See *De Ware Tijd* (Paramaribo), July 10, 1981, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Latin America Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 2363 (JPRS 78906), Sept. 3, 1981, p. 90. It is too early to determine the legal status or orientation of this party, and there has been no indication of whether or not it is recognized by the Soviet Communist Party.

All of the East European ruling parties except those in Czechoslovakia and Poland claimed slight membership gains. In December, the Polish United Workers' Party reported a decline of 415,000 members between June 30, 1980, and December 1, 1981—a drop of some 13 percent.[8] Imposition of martial law apparently has brought more resignations (and expulsions), although no comprehensive information has been published.

In Western Europe, the largest gains were claimed by the Portuguese Communist Party (plus 23,000 members). By contrast, the Italian party's claimed membership is down nearly 100,000, and the French party is estimated to have lost a similar number of members, despite the PCF's very recent claim to have increased its membership to 710,000.[9] The figures for the Spanish Communist party are probably inflated. For one, they do not allow for potential defections by the Catalan and Basque organizations; moreover, growing estrangement between Moscow and Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo may lead to formation of a significant pro-Moscow rump within the PCE. For all of Western Europe, there was an estimated net loss of about 160,000.

A final item in the Checklist is a listing of major international Communist front organizations. Only the 10 most important ones have been mentioned. Several fronts included in the 1980 list (the International Federation of Resistance Fighters, the International Institute for Peace, and the International Radio and TV Organization) have been excluded inasmuch as they are basically regional organizations.

---

[6] Although the 1982 *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs* includes profiles on Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Mozambique, and South Yemen, none of the ruling parties in these countries are recognized as "Communist" by Moscow, and hence they have been left off the Checklist.

These and a variety of other parties, fronts, and movements are listed in the Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement" that follows the Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts—Eds.

[7] See *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, p. 46.

[8] *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Dec. 10, 1981.

[9] Secretary General Georges Marchais's report to the 24th Congress of the French Communist Party on Feb. 4, 1982, as reported in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Feb. 4, 1982.

Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"

By Wallace Spaulding

The "national liberation movement" comprises, in the eyes of Soviet theoreticians, the third most important component in the "world revolutionary process,"[1] exceeded in importance only by the "world socialist system"[2] (the 16 *countries* ruled by Communist parties) and the "revolutionary movement of the working class in capitalist countries"[3] (some 80 Communist *parties* recognized by the Soviets in non-Communist countries). These last two are treated in the preceding Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts.

The "national liberation movement" is clearly a more complex phenomenon from the Soviet standpoint. Indeed, Soviet terminology to deal with it has altered over time, and Soviet analysts do not always make explicit exactly which entities fall into specific categories at any given time. To discern the elements of the movement, one must plow through a mass of Soviet theoretical writings and also turn to such indicators as participation of various parties or movements in congresses of certain ruling Communist parties and in the activities of both *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the official Soviet-line theoretical monthly of 63 Communist parties) and Communist front organizations. The results of such an effort, which perforce cannot claim to be comprehensive, are offered in the Checklist below.

The national liberation movement includes, first of all, "revolutionary democratic parties" and the "countries of socialist orientation" which they rule. The latter are said to be the "vanguard" of the national liberation movement.[4] Such countries differ from Communist ones in that they have not definitively left the "world capitalist system," even though the *national* economy in the majority of them is dominated by the state sector.[5]

As is evident from the accompanying listing, the vast majority of the revolutionary democratic parties operate in Africa and the Middle East. Boris Ponomarëv, writing in 1971, by and large excluded Latin America when discussing the national liberation movement, on the grounds that (in contrast to Africa and non-Communist Asia) the region had "a relatively developed capitalism," a strong and experienced working class, a long history of revolutionary struggle, and Communist parties in all countries.[6] There are, however, as we shall note below, parties and movements in Latin America which do seem to be included under the broad umbrella of the world "national liberation movement."

Although Communist parties often exist in countries having revolutionary democratic parties, it is the latter that are treated by Soviet writers as the distinctive pro-

Colonel Spaulding, USAR (ret.), is a Washington-based observer of international Communist affairs. He holds a doctorate in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, PA) and is a graduate of the US Army War College.

---

[1] K. Maydanik and G. Mirskiy, "The National Liberation Struggle: The Current Stage," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEMO*), No. 6, June 1981, as translated in US Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs* (Arlington, VA—hereafter, *JPRS/UPSA*), No. 1171 (JPRS 78972), Sept. 14, 1981, p. 18; N. N. Inozemtsev, "A Revolutionary Step for Millions," *Knizhnoye obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 8, Feb. 20, 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1126 (JPRS 77897), Apr. 22, 1981, p. 11; V. Zagladin, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnoye kommunisticheskoye dvizheniye: ocherk strategii i taktiki* (The International Communist Movement: Sketch of Strategy and Tactics), Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, as trans. by US Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 57044, Sept. 18, 1972; and M. Mitin, "A Doctrine Which Is Transforming the World," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 20, 1974, p. 4.

[2] Mitin, loc. cit., pp. 1, 4; Zagladin, op. cit., p. 47; and Moscow TASS, Jan. 23, 1982.

[3] Zagladin, op. cit., p. 59; Mitin, loc. cit., p. 4; Ye. Kuskov, "The Most Active and Influential Force," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, November 1972, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *Kommunist* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS/Kommunist*), JPRS 57988, Jan. 16, 1973, p. 107; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[4] R. A. Ulyanovskiy, "Great October and Revolutionary Process in Asian and African Countries," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 2, 1977, trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Arlington, VA), JPRS 69699, Aug. 30, 1977, p. 15.

[5] A. Kiva, "Socialist Orientation: Some Problems of Theory and Practice," *MEMO*, No. 10, October 1976.

[6] B. Ponomarëv, "Topical Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Process," *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1971, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 54571, Nov. 29, 1971, pp. 70, 75.

Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement": Indicators of Participation

	Attendance							
	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia), Dec. 78	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Socialist Unity Party (E. Berlin), Oct. 80	26th Congress, Communist Party of Soviet Union (speaking order, main sessions), Feb.-Mar. 81	12th Congress, Bulgarian Communist Party, Mar. 81	10th Congress, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany), Apr. 81	Work conference, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Nov. 81	Last article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*	Has members on the World Peace Council[a]
"REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES								
Of which:								
"Vanguard" revolutionary democratic parties:								
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan	—	x	15	x	x	x	Sept. 81	PC
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party	—	x	19	x	x	x	June 76	VP
Benin People's Revolutionary Party	—	—	x	x	x	x	—	(PC)
Congolese Labor Party	x	x	36	x	x	x	Apr. 81	PC
Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia	x	x	18	x	x	x	Apr. 78[b]	VP
Mozambique Liberation Front	x	x	26	x	x	x	June 76	PC
Yemen Socialist Party	x	x	22	x	x	—	Sept. 81	PC
Other revolutionary democratic parties:								
Algerian National Liberation Front	—	—	27	x	x	—	—	(PC)
Burmese Socialist Program Party	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Democratic Party of Guinea	—	—	x	x	x	x	Aug. 76	VP
African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands[c]	—	x	x	x	x	—	May 76	PC
Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee for the Malagasy Socialist Revolution (AKFM-KDRSM)	—	x	x	x	x	x	Jan. 81	VP
Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe	—	—	x	x	x	—	—	(M)
Seychelles People's Progressive Front	—	x	x	—	—	—	—	(M)
Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Syria	—	x	24	x	x	—	—	VP
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania	—	—	x	x	x	—	May 78	(M)
Possible revolutionary democratic parties:								
New Jewel Movement of Grenada[d]	—	x	x	x	x	—	Sept. 80	—
Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua	—	—	32	x	x	—	July 81	PC
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS PROPER								
Of which:								
Unitary:								
National Liberation Front of Bahrain	x	x	x	x	—	x	Oct. 78	M
Southwest African People's Organization (Namibia)	—	x	x	x	x	—	July 81	PC
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	M
African National Congress (South Africa)	—	x	x	x	x	—	Mar. 80	VP
POLISARIO Front (Western Sahara)	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	M

	Attendance							
	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia), Dec. 78	Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Socialist Unity Party (E. Berlin), Oct. 80	26th Congress, Communist Party of Soviet Union (speaking order, main sessions), Feb.-Mar. 81	12th Congress, Bulgarian Communist Party, Mar. 81	10th Congress, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany), Apr. 81	Work conference, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Nov. 81	Last article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*	Has members on the World Peace Council[a]
United front:								
Coordinating Body of Revolutionary Mass Organizations/Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador)	—	x	—	—	x	—	July 81	(M)
Association of Revolutionary Organizations of Guatemala	—	x	—	—	—	—	Mar. 81	(M)
Palestine Liberation Organization	—	x	x	x	x	—	July 76	VP
OTHER "SOCIALIST-ORIENTED" PARTIES								
Of which:								
Ruling:								
Unity and National Progress Party (Burundi)	—	x	x	—	x	—	—	—
People's National Congress (Guyana)	—	x	x	—	x	—	—	PC
Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Iraq	—	—	—	x	x	—	—	—
General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamhiriyah	—	x	x	x	x	—	—	PC
Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution[e]	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	(M?)[e]
Democratic Union of the Mali People	—	x	x	x	x	—	—	PC
All-People's Congress of Sierra Leone	—	x	x	—	x	—	—	PC
Uganda People's Congress	—	—	—	—	x	—	—	—
United National Independence Party (Zambia)	—	x	x	x	x	—	—	PC
Zimbabwe African National Union[f]	—	x	—	x	—	—	—	VP[f]
Nonruling:								
National People's Party of Bangladesh	—	—	x	x	x	—	—	(PC)
MAPU Worker-Peasant Party of Chile	—	x	x	x	x	—	Jan. 76	—
Chilean Socialist Party	—	x	x	x	x	—	—	PC
National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt	—	—	x	x	—	—	May 75	VP
People's National Party of Jamaica[d]	—	—	x	—	—	—	—	(PC)
Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)[d]	—	—	x	x	x	—	—	PC
Socialist Revolutionary Party (Peru)	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	—
Socialist Party of Puerto Rico	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	—
Socialist Party of Uruguay	—	x	—	—	—	—	—	PC

[a] Key to symbols: VP—Vice President and member of the WPC's Presidential Committee; PC—member of Presidential Committee; M—member of World Peace Council. Where symbol is in parentheses, the country is allocated the indicated position, but no incumbent is currently identified; it is only assumed that a member of the party in question will be named to the slot.

[b] At the time, COPWE had not been created; the organization represented was the Provisional Military Administrative Council, then and still the actual ruling body in Ethiopia.

[c] Since the overthrow of Guinea-Bissau's Luis Cabral in November 1980, it appears that two separate parties are emerging from PAIGC, one in the Cape Verde Islands, the other in Guinea-Bissau. It is not clear how Moscow views these developments.

[d] Is a member of the democratic Socialist International.

[e] The dominant group in Madagascar's ruling coalition. No slot is indicated for this party in the WPC, although the listing is said to be incomplete, leaving open the possibility that a representative from this party could be added to those from its junior coalition partner, the AKFM-KDRSM.

[f] Moscow long supported the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) over ZANU, and indeed ZAPU remains the country's representative on the WPC. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo was published in the February issue of *World Marxist Review*, and is a vice president of the WPC. It remains to be seen how Nkomo's removal from Zimbabwe's government in early 1982 will affect Moscow's attitudes toward ZANU.

SOURCES: For the 1978 meeting in Sofia, *World Marxist Review* (London), February 1979, p. 3. For the 1980 meeting in East Berlin, ibid., December 1980, pp. 23–24. For the 26th CPSU Congress, Moscow TASS, Feb. 20–21, 1980; Radio Moscow, Feb. 19 and 22, and Mar. 6, 1981; *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 20 and 23, and Mar. 5 and 7, 1981. For the Bulgarian party congress, *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Apr. 1, 1981. For the East German party congress, East Berlin, ADN, Apr. 11, 1981. For the November 1981 conference, *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1981. For the WPC, World Peace Council, *List of Members 1980–1983*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., and *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 3, 1981, p. 2.

gressive elements of Africa and non-Communist Asia.[7] The revolutionary democratic parties are said to differ from Communist ones in that they reflect multiclass interests and fail to have a uniformly cohesive doctrine and discipline.[8] But, while these parties are generally regarded by Soviet writers to be dominated by "petit-bourgeois" and other non–working class elements,[9] virtually all have acquired at least some Marxists, according to Soviet Afro-Asian specialist A. Kiva.[10]

In discussions of revolutionary democratic parties, Soviet writers single out for special attention seven that come closer than the others to being "genuine" Communist parties.[11] These "vanguard" or "elite" revolutionary democratic parties—in Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen—have stricter class and ideological requirements for membership than do others and have openly declared their commitment to "scientific socialism" (as the Soviets term Moscow's brand of socialism).[12] According to one writer, this elite group, exercising "people's democratic" power, generally took the "noncapitalist" path of transition to socialism in the 1970's.[13]

The activities of these "vanguard" parties and the way they are treated by the CPSU highlight their special place in the national liberation movement. These seven (plus the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee for the Malagasy Socialist Revolution—AKFM-KDRSM) were the only revolutionary democratic parties to attend a conference in November 1981 on the work of the magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.[14] Leaders from each of the seven, except the Benin People's Revolutionary Party, were accorded the privilege of addressing a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress in February-March 1981, an honor extended to leaders of only 26 of the 83 regular foreign Communist parties in attendance. Moreover, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen were the only non-Communist countries except Grenada to vote with the Soviet Union in the United Nations (UN) in January 1980 on the Afghanistan question. The same five attended the June 1980 and July 1981 sessions of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as observers, and they signed friendship treaties with the USSR between 1976 and 1979 (the Congo signed a similar treaty in May 1981).

Nine other parties are currently (as of mid-1981) stated by Soviet experts to be "revolutionary democratic" (see the Checklist).[15] These differ from the "vanguard" parties in this category in that the degree of organization of the ruling party is deemed less advanced. The nine parties vary in their closeness to Moscow. Syria's Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party appears the most pro-Soviet: the state it rules signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in October 1980; and the party, together with Algeria's FLN, was granted the distinction of having its representative address a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress. Similarly, the AKFM-KDRSM of Madagascar, while only a junior member of its country's ruling coalition, seems to lean strongly toward Moscow (as evidenced by the party's aforementioned involvement in the conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and by Madagascar's signing of a friendship treaty with Moscow in June 1979). At the other extreme is the largely isolationist Burmese Socialist Program Party.

There may be some basis for including two other ruling parties—the New Jewel Movement of Grenada and the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua—among the revolutionary democratic movements, although the Soviets have not publicly done so. As noted above, Grenada was the only other non-Communist country to join the "vanguard" revolutionary democracies in supporting the Soviet position in the January 1980 UN debate on Afghanistan. Also, in September 1980, a New Jewel spokesman was published in *World Marxist Review* (the London edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), a distinction enjoyed by each of the "vanguard" revolutionary democratic parties except that of Benin, but by less than half of the "other" revolutionary democratic parties (see Checklist). As for the Sandinistas, "revolutionary democratic" status might be inferred from two things: (1) their representative was permitted to address a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress, a privilege otherwise reserved only for important Communist and revolutionary democratic parties, and (2) like Algeria's FLN, the Sandinistas have replaced the local national Communist party as Nicaragua's sole representative at foreign Communist party congresses (see Checklist). In August 1980, an authoritative Soviet-line source identified Nicaragua and Grenada as the sole countries, other than Cuba, to have "taken the road of building a new society in Latin America."[16]

---

[7] Zagladin, op. cit., pp. 199–205, 225–29; V. G. Solodovnikov et al., Eds., *Politicheskiye partii Afriki* (Political Parties of Africa), Moscow, n.p., 1970, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 52950, Apr. 23, 1971, pp. 169–70.

[8] A. Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation: Some Aspects of Their Political Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1973, p. 32; Zagladin, op. cit., p. 255; Solodovnikov et al., op. cit., p. 75; G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1974, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 61776, Apr. 17, 1974, p. 100.

[9] A. Belskiy, "The National Liberation Movement: Laws and Prospects," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1975, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS/UMA*), No. 1137 (JPRS 64667), Apr. 30, 1975, p. 45; Zagladin, op. cit., pp. 79, 206; and Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation . . . ," pp. 33, 35–36.

[10] Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation . . . ," p. 37.

[11] Ye. Primakov, "The Law of Uneven Development and the Historical Fate of Liberated Countries," *MEMO*, No. 12, December 1980, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1129 (JPRS 77924), Apr. 24, 1981, p. 21; Y. N. Gavrilov, "Problems of the Formation of Vanguard Parties in Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1980, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1111 (JPRS 77660), Mar. 24, 1981, p. 2; and V. Li, "Social Revolution in Afro-Asian Countries and Scientific Socialism," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 3, March 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1150 (JPRS 78507), July 14, 1981, p. 12.

[12] Venyamin Chirkin, in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 4, July-August 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1180 (JPRS 79176), Oct. 8, 1981, pp. 4–5; V. Li, loc. cit.

[13] Ye. Primakov, "Countries of a Socialist Orientation: Difficult but Feasible Transition to Socialism," *MEMO*, No. 7, July 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1185 (JPRS 79272) Oct. 22, 1981, p. 12. Primakov draws a distinction between the contemporary "revolutionary democratic" parties and parties of a more conservative, less mass-based nature which in the 1960's were seen as having taken the road to scientific socialism. He refers to the latter as "national revolutionary" regimes.

[14] *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1981.

[15] See, for example, Chirkin, loc. cit., pp. 4–8; and N. D. Kosukhin, "Development Trends of the Countries of a Socialist Orientation," *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), No. 4, July-August 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1197 (JPRS 79561), Dec. 1, 1981, p. 65.

The relatively high degree of organization of the revolutionary democratic parties is often evidenced through the institution of party congresses—although holding of "congresses" does not of itself indicate a well-developed party structure, as suggested by the very title of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). A listing of recent congresses is provided in Table 1.

Table 1. Congresses of Revolutionary Democratic Parties in 1980–81

	Number of congress	Dates
In 1980:		
Ethiopia (COPWE)	Organizational	June 17–20
Madagascar (AKFM–KDRSM)	9th	Aug. 13–17
South Yemen (YSP)	Extraordinary	Oct. 10–15
Angola (MPLA)	Extraordinary	Dec. 18–23
In 1981:		
Ethiopia (COPWE)	2nd	Feb. 9–13
Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC)	1st	Nov. 8–14

There are no convenient Soviet listings of other ruling and nonruling groupings that Moscow considers to comprise part of the world "national liberation movement." Nevertheless, one can discern certain categories of parties or movements other than the revolutionary democratic parties which seem to figure in the movement as Moscow conceives it.

One such grouping consists of "liberation movements" proper. That the Soviets use this as a separate category was evidenced in the listing of groups attending an October 1980 conference cosponsored by *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.[17] As can be seen from the Checklist, these can be subdivided into those that are single (or unitary) and those that operate as "united fronts." The five unitary liberation movements listed in the Checklist participate in Communist-sponsored meetings, and four of them (all except the Bahrain National Liberation Front) serve as the organizational affiliate from their respective countries on the World Peace Council,[18] which is regarded by the Soviets as the most important of the international Communist front organizations.[19] Leaders of the Bahrain, Namibian, and South African movements have been published in *World Marxist Review*. In closeness to the Soviets, these movements range from the Bahrain group, which habitually participates in meetings of Arab Communist parties (the sole officially non-Communist organization to do so),[20] to the POLISARIO Front, which appears to be out to gather support from any quarter whatsoever.

Like the unitary liberation movements, those of the united-front type also participate in meetings sponsored by Communist parties. Each of the fronts has had a spokesman published in *World Marxist Review*. Moreover, each of these fronts includes a Communist component.[21] Again, closeness to Moscow varies. Of the group, the Palestine Liberation Organization appears to have the least affinity for the USSR, its ties with the latter appearing to be based primarily on opportunism.

There is yet a third, more amorphous grouping of ruling[22] and nonruling political parties that, while not qualifying as revolutionary democratic parties or liberation movements per se, nevertheless seem to be (or may be inferred to be) viewed by Moscow as part of the worldwide "national liberation movement." It is difficult to arrive at a definitive listing of such "socialist-oriented" parties, because the Soviets themselves make no such listings and appear to shift their opinions regarding one or another party as developments unfold within the individual polities or in their external relations. While not claiming to be exhaustive, the present Checklist identifies such of these parties that appear to fall into the category by virtue of the "objective" criteria of participation in meetings sponsored by Communist parties. Almost invariably, they also participate in one or another international Communist front organization, most often the World Peace Council.

---

[16] "The Latin American Proletariat and Its Allies in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *World Marxist Review* (London), August 1980, p. 48.

[17] Pavel Auersperg (the Czech managing editor of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), "International Meeting of the Forces of World Progress," *Trybuna* (Prague), No. 48, Nov. 26, 1980, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report: Political, Social and Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA), No. 1843 (JPRS 77193), Jan. 16, 1981, p. 12.

[18] See World Peace Council, *List of Members, 1980–83*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., pp. 97, 105, 128, and 155.

[19] Shakhnazarov, loc. cit., p. 101; Kuskov, loc. cit., p. 103. See also Brian Crozier, "Moscow's Efforts for 'Peace,'" *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey, England), Jan. 13, 1982, p. 3.

[20] *Information Bulletin* (Prague, published by Peace and Socialism International Publishers), No. 4, 1979, p. 12; and *Al Nida* (Beirut), May 10, 1981.

[21] On Palestine, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1975, p. 592; on Guatemala, see *World Marxist Review*, March 1981, p. 112; on El Salvador, see ibid., October 1980, p. 19.

[22] In the case of Madagascar, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution is the dominant partner in the ruling coalition.

Among the ruling parties in this category, the majority chose not to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the UN debate (they either abstained or absented themselves). Four (Guyana, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania), however, voted with the UN majority in calling on the Soviet Union to cease its intervention in Afghanistan.[23] Among the nonruling parties on the fringe of the national liberation movement, some appear more pro-Soviet than the ruling parties just mentioned (e.g., the Chilean MAPU and the Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Party are the only two in this whole third category to have been published in *World Marxist Review*).

Finally, one should mention yet one additional category which Moscow now seems to employ when it views the worldwide "national liberation movement." This comprises states (not so much the ruling parties of these states) of "national capitalist" orientation. As described in the literature, national capitalist countries are those that have a basically capitalistic domestic structure but which are attempting to disengage from the international capitalist system and to free themselves from the influence of multinational corporations operating in that system, and whose domestic political scene shows some elements which suggest the potential for noncapitalist political development. Countries which at times seem to be considered in this category include India, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.[24] This category is new, and determination of which states fall into it is open to debate and shift in accordance with events. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to offer any sort of listing of states (or parties) that might be included.

---

[23] Interestingly, Iraq's Ba'ath Party was considered "revolutionary democratic" by Moscow in the 1970's until a downturn in bilateral relations between the two countries. Mali (in the 1960's) and Uganda (in the 1970's) also seemed to fall into the category of "revolutionary democracies," but subsequent political changes have brought to power ruling parties in those countries that are somewhat cooler toward Moscow and as a result appear to be accorded a less exalted status within the national liberation movement.

One can point to three other countries that "fell from grace," although as recent developments demonstrate, such changes need not be permanent in Moscow's eyes. These are Egypt, Ghana, and Somalia. In the first case, developments under Anwar Sadat (including expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972) left Moscow with little to work with except the National Progressive Unionist Party. However, since Sadat's assassination, the CPSU seems to be a bit more optimistic about relations with Egypt. The recent coup in Ghana, bringing to the fore the leftist forces around Jerry Rawlings, may change Moscow's perceptions of the political orientation of Ghana. And in Somalia, Moscow has not seen fit (specifically) to relegate the ruling party to the capitalist world and may be hoping to reorient it once again toward national liberation.

In the cases of Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, and Uganda, the downgrading from "revolutionary democratic" status was explicitly noted in the Soviet literature. See R. Ulyanovskiy, *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1979, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 74317, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 132; and Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation. . . ." Iraq's "departure" can only be inferred from omission of its Ba'ath party from lists of revolutionary democracies published in 1981. See the sources cited in fn. 15.

[24] Some sense of the Soviet approach to this matter may be gained from reading Chapter 2, entitled "Socioeconomic Shifts in the Liberated Countries," in K. N. Brutents, *Osvobodivshiyesya strany v 70-ye gody* (The Liberated Countries in the 70's), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, pp. 22–50. See also G. Kim, "The National Liberation Movement Today," *International Affairs*, April 1981, p. 30. Kim contrasts such countries, with their "mass 'democratic' capitalism 'from below'," to countries of "dependent capitalism," which rely heavily on international capital for their development. "Evaluating the role of [the former] in the national liberation movement," Kim writes, "it is necessary to proceed from the fact that on the whole they retain their considerable anti-imperialist sentiments."

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, *International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.*

MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET UNION

TO THE EDITORS: William Hyland, in his article "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1982), speculates that General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev has stifled the Soviet military by "assaulting one of its sacred preserves: military doctrine" (p. 22, col. 2). In my view, Mr. Hyland has ignored an extremely important development predating any intrusion into military doctrine by Mr. Brezhnev. This was the noticeable shift, after 1973 or so, in Soviet *declaratory policy*, as opposed to actual military policy or strategy. Civilian leaders, including Brezhnev and other Politburo members, and a few "talking" generals in the military itself, began to take back a number of "hawkish" military strategic and doctrinal positions long established in military writings going back to the 1960's. But, and this is crucial, a number of military texts *continued* with the old line. First, some background.

At the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (in early 1971 and early 1976 respectively), Soviet leaders vented the civilians' "Peace Program." In addition, officers such as Gen. M. A. Mil'shteyn, and not a few Soviet media spokesmen following orders from the Central Committee's Department of International Information, also came forward. To quote from Mil'shteyn's interview with *The New York Times* of August 25, 1980, their line was simply that Soviet military policy was strictly "defensive"; if some writings once hinted otherwise, this view had, nevertheless, changed from the former more militant, now "obsolete," view.

Had things really changed, however? Proof that they had *not* came from several military sources, despite declaratory statements by "talking" generals or figureheads who followed the tactical party line designed for foreign consumption.

One indication of continuity of the old, offensive line (perhaps including nuclear preemption), were some of the articles in the new edition of the *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia—hereafter, *SVE*), which went to press between 1976 and 1980 in eight volumes, published in Moscow by Voyenizdat. Particularly in articles written by hawkish authors remembered for their bold writings of the late 1960's and early 1970's, the *SVE* rattled with statements calling for military-technological "superiority over the enemy" (the very title of an entry on page 500 of Vol. 6, which went to press in 1978, or five years after the birth of détente, SALT I, and the CPSU's Peace Program); and for upgraded civil defense, described as having strategic importance (Vol. 3, pp. 23–25). There was obvious stress upon the factor of surprise and concealment, in both strategic and tactical warfare (Vol. 4, p. 610, and Vol. 7, p. 51); upon application of laser-beam weapons in what the Soviets in the *SVE* call "*kosmicheskaya voyna*," or space war (Vol. 4, p. 380—lasers get an extended treatment in Vol. 4, pp. 559–62). In several places, the *SVE* traditionalists (like the authors of a number of books cited in the *SVE*) describe a nuclear world war as "avoidable" but also point out that if it came, it could be both won and survived by the Soviet side, and for dessert (or is it "desert"?), that "eternal peace [could be] established" by liquidating "the profound causes of war"—read "capitalism" (see Vol. 2, pp. 308–09, and Vol. 7, pp. 81 and 457). Moreover, there are, of course, numerous bows to the most militant propositions of Marxism-Leninism, especially in the articles on "national-liberation war" (note: not "struggle") and "guerrilla warfare" (see Vol. 5, pp 536–38, and Vol. 6, p. 228).

Finally, if more evidence were needed, a number of books and articles came out in the mid-1970's that unqualifiedly repeated all the harshness of earlier years. These were not authored by the Mil'shteyns or other "politicos" whether in mufti or field green, but by well-known Soviet authorities on weapons, tactics, and strategy—all of them soldiers. For representative works, see Col. D. A. Volkogonov et al., *Voyna i armiya* (War and the Army), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977; Col. S. A. Tyushkevich et al., *Sovetskaya Vooruzhënnyye Sily* (The Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1978; and Col. Gen. A. S. Zhëltov et al., *V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhënnyye Sily* (V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1980. Interestingly, too, the new *SVE* continues to cite as "Required Reading" for officers and enlisted men these very books, books that Gen. Mil'shteyn told *The New York Times* were "obsolete."

ALBERT L. WEEKS
Political Science Editor
Military Science and Technology
New York, NY

MR. HYLAND REPLIES: I appreciate Professor Weeks's comment: he is a well-recognized authority on these matters, and he makes some valid points. I think that he and I are in agreement. He stresses continuation in Soviet military writings of what might be called the orthodox position and cites a great deal of evidence.

My point was that the gap between this body of material and what the political leaders have been saying seems to have widened since around 1977, and in the last year has reached the point where Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolay Ogarkov seem to be in direct opposition to each other. Professor Weeks's evidence suggests to me that there is indeed a quarrel over military affairs, and a new pamphlet, *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland* by Marshal Ogarkov (reported in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1982), seems to be further evidence that this quarrel continues.

Since these issues are at the heart of Soviet policy and cannot fail to be reflected in Soviet politics, I would repeat my general proposition that we need to go back to Kremlinology.

WILLIAM G. HYLAND
Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
Washington, DC

READING SOVIET STRATEGY

TO THE EDITOR: In their article "Empire and Soviet Power" (*POC*, November-December 1981), Rebecca Strode and Colin Gray discussed the Tsarist heritage evident in Moscow's current strategic posture. Readers who wish to pursue this theme should consult the recent writings of David R. Jones, Director of the Russian Research Centre of Nova Scotia (Cambridge Station and Halifax), and Peter Vigor, head of the Soviet research section at Britain's Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (somewhat immodestly, I might perhaps also suggest my own new work, *The Nuclear Era*, to appear this spring).

However, the point of this letter is to bemoan the fact that the footnote citing authorities for the extreme view of Moscow's strategic purpose lumps a scholar on 19th-century Russian history and authors who, although prolific commentators on Soviet policy, are not proficient in the Russian language. This leads me to question whether Western strategists are really adequately familiar with Soviet military writings. Second hand, maybe, but by and large through poor translations. We would do better to return to older ideals and insist that area studies expertise rest on a modicum of relevant linguistic knowledge and, if at all possible, some first-hand knowledge of consequence. For a society to be content with less while deliberating on matters of utmost gravity, is akin to setting sail with binoculars (to scan the surface) but without sea charts (to mark the shoals).

C. G. JACOBSEN
Director of Soviet Studies
Center for Advanced
International Studies
University of Miami
Coral Gables, FL

MS. STRODE And MR. GRAY REPLY: We regret that Mr. Jacobsen did not address our argument on substantive grounds, but chose instead to impugn the competency of several authors cited in a footnote. Since our article is neither an endorsement nor a refutation of those author's views, Mr. Jacobsen ought perhaps to have addressed his assertions directly to them, not to us. But Mr. Jacobsen goes on to suggest that Western strategists as a whole are incompetent to deal with their subject, and since we consider ourselves to be strategic analysts, a response to his critique is in order.

A strong background in Russian area studies would certainly strengthen any military analyst's capabilities; indeed, it was to stress this very point that we wrote our article. But the fundamental problem is not one of linguistic ability. The quantity of Soviet military writings available in English translation is enormous, and Mr. Jacobsen's further implication that the resources of the entire US defense community are inadequate to obtain accurate translations is unsubstantiated. The problem rather is one of too narrow a focus on these sources. The debate over Soviet military doctrine has become sterile, and it is time for analysts of Soviet defense policy to cease trying to derive from professional military writings an indication of the Soviet political leadership's global intentions that they simply do not contain. Knowledge of the historical and political context within which Soviet military doctrine is formulated is essential to a fuller understanding of Soviet attitudes toward nuclear war. To the extent that fluency in Russian facilitates this end, it is certainly a valuable skill.

Nevertheless, if Mr. Jacobsen wishes to take issue with us, he must do so on substantive grounds. We could, of course, delineate our own credentials in military history, Russian history, Soviet area studies, military strategy, and—yes—the Russian language, but we decline to do so, in the belief that our argument should stand or fall on its intellectual merit, not on the curricula vitae of its authors.

REBECCA V. STRODE
Hudson Institute
Croton-on-Hudson, NY

COLIN S. GRAY
National Institute
for Public Policy
McLean, VA

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

BACK ISSUE ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

ORDER FORM

Please enter my subscription to PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) for one year (six issues) @ $14.00 domestic or $17.50 foreign.

Number of subscriptions ____________.

Enclosed is $ ________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No.______________

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City

State

ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to
Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D C 20402

ORDER FORM

Please send the following back issue(s) of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) @ $3.25 domestic or $4.10 foreign.

Date(s) of issue(s) ____________.

Enclosed is $ ________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No.______________

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City

State

ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to
Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D C 20402

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last five) issues of *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single-issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURRENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $14.00 each; outside the US, $17.50 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $3.25 each; outside the US $4.10 each. A 25% discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services, ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49–65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Microfilming Corp. of America
1620 Hawkins Avenue, Box 10
Sanford, NC 27330

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

S. S. REFERENCE
LD C
U.S. DOCUMENTS
NEWARK PUBLIC LIBRARY


SOVIET UNION
CHINA
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN

Problems of Communism

3

MAY-JUNE 1982 VOL XXXI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editoral matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for Problems of Communism appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 Afghanistan in China's Policy
by Yaacov Vertzberger

24 Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation
by Vladimir V. Kusin

BOOKS

38 China's Economic Development: Demise of a Model
by Jan S. Prybyla

43 Communism and Philippine Reality
by Philip Dion

49 Romania's Travails
by Aurel Braun

56 Moscow in the Middle East
by Karen Dawisha

60 Dilemmas of Single-Party Rule in the Soviet Union
by Astrid von Borcke

66 The Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia
by Harley D. Balzer

73 Terrorist Trends and Ties
by Douglas S. Blaufarb

78 Western Intellectuals and Communist States
by Peter W. Rodman

Cover: A June 28, 1977, Landsat photo of the conjunction of Afghanistan, the USSR, China, and Pakistan (scale reduced to 1:1,000,000). US Government photo.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.
SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT)
David E. Albright
SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT)
Wayne Hall
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
William E. Freeman
Sophia Sluzar
DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
Linda A. Wray
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Gwenette Worthington

IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Afghanistan in China's Policy
Yaacov Vertzberger

The coup of 1978 in Kabul and particularly the Soviet invasion in December 1979 have sharply increased the salience of Afghanistan and adjacent areas in the foreign policy thinking of China. Beijing views events there as part of a Soviet master plan aimed at controlling the oil routes of the Middle East, undermining the independence of Europe, and encircling China. The Chinese response has been to seek a united front with Western Europe, Japan, Pakistan, and the United States to counter Soviet expansionism.

Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation
Vladimir V. Kusin

In throwing out political liberalism, Czechoslovakia's post-1968 leadership also jettisoned economic reform. Excessive investment (similar to that in Poland under Edward Gierek, but in this case domestically financed), successive disruptions in the price and supply of imported oil, and a highly inflexible economic system combine to pose a major threat to the country's growth prospects.

• • •

Essay-reviews

China's Economic Development: Demise of a Model
Jan S. Prybyla

Since the late 1970's, the critique by the post-Mao leadership in China has tended to demolish the "Chinese model" of economic development as a viable alternative for underdeveloped countries. The Chinese themselves now seek to find an alternative approach to development that will prove effective. In this search, the fundamental challenge that confronts them is to avoid a situation in which the state subsidizes most of its sources of revenue, including industry, agriculture, and transportation.

Communism and Philippine Reality
Philip Dion

The history of communism in the Philippines suggests a general inability or unwillingness of party leaders to discern the true concerns of the masses they would lead in revolution. Only in the Huk effort against the Japanese and a brief postwar peasant rebellion did the party seem to be at least partially in step with broad social currents. Today, the divided Communist movement appears to be of only marginal importance as Philippine society undergoes the throes of modernization.

Romania's Travails
Aurel Braun

A worsening of the economic situation in Romania is accentuating a sense of dissatisfaction among the population. Continued poor economic conditions might even restrict the ability of the Ceausescu regime to pursue distinctive domestic and foreign policies within the Soviet bloc.

(Essay-reviews continued on next page)

2

Moscow in the Middle East
Karen Dawisha

The Soviet Union has been able to exploit local conflicts in the Middle East to increase its own influence there. As long as sources of tension—and particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict—persist, containment and reduction of the Soviet role in the area will be difficult.

Dilemmas of Single-Party Rule in the Soviet Union
Astrid von Borcke

In the 1980's, the Soviet political system may experience a crisis arising from the combined effects of an intensified arms race, economic slowdown, and its own inadequacies. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the dominant and most pervasive of all Soviet bureaucracies, faces the still unresolved dilemma of balancing modernization-rationalization with maintenance of political power.

The Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia
Harley D. Balzer

The situation of the Soviet scientific-technical intelligentsia today still reflects the impact of the Cultural Revolution of 1928–31. This "revolution" shaped the current Soviet leadership and the institutions in which the scientific-technical intelligentsia work. It also reinforced traditional attributes of the Russian style with regard to science and technology. Finally, the Cultural Revolution failed to end the struggle for professional autonomy; it merely moved professional interests to seek to influence Soviet political life from the inside.

Terrorist Trends and Ties
Douglas S. Blaufarb

Because of the sharp distinction between their alleged goals and the means they advocate, urban terrorists in the industrialized democracies are viewed by their contemporaries as dangerously disturbed minds rather than the vanguard of the future. By encouraging many kinds of terrorist groups, Moscow may not be pursuing a global strategy, but as several recent studies make clear, the USSR does thereby achieve maximum disruption of other societies at minimal cost and political risk to itself.

Western Intellectuals and Communist States
Peter W. Rodman

Since the 1930's, significant numbers of Western intellectuals have made pilgrimages to Communist countries. Yearning to believe in the virtue of regimes they have regarded as moral experiments of vast importance to mankind, they have not looked closely at the realities of life in these countries. This suspension of disbelief has stemmed largely from a rejection of their own societies and a compulsive faith that other, better societies lie within reach.

Afghanistan in China's Policy

By Yaacov Vertzberger

Central Asia—particularly Afghanistan—is today an area of pivotal concern in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Events in Afghanistan, including the Saur revolution of 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion and occupation, have had far-reaching implications for the PRC's conceptions of its national security, both in regard to global politics and with respect to its own military requirements. This impact is evident in China's policy not only in the region, but also toward the Third World, Europe and Japan, and the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the US.

The importance Beijing accords the region is a very recent development. Traditionally, Central Asia played a minor role, or at least not a decisive one, in the foreign policy of the Middle Kingdom. Central Asia was at the periphery, and the great distances and difficult terrain inevitably had their effect. Beijing's influence was generally limited, although it fluctuated according to the strength of the Chinese regime. Relations between the Chinese empire and local rulers were basically twofold: "For Central Asia, relations with China meant trade: For China the basis of trade was tribute."[1] No real vassalage system was involved, only a symbolic recognition of the supremacy of China and its Emperor, the Son of Heaven. Occasionally, these quasi-tributary relationships engendered tension, hostility, and even violence. Nevertheless, major incidents were exceptional and relatively short-lived. Even Russian expansionism and annexation of Kokand and West Turkestan, the Chinese annexation of Eastern Turkestan in 1884, and the emergence of modern Afghanistan did not substantially change the relatively minor role Central Asia played in China's foreign policy.[2]

To understand how China's Afghan policy has evolved from one of benign neglect to one rooted in crisis diplomacy with global dimensions, we shall first trace relations between the two countries from October 1949 (when Communist rule was established in China) to December 1979 (when Soviet military power descended upon Afghanistan). This provides a setting for a more detailed examination of Beijing's perceptions about and reactions to Moscow's Afghan venture.

Sino-Afghan Relations, 1949-79

In 1949, the newly formed Communist regime in China took no more interest in Afghanistan than had previous Chinese governments. It perceived hardly any promise for a Marxist party or movement of any significance in Afghanistan. It likewise saw only the slightest prospect for success—if indeed any at all—in penetrating Afghanistan's society and economy, characterized by tribalism and Islamic religious fanaticism, all particularly marked in the agrarian sector, which, according to the Maoist scheme, should have been the first

Mr. Vertzberger is Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. His recent studies on Asian affairs are forthcoming in Journal of Contemporary History, Asian Survey, Journal of Strategic Studies, *and the* Washington Papers. *Mr. Vertzberger wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Yosef Meir and express his gratitude to the Bentwich Fund and to the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University for their financial support.*

---

[1] J. F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368–1884," in J. K. Fairbank, Ed., *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 209. On trade relations, see M. Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1975, pp. 70–83, 163–65.

[2] Rossabi, op. cit., pp. 284–87, argues that Imperial, Republican, and Communist China basically pursued the same objective in Inner Asia, though they used different means.

target. Although the Afghan government was one of the first to recognize the PRC, doing so as early as January 12, 1950, the PRC reacted coolly. It initiated contact with Afghanistan only in 1954, when, in the wake of the Geneva Conference and in an attempt to widen its international connections, it adopted the *Panshila* principles of peaceful coexistence. The two countries finally established full diplomatic relations only on January 20, 1955.

In the following years, China began to evince a more active interest in its relations with Afghanistan. Its concern was hardly over events in Afghanistan itself. Rather, what interest China did show in Afghanistan derived primarily from its concerns over broader regional politics. From the late 1950's until well into the 1970's, then, China's relations with Afghanistan tended to ebb and flow with the tide of events in the region—particularly in southern Asia and the Middle East.

In southern Asia, the key event was the uprising in Tibet in 1959. China's ruthless suppression of the Tibetans brought relations between China and India to the point of conflict. Those relations deteriorated even further after Premier Zhou Enlai's unsuccessful border-dispute talks with Jawaharlal Nehru in April 1960. China thereafter moved to strengthen its ties with India's neighbors and attempted to settle boundary disputes with the other countries of southern Asia—successfully with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan, and unsuccessfully with Bhutan. This was the atmosphere in which the PRC and Afghanistan signed, during Zhou Enlai's visit to Kabul in November 1960, a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Nonaggression, modeled after those China had signed with Burma and Nepal.[3]

In this period, the settlement of border disputes was the most important development in Sino-Afghan rela-

Mohammad Daoud is welcomed by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Beijing airport for a visit in an unspecified year (prior to 1964), during Daoud's first tenure as Afghan Prime Minister.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

---

[3] The full text of the agreement is given in *Peking Review*, No. 51, December 1960, p. 18.

tions. The original boundary between China and Afghanistan had been drawn by Great Britain and Russia at the 1895 Pamir Conference. In order to leave a buffer zone between themselves, the two treaty powers awarded a 300-kilometer-long salient—known as the Wakhan Corridor—to Afghanistan. According to subsequent Afghan governments, the border between Afghanistan and China was about 100 kilometers long (75 kilometers long according to Chinese sources), running from the Afghanistan-Pakistan-China trijunction to the Afghanistan-China-USSR trijunction, at 37°3′N and 74°33′E.[4] China, which had not been present at the Pamir Conference, refused to recognize this settlement and demanded the Wakhan Corridor for itself, as part of its claim to all of the Pamir mountains.

The Chinese position on the issue, however, was flexible. From the 1950's, the PRC had in practice recognized the Afghan claims.[5] In November 1963, it signed a border agreement renouncing its own claims. In so doing, it hoped to gain an additional means of isolating India and to win a propaganda advantage in the Third World: China could contrast India's "rigid attitude" with its own readiness to act "fairly" and "moderately" in settling border disputes.

Increased Chinese trade and aid soon followed the 1963 border agreement. Trade between China and Afghanistan was small in scale, although it did grow annually, particularly in the form of barter exchange. The Chinese aid program was effective, if modest in scale. It amounted to only 3–5 percent of what the US and the Soviet Union each extended to Afghanistan and ranked as one of China's smallest aid programs to an Asian non-Communist country. While China substantially increased its aid to Afghanistan in 1972—it offered US$44 million for Afghanistan's Fourth Five-Year Plan—Afghanistan was still only 15th on China's foreign aid list, in contrast to third on the Soviet aid list.[6] In this period, China clearly attached relatively little importance to Afghanistan and saw no point in competing with the Soviet Union there economically.

In the Middle East, China's concern has been primarily the role of outside powers in regional politics. China regards the Middle East as the imperialist West's vulnerable zone, through which a blow might be struck at imperialist interests, with the cooperation of at least some of the Middle Eastern states. Perhaps even more important, however, China fears Soviet penetration of the region. In broad, abstract, strategic terms, a Soviet-dominated Middle East would be yet another piece in the encirclement of China and would serve as a springboard for Soviet advances in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Clearly, then, "the Middle East was far from marginal in China's world outlook and foreign policy considerations,"[7] and it was important to have good relations with Afghanistan, which in geopolitical terms links South and Central Asia with the Middle East.

China's Muslim minority has also kindled an active though limited Chinese interest in Afghanistan. The bulk of China's Muslims live in Xinjiang, the strategically sensitive region on China's western border, and maintain religious and other relations with ethnically similar populations across the border in Afghanistan and the USSR. The existence of this minority has contradictory implications for China. On the one hand, China's Muslims represent a means by which the Soviet Union could penetrate the "bamboo curtain" along China's borders to intervene in the PRC's internal affairs. This larger dimension has raised the need for China to settle its border disputes with its Muslim neighbors. On the other hand, China has attempted to use its Muslim peoples as a bridge to fellow Muslims elsewhere, in Southeast Asia and Africa, for example, but particularly in the Middle East.[8]

Thus, China's interest in South Asia and the Middle East long tended to determine its interest in Afghanistan. In the early 1960's, when regional tensions were high and it showed an increased interest in the Middle East, China made a strong effort to improve relations with Afghanistan. From late 1965 to late 1971, Beijing evinced little interest in the Middle East, and even less in Afghanistan. In 1971, when the PRC once again came to perceive the Middle East and Europe as vital Soviet targets—domination of the Middle East and Europe would secure the Soviet rear and thus serve as a precondition for the encirclement of China[9]—China began to attach more strategic importance to Afghanistan. Hence, it reinforced its efforts to demonstrate a presence in Afghanistan, though it well understood that

---

[4] Shen-Yu Dai, "China and Afghanistan," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 25, January-March 1966, fn. 25; and Rahul Ram, *Politics of Central Asia*, London, Curzon Press, 1974, p. 35.

[5] H. C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1966, pp. 320–21.

[6] In the period 1954–1979, total Soviet aid to Afghanistan amounted to US$1.3 billion, while in the period 1956–1979, Chinese aid to Afghanistan totaled only US$75 million. See US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 108–09. See also R. S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1972, p. 126; Sreedhar, "Sino-Afghan Economic Relations," *China Report* (Delhi), September-December 1976, pp. 7–9; J. F. Copper, *China's Foreign Aid*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976, p. 65; M. J. Fry, *The Afghan Economy*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1974, p. 228; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 8, 1976, p. A/16, Oct. 14, 1976, p. A/23, and Jan. 4, 1977, pp. A/11–12.

[7] See Y. Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1944–74*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 5.

[8] Ibid., pp. 18–19.

[9] Ibid., p. 163.

Signing of the Sino-Afghan border treaty on November 22, 1963, in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Afghan Minister of the Interior Abdul Kayeum congratulate each other after the signing. In the immediate background from center to right are the then Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Liu Xiaoqi; Chairman of the National People's Congress's Standing Committee, Chu De; and Premier Zhou Enlai.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

it could not challenge the USSR on equal terms in this respect.

The Afghan coup of 1973, which deposed King Zahir Shah and brought Mohammad Daoud to power, seemed to fit the pattern of previous years. Beijing had ample cause for concern. After all, Daoud was not entirely an unknown quantity. In Chinese eyes, he was the architect of the special relationship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the 1950's, and his coup was perceived as Soviet-inspired, an expression of Soviet expansionism south toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.[10] Daoud's partners in the coup, moreover, were members of the Parcham party, a Marxist group identified with the Soviet Union. Neither the man nor his partners augured well for Chinese interests. Thus, when China recognized the new Afghan regime in July 1973, it was not at Beijing's initiative but on that of Daoud and at the request of the Afghan government.[11]

Over the next few years, Chinese interest in Afghanistan increased, as regional developments gave reason for apprehension: First, the more China's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, the greater its worries over the Soviet military and economic presence in Afghanistan became. For example, Chinese concern was evident when a high-ranking Soviet military mission led by Marshal K. S. Moskalenko visited Afghanistan in October 1973. Second, Daoud was taking an aggressively nationalist stand on the Pushtunistan issue, and the Soviet Union might well support his claims. This threatened China's close ally Pakistan, still weakened from its military defeat by India in 1971.

All in all, however, China reconciled itself to developments in Afghanistan with a healthy pragmatism. Its fears over the Daoud regime's Soviet ties abated somewhat in December 1974, when Daoud sent his brother, Mohammad Naim Khan, as special ambassador to meet with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, and Vice-Premier Li Xiannian. Daoud clearly wanted to improve Sino-Afghan relations and underline the importance that he attached to Afghanistan's ties with China. China, for its part, utilized the visit to indicate that the Afghans would do well to improve their relations with their neighbors in order to prevent the superpowers from interfering in local conflicts.[12] China also agreed to expand its economic aid to Afghanistan, offering a long-term, interest-free development loan of US$55 million.[13]

---

[10] *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 1973, p. 11,613C.

[11] *Peking Review*, Aug. 3, 1973, p. 9.

Nor did the Pushtunistan issue come to much. In 1975, Daoud made efforts, with the support and mediation of the Shah of Iran, to improve his relations with Pakistan and reduce his dependence on the USSR. Daoud began the process with a visit to Tehran in April 1975 and followed up with a visit to Islamabad in August 1976. Although no practical agreement was reached, the atmosphere was considerably improved. The amelioration of Pakistan-Afghan relations allowed China more easily to reconcile good relations with Afghanistan with good relations with Pakistan. China could also emphasize its common interests with both states[14] and claim that the amicable relations developing among South Asian states would reduce the ability of the world powers to manipulate regional affairs.[15]

The Saur revolution of April 1978, in which Dauod was overthrown by Nur Mohammad Taraki, caught Beijing as unprepared as any other world capital. The Chinese knew little about the relatively anonymous figures who rose to lead the Afghan government, let alone their ideological orientation and foreign policy preferences.[16] That the general line would be pro-Soviet was clear, although the extent of Soviet influence was not. By now, moreover, China was not unused to a pro-Soviet line in Afghan politics. History had shown that even an Afghan leadership with an initially strong pro-Soviet bias could change its direction. Daoud was a case in point.

Still, as after Daoud's takeover in 1973, a doubtful Beijing did not take the initiative. Only at the request of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) did it recognize the new Afghan regime[17]—and only after the new Afghan leadership had confirmed its policy of strict nonalignment (no bilateral or multilateral military arrangements) and had assured Beijing it had no intention of becoming an "Asian Cuba."[18] Taraki himself stressed his desire to consolidate friendly relations with China.

Chinese apprehensions were soon aroused, however, by a number of developments. In December 1978, the DRA signed a friendship treaty with the USSR. Described by the two parties as a step toward the creation of an "effective security system in Asia," the pact was evocative of the Soviet effort to establish a collective security system in Asia, which Daoud had once refused to join.[19] Moreover, the Soviet Union increased its presence, in the form of an ever-growing number of civilian and military advisers, in response to mounting rebel activity in Afghanistan (from March 1979). The Afghan resistance, Chinese observers noted, extended not only to religious circles and government officials, who had been supporters of the old regime, but to all social sectors. To China, this resistance represented a reaction not so much against the Taraki government as against Soviet intervention *imposed* on the Afghan government and cloaked in legality by the friendship treaty.[20] Finally, China became increasingly annoyed at Soviet accusations that it, Pakistan, the United States, Iran, and Egypt were meddling in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Such accusations raised Chinese premonitions of a Soviet takeover in Afghanistan and, eventually, conflict with China.[21] China had for some years entertained no illusions about Soviet motivations and intentions. But an actual Soviet presence in Afghanistan would greatly increase the dangers of the Soviet threat.

Events in the latter half of 1979 moved quickly toward the realization of China's worst fears. China's sense of the legitimacy of the Afghan regime was shaken greatly when Hafizullah Amin seized power from Taraki in September 1979. Amin did make new promises about pursuing a policy of nonalignment while stressing Afghanistan's special relationship with the Soviet Union. But

---

[12] *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 9, 1974, p. A/16.

[13] *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (London), 1975, p. 26,921; *Peking Review*, Dec. 13, 1974, p. 4.

[14] *Peking Review*, Sept. 3, 1976, p. 30; *FBIS-CHI*, June 4, 1976, p. A/14, and Aug. 26, 1976, p. A/15.

[15] Daoud sounded these themes himself on occasion. See, for example, his speech at the opening ceremony of the first Loya Jirgah (Grand National Assembly) on expanding and strengthening friendly ties with China (*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 1, 1977, p. A/6). He went even further in 1978, criticizing "outside interference" in the Horn of Africa—clearly hinting at the USSR but not naming it—in his joint communique with the late President Anwar al-Sadat during his visit to Egypt a few weeks before Daoud's overthrow (*FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 11, 1978, p. A/19).

[16] Spokesmen for the Taraki regime denied that they were Communists, arguing that no Communist party exists in Afghanistan. They described the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as a party of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, craftsmen, and middle-class bourgeoisie. See the interview with Hafizullah Amin in *Newsweek* (New York, NY), July 3, 1978.

[17] *FBIS-CHI*, May 8, 1978, p. A/18.

[18] *FBIS-CHI*, May 11, 1978, p. N/1, and May 18, 1978, p. A/11.

[19] *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1978, p. A/4.

[20] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) commentaries of June 11 and 29, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 18, 1979, p. F/1, and July 10, 1979, p. C/1.

[21] Xin Changin, "Afghanistan in Turmoil," *Beijing Review*, June 15, 1979, p. 24.

Soviet military equipment seen in December 1979 at Kabul airport at the height of Moscow's lightning invasion of Afghanistan.

—F. Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

even this question became irrelevant following Amin's overthrow at the hands of Soviet forces, which in December 1979, invaded Afghanistan and installed the Parcham leader Babrak Karmal as prime minister.

Implications of Soviet Intervention

China strongly condemned the Soviet action, rejecting all Soviet attempts to justify it. Beijing scoffed at the Soviets' claim that they had been invited in. Amin obviously would not have sought his own ouster and execution. Karmal held no public post at the time and was not even in Afghanistan during the coup. How could he have invoked the friendship treaty to legitimize intervention? In addition, China saw no external threat to Afghanistan, as claimed by the Soviet Union—except that from the Soviet Union itself. Nor did it see any threat to the USSR. Finally, China denied that the Soviet action fell within the framework of the UN charter.[22]

At the same time, Beijing moved toward different conclusions about events in Afghanistan since April 1978. Seen in retrospect, the "so called 'April Revolution' only eliminated a few Afghan leaders who refused to take orders from Moscow,"[23] and what followed was nothing less than a series of coups d'état planned and aided by the Soviet Union. The result was chaos, disintegration, instability, and the complete subjugation of Afghanistan to the USSR. As in the case of the Amin regime, China refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Karmal government and also rejected the legality of the treaty Karmal signed with Moscow, which allowed Soviet troops to remain "temporarily" on Afghan soil. The implication was clear: it was actually the non-Marxist Muslim guerrilla groups of Afghanistan that were the standard-bearers of the "national liberation struggle."[24]

Thus, China was prepared to commit itself in principle to support the Afghan resistance groups. The extent of its aid would be dictated by pragmatic considerations, such as the need to oppose Soviet adventurism, and by China's perceptions of the risks and opportunities involved.

---

[22] New China News Agency, Dec. 29, 1979, in British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East* (hereafter—*SWB-FE*), Dec. 31, 1979, 6307/C1/9–10; and *Renmin Ribao* editorial, Dec. 31, 1979, in *SWB-FE*, Jan. 3, 1980, 6309/C/4–5; and *FBIS-CHI*, May 7, 1981, p. F/1.

[23] *Renmin Ribao*, July 1, 1980, p. 6, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 3, 1980, p. C/5.

[24] Xinhua (in English), June 18, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 19, 1980, p. C/1.

AFGHANISTAN – THE LARGER PICTURE


30
45
60
75
90
105
120
G.D.R.
Poland
Moscow
Czech.
Hungary
Romania
Yu.
Bulgaria
Gr.
Soviet Union
Lake Baikal
2500 n.m.
45
Ulaanbaatar
Mongolia
Beijing
Karaganda
Aral Sea
Turkey
Baku
Tashkent
Xi'an
Syria
China
30
Jordan
Iraq
Tehrān
Cairo
Kābul
Iran
Afghanistan
Islāmābād
Egypt
Persian Gulf
Pakistan
Nepal
Bhu.
500 n.m.
New Delhi
Chah Bahar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Bang.
Vietnam
Sudan
India
Burma
Laos
Oman
1000 n.m.
15
Thailand
Yemen (Sana)
Yemen (Aden)
Kampuchea
Ethiopia
Malaysia
Somalia
Kenya
0
Singapore
Indonesia
15
Madagascar
Indian
Ocean

The Soviet invasion clearly gave Afghanistan and its environs new importance in Chinese perceptions and calculations. The significance was seen as both strategic and military.

Strategic implications. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Chinese had come to view the Afghan revolution as part of a Soviet master plan. Vietnam was one facet; Afghanistan was another:

> *Situated south of Central Asia, Afghanistan is strategically very important. The old tsars drooled over it long ago. The new Soviet tsars have assumed the mantle from the old tsars. To get hold of the passage leading out of the Indian Ocean and to control the strategic sea route of the West and Japan, the Soviet Union is energetically trying to control Afghanistan to open a land route south to the Indian Ocean while attempting to grab naval and air bases in Vietnam as a foothold and carve out a sea path through the Indian Ocean.*[25]

In this context, the December 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty was now perceived by Beijing as another link in a chain of treaties forged by Moscow with countries bordering on China (India, Vietnam, and Mongolia being seen as already tied to the Soviet Union).

With the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan became even more critical. Beijing saw events in Afghanistan as another key step—like the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea—in a well-orchestrated Soviet master plan for world hegemony. Xinhua commentary emphasized the logic of this master plan:

> *The Soviet Union moves from north to south while its proxy, Vietnam, moves from east to west to carry out Moscow's southward strategy that aims at controlling the oil-producing regions in the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf area on the one hand and Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca on the other, with the Gulf area and the Strait of Malacca being the most strategically important. The Soviet Union will not be satisfied or stop its step without hitting its strategic targets. Control of Afghanistan and Indochina is only the first two steps in the southward strategy, and the next step is to seize "oil-supply centres" of the West in the Middle East and near east, control the passage from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, and cut off "the life line of the West at sea." Only by realizing these objectives can the Soviet Union complete its plan to divide and surround strategic points in Western Europe so as to give strategic support through coordinated action. Thus the entire Euro-Asian continent would be under its armed threat from north to south. And the Soviet Union would hold an ever-present threat with a military blockade from the sea. Therefore, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its control of Kampuchea through Vietnam are neither isolated and temporary steps, nor local problems of concern to only one or two areas, but an overall problem concerned with the destiny of many countries and the future of the world.*
>
> *The Soviet Union has not yet completed its strategic deployment. When will it be completed? To put it specifically, the Soviet Union will have basically obtained the strategic position outlined above when it achieves the following: First, it controls the oil resources in the Middle East, Northern Africa and the Gulf region, second, it controls Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca and third, it can have its own way in southern Africa and particularly on the east African coast along the Indian Ocean.*[26]

In January 1979, forces of the Hanoi-backed Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation enter Phnom Penh, from which the Khmer Rouge forces of Pol Pot had withdrawn.

—MTI/SYGMA.

---

[25] Xue Yuan, "Turmoil in Afghanistan," *Renmin Ribao*, June 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 18, 1979, p. F/2.

[26] *FBIS-CHI*, June 19, 1980, pp. C/1–2. See also Observer, "Critical Choice," *Renmin Ribao*, June 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 20, 1980, pp. C/1–3; and Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), July 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 14, 1980, p. C/2.

As the Chinese see it, the Soviet plan for global hegemony has two components, diplomatic and military, employed simultaneously or alternately. On the diplomatic front, détente serves the final objective by lulling its target nations, dividing them, and serving as a smokescreen for the "new tsars'" real intentions.[27] Behind what they put forth as their peace-loving facade, the Soviets exploit every opportunity that comes their way. Despite détente, the Soviets exploited the turbulent situation in the Middle East and the Gulf area to carry out a more daring military action than ever before. By using the military clause of a friendship treaty as a pretext to intervene in a non-Communist-bloc country, they extended their grasp even beyond the confines implied by the Brezhnev Doctrine.[28]

Furthermore, in the Chinese view, the Soviet global strategy is indirect in approach. The primary target is Western Europe. But the main thrust—a flanking attack—is through Africa and Asia.[29] For China, the critical question will be the reaction of the West and Japan. Will they be reluctant to resist Soviet demands and to enter into some form of cooperation directed against the Soviet threat? Or will the Soviet threat be the catalyst for just such cooperation. What direction events will take, according to China, depends on what positions the United States and the Third World take and on what pressures they can bring to bear on Western Europe and Japan to stand fast.

As for China, the Soviet strategy is "encirclement and isolation" (a nuclear attack would be counterproductive, since it would "yield no useful results" and "put the Soviet Union in a passive position strategically"). Encirclement is pursued by stationing large numbers of troops on the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, by occupying the Wakhan Corridor, and by engaging Vietnam to threaten China from the south.[30] In the long run, the threat to China would be a multidirectional surprise attack; to prepare for it, China would have to disrupt the progress of the four modernizations, which in turn would weaken it in no small measure. Isolation of China is pursued through an unconstrained effort to disrupt any cooperation between the PRC and other states, such as the United States, Japan, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). If encircled and isolated, China fears it may have no choice but to give in to Soviet demands.

Beijing seems to have no doubts about its interpretation of Soviet strategic intentions: "It is precisely because Afghanistan is of vital strategic importance to the Soviet global strategy that the Soviet Union has taken the risk of seizing it."[31] Therefore, Chinese spokesmen argue, the Soviet claim of being only temporarily in Afghanistan cannot be taken seriously. Furthermore, neither the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan nor the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea can be seen as spontaneous decisions or accidents. Both were carefully calculated moves. The Chinese leadership claims to have no illusions. They are vehement that the USSR and Vietnam will not retreat until the situation becomes extremely difficult.[32]

Military implications. The Chinese leadership has a healthy respect for the military strength of the USSR. In particular, it is well aware that the Soviets can fight and win different kinds of wars without having to resort to nuclear weaponry. And as Afghanistan demonstrated, the USSR is more than willing to make use of its military machine directly and offensively, and not just through proxies. All this poses difficult problems for China's defense strategists.

One problem is that posed by the high mobility demonstrated by the Soviet military on the sea and in the air. In Beijing's view, such mobility enables the Soviets to supply their allies and proxies quickly and effectively. It allows them to fight strategically along internal lines, since they can shift an attack's center of gravity as the situation on the battlefield dictates. It allows Soviet naval power to dominate the Indian Ocean. Finally, it permits the Soviets to concentrate large forces on short notice at any point along their borders.

The Chinese military considers this last capability to be the salient feature of the Soviet offensive military threat—sudden preemptive strikes, usually carried out at night or just before dawn and preceded by negotiations with the country soon to be invaded.[33] The sudden attack is especially effective against a country—such as China—that has no sophisticated early-warning system.

---

[27] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1980, p. C/3.

[28] *SWB-FE*, Jan. 3, 1980, 6309/C/5.

[29] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 11, 1980, p. C/3; "Moscow's 'Dumb-bell' Strategy," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 25, 1980, pp. 8–9. See also "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," ibid., Jan. 28, 1980, p. 19; and Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong, "Expansionist Soviet Global Strategy," ibid., June 22, 1981. Some Chinese leaders argue that the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, as the principal targets of Soviet aggression, should be principally responsible for containing the Soviets; they thus justify giving priority to economic development over investment in the military. See C. F. Chyba, "U.S. Military-Support Equipment Sales to the People's Republic of China," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), April 1981, p. 479.

[30] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Feb. 18, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 19, 1981, p. C/4.

[31] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Aug. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1980, p. C/7.

[32] Zu Lie, "Détente or Offensive," *Shijie Zhishi* (Beijing), July 16, 1980, pp. 5–7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1980, p. C/8.

[33] See "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," *Beijing Review*, Jan. 28, 1980, pp. 15–19.

A view of the tortuous terrain along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan.

—Christine Osborne/Camera Press.

This may explain why the PRC since 1979 has agreed to operate an electronic intelligence-gathering station in Xinjiang jointly with the United States.[34]

Another problem is that posed by the de facto Soviet annexation of the Wakhan salient and the large-scale introduction of Soviet troops there to facilitate communications and to seal off the local passes to China and Pakistan. The PRC perceives such moves as a Soviet attempt to gain a "strategic edge over China and Pakistan."[35] The Soviets can now supply their own troops without harassment from Afghan guerrillas during passage through the northern border area. They can use the Wakhan area as a supply and ordnance depot. Most important, they have in effect physically separated Afghanistan and China and brought the Soviet border right up to Pakistan.[36] Thus situated, they can exert a direct military influence on the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, thereby increasing their leverage over India. Finally, by occupying the salient and evacuating the area's inhabitants, the Soviets can seal off the only direct land route from China for supply of the Afghan insurgents.

A third area of concern is that for the Soviet military, Afghanistan has become a ground for testing weapons under combat conditions. According to the Chinese, the Soviets have tested light and heavy military equipment, such as new assault rifles, grenade launchers, self-propelled artillery, and armored personnel carriers. They have tested battle management equipment, including computers,[37] and have had the chance to evaluate the effectiveness of their battlefield tactics and logistics in a limited war and to make the necessary adjustments in training and equipment.[38] Finally, they have tested unconventional means of warfare, including

---

[34] *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), June 19, 1981, pp. 1–2. The facilities are manned by Chinese technicians and monitor Soviet missile tests.

[35] *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 5, 1980, p. F/1.

[36] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Mar. 13, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1981, pp. C/3–4.

[37] *FBIS-CHI*, July 2, 1980, p. C/1.

[38] Li Yunfei, "The People of Afghanistan Are Fighting a Protracted War," *Renmin Ribao*, June 25, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 2, 1981, p. F/4.

Geopolitics of the Wakhan Corridor


CHINA
Xinjiang
USSR
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
INDIA
Boundary in dispute
Pamirs
claimed by China
WAKHAN CORRIDOR
Pamir River
Kowtal-e Wakhjir
Kowtal-e Barowghil
Mintaka Pass
Minteke
Gardaneh-ye Khunji
Northern Areas
Highway
Karkoram
Karakoram Range
Indus River
Gilgit River
Gilgit
Hindu Kush
North-West Frontier Province
Federal Admin. Tribal Areas
(NWFP)
Khyber Pass
Azad Kashmir
Jammu and Kashmir
Cease-fire line
Srinagar
Islamabad
Punjab
Mardan
Peshawar
Jalalabad
Kabul
Charikar
Feyzabad
Qonduz
Dushanbe
Legend
International Boundary
Provincial Boundary
Road
Trail
Scale 1:2,500,000
0
25
50
75
100 km

SOURCE: Prepared for *Problems of Communism* by the Cartographic Services Laboratory, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, from US Central Intelligence Agency map "Afghanistan," No. 504637, October 1980, and U.S. Department of State map "China–USSR Border, Western Sector," No. 503821, November 1977. Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

chemical and biological weapons, just as the Vietnamese have done in Laos and Kampuchea.[39]

All these factors are highly relevant to Chinese military thinking: "people's war" has been one of the principal PRC military doctrines for waging war in the modern era (probably against the Red Army), and Afghanistan represents a classic case of "people's," or guerrilla, warfare. The Chinese have been encouraged by the relative success of the Afghan insurgents against superior Soviet military deployment and firepower, which, to Beijing, has shown that "when a small nation is invaded, its people can mobilize all patriotic forces and adopt military tactics which conform to the specific conditions of their own nation to deal with even such military superpowers as the Soviet Union."[40]

Is the Chinese leadership whistling in the dark? Or do they really believe what they say? It is hard to tell for certain, but it is reasonable to assume that what has happened in Afghanistan has not gone without effect. Afghanistan has undoubtedly contributed to the disputes within and between military and political elites in Beijing over "people's war,"[41] and it has surely affected decisions on the procurement of military equipment, and the size and distribution of the military budget.

Policy conclusions. What conclusions on policy has Beijing drawn from the Afghan crisis and its implications?

First, China's policy for thwarting the Soviet master plan is resistance, not appeasement. Concessions to the USSR, China contends, would only be a prelude to another world war, as in 1939. Indeed, Western weakness in the face of Soviet aggression in Indochina, Angola, and the Horn of Africa has only encouraged further Soviet aggression.[42] Resistance, by contrast, is clearly effective. It is graphically demonstrated in Afghanistan, where the Red Army has been unable to stamp out the resistance. A relatively small number of poorly armed guerrillas have pinned down 100,000 Soviet troops. According to Chinese sources, the Soviets have suffered over 10,000 casualties, Soviet soldiers are tired, and morale is low.[43] Thus, the Afghan rebels "have exploded the myth of the invincibility of Soviet hegemonism.[44] China estimates that to turn the tide, the USSR may have to employ up to 300,000 troops and invest even more money than the US$3–4 million it now spends every day.[45] Otherwise, it may sink even deeper into what has begun to resemble a Vietnam-type quagmire.

Second, the Chinese have concluded that the only means of resisting Soviet imperialism and hegemonism is to build the broadest possible international united front, one that will include China and the Third World, Western Europe and Japan, and the United States. This represents a major departure. According to Mao Zedong's theory of the "differentiation of the three worlds," the United States and the Soviet Union are

Members of the Afghan liberation movement stand guard over three Soviet prisoners in Quetta south of Qandahar, in December 1981. The three are identified as V. A. Bidenka, 18; Yu. G. Povarnitsin, 19; and Mohamed Kuli, 19.

—Roland Neveu/Gamma-Liaison.

---

[39] See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 13, 1980, p. C/2. On this point, the Chinese cite Western sources.

[40] Yi Li, "What the Afghan War Tells Us," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 1, Jan. 1, 1980, pp. 47–48, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 22, 1980, p. F/2, and Aug. 11, 1980, p. C/2. For a detailed description of Soviet counterinsurgency tactics and their failure, see N. P. Newell and R. S. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1981, Ch. 7.

[41] On the two schools in that debate, see E. Joffe and G. Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1978, pp. 15–19. Further hints of an ongoing debate can be found in the lecture to the People's Liberation Army Military Academy by Su Yu, a leading member of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, as reported by New China News Agency (in Chinese), Jan. 19, 1979, in *SWB-FE*, Jan. 23, 1979, 6023/BII/4–6.

[42] *FBIS-CHI*, July 18, 1980, p. C/1.

[43] *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 6, 1980, p. C/2.

[44] Observer, *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 26, 1980, p. 6, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1980, p. C/2.

[45] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1980, pp. C/3–4.

motivated by the same basic drives.[46] The view excluded the possibility of US participation in an antihegemonist front. In the current situation, however, the "chief contradiction in state relations in East Asia and the Western Pacific" is not between the two superpowers and the rest of the world, but "between Soviet expansion and aggression on the one hand and the opposition to it from China, Japan, ASEAN and other east Asian countries, together with the United States on the other."[47] Hence, there is a common strategic interest in establishing a united front, despite any secondary contradictions between the partners in that coalition (such as between China and ASEAN or China and the United States).[48] Beijing knows that because of differences between the potential members of a united front, "it is not possible to express a united strategy against hegemonism in a specific form and by united action." It is possible, however, "to strengthen consultation . . . and to work together and supplement one another."[49] For China, any sort of cooperation, even if partial and limited, is a step in the right direction.

Third, time is of the essence in opposing Soviet hegemonism. Immediate action may not change the Soviets' strategic orientation. But they can be made to pay a heavy price. The anti-Soviet coalition can thereby gain time to organize itself, coordinate its policies, and build up its strength. With the world balance of power changed, it will then be able to prevent the outbreak of a third world war.[50]

In Afghanistan, immediate action means foreign aid to the rebels. China, and the other front-line states of Pakistan and Iran, have provided limited aid to the rebels. They have also acquiesced in the movement of supplies and manpower across the Afghan borders.[51] But they have held back from providing full-scale support. Egypt has been one of the few countries openly to provide support, in the form of weapons and training in Egyptian camps.[52] It has also taken steps to cooperate with the United States, making air and naval bases accessible to US forces as a deterrent against further Soviet advances. In this way, China perceives that the United States has in fact become part of a coalition of local forces, neighboring regional powers, and a global power. To the Chinese, US participation in this coalition is a welcome step, one that illustrates the possibility of a workable united front against the Soviet drive for world hegemony.

Fourth, Soviet and Vietnamese behavior must be understood to be part of the same master plan. Any concession on Afghanistan will have adverse effects in Southeast Asia. Any compromise in one area will be a precedent for compromise in the other. The results would only impede the establishment of world peace and expose the Eurasian continent to Soviet threat and blackmail. China holds that the two issues must be dealt with simultaneously.[53]

Fifth, Beijing insists on nothing less than complete, unconditional Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It rejects Soviet proposals for conditional or partial withdrawal.[54] In fact, it warns against any political settlements with the USSR, either an agreement specifically on Afghanistan (through Pakistani/Iranian talks with the Karmal regime) or a package deal linking the Afghanistan issue with the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and disarmament issues. Any such agreement would not only legitimize Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Karmal government, China claims, but also allow Moscow to retain its bases in Afghanistan while the United States and Great Britain pull out of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.[55] In consequence, China sees any negotiations on turning the Indian Ocean region into a "zone of peace" to be potentially as dangerous as the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.[56] Such negotiations could expose China in the south and critically weaken its international position.

Finally, China insists on two further conditions after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. One is the freedom for each country to decide its own destiny "without outside interference." Obviously, China expects that any such exercise—for

---

[46] Editorial department of *Renmin Ribao*, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" (reprinted by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, in 1977). On China's united front doctrine, see J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

[47] Pei Monong, "The International Situation and Development Prospects in East Asia," *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 27, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 8, 1981, p. A/2.

[48] Pei Monong, "A Brief Discussion of the Strategic Relationships Opposing Soviet Hegemonism," *Renmin Ribao*, July 8, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 9, 1981, pp. C/1–3.

[49] *FBIS-CHI*, July 9, 1981, p. C/3.

[50] Chen Youwei, "Why Do We Think About 1939?" *Renmin Ribao*, July 16, 1980, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 18, 1980, pp. C/1–2.

[51] China has supplied the Afghan insurgents primarily with recoilless rifles, Soviet-designed rifles and light machine guns, and mines. It has also probably provided training to a limited number of Afghans. Egypt has contributed 81-mm mortars, RPG rocket launchers, and assault rifles. Others that have provided aid include the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. See *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), May 8, 1981; "Arming Afghan Rebels," *Foreign Report* (London), Aug. 13, 1981, p. 3. Should Pakistan supply the Afghan guerrillas with Chinese-made light weapons, it would be difficult to prove the arms had not really come from China. According to Soviet sources, there is indeed a Sino-Pakistani conspiracy to provide training and large quantities of weapons to the Afghan insurgents, a conspiracy in which the two cooperate with the United States. See Y. Agranov, "The Afghan Revolution and Peking's Treacherous Course," *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow), No. 3, 1980, pp. 102–03.

[52] *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 10, 1980, p. I/2, and Feb. 15, 1980, pp. I/1–2.

[53] See Observer's articles in *Renmin Ribao*, June 19 and July 3, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 20, p. C/3, and July 3, 1980, p. C/2.

[54] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 25, 1980, p. A/4.

[55] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), July 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 14, 1980, p. C/1.

[56] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 7, 1980, p. A/1.



The Pakistani Army on maneuvers in Chinese-model tanks in February 1980 at the Nowshera military base near the Afghan border.

Lembray/Gamma-Liaison.

example, free general elections—would not favor the Soviets or their proxies. The other condition is the restoration of Afghanistan and Kampuchea "to their independent and nonaligned status." When all conditions are met, Chinese spokesmen have said, China will join other states in giving both Afghanistan and Kampuchea international guarantees of independence and sovereignty.[57]

Sino-Pakistan Relations

In the Chinese view, the next three targets in the Soviet step-by-step drive south are Pakistan, Iran, and Thailand. Of the three, the closest to the PRC's heart is its ally for the past two decades—Pakistan.

What are China's interests in Pakistan? First, China professes a moral commitment to Pakistan's defense. Xiao Ke, China's Vice Minister of Defense, enunciated this commitment clearly during his March 1980 visit to Islamabad:

> *Our friends can rest assured the Chinese people and army will firmly stand forever by the side of the Pakistan people and armed forces in their just struggle against hegemonic aggression and intervention to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty.*[58]

Second, Beijing must feel its credibility is at stake in

---

[57] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 25, 1980, p. A/4.

[58] *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 19, 1980, p. F/2. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese commitment to support Pakistan has been consistently reaffirmed by China's highest authorities. See Hua Guofeng's speech in Beijing's service (in Urdu) to India and Pakistan, May 2, 1980, reported in *FBIS-CHI*, May 5, 1980, pp. F/6–8; Zia-ul-Haq's press conference, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 8, 1980, p. F/3; an editorial in *Dawn* (Karachi), May 4, 1980, p. 7, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), May 9, 1980, pp. F/1–2; Foreign Minister Huang Hua's statement on the occasion of Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi's visit to Beijing in December 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 29, 1980, p. F/1; and Premier Zhao Ziyang's statement during his visit to Islamabad in June 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 3, 1981; p. F/3.

Pakistan. It could not provide much help to Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, and its prestige suffered accordingly. If something of the same sort happened again, its credibility as a reliable ally would be seriously damaged, and its hard-won status in the Third World could be lost. Even worse, a tarnished China could not hope to rally prospective members to its united front, and a diplomatically isolated China would be in no position to oppose Soviet ambitions.

Most important, perhaps, is Pakistan's geostrategic position. Pakistan blocks further Soviet expansion toward the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and toward South and Southeast Asia. It lies close by the oil-shipping lanes vital to Western Europe and Japan, as well as to other oil-importing countries in Asia and Africa. And it controls a southern avenue of attack into Xinjiang and Tibet. If the Soviets moved into Pakistan, they could take advantage of the roads leading into China, particularly the Karakoram Highway and the ancient silk route through the Mintaka Pass. With their ally Vietnam and with a possible ally in India, they would thus draw the circle tighter around China. The PRC would be further isolated physically, and it would have to divert additional resources to defense, with possibly disastrous results for its political, social, and economic development.

Such factors—self-interest, if not moral imperatives—give reason to believe that China's commitment to Pakistan is serious and viable. What threats, then, does the current Pakistani regime face? From the Chinese perspective, some are direct, i. e., those posed by the Soviet Union itself. Others are more indirect, i.e., those raised by Pakistan's own domestic difficulties.

The least likely Soviet option in present circumstances, according to the Chinese, is a direct military thrust into Pakistan.[59] The Soviet supply lines over land and by sea would be long and difficult. So long as Afghanistan is not secure, the logistics problem of fielding and supplying an army of some 500,000 men would be immense. The Soviets would suffer extensive losses of men and matériel at the hands of the tough and experienced Pakistani army. Not least, any Soviet attack on Pakistan would probably trigger a military reprisal by both the United States and China.

A more likely option is a Soviet attempt to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan. The Afghan government could encourage Pathan and Baluch demands for self-determination. For their part, the Soviets could train and supply subversive groups in the region,[60] relying in Baluchistan on left-leaning local political groups and tribal leaders. Should such efforts bear fruit in the form of a Soviet-supported Baluch state, the Soviets would gain access to an Indian Ocean port (Gwadar) strategically located near the Persian Gulf states and major oil routes. A Baluch state might also be a first step toward the disintegration of Iran, whose Baluch minority has traditionally demanded independence. In the latter case, the Soviet Union might gain access to yet another Indian Ocean port—Chah Bahar, now in Iran.

A third Soviet option would be simply to destabilize Pakistan. The Soviets could support underground groups—Al Zulfikar (a Soviet- and Afghan-backed terrorist organization based in Afghanistan) and Mazdoor Kissan (in the North-West Frontier Province). They could also undertake limited military harassment along the border.[61] The danger, of course, is that border skirmishes might get out of hand and escalate.

India must be a factor in all such calculations. India could try to reoccupy Azad Kashmir—a possibility that cannot be discounted out of hand. It could launch a two-pronged attack with the Soviet Union and simply carve up Pakistan. Or it could apply greater pressure in any one of a number of ways. Whatever the case, the Indian dimension adds significantly to Pakistan's defense burden. It is with some reason, therefore, that China has made efforts—for the time being to no avail—to fully normalize relations with India and to promote normalization of relations between Pakistan and India. It is for the same reason, moreover, that China has sought to counteract India's gravitation toward the Soviet Union and to impress on New Delhi the danger of having the Soviet Union on one's doorstep.[62] It is one thing to have a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union when there is a buffer in between; it is quite another when there is a common border, as the Afghan example demonstrates.

As the Chinese are well aware, however, domestic instability may prove Pakistan's worst enemy. Pakistani politics have been in unremitting turmoil since at least 1977. The elections held that year solved nothing. Nor do the military takeover by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 and the hanging of Ali Bhutto in 1979 give much reason for optimism. To make matters worse, Zia has managed to antagonize most of the political parties of Pakistan—particularly Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party—by banning their activity and reneging on his promise to hold free elections. Recently, the emergence of Al Zulfikar, led by Bhutto's eldest son Murtaza[63] and bent on the destruction of the current Pakistani regime, has been especially ominous.

---

[59] This view is shared by Zia-ul-Haq. See his interview in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 16, 1981, p. 45.

[60] According to the New China News Agency, the Soviets were training 3,000–4,000 Baluchis in Qandahar Province for that purpose. See *SWB-FE*, Apr. 11, 1980, 6392/C/1; Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 6, 1980, pp. F/1–2; "Moscow's 'Dumb-bell' Strategy," loc. cit., p. 8; and Zhang Gholiang, "Moscow Covets Baluchistan," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 10, 1980, pp. 26–27. According to this last article, the Soviets began subversive activities in Baluchistan in the early 1970's, attempting to foster pro-Moscow leanings among Baluch intellectuals in Pakistan and Iran and helping to establish the Baluch People's Liberation Front.

[61] There have been recent reports that the Soviets have adopted this strategy. See J. Fullerton, "Cross-border chess," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 13, 1981, pp. 24–25; and "Tribal stick, aid carrot," ibid., Mar. 12, 1982, p. 16.

[62] "Mutual Understanding of Great Significance," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 18, 1980, pp. 13–14.

Social problems are also numerous. Zia's emphasis on Islamization is not welcomed by the urban educated elite. It has also caused friction within Islam between the country's Sunni majority and Shi'a minority. Finally, there are a number of ethnic rivalries.

The economy is a third problem area. Pakistan has been brought to the verge of bankruptcy by declining exports, increasingly costly oil imports, labor unrest, sluggish growth, and rapidly falling foreign-currency reserves. On top of that, it has had to cope with more than 2.5 million refugees from Afghanistan and a growing number from Iran, which not only imposes an additional economic burden but may well lead to tensions with the local population. Owing to the invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan now receives US$5 billion in aid a year from a World Bank consortium, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.[64] This largesse has temporarily staved off disaster, but it may not be enough to cover the growing needs of a modernizing Pakistani army threatened by Soviet forces in Afghanistan and locked in an arms race with India.[65] It could even dry up altogether. China on its own could not and would not take on such a burden.

For Beijing, because of this complex combination of external threat and domestic instability, Pakistan clearly has become a front-line state in the full sense of the term. How has this fact affected the advantages and disadvantages China derives from its relations with Pakistan?

On the one hand, China is put in a more vulnerable

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq visit an Afghan refugee camp at Nasir Bagh near Peshawar in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province on June 2, 1981.

—Shamin Ur Rehman/Gamma-Liaison.

---

[63] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 16, 1981, p. 7.

[64] R. Tasker, "On the frontiers of fear," ibid., p. 42.

[65] On India's military buildup, see R.D.M. Furlong and G. S. Sundaram, "India—Asian Power Broker of the 1980's?" *International Defense Review* (Geneva), No. 4, 1981.

position than it would like. Obviously, a weak and unstable Pakistan is a tempting target. Its very weakness raises the probability that China might be asked to directly intervene on its behalf, a possibility China would rather not face. If China has to intervene, it would prefer to do so for a stronger and more resilient Pakistan, because that would mean a lower cost, less of a commitment, and a greater chance of success.

Moreover, there is the possibility that Pakistan will accede to Soviet pressure. Zia has dropped hints that he is willing to consider some kind of accommodation with the Soviet Union and to recognize it as a regional power.[66] Beijing, which has been trying for years to deny the Soviet Union the status of an Asian power, has urged Pakistan to step up the struggle, and neither to fall into the trap of a "political solution"—more poetically, a "withered olive branch"—nor to be cowed by Soviet threats.[67] Nevertheless, should Pakistan decide to come to some agreement with the Soviets, China will acquiesce, albeit reluctantly. China has often claimed that, as a matter of principle and unlike other powers, it will not use aid to apply pressure. It could gain little by opposing Pakistan's move, since the Soviets would probably be more than willing to supply economic and military aid to Pakistan, which now fields such relatively outdated Chinese-produced equipment as the Chinese equivalents of the MiG–19 aircraft and T–54/55 tanks.

On the other hand, China derives several substantial advantages from the situation. First, the Soviet threat has, at least temporarily, stabilized domestic Pakistani politics, which have certainly been a source of concern to China since the execution of Bhutto. Second, the flow of aid from the oil-rich Arab states and Western donors has, at least for the present, removed the threat of economic collapse and reduced the Pakistani drain on China's scarce economic resources. China might even hope to have some of its loans repaid. Third, the West, and the United States in particular, are increasingly willing to supply Pakistan with modern weapon systems. As a result, China may not need to provide Pakistan with such large quantities of tanks and aircraft, and the Pakistan army may grow into a more formidable obstacle to Soviet expansion and a more valuable military ally of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Pakistan is already shifting from Chinese military equipment to Western-produced—mainly US—weapons now that the United States has agreed to resupply and modernize its armed forces.[68] Finally, Pakistan's growing prominence in the Islamic and Arab worlds must be considered a windfall. Through Pakistan, China can attempt to penetrate the Islamic bloc in general, and the Middle East in particular.

In the meantime, the course of Sino-Pakistani relations has been smooth. Beijing and Islamabad keep each other advised on all dimensions of the Afghan problem at the highest political level. There are clear signs of close cooperation and indications that military activities would be coordinated should the need arise. Since 1979, and particularly during 1980 and 1981, high-ranking military delegations from both countries have visited and exchanged views with their counterparts in all three military branches.[69]

The Third World

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may prove to have been a watershed in China's relations with fellow members of the Third World. Since the 1960's, the Soviet Union and China have competed for influence in the Third World. The Soviets always had a clear lead, not so much for ideological reasons as for the material payoffs they could offer. Since Afghanistan, however, China has been in a much stronger position. In particular, it has been able to utilize the three larger dimensions of the Afghan crisis—Afghanistan is Muslim, it is Asian, and it was nonaligned—to embarrass the Soviet Union and win more influence for itself.

Of the three, the Islamic dimension seemed the most promising. The Muslim reaction to the Soviet invasion had been strong and swift. Nearly all the Islamic world organizations and nearly all the individual Islamic states denounced the Soviet action. The Higher Council of Al-Azhar even defined the Soviet incursion not only as aggression against an Islamic country but as aggression against the entire Muslim world.[70] This was a pronouncement of special religious significance, for it legitimized the struggle against the Soviets as a jihad, or holy war. Members of the Islamic Conference rejected all Soviet efforts to placate them or to soften their uncompromising stand against the Karmal regime. Pakistan and Iran were sufficiently emboldened to refuse direct dealings with the Karmal government, a position strongly endorsed by China.[71]

---

[66] See his interview in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Oct. 16, 1980, p. 45.

[67] *FBIS-CHI*, July 24, 1980, pp. C/5–6. Pakistan has consistently denied training or supplying the Afghan rebels or letting supplies for them pass through its territory.

[68] Most of Pakistan's army and air force equipment has been supplied by the Chinese (75 percent of its tank force, 60 percent of its combat aircraft, and most of its light naval craft). See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1981–82*, London, 1981, p. 86.

[69] See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1980, p. F/2. In the period 1979–81, PRC delegations paid several visits to Pakistan: in October 1979, a military delegation led by Zheng Caqian, Deputy Chief of the General Staff; in March 1980, a military delegation led by Xiao Ke, Vice Minister of Defense; in November 1980, a navy delegation led by Liu Daosheng, First Deputy Commander of the Navy; in November 1980, a military delegation led by Wan Dingli, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; in December 1980, a military delegation led by Han Huaizhi, Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff; and in November 1981, a military delegation led by Yang Dezhai, Chief of the General Staff. In the same period, there were several Pakistani visits to China: in April 1979, a National Defense College delegation led by Chief Instructor Syed Murad; in October 1979, an air force delegation led by Air Marshal Mohammad Shamin, Chief of the Air Staff; in February 1980, a military delegation led by Lieutenant General Jilani, Secretary of Defense; in March 1981, a Navy Staff College delegation led by Commodore Razi Ahmend; and in May 1981, a navy delegation led by Admiral Karamat Rahaman Niazi, Naval Chief of Staff.

[70] *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 3, 1980, p. I/2.

Beijing made its approach to the world of Islam in a number of ways—among others, through its Muslim minority. In January 1981, for example, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia received a cable in which the Muslims of China declared their support for the Saudi government's "wise measures" with respect to the 1979 incident at the Great Mosque in Mecca. At the same time, sources in Beijing reported, the Chinese and Saudi governments had secret contacts, including discussions over the establishment of diplomatic relations.[72] As a result, Saudi-Chinese relations improved considerably. Such approaches, the Chinese government could hope, might earn the goodwill at once of the Islamic world and of its own most problematic minority.

The Asian dimension also proved helpful, although probably less subject to manipulation. The members of ASEAN took an active part in the diplomatic offensive against the USSR after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Asian criticism (particularly by ASEAN states) of Soviet interference in Afghanistan, furthermore, helped mute criticism of China's 1979 attack on Vietnam. China could warn more easily against the Soviet trap of using the "Chinese threat" to mask the true danger posed by the USSR to the Third World.[73]

Some of China's Muslims at prayer at a mosque in Urumchi, capital of the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region.

—Gamma/Pekin via Liaison.

---

[71] Commentator, "The Will of the Islamic Countries Cannot Be Insulted," *Renmin Ribao*, May 25, 1980, p. 4, in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Political, Social and Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA), No. 75841, June 9, 1980, pp. 1–2; and "The Powerful Voice of 700 Million Muslims," *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 30, 1981, p. 6, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 3, 1981, pp. A/1–2.

[72] On the cable, see Radio Riyadh, Jan. 26, 1981, as reported in *USSR and the Third World* (London), Vol. 10, No. 1, 1980, p. 17; on the secret contacts, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 6, 1981. See also *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 13, 1981, p. F/2.

[73] *FBIS-CHI*, July 22, 1980, p. C/2, and Sept. 26, 1980, pp. C/4–5.

NON ALIGNEMENT
NDING AFGHANISTAN
LONG LIVE AFGHANISTAN

Several hundred Afghans demonstrate in February 1981 outside New Delhi's Vigyan Bhavan, where foreign ministers of the 95 member states of the nonaligned movement were meeting.

—Teki/Gamma-Liaison.

The nonaligned movement, in which the positions and resolutions of the Islamic Conference organization set the tone, was another arena in which the Soviet Union lost ground to China. In the United Nations, the nonaligned countries pushed through a string of resolutions condemning Soviet behavior. Moscow was dealt some of the most devastating and embarrassing diplomatic blows it had ever suffered, and Beijing could crow that it had been right all along—the Soviets were no longer the "natural ally" of the Third World and the nonaligned countries.[74] At the 1981 conference of foreign ministers of the nonaligned movement, held in New Delhi, the USSR was actually called a threat to the movement's influence in world affairs, a development unprecedented in the history of such conferences.[75] Throughout, China had the pleasure of seeing the failure of a concerted Vietnamese and Cuban campaign to forestall a strong anti-Soviet reaction to Afghanistan. Thus, it reaped the further benefit of being able to portray the USSR's allies, particularly Vietnam, as Soviet trojan horses in the nonaligned camp.

The Second World

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China seized the opportunity to seek to undermine Soviet relations with what it refers to as the "second world"—i.e., Western Europe and Japan.

Regarding Western Europe, China had been especially concerned at what it saw as European softness—whether out of naiveté, fear, or weakness—toward the Soviet Union.[76] With soft-liners in European governments, China utilized the invasion to revive the ghosts of the Munich crisis of 1938 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Finlandization is untenable, Beijing argued, for in the final analysis—as the Afghan case showed—nothing less than direct control will satisfy the Soviet Union. With the leaders of Western Europe's Communist parties, China employed much the same argument. As the fate of Afghanistan's Khalq leadership demonstrates, the Chinese contended, the Soviets simply do not allow polycentrism. Thus, the PRC took steps to further contest the Soviet claim to leadership of the international Communist movement, a longtime pursuit of the Chinese Communist Party.[77]

---

[74] *FBIS-CHI*, July 17, 1980, pp. A/1–3, and Nov. 24, 1980, pp. A/1–2.

[75] *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 10, 1981, p. C/1; Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), Feb. 10, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 12, 1981, pp. A/1–2; and *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 18, 1981, pp. C/2–3.

[76] Xinhua, Dec. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 22, 1980, p. A/2; and Yi Jiao, "Soviet Foreign Policy as Seen from the 26th Congress of the CPSU," *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 3, 1981, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 13, 1981, p. C/3.

[77] See the Xinhua interview with Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo on the eve of his 1980 visit to Beijing. In the interview, Carrillo rejected the notion of a "leading center," "guiding party," and "guiding country." Reported in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 12, 1980, p. G/1. Beijing noted that not one of the general secretaries of the three major Eurocommunist parties attended the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). See *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 14, 1981, p. G/4. See also the Xinhua report on Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the CPSU Congress, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 24, 1981, p. C/1.

As for Japan, Beijing could be satisfied on several accounts. China found Tokyo more receptive to Chinese overtures to consolidate mutual relations further.[78] Japan's relations with the USSR, already cool because of the Northern Islands dispute, became even chillier after the invasion, as Tokyo suspended credits and imposed other economic sanctions.[79] Moreover, China benefited indirectly from Japan's growing willingness to play a more active role in Asian diplomacy, particularly in South and Southeast Asia.[80] With greater access to leaders such as Indira Gandhi and Suharto, Japan used its connections to call not only for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan but also for support of Democratic Kampuchea. In reformulating its defense concepts and policies, Japan also evinced a disposition to increase its military expenditures.[81] In China's view, a more active and defense-conscious Japan would strengthen the proposed united front and raise additional obstacles to Soviet expansion in East Asia.



Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang seen in Bangkok during February 1981 consultations with Thailand's Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda.

—Terry Schmitt/SYGMA.

The Great Triangle

In the global diplomatic arena, the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan and later the Soviet invasion and occupation of the country have had important implications for China's relations with the United States and the USSR. Some are indirect—namely, the changes stemming from hardening US-Soviet relations. Others are direct—namely, the changes in China's bilateral relations with each of the superpowers.

One effect of the invasion has been the disruption of détente.[82] China never liked détente, for it feared that under the guise of détente, the United States and the USSR might gang up against it or that the Soviets might be able to isolate and attack it without fear of a strong Western reaction.

In Chinese eyes, the Soviet invasion also served as a test of US mettle. Was the United States still so paralyzed by its Vietnam trauma that it would be an unreliable ally even when its most vital interests were at stake? If so, an accommodation with Moscow, even at the price of concessions, would be China's only rational course. Or could Washington be counted on to take steps to contain the Soviet Union? China found the US reaction encouraging. The United States seemed ready to increase its military power, particularly by maintaining a permanently increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean.[83] Containment of the growing Soviet naval threat is important to China, which lacks a blue-water navy and will not have one for some time to come.

China was encouraged, too, by what it perceived to be a strengthening of the Atlantic alliance. The Soviet invasion was seen as putting a halt to what had seemed to be a growing rift between the United States and Western Europe.[84] In fact, it shocked the West into agreeing that a more cohesive alliance was better suited to deter Soviet adventurism.[85] Because China regards Western Europe as the main target of Soviet strategy, it views Western cohesion as vital to halting the Soviet drive for world domination,

China also saw gains from US economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The US grain embargo of 1980, which left 17 million tons of surplus grain in US granaries, enabled China to buy grain at a lower price—a major economic windfall.[86] More important, it contributed to food shortages in the USSR, and to what China expects to be major Soviet domestic difficulties.[87] In fact, in the Chinese view, a strategy of bleeding the USSR might diminish the Soviet capacity for aggression and gain other countries the time to weld a united anti-Soviet front.[88] According to the Chinese, other US sanctions have had similar impact. Beijing regards the US ban on the export of high technology as having been particularly effective. The boycott of the Moscow Olympic games is seen as less so, though it did damage Soviet prestige.

---

[78] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 3, 1981, p. C/2.

[79] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 3, 1981, p. D/1.

[80] *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 5, 1980, p. D/1.

[81] Xinhua Domestic Service (in Chinese), Nov. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 13, 1980, p. D/2; and Wu Xuewen, "1980—A Year for Japanese Foreign Defense Policies," Xinhua, Dec. 24, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1980, p. D/5.

[82] China saw this as beginning, even before the invasion, with the kidnaping and murder of US Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul, an incident in which Soviet advisers played a dubious role. See *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1979, pp. A/6–7.

[83] The Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the increased threat it poses to shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean have made the US base on Diego Garcia even more important strategically and as an indication that the United States will not let the USSR become the dominant naval power in the region. See J. Clemenston, "Diego Garcia," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies* (London), June 1981, p. 34.

[84] Zhang Mingyang, "Multipolarization of the World and Unity Against Hegemony," *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 2, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 8, 1981, p. A/1.

[85] Xiao Xi, "US Relations with the Soviet Union in the Past Year," *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 23, 1980, p. 7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1980, pp. B/1–2.

[86] The United States and China signed a grain agreement in October 1980.

Nevertheless, Beijing seems not to have high hopes that the United States will maintain its firm policy toward the Soviet Union. The United States, the Chinese believe, must contend with its declining military strength, growing economic difficulties, and the mistaken belief of some segments of American public opinion that détente with the USSR is still possible.[89] Thus, China viewed the lifting of the US grain embargo as a sign of possible weakness—the strong statements of the new US administration notwithstanding.[90]

In Sino-American bilateral relations since Afghanistan, the global dimension has been the primary motive force.[91] Developments have tended to flow from what the Chinese see as a common evaluation of the strategic situation.[92] However, the Chinese do not foresee agreement with the United States on all outstanding issues, for participation in a united front is conditional only on having a common evaluation of the central contradiction—Soviet hegemonism. Thus, the Chinese particularly welcomed the tough anti-Soviet position of the Reagan administration, seeing it as even closer to their position than the Carter administration's had been. But they profess to interpret Reagan's Taiwan policy as a return to a two-China policy, which has set back the evolving friendly relationship between the PRC and the United States. Both sides have so far tried hard to avoid an all-out confrontation on this issue.

China's friendlier relationship with the United States has involved a change of policy: from a policy of equidistance from both the United States and the USSR, China has now adopted a policy of cooperation with the United States against the common threat from the USSR.[93] In the past, China had been concerned lest a closer alignment with the United States and a complete break with the USSR give the United States more flexibility and allow it to play China off against the USSR.[94] But following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasing US commitment to a hard-line anti-Soviet stance, China could bring to a logical conclusion its definition of the USSR as the main source of threat.[95] In other words, the Chinese leadership could argue that the danger of collusion between the two superpowers had faded and thereby justify a firmer alignment with the United States.

The immediate practical result of a friendlier Sino-American relationship has been in arms transfer opportunities. In January 1980, during a visit to Beijing, US Secretary of State Harold Brown had announced US agreement to sell "nonlethal" military-related equipment to China. By June 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, also during a visit to Beijing, expressed US willingness to sell lethal weapons to China.[96] Although China can buy all the lethal weapons it can afford, and more, in Western Europe, the US agreement had the symbolic value of cementing what the Chinese may well see as an informal alliance, a process actually begun with the formal establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations in January 1979.

China is surely looking to broaden that relationship. The US administration, having broken the taboo on Sino-American military cooperation and perceiving the need to rearm itself faster than Congress, the public, or economic conditions would allow, may consider it expedient to help finance the modernization of the PLA.[97] In that case, China might be able to avoid a difficult choice—that is, it could direct more resources toward economic development and still carry out a significant military modernization program, financed in part by the United States.

Finally, the closer Sino-American ties have resolved Pakistan's two-decade-long dilemma—the need to

---

[87] Xinhua cited US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's evaluation of the high costs of the grain embargo to the Soviet economy. See *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 23, 1980, p. B/3.

[88] The PRC regards Soviet economic difficulties and domestic complications as a major gain. It estimates that Cuba costs the Soviet Union about US$12 million a day, Vietnam US$3 million a day, and Afghanistan about US$4 million a day. See Yu Pang, "Moscow's Southward Thrust Menaces the Third World," *Beijing Review*, May 12, 1980, p. 25.

[89] Xiao Xi, loc. cit., p. B/2.

[90] *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 28, 1981, pp. B/2–3.

[91] *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 29, 1980, p. B/1, and Dec. 22, 1980, p. A/3.

[92] *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 3, 1980, p. B/3.

[93] *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 30, 1980, p. B/3.

[94] G. Segal, "China and the Great Power Triangle," *China Quarterly*, September 1980, pp. 502–04.

[95] On the evolution of China's perception of the Soviet threat, see Chyba, loc. cit., pp. 475–80.

[96] On that occasion, Secretary Haig declared that the United States intended to treat China "as a friendly nation with which the United States is not allied, but with which it shares many interests." *International Herald Tribune*, June 17, 1981, p. 1. The sale of arms to China has not yet materialized. It is possible that China is not willing to give the United States an excuse for evenhandedness in selling arms to Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese leadership has given a lower priority to the modernization of the PLA than it has given to the other three modernizations. The PLA leadership itself has yet to decide—if it intends to modernize through the acquisition of modern Western weapons systems—what its priorities are and from whom to buy, Europe or the United States.

[97] A hint of that possibility can be found in Secretary Haig's press conference in Beijing on June 16, 1981. See *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), August 1981, p. 37.



Deng Xiaoping, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, confers with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig during the American official's June 1981 visit to Beijing.

—Zimberoff/SYGMA.

choose between and broker the interests and demands of its two allies, China and the United States. Although this dilemma has not been acute since 1972, it has occasionally been embarrassing, both in Pakistan's direct relations with China and the United States and in its approach to India.

In Sino-Soviet relations, too, the global dimension is paramount. China has shown extreme concern over what it sees as the Soviet determination to gain predominance over the United States. To the Chinese, the Soviet goal is supremacy, both quantitative and qualitative, and the Soviet strategy is to improve its land and sea positions to the extent that, in the long run, it can tilt the overall global balance in its favor and dictate terms to all.[98] As Beijing has stressed, the Sino-Soviet conflict goes far beyond the bounds of ideology.

With the Soviet invasion, Sino-Soviet relations came to a standstill. They had previously begun to deteriorate rapidly, as the Soviets increased their military support to the Marxist government in Afghanistan and "legitimized" their growing involvement by a succession of more than 40 treaties and agreements. China, for its part, vehemently denied Soviet charges that it had offered arms to antigovernment groups,[99] lest it be dragged into a military confrontation for which it was and still is unprepared. After the invasion, the Chinese abruptly canceled a second round of Sino-Soviet talks, which had been scheduled for early 1980. A Sino-Soviet détente seemed a very remote possibility.

Subsequent developments have confirmed initial impressions. During 1981, China and the Soviet Union kept in touch at middle bureaucratic levels—such as through Mikhail Kapitsa, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's First Far Eastern Department, and through Soviet Sinologist Sergey Tikhvinskiy, head of the Foreign Ministry's Historical-Diplomatic Administration. In March 1982, Brezhnev made his dramatic offer of talks to resolve all outstanding issues without preconditions.

---

[98] Beijing Domestic Service (in Mandarin), Sept. 24, 1980, *in FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1980, pp. C/1–3.

[99] Xue Yuan, "The Soviet Union Will Suffer the Consequences of Its Interference in Afghanistan," *Renmin Ribao*, June 29, 1979, *in FBIS-CHI*, July 10, 1979, pp. C/1–2.

But Soviet efforts to woo China and exploit the hostility engendered by the US position on Taiwan have made little headway.[100] "No preconditions" is precisely what the Chinese leadership cannot accept. They do have preconditions, which they regard as essential, and they are unwilling, for the time being, to treat their relationship with the United States as if—in the phrase of one Beijing official—that relationship were "a piece of straw which can be blown off the wall by any puff of wind."[101]

According to Deng Xiaoping, the Sino-Soviet stalemate will in all likelihood remain unchanged. Unless the Soviet Union complies with China's conditions, which include a reduction of the number of Soviet divisions on the Chinese border from 54 to 10 and a withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the Mongolian People's Republic, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, "Sino-Soviet relations will not change even in 10 to 20 years."[102] China, too, has reemphasized that Soviet command over the Communist movement is unacceptable, that only full equality among the socialist countries is acceptable.[103]

It should also be noted that the border dispute between the USSR and China remains unresolved. Indeed, the Soviet border treaty with Afghanistan, signed on June 16, 1980, has aggravated the issue. Because Afghanistan has recognized the Soviet claim to a region in the Pamirs that China claims as its own, China refuses to recognize the treaty's legality.[104]

Conclusion

With the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan returned from obscurity "to the cockpit of the struggle for Eurasian hegemony."[105] Thus, the "Great Game" began again, but with much higher stakes and in very different global and regional circumstances.

China, like the West, received a rude awakening. Its first reaction was alarm, for it was unprepared to face the host of diplomatic, strategic, and military problems that arose. The grave strategic implications of its archenemy's sudden blow appeared to overwhelm it. But within weeks, China began to take advantage of whatever opportunities it could discern.

Indeed, with time, the threat seemed to remain relatively stable, and the opportunities to grow. The opportunities were spread along a whole spectrum, from high to low politics, from national security to economics. Furthermore, China could link the situations in Kampuchea and Afghanistan, i.e., it could completely identify Vietnam with the USSR and thus isolate Vietnam. Most of the costs to China were verbal, and the rest involved only limited aid to the Afghan insurgents and to Pakistan. In effect, China might well see Afghanistan as a blessing in disguise.

What must be frustrating to the Chinese is that while they may be able to manipulate events, they have little influence over the eventual outcome. At this point, the principal question for the Chinese leadership must be the steadfastness of the West, particularly Western Europe. Will the "fickle West" stand fast? Or will it prefer the illusion that the Soviets will be satisfied with recognition of the current Afghan regime and abandon all further plans for southward expansion? All China can do is try to convince prospective united front members of Soviet perfidy. At the same time, it can hint at and count on its trump card—the possibility of Sino-Soviet détente.[106] But here again Beijing is dependent on the Soviets. Even if the Soviet Union plays along, what price will it exact?

---

[100] A. Bovin, "Partnership Without Trust," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 31, 1982, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Feb. 10, 1982, pp. B/1–3. Bovin's article deals with the "failure" of the US policy of parallelism.

[101] D. Bonavia, "More than merely a straw in the wind," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 2, 1982, pp. 14–15.

[102] Beijing Service to USSR (in Russian), Nov. 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 28, 1980, p. C/1.

[103] Yang Hui and Zhan Xihuang, "Internationalism or Hegemonism?" *Hongqi*, No. 23, Dec. 1, 1980, pp. 44–48, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 17, 1980, p. C/4.

[104] *FBIS-CHI*, July 22, 1981, p. F/1.

[105] Newell and Newell, op. cit., p. 118.

[106] See, for example, Chinese overtures to the Soviet Union within hours of the June 1981 Haig visit, in which the PRC called for talks on a new treaty to settle Sino-Soviet border disputes. *International Herald Tribune*, June 19, 1981, p. 1.

Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation

By Vladimir V. Kusin

In the 1970's, the regime of Gustav Husak sought to "normalize" and consolidate its rule in Czechoslovakia, where Communist party dominance had been badly eroded and shaken by the reformist movement of the late 1960's. During the 1980's, the same regime faces an uphill struggle in trying to normalize and consolidate the Czechoslovak economy.

In securing its rule after the Prague Spring of 1968, the Czechoslovak regime enacted policies that are now beginning to backfire. This is the old story of the conflict between central control and viability, with which all Communist states have been grappling since World War II, only the nature of the dilemma has now become more complicated than ever before. Not only do party officials no longer have a clearly defined enemy—be it the bourgeoisie or revisionists—against which to lead the rank and file, but the economic task at hand far surpasses in complexity the relatively simple programs of industrialization and collectivization, with their mixture of coercion and extensive expansion, to which the Communist parties were given over and conditioned in the past. Modernization, intensification, and rationalization are the catchwords most often used to sum up what is now required. The snag is that the Communist policies of the past have destroyed many of the prerequisites—of substance, attitude, and mood—for successfully coping with the challenge.

Between Reform and Orthodoxy

Czechoslovak communism is an interesting phenomenon. Central to its history has been the conflict between reform-orientation and orthodoxy, also interpreted by writers on the subject as a clash of wills between nationalists and internationalists, or between Prague and Moscow.[1] The founding father of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS), Bohumir Smeral—later condemned for reformist deviation, and yet later, when safely dead, reinstated to an honorable place in the party's pantheon—seemed to have an instinctive insight into the dilemma right at the start. A witness reported that Smeral, pressed by V. I. Lenin and his emissary Bela Kun to finally part ways with the social democratic tradition and to found a party that would be a section of the Communist International, said to a Czech friend of his in April 1921:

> *It is a far-reaching step. . . . We shall become a part of a large community and decisions concerning us will no longer depend on us. . . . I do not know, I do not know. Russia differs from us, and we differ from Russia. What am I to do? What can I do? I can do nothing. Events rush past, they drag men along, as they have always done.* Alea iacta est![2]

Smeral's "What can I do? I can do nothing" replicated itself in Czechoslovak Communist history several times in crucial situations. The fundamental antagonism be-

---

[1] See, for example, H. Gordon Skilling, "Stalinism and Czechoslovak Political Culture," in R. C. Tucker, Ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation,* New York, NY, W. W. Norton & Co., 1977; David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia,* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979; and Vladimir V. Kusin, "Communism and Nationalism in Czechoslovakia: Fusion, Coexistence or Conflict?" in N. Lobkowicz and F. Prinz, Eds., *Die Tschechoslowakei 1945–1970* (Czechoslovakia: 1945–1970), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1978.

[2] Karel Gorovsky, "On the Founding of the CPCS: the Dresden Conference in April 1921," *Revue dejin socialismu* (Prague), No. 3, 1968, p. 444. Smeral sent Gorovsky with four other Communist delegates from Czechoslovakia to meet Bela Kun in Dresden.

Mr. Kusin is senior research analyst for Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty and a prolific writer on East European affairs, with special reference to Czechoslovakia. His latest book is From Dubcek to Charter 77, *1978.*

V PEVNÉ JEDNOTĚ
KSČ A LIDU
ZA DALŠÍ ÚSPĚCHY
V BUDOVÁNÍ ROZVINUTÉ
SOCIALISTICKÉ SPOLEČNOSTI

At the 16th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS—KSC in Czech) in April 1981. In the front row, from left to right: Alois Indra, CPCS Presidium member and Chairman of the Federal Assembly; Vasil Bilak, CPCS Presidium member and Central Committee Secretary; Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev; and Gustav Husak, First Secretary of the CPCS. The slogan at the rear reads: "In Firm Unity of the CPCS and the People Toward Further Success in Building A Developed Socialist Society."

—CTK via Eastfoto.

tween domestic requirements, usually calling for a moderate reformist approach, and internationalist *diktat,* almost invariably imposing a radical or revolutionary solution on policy problems, has usually been resolved—even if sometimes after much soul-searching and fierce internal battles—by adopting a Moscow-endorsed course, usually hard-line.[3] Thus the CPCS opted for "bolshevization" in the second half of the 1920's, accepted the Popular Front concept in 1935–36, followed the Comintern line of "an imperialist war" in 1939 in the face of Nazi occupation, abandoned the idea of a "Czechoslovak road to socialism" after World War II, and reverted to orthodoxy in the aftermath of the Prague Spring.[4]

The General Policy Line of the 1970's

The postreformist "normalization" course of the last decade rested on what we may call the three C's: coercion, consumerism, and circuses. Let us look briefly at each of these factors.

---

[3] The one notable exception was the grudging acceptance in the 1950's and early 1960's of Khrushchev's insistent call for de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia.

[4] For two highly competent scholarly histories of the CPCS, see Zdenek Suda, *Zealots and Rebels,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980; and Jacques Rupnik, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Tchècoslovaque des origines à la prise de pouvoir* (History of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from Its Origins to the Seizure of Power), Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1981. On the Prague Spring, read H. Gordon Skilling's unsurpassed *The Interrupted Revolution,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976. For a detailed history of the "normalization" period, from 1968 to 1978, see Vladimir V. Kusin, *From Dubcek to Charter 77,* Edinburgh, Q Press, and New York, NY, St. Martin Press, 1978. On the Czechoslovak human-rights movement from 1977 to 1981, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

Coercion. The Husak regime has built up a formidable police force and has readily and actively applied it against dissidents and as a means of general intimidation. The overall police apparatus in Czechoslovakia (whose total numbers have never been disclosed) consists of a specially beefed-up secret (political) police, emergency (riot) units (probably numbering more than 10,000), a 23,000-strong "auxiliary police" force (vigilantes), and evidently an extensive network of informers. A new law giving the police only vaguely restricted powers to interfere with even minute aspects of each citizen's private life was adopted in 1974. The new Criminal Code enacted in 1973 was especially designed to facilitate swift persecution of political and ideological deviance. Particularly telling with regard to repression of intellectual freedom is the blatantly political commentary on criminal offences of a dissident nature, published in 1980 for the guidance of judges.[5]

The "normalization" period has also seen a determined reactivation of the so-called People's Militia, the CPCS's 120,000-strong private army of regularized, part-time vigilantes. Their arsenal now contains machine guns, small artillery, and other weaponry beyond the small-arms class. Counterinsurgency techniques loom high in their centrally prescribed training programs.

Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Gustav Husak, right, is shown busts of Soviet heroes by Soviet Col. Gen. A. M. Mayorov during a May 1972 visit to the headquarters of the Central Group of Soviet Forces, located in Milovice, Czechoslovakia.

—CTK via EUPRA.

Some 200,000 men are kept in arms, including the army, the air force, the border guards, and the civil defense troops. Czechoslovak conscripts have a long term of military service, from 24 to 36 months depending on the branch of service.[6] Sixty-six percent of the armed forces are conscripts. Political supervision over the army is total. The proportion of party members among commissioned officers is very high, probably close to 80 percent. The corresponding figure in the police is 72 percent; in the emergency (riot) squads, over 90 percent.[7]

These armed forces have been modernized, both in terms of hardware and in operations. War exercises, expecially those involving other Warsaw Pact troops, are publicized as shows of force designed to keep the population well aware of the constant bolstering of the armed might of the state and its allies.

In addition, the Soviet Union has maintained its own Central Group of Forces—some 50–75,000 men strong—in Czechoslovakia since the invasion of 1968. They keep a relatively low profile and lead a semisecluded existence, but their presence has been forgotten by no one.

Coercion entails, however, more than what the armed constituencies of the party and the state can enforce. Since the early 1970's, there has been a sustained tightening of politically motivated regulation of such "civilian" fields as social mobility, freedom of career pursuits, and education. Some 550,000 responsible positions—political and nonpolitical—are under direct party tutelage, i.e., they cannot be filled without the party's consent or can be filled only by party members.[8] An even greater number of career openings are being watched indirectly. Victimization through job loss, demotion, or denial of employment is normal practice. Two campaigns illustrate the case in point: the purges of Prague Spring adherents in the early 1970's and the discrimination against Charter 77 signatories in 1977 and later. Children from dissident families also find their educational opportunities constricted. Vaclav Havel, the playwright and human rights activist who is now serving a four-and-a-half-year term for dissidence, poignantly complained in April 1975 in an open letter to president

---

[5] Karel Matys, ed., *Trestni zakon. Komentar* (Criminal Law: Commentary), 2 vols., Prague, Panorama, 1980.

[6] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980–81*, London, 1979, p. 15.

[7] Czechoslovak Television, Sept. 9, 1981, 1830 hours.

[8] Mikulas Beno in *Zivot strany* (Prague), No. 14, 1980, pp. 6–11.

Czech playwright Vaclav Havel, right, one of the first spokesmen for the Charter 77 group in Czechoslovakia, pictured in May 1978 with fellow Chartist Pavel Landovsky, a noted Czechoslovak film actor, at Havel's cottage 150 kilometers north of Prague. Twice imprisoned in the previous year for his stand, Havel faced trial for "activities detrimental to the security of the state."

—Peter Marlow/SYGMA

and party leader Husak of the "rule of fear" which pervades Czechoslovak society.[9]

Consumerism. In the first half of the 1970's, the public was offered considerable consumer gains as a substitute for frustrated political and human rights aspirations. Students of the period speak of an unwritten social contract whereby the public sacrificed reformist dreams for material comforts. After a brief pause in 1969–70, the standard of living did begin a respectable rise. During the 1971–75 plan period, the country's net material product grew by 32 percent; personal consumption, by 27 percent; and real wages, by over 5 percent. This was a period of rapid motorization. In 1971, there was one car for every 17 persons; in 1975, one for every 10; and in 1979, one for every 8.[10]

It is difficult to explain exactly why the general public took to working so hard and producing good results. The fact remains, however, that the regime—while destroying attempted political opposition[11] and introducing very tight controls over intellectual activity—gained a certain measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the man in the street because the economy performed satisfactorily. The evident material benefits were unashamedly connected by government spokesmen with the advent of the nonreformist order of things.

Ironically, by the end of the 1970's, party leaders came to complain bitterly about a popular materialism whose seeds they themselves had allowed to germinate as a concomitant to their pacification programs. Attachment to material possessions was now said to reflect petit-bourgeois attitudes, which were accused of hampering progress toward Communist awareness and, somewhat illogically, of lowering economic efficiency. An editorial in Bratislava *Pravda* of February 1, 1982, criticized such relics of the past:

> *A much too rapid homogenization of society [presumably: egalitarianism], an all-round growth of requirements, and the fact that large funds are being pumped into certain branches without regard for their performance: all this slows down the dynamics of development. New social groups emerge which lead a parasitic ex-*

---

[9] For an English-language text, see *Voices of Czechoslovak Socialists*, London, Merlin Press, 1977, pp. 90–125.

[10] *Statisticka rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky 1980* (Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980), Prague, SNTL, 1981, p. 538.

[11] For a brief survey of oppositional activity in the first half of the 1970's, see Vladimir V. Kusin, "Challenge to Normalcy: Political Opposition in Czechoslovakia 1968–1977," in Rudolf L. Tokes, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 25–59.

istence. They fare well regardless of how they work, and—thanks to their position—they enrich themselves in a nonsocialist manner.

Circuses. Toleration of a widened range of individual entertainment formed another factor in the depoliticization scheme. Pop music (though not the more extreme styles), film spectaculars from the West, detective stories, a plethora of cookbooks, and soap-opera-type television series were allowed as the population turned to privatization. The regime encouraged private construction of family homes and weekend abodes. The number of the latter increased from 128,000 in 1969 to 160,000 in 1973 and 225,000 in 1981 in the Czech Lands alone.[12] Less than strenuous working conditions were, implicitly if not overtly, offered as a gift by the new regime to the public.[13] An early escape on Friday afternoon in a private car laden with stacks of precooked Wiener schnitzel for a weekend away from it all at a private country cottage became a typical genre picture of the mid-1970's.

For the majority of the populace, the beating of ideological drums, signalling that the hopes of 1968 had forever disappeared, turned into a not too pleasant but bearable background noise. What mattered was well-clad and well-fed recreation.

We do not and cannot know to what extent Moscow hatched the details of the Czechoslovak normalization. Certainly, the dismantling of the liberal changes of 1968 could only have begun with the superior authority of the power that had intervened militarily to cancel those changes, but this left unanswered some crucial questions. Whatever Moscow's input, the new government had to resolve two key issues: first, whether the market-oriented economic reform—designed and launched several years before the Prague Spring—would be allowed to proceed, and, more generally, whether a policy of "Kadarization"—a mixture of political control, consumerism, and a measure of social liberalization—might be pursued.

Motor traffic on a new highway from the Sporilov residential district of Prague to the town of Mirosovice.

—CTK via EUPRA.

---

[12] See, for example, *Pravda* (Bratislava), May 28, 1973; *Kvety* (Prague), Aug. 4, 1973; Radio Prague, May 21, 1974; and Radio Hvezda, Nov. 12, 1981,

[13] By general admission, between 15 and 30 percent of working time is wasted.

Options Foregone

For at least two years after the invasion of August 1968, it seemed as if the economic part of the reform package would be kept alive, shorn of the more consequential features added to it during the Prague Spring and of its politically unacceptable self-management corollary. Several politicians who now wielded power spoke publicly in favor of such a reform, although others did not.[14] In the end, all meaningful reformist prescriptions were swept away, and the 1971–75 plan stressed central command and extensive growth rather than autonomous enterprise activity and intensive modernization.

One can only surmise that what the moderates wanted, the hard-liners denied them either with Moscow's backing or at Moscow's order. By extrapolation, the Hungarian course, of which market socialism was the centerpiece, was ruled out of order by the same diehard alliance.

Kadarization appeared well suited for Czechoslovakia after 1968—especially because of the strength of the Czechoslovak economy, which could have provided the basis for a social contract of the Hungarian kind, and also because the shock of the Soviet invasion had cured the majority of the population of pursuing radical political change for the moment. Indeed, on several occasions in the early 1970's, it looked as if moderate and conciliatory "normalization" might well get started in Czechoslovakia.

The first such opportunity came in the autumn of 1969, after street demonstrations on the first anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion had been provoked and suppressed (proving to Moscow that the new regime was firmly in the saddle and not averse to using force against its own people) and after the top party and state bodies had been purged of the most committed reformists. Resurgence of intraparty revisionism had become improbable by that time, and the evident public frustration and apathy could well have been slowly turned into support for a measured, if centrally controlled, preservation of certain benign practices in the relationship between rulers and ruled.

Indeed, in talking to a January 1970 meeting of the Central Committee, Husak seemed to sound a Kadarian note:

> *He who is not against us, is our potential ally. He is not an enemy, he must be cultivated, he must be won over.*[15]

But such a conciliatory approach was not to be. In short order, the CPCS launched a vicious round of purges and persecution—one which in vindictiveness and extent can be compared to China's Cultural Revolution. During 1970, about 1.5 million members of the party were screened individually by a reported 70,217 special purge committees staffed by 235,270 trusted hard-liners. Some 460,000 members were ousted from the party on grounds of having reformist leanings, and another 150,000 quit on their own initiative.[16] The purge eliminated one third of all officeholders in the party, including 9 of 12 regional chief secretaries and 59 of 112 district chief secretaries. Of the 137-member Central Committee elected at the 14th CPCS Congress in May 1971, 26 were survivors of the pre–Prague Spring days.[17]

Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, at a meeting honoring members of the People's Militia (LM).

—CTK via EUPRA.

---

[14] For example, the Economic Department of the CPCS Central Committee stated: "It is now necessary to purge the further progress of the economic reform of tendencies which have prevailed in its implementation recently, and to return to the starting points and objectives which the party had set out." See *Nova mysl* (Prague), No. 11, 1969, p. 1371. By contrast, Husak—judging by his speeches and articles—opposed the continuation of a market-based reform virtually from the moment he gained full power. See various items in Gustav Husak, *Projevy a stati, duben 1969–leden 1970* (Speeches and Articles, April 1969 to January 1970), Prague, Svoboda, 1970.

[15] Husak, op. cit., p. 339.

[16] Author's calculations. No reliable or consistent official statistics on the purge have ever been published in Czechoslovakia. In an interview with the American *Daily World* (New York, NY), reproduced in *Rude pravo* (Prague), Sept. 13, 1975, Vasil Bilak said that 70,934 persons had been expelled and 390,817 had suffered the somewhat lesser penalty of having been struck off the party roster. I discuss the discrepancies in official statistics at some length in *From Dubcek to Charter 77*, pp. 85–87.

[17] Compare lists in *XIII. sjezd KSC* (13th CPCS Congress), Prague, Svoboda, 1966, pp. 373–74, and in *XIV. sjezd KSC* (14th CPCS Congress), Prague, Svoboda, 1971, pp. 547–448. The purge of the Central Committee recalls in its scale the "bolshevization" of 1928–30, when Klement Gottwald assumed power and engaged in a large-scale ouster of "opportunists."

This purge added to the ranks of the disaffected. Four earlier purges—one each in Slovakia and the Czech Lands in 1946–47, another in 1948–49, and the fourth in 1950—had already produced some 600,000 expellees or otherwise discarded members. During 1950–70, an estimated 300,000 more had left the party either on their own initative or through quiet dismissals. Allowing for mortality, the combined numbers of erstwhile card-carrying Communists at the end of 1970 stood at not much less than the membership of the existing "official" party at that time, i.e., about 1.2 million.[18] In effect, these former members comprised an alternative party, passive and unorganized, but bound together by a reformist opposition to the ruling doctrinal precepts.

More important, the purge deprived the economy of tens of thousands of able managerial personnel. Yet even after the formal purge, at the end of 1970, the new leaders (who included a number of turncoats, former revisionists) could have called a halt to the settling of accounts. The population, including the majority of its politically active segment, had been demonstrably browbeaten into submission. Had the leadership shown a conciliatory face then, it might have been rewarded with active cooperation by some. Instead, it hounded people ousted from the party from all positions of influence and replaced them with a great many incompetents.

Former Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Alexander Dubcek photographed with other ordinary citizens in Bratislava, where he had been assigned to minor managerial duties.

—UPI.

Whether as instigator or just firm endorser of suggestions originating among the Czechoslovak recalcitrants holding sway in the Prague leadership, Moscow is ultimately to blame for the purge policy in Prague. At least a partial explanation of Moscow's attitude may lie in the shift of Kremlin attention to Poland, where the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka shook and fell under the impact of popular wrath and economic slide. To salvage the situation, Moscow gave the new Polish party leader, Edward Gierek, the go-ahead for a capitalist-assisted growth explosion. With the risk center having moved to Poland, it was imperative to keep the political, economic, and ideological screws tightly fastened on adjacent Czechoslovakia.

Both the permission to Poland to incur a vast foreign debt and the prohibition of a Czechoslovak "Magyarization" were errors, as became evident 10 years later. In the Czechoslovak case, which is our concern here, the mistake was to throw out the baby of economic reform with the bathwater of a political threat to CPCS dominance. However firmly and repeatedly the party leaders in Czechoslovakia asserted the correctness of the "general policy line" adopted at the 14th CPCS congress in 1971 and reaffirmed at the 15th congress in 1976,[19] they are wrong. The results do not bear them out. Concerned above all with securing their own political tenure, they begot trouble for themselves and the country as a whole in promoting a further round of extensive industrialization at the start of the 1970's while simultaneously returning the management system to the old command model. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (for 1971–75) was once again an exercise in arithmetic economic expansion, with the hope of generating a quick return on an escalated investment drive. The success was short-lived, as will be shown below.[20]

The limits on extensive growth had already been apparent and reasonably well researched before and dur-

---

[18] For details about membership trends, see G. Wightman and A. H. Brown, "Changes in the Levels of Membership and Social Composition of the CPCS 1945–1973," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1975, pp. 396–417.

[19] According to Bruno Hribek, writing in *Tribuna* (Prague), Jan. 28, 1981, this was the third "general policy line" in CPCS history. The first was evolved to strip the bourgeoisie of power and to install the dictatorship of the proletariat. The second, formulated after the seizure of full power in 1948, aimed at "constructing the foundations of socialism." Having "attained" this goal in 1960, Hribek states, party caucuses proceeded to map out a policy designed to lead to "a developed socialist society." But in view of the reformism of the 1960's and the crisis of the Prague Spring, it took longer to define this "line" than had been anticipated. The line was eventually postulated at the 14th congress in 1971, further corroborated at the 15th congress, and endorsed at the 16th congress in 1981—without a change, because, so it was argued, no change was needed. On the "rightness" of a failed and faltering line, see also the editorial "Forward to the 16th Party Congress," *Nova mysl*, No. 1., 1981, pp. 14–20.

[20] The share of investment as a percent of net material product grew from 31.5 in 1970 to 35.4 in 1975, and the capital tied up in unfinished projects increased from 294.8 billion korunas to 413.5 billion over the same period. These figures were computed from various issues of *Statisticka rocenka*.

Table 1: Czechoslovak Payments for Soviet Oil, 1971–81

	Amount imported		Total price paid		Price per ton (statistical)[a]	
Year[b]	Thousands of tons	As a percent of 1970	Millions of korunas	As a percent of 1970	Korunas per ton	As a percent of 1970
1971	10,668	113.5	1,331	115.7	124.7	101.9
1975	15,503	164.9	3,734	324.6	240.8	196.9
1980	18,803	200.0	11,086	963.9	589.6	482.0
1981[b]	19,200	204.2	12,000	1,043.5	625.0	510.9

[a] The "statistical price" conceals a special deal concluded in 1966, which set a lower price for 5 million tons of Soviet oil per year from 1971 through 1984. The overall price will soar in 1985, when this deal expires. See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1966, p. 1; and Vaclav Brodnicek, "25 Years of Czechoslovak-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations," *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade* (Prague), No. 5, 1970.

[b] Data for 1981 are estimates pending availability of official statistics.

SOURCES: Various issues of *Statisticka rocenka* (Statistical Yearbook), Prague, SNTL, and of *Jahrbuch des Aussenhandels der Tschechoslowakei* (Yearbook of Czechoslovak Foreign Trade), Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce; "Facts on Czechoslovak Foreign Trade," *Zahranicni obchod* (Prague), No. 10, 1981; and the author's own calculations.

ing the Prague Spring. Most economists had then arrived at the opinion that the Czechoslovak economy must be steered toward structural changes and higher efficiency and that the only way of doing this was via exercise of extensive enterprise autonomy in a socialist market milieu, under the umbrella of macroeconomic planning in areas which market forces could not govern satisfactorily.[21] However, the party at the turn of the decade anathematized this potential lifeline.

The "Oil Shock"

For the first five years, developments seemed to confirm the wisdom of the leadership's orientation. The years 1971–75 in fact proved to be the most successful of all quinquennial planning periods in the country, as measured by quantitative fulfillment of set quotas.[22] The population, embittered by its political defeat, seemed to take refuge in economic performance as a kind of compensatory self-assertion. Then came the two-stage oil shock.

The first stage, triggered by the decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1974 to sharply increase world oil prices, did not shake the confidence of the Czechoslovak regime, which smugly felt that nothing could happen to a member of the socialist bloc assured of cheap Soviet oil. The self-righteousness began to crumble in 1975, and by 1980, Czechoslovakia was paying nearly five times as much per ton for Soviet oil as it had paid in 1970 (see Table 1). It is of little consolation or consequence that the country would have had to pay considerably more if it had had to import its oil from hard-currency areas.[23] What mattered was the inability of the extensive, inflexible Czechoslovak economic system to respond to the situation and generate enough exports to pay for its increasingly expensive imports, particularly oil.

Indeed, Czechoslovakia has had difficulty for many years in marketing its goods abroad. In 1980, Vasil Bilak acknowledged that only 2 percent of manufactures for export had attained world standards.[24] Czechoslovakia's foreign trade minister reported in 1981 that nearly 60 percent of Czechoslovak manufactures command less than the average international price for comparable goods. In that year, Czechoslovakia reportedly had to pay 8.6 percent more for the average basket of imported goods from nonsocialist countries than it paid in 1980, and it received an increase of only 6.7 percent in payment for its exports to the same countries.[25] It has been observed recently that Czechoslovakia is probably the only advanced country in the last decade to have systematically increased exports of consumer goods (to the detriment of the home market), heavy metallurgical goods, and raw timber, but not of engineering products.[26]

Similar conditions prevail in exchanges with the Soviet Union, only the problem is more serious in light of Czechoslovakia's heavy dependence on Soviet oil shipments.[27] Prague has received numerous signs over the last decade of Soviet displeasure at the range and quality of Czechoslovak exports to the USSR. A *Rude*

---

[21] These views were advocated, for example, by the working team under Professor Ota Sik, which designed the 1965 and then the 1968 reforms. See, for example, Ota Sik, *Plan and Market under Socialism*, New York, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1968; and Radoslav Selucky, *Czechoslovakia: The Plan that Failed*, London, Nelson, 1970.

[22] See fn. 10.

[23] The USSR prices its oil shipments to Eastern Europe on a sliding five-year average of OPEC prices. Hence, Soviet prices rise with an appreciable delay as compared to OPEC prices.

[24] *Nove slovo* (Bratislava), May 22, 1980, pp. 1–3.

[25] Foreign Trade Minister Bohumil Urban on Radio Prague, Dec. 5, 1981, 1240 hours.

[26] *Pravda*, Mar. 24, 1982, p. 1.

[27] In 1980, Czechoslovakia imported 19.2 million tons of crude oil, of which 18.8 million (98 percent) were from the USSR. *Facts on Czechoslovakia*, Prague, Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1981, p. 48.

pravo editorial on January 25, 1982, acknowledged as much:

> *The Soviet market is becoming ever more discriminating. . . . It gives us ample opportunities, but whether we take advantage of them or not depends on us, on the technical, economic, and quality standards of our goods, and on our accurate compliance with orders in terms of time and assortment. It would be foolish to believe that the agreed volumes of trade have bound the Soviet partner to accepting just anything from us to the full extent of the contracted sum of money; not even the best of friends behaves in this way.*

To compensate for inadequate exports, Czechoslovakia has sunk considerable capital investment into Soviet extracting and manufacturing industries in return for assured deliveries of raw materials. Agreements already in operation relate to the production of asbestos, artificial fertilizer, ferrous alloys, electric power, feed concentrates; the extraction of crude oil; the processing of iron ore; the laying of gas pipelines; and cooperation in nuclear energy.[28] In the past decade, Czechoslovakia has contributed some 800 million transferable rubles (or 6.4 billion Kcs, or korunas) to "integrative projects" within the framework of the Moscow-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).[29] While commitments of this scope, plus other raw-material-oriented contracts within CMEA, may look very advantageous at a time when raw-material prices are high, they have the long-term effect of curtailing Czechoslovakia's capacity to modernize its own manufacturing base either through the country's own effort or by purchases of advanced machinery from the West.

(Not without reason, the only consistently active balance in Czechoslovakia's foreign trade has been in dealings with the less developed countries. One suspects that in addition to sales of fairly simple investment units, these balances reflect exports of weaponry.[30])

As a result of the oil-price shock and other factors inherent in the Czechoslovak economic system (more on these below), performance in the second half of the 1970's turned sharply worse (see Table 2). By 1981, total and per capita national income were virtually not growing, or perhaps even on the decline.

It was at this point that the second stage of Czechoslovakia's oil shock began. In 1981, it was decided that the country would purchase less Soviet oil in the years 1982–85 than had been envisaged when the 1981–85 five-year plan was being compiled—and also less than the Soviet Union had solemnly promised to deliver. There are signs that Moscow may have forced Czechoslovakia and other East European states to accept such cuts because the USSR preferred to sell oil in the West.[31]

At first, the size of the cut was said to be 10 percent of the 1980 level, although figures mentioned more recently by Czechoslovak Federal Prime Minister

Table 2: Trends in Czechoslovak National Income, 1976–81[a]

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Overall national income, billions of korunas	394.1	410.6	427.5	440.6	453.1	454.0
Overall national income, percent increase over previous year	3.7	4.2	4.1	3.1	2.8	0.2
Per capita national income in korunas	26,417	27,319	28,240	28,913	29,593	29,650[b]
Per capita national income, percent increase over previous year	3.3	3.4	3.4	2.4	2.4	0.2[b]

[a] Calculations here are for "national income produced." All data are in base-year 1977 prices.

[b] Per capita figures for 1981 are very much in doubt. Only rough data are available, and the effects of a bad harvest and curbing of imports are likely to make data for "national income used" far worse than those for "national income produced."

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: *Statisticka rocenka Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky 1981* (Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1981), Prague, SNTL, 1981, pp. 20–21; *Statisticke prehledy* (Prague), No. 10, 1981; *Rude pravo* (Prague), Feb. 2, 1982; and, for the percentages, the author's own calculations. For comparability with 1975, the data for 1976 were restated in base-year 1967 prices. This yields a lower 1976 growth of overall national income than is suggested by the data given in *Statisticka rocenka 1981*, pp. 20–21. That this 3.7 figure is more realistic is confirmed by the 3.3 growth in per capita national income in 1976 indicated on p. 316 of the cited issue of *Statisticke prehledy*.

---

[28] See, for example, Ladislav Laurinec, "Decisive Importance of Economic Cooperation with the USSR," *Revue obchodu, prumyslu, hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 2, 1982, pp. 6–7.

[29] Rudolf Rohlicek, Deputy Federal Prime Minister and Czechoslovakia's representative to CMEA, in an interview with the Czechoslovak Press Agency (CTK), June 15, 1981.

[30] See Leo Dobes, *Czechoslovak Economic Relations with the Developing Countries*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford, 1980, especially pp. 241–303. On the international arms trade, see the annual volumes of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC) and *World Armaments and Disarmament* (published by SIPRI, Stockholm), plus arms trade registers of individual countries.

[31] Soviet oil deliveries to other CMEA countries are also being cut. See, for example, the Michael Dobbs story filed from Prague, "Burdened Soviets Plan to Cut Back Energy Sales to Eastern Bloc by 10%," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 11, 1981.

Lubomir Strougal point to the possibility of an even greater reduction. According to Strougal, the overall decrease of Czechoslovak imports of fuel and energy would amount to 2.6 million metric tons of standard fuel equivalent in 1982 and 3.5 million tons in each of the remaining three years of the present quinquennium, as against 1980 quantities. Czechoslovakia imported some 19.3 million tons of crude oil in 1980.[32] Whether 10 percent or greater, a cut of this magnitude is virtually impossible to absorb without closing down or at least severely cutting back some production programs.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to view Czechoslovakia's economic problems as solely the result of the admittedly severe oil shock. By its size and strength, Czechoslovakia should have been able to survive the adversity as well as Western economies have done. Indeed, Czechoslovakia's socialist neighbor Hungary, which has persevered in economic reforms, has demonstrated an ability to cushion the shock of worsening terms of trade. In 1981, Hungary recorded a 1.8 percent growth in national income as against a nearly zero growth in Czechoslovakia.[33] Clearly, there are serious deficiencies beyond energy supply and cost that plague the Czechoslovak economic system.

Overcommitment to Investment

As already suggested, the construction sector is the least satisfactory economic sector in Czechoslovakia today. Its malaise reflects abysmal failures in the regime's investment policies and organizational skills. Even *Rude pravo* acknowledged this in a July 29, 1981 editorial:

> *The fact that three quarters of all construction firms failed to meet their planned targets [in the first half of 1981] signals perhaps the worst result ever achieved since socialism began to be built in Czechoslovakia.*

Construction work at the site of the V-2 nuclear power plant, being built at Jaslovske Bohunice in western Slovakia with Soviet aid.

—CTK via Eastfoto.

Projects confidently blueprinted by central planners are not completed on time. This ties up resources and plays havoc with the planning process because output scheduled to derive from the new facilities is not forthcoming. By the end of the 1980, some 30,000 industrial building sites stood half finished.[34] Valued at 525 billion crowns,[35] this tied-up capital compares with a total value of 2,500 billion Kcs for all capital funds in the Czechoslovak national economy at the end of 1980.[36] Moreover, on an annual basis, the volume of funds sunk into newly launched projects has been consistently greater than the combined value of completed projects and of the output deriving from them. In 1980, the value of capital funds in the economy increased by 8 percent, but industrial output grew only by 3 percent.[37]

In its investment policies, the Czechoslovak government may have committed a mistake comparable to that of the Gierek regime's indulgence in foreign credits and loans, except of course that the Czechoslovak push for speedy growth was largely self-financed. In both instances, policymakers made their country heavily dependent on things that they were eventually unable to put to efficient use: loans and credits from the West in the case of Poland and a mass of inoperative domestic investment in Czechoslovakia. The Poles have found it impossible to service their debts; the Czechoslovaks, their own expansion.

By 1980, even the most inveterate Czechoslovak defenders of extensive industrial growth seemed to have come to their senses. A reorientation in investment policy toward intensive modernization was decreed, and a zero growth rate for investment was set for the 1981–85 plan period.[38]

---

[32] See the account of a Strougal speech in Ostrava, *Rude pravo*, Jan. 27, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[33] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1981*, Geneva, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1982, Ch. 3.

[34] See Florian Kanis and Julius Krajci, "Leave the Path of Investment Romanticism," *Pravda*, July 11, 1981, p. 3.

[35] See Otto Sedlacek, "How to Make the Number of Unfinished Projects Optimal," *ibid.*, July 22, 1981, p. 5.

[36] "On the Threshold of the Seventh Five-Year Plan," editorial in *Investicni vystavba* (Prague), No. 1, 1981, p. 3.

[37] Jaroslav Sykora, "Investment and the Outlook for Economic Development," *Tribuna*, Apr. 29, 1981, p. 13. In fact, old and outmoded factories seem to have more success than brand new ones in fulfilling plan quotas.

Czechoslovakia's planners are apparently working on two variants of a "maneuver" that they hope will lower the amount of funds tied up in unfinished projects, with a turn for the better expected five or six years hence. In the first variant, completion of projects is to be pushed (to the tune of an additional 20 billion Kcs in 1982 alone), to lower the total value of capital tied up in construction to below 400 billion by around 1987. The alternative is to make drastic cuts in investment expenditure for some two to four years, to be followed by a still moderate investment phase lasting another four to six years.[39] In either case, the maneuver is admittedly the most demanding one in 30 years—i.e., since the nationalization of industry and the first wave of agricultural collectivization.[40]

Use of the word "maneuver" rather than "reform" is surely symptomatic. Poland's Gierek employed the word "maneuver" when Poland plunged into foreign debt and then again when it tried to extricate itself from that debt. While other designations have also been applied in the Czechoslovak case, for example, "a decisive transfer" or "a structural reorientation" in investment policy,[41] the goal is not to change the rules of the economic game. Everything is to be done on command from the center, and the enterprises are to have even less room for independent decisions than they have enjoyed heretofore.

Planning on the Wane

Ironically, with all the emphasis on central control, planning is of decreasing utility in the management of the Czechoslovak economy. This is true both of long-term (five-year) and annual plans.

How little real bearing the 1981–85 five-year plan has can be seen from the fact that it was adopted only in December 1981—i.e., at the end of the first year in the period for which the plan was to direct the economy—and then only in the form of a guideline.[42] Targets by then had already been scaled down from earlier drafts,[43] and they will almost certainly be trimmed again. For example, the goal for growth in national income was originally set at 14–16 percent for the whole 1981–85 period, implying an annual growth rate of 2.7–3.0 percent. In December 1981, the target was slashed to 10–14 percent, or 1.9–2.7 percent annually. Official reports suggest that national income increased only 0.2 percent in 1981,[44] and even this is probably an overestimation—national income may actually have declined by 1 or perhaps 2 percent.[45] The 1982 annual plan stipulates a growth rate of only 0.6. percent.[46] Clearly, only a miraculous performance in 1983–85 would enable Czechoslovakia to achieve the gigantic economic advance envisaged in the five-year design.

Table 3: Czechoslovakia's Plan(s) and Results for 1981

(percent change from 1980)

	Original plan	Adjusted plan	Reported results
National income produced	2.8	n.a.	0.2
Industrial output	2.7	2.3	2.0
Productivity in industry	2.2	2.3	1.6
Volume of construction work	2.8	2.7	−2.0
Productivity in construction trade	2.8	2.1	−1.3
Agricultural output	2.6	n.a.	−3.4

SOURCES: for original plan, *Statisticke prehledy* (Prague), No. 3, 1981, pp. 78–79; for the adjusted plan, ibid., No. 1, 1982, pp. 8–9; for results, *Rude pravo* (Prague), Feb. 3, 1982, pp. 1–3.

As is evident from the experience in 1981, annual planning is only a shade more viable than five-year planning in Czechoslovakia. The 1981 plan was adjusted downward during the year in various sectors so as to make it softer for the stragglers, and even the lower figures proved ultimately too high to be met by substantial sections of industry and by agriculture. The latter experienced a particularly bad shortfall in grain production (see Table 3). A *Rude pravo* editorial of February 3, 1982, admitted that the results for 1981

> *reveal that the process of economic intensification is not continuing at a sufficient pace. . . . One must remember that we planned to achieve more, but the resources that were created made the task impossible.*

One is justified in deducing that planning from the center has lost the greater part of its economic influence, while of course it retains political and ideological meaning and a certain measure of coercive effect. In place of planning, the authorities have felt impelled to resort to crisis management through ad hoc decrees adjusting particular behavior of enterprises, regulating money flows from the center, imposing additional taxes on industry, and mounting austerity programs one after another—each of them tighter than the preceding one. Planned determination of prices is no longer fully feasible. Rather, prices reflect increasing subsidies and are manipulated outside the planning process. In October 1981, the prices of gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and lubricants were increased by 25–75 percent.[47] In January 1982, prices of meat, cigarettes, wine, rum, Czechoslovak-made vodka, rice, and restaurant meals went up. The increases ranged from 17 to 41 percent for the various groups of products. While some meat cuts remained cheap, the price of others rose by as much as 120 percent.[48]

---

[38] "Law on the Seventh Five-Year Plan," *Sbirka Zakonu* (Prague), Dec. 15, 1981, Article 7b. In fact, total investment outlays in 1981 were 3.7 percent lower than in 1980. See the report on plan fulfillment in *Rude pravo*, Feb. 2, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[39] Sedlacek, loc. cit.

[40] Ibid.

[41] See, for example, Josef Haman's speech at the 1981 Builders' Day Celebration, as reported in *Rude pravo*, July 13, 1981, p. 2.

[42] See "Law on the Seventh Five-Year Plan," *Rude pravo*, Dec. 15, 1981, pp. 1–3.

[43] Cf. "Directives for the Seventh Five-Year Plan," ibid., Feb. 28, 1981, appendix.

[44] "Report of the Federal Statistical Office," ibid., Feb. 2, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[45] The official figures so far available permit computation only of "produced national income,"—i.e., only value added—rather than "used national income."

[46] *Rude pravo*, Dec. 16, 1981, pp. 1–2.

The Economy and Leadership Politics

It is not surprising that economic problems dominate the agenda of Czechoslovakia's leadership. Economic issues clearly reflect all the political and ideological tangles that the establishment has invited for itself. Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev was right when he told his Czechoslovak hosts at the CPCS congress in April 1981 that the economy had become "the main front" for all the socialist countries; the solution of economic problems, the priority task of ideological-educational work of all the Communist parties.[40]

The seriousness of the economic challenge—underscored by Poland's plunge over the economic precipice yawning before all of Eastern Europe—is generally recognized in Prague. Federal Prime Minister Strougal, a member of the CPCS Central Committee's Presidium, has called the economic problems facing Czechoslovakia in the present five-year period "unprecedented in their scope and complexity," a "great trial."[50] Milos Jakes, a secretary of the CPCS Central Committee and Presidium member, defined the "strategic task" to be transformation of an extensive, growth-oriented economic mechanism into a frugal, intensive, and modernized one. Like others, Jakes viewed this undertaking as comparable in importance and difficulty to industrialization and to collectivization of agriculture.[51] Such comparisons with earlier critical junctures in the course of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia indicate the leadership's concern about the gravity of the present situation.

Lubomir Strougal, Premier of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, delivers a report on the "Main Directions of the Economic and Social Development of Czechoslovakia for 1981–85" at the 16th party congress in April 1981.

—CTK via EASTFOTO.

Although the main objectives are commonly accepted, there is less concurrence on how to attain them. Vasil Bilak, the ideologist, advocates ideological and political mobilization. Thus, at a meeting of the CPCS Central Committee last October, he said that the present economic difficulties could be overcome "if we mobilize the whole of the party and the National Front; if we tighten party, state, work and technological disciplines; and if the standard of management is brought up to current requirements."[52]

Not all of Bilak's comrades in the leadership appear willing to continue to rely on exhortation as an effective instrument of economic advance. A modicum of technocratic reformism, though not necessarily of a market orientation, is discernible. For example, Strougal has called for "opening up avenues for further progress toward a qualitative transformation of the system of management." He pleads for the use of "value tools"—such as prices, profits, realistic monetary rates, and credits—without which it is impossible "to measure and influence efficiency." He also speaks of "the irreplaceable power of material stimulation."[53] Some students of Czechoslovak affairs believe that the group of timid "minireformers" around Strougal includes the Federal Finance Minister, Leopold Ler, and the present Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Svatopluk Potac.[54]

---

[47] Ibid., Oct. 15, 1981, pp. 1–2.

[48] Ibid., Jan. 27, 1982, pp. 1–3, and Jan. 30, 1982, p. 2.

[49] *Rude pravo*, Apr. 11, 1981, p. 1.

[50] Speech at a CPCS Central Committee session, as reported in ibid., Oct. 31, 1981, pp. 3–4.

[51] Speech at a meeting to commemorate the February 1948 takeover, as reported in ibid., Feb. 26, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[52] Reported in ibid., Oct. 30, 1981, p. 3.

The Strougal perspective has found support among some circles of expert policy advisers. An unexpected boost, or at least a call for innovation in conceptual solutions, came from Vaclav Kves, Rector of the Party Political School. Kves exhorted Czechoslovak economists not to rely on old experience but to advance constructive proposals based on research and new theoretical conclusions. He called on "certain central agencies and their officials" to stop meddling in economic control by enforcing ill-thought-out "macrostructural changes."[55] Similarly, Jaroslav Vejvoda, an associate professor at the Prague School of Economics, has forcefuly criticized the abandonment of the market principle (which he calls "supply-demand" and "commodity-monetary relations") at an early stage in the post-1968 "normalization." This "critical denial of reformist ideas" and blind return to "the status quo ante in socialist economic management," Vejvoda argues, left Czechoslovakia without "instruments with which to switch the economy onto an effective track."[56]

Never to be ignored in any assessment of the policy direction to be adopted by the CPCS Presidium are the views of Moscow. Significantly, Milos Jakes, a Presidium member known for his good contacts in Moscow, has been granted additional power in economic matters.[57] Indeed, hardly a day now passes without reference from high Czechoslovak quarters to the importance of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries in finding a way out of the dire straits. CMEA integration is particularly highly touted.[58]

Milos Jakes, a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and—since June 1981—chairman of its Economic Commission.

—CTK via EUPRA.

Another factor of potential importance in the Czechoslovak political equation is Alois Indra, the man originally pegged by the Russians to lead a "workers' and peasants' revolutionary government" to replace Dubcek in the wake of the 1968 invasion,[59] but who subsequently had a falling-out with Husak and was relegated to the largely ornamental post of Federal Assembly Chairman. This March, Indra published an important article criticizing passivity, defeatism, opportunism, and nepotism in the CPCS. He issued a thinly veiled call for another purge:

> *In the interest of the party's authority . . . we are duty-bound actively . . . to suppress all signs of passivity and capitulationism. The "how numerous are we?" will always be the less important question. The "what are we?" is definitely more decisive.*[60]

Indra's pitch reminds one of Bilak's, and the former is also said to have good connections with Moscow. However, one hesitates to regard the two as political bedfellows.

---

[53] In ibid., Mar. 31, 1982, pp. 1–3.

[54] A number of speeches and articles by Ler and Potac support this interpretation. See, for example, Ler's broadcast on Radio Prague, Dec. 14, 1981, 1000 hours, and Potac's article in *Planovane hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 1, 1982, pp. 1–8.

[55] *Politicka ekonomie* (Prague), No. 1, 1982, pp. 1–10.

[56] *Hospodarske noviny* (Prague), Oct. 23, 1981, p. 4.

[57] Jakes became chairman of the CPCS's Economic Commission in June 1981. He is simultaneously a full member of the Presidium and a Central Committee secretary.

[58] See, for example, the editorial "The Key Importance of Cooperation with the USSR," *Rude pravo*, Jan. 25, 1982, p. 1.

[59] Indra's role in 1968 was described by Zdenek Mlynar (among others). See his *Nachtfrost* (Nightfrost), Köln, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978.

[60] *Nove slovo*, Mar. 11, 1982, pp. 1–3. For another article which hammers home the need for greater vigor among the Communists, see *Pravda*, Mar. 11, 1982, p. 1.

Presiding over the whole assortment of ideologists, party activators, quasi-technocrats, CMEA integrationists, and nonentities comprising the Communist leadership in Czechoslovakia today is Gustav Husak, who is simultaneously party General Secretary and President of the country. In his name and under his unquestionably skillful political leadership, the CPCS wiped out the reformism of the Prague Spring and achieved dubious fame as the harshest and domestically least tolerant member state of the Soviet bloc in the 1970's, not excluding East Germany and Bulgaria. Having defeated reformism, Husak gradually evolved from the Great Normalizer into a consensus preserver and advocate of a status quo that was largely of his own creation. He has doubtless acted in the Soviet interest and perhaps even aspires to replicate in Czechoslovakia the role Leonid Brezhnev has so successfully played in Moscow. But Husak is a derivative, subordinate political figure. And as in Brezhnev's USSR, so in Husak's Czechoslovakia, consensual conservative politics have become a dead hand on economic advance.

Informed foreigners returning from visits to Czechoslovakia talk about Husak's waning influence in all except one aspect of party politics. He is still able to hold the party Presidium in a state of uneasy equilibrium. But the price is "no innovation." No one appears courageous enough to make a radical move, lest the Presidium's balance be lost or lest he find himself exposed to a concerted onslaught by the others. "If it moves, shoot," seems to be the rule. One is tempted to recall Bohumir Smeral's lament of more than 60 years ago: "Events rush past, they drag men along, as they have always done."

What Is to Be Done?

The limits that constrain the Czechoslovak leadership in 1982 constitute a formidable straitjacket. While options exist, none of them is very promising.

First, the CPCS might pursue a Hungarian-style, market-oriented reform. Even were Prague to obtain Moscow's endorsement for such a course—which is by no means assured—the CPCS's implicit admission of having made a cardinal mistake in the vindictive policies following the Prague Spring would likely shake, and possibly shatter, the ideological consensus among the party's leaders. Time is another limiting factor. The accumulated economic problems demand an early remedy. Yet, one does not change from a command to a market economy overnight. Moreover, the conceptual underpinning and practical preparations for such a transformation have been destroyed under "normalization."

Proponents of modest reforms in the Czechoslovak economic system: left, Leopold Ler, Federal Finance Minister; right, Svatopluk Potac, Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

—CTK via EUPRA.

A second approach—modernization via Western assistance—also appears foreclosed. Such a strategy would require foreign credits, but Poland's current adversity makes Czechoslovakia's doctrinal purists dead set against heavy borrowing. In the words of Bilak, "anyone who incurs undue debts in the West is like a Christian who sells his soul to the devil."[61] The East German example—insofar as it complements heightened domestic efforts with steady access to easy and cheap credits—is negated for virtually the same reason.

What remains is the tired conventional wisdom of Communist governance. This consists of three basic elements: tinkering with the economic mechanism and economic policies; exhortation and tightening of discipline; and close embrace of a policy of integration within CMEA, particularly with the Soviet economy.

The chances are that, as so many times in their history, the Czechoslovak Communist leaders will once again let Moscow make their choice for them. So far, such decisions have made Czechoslovakia a country of reduced political, cultural, and intellectual circumstances. They may now lead the country to economic disaster.

---

[61] Speech at the October 1981 CPCS Central Committee session, loc. cit.

Books

China's Economic Development: Demise of a Model

By Jan S. Prybyla

ROBERT F. DERNBERGER, Ed. *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980.

JOHN F. JONES, Ed. *Building China: Studies in Integrated Development.* Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, distributed by the University of Washington Press, 1980.

PHILIP C. C. HUANG, Ed. *The Development of Underdevelopment in China.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC development has been the subject of much interest and scholarly attention in the West—and for good reasons. The most obvious is, of course, the sheer head count. But when this is added to the scarcity of farmland and the deficiency in technology, a developmental problem of awesome dimensions emerges.

Even without official figures for many years, it has always been theoretically possible through extrapolation and visual evidence to arrive at a fairly astute assessment of China's developmental performance since its completion of initial reconstruction in 1952. Between that year and 1980, per capita national income (in the Chinese definition, net material product, which includes "nonproductive" services like government and retail trade) increased about three times; the gross value of industrial output, more than seven times; agricultural output, 1.7 times; and foreign trade turnover, more than four times.

That is a respectable performance for any developing country. Many countries have done much worse; a few have done much better.

But China has fascinated many observers more for things other than its growth rates. Among these have been its apparent concern with the equity of income distribution (including the guaranteed grain and cooking oil allotment in the countryside, urban rationing of basic necessities, and a consumer goods pricing policy oriented toward the poor), its remarkably stable (until recently) domestic prices, its full employment, its balanced budgets, and its lack of significant indebtedness on foreign account. The fusion of the Soviet centralized planning model with Maoist "newborn socialist things" (for example, the cooperative medical service, the revolutionary committees, the three-tiered organization of the people's communes) and age-old hardheadedness (resort to semitraditional technology, as in the "five small" industries) deeply impressed many people in the West, and not just professional left-wingers.

With rare exceptions, Western reporting on China's economics was upbeat, often enthusiastic and laudatory. At the very least, every mass campaign—including the biggest of them all, the Cultural Revolution—was combed for its constructive contributions, while the damage caused en route was skimmed over or dismissed as the inevitable price one had to pay for revolutionary change and a better tomorrow. China was a country without flies, dirt, and crime. Its happy combination of material progress, equity, and moral probity constituted a new societal model from which other developing (and developed) countries could learn. People were fed and clothed "adequately," they had a roof over their heads, they were in decent physical health, the worst social abuses had been rectified (in part by repeated "study" imposed on powerholders), and a spirit of healthy asceticism—long lost in the consumerist West and in revisionist Russia—made people content with simple pleasures. This was the net picture that emerged, although the precise argument was couched more cautiously and qualified by many clauses and disclaimers.

Then something happened to deeply upset this pastoral odyssey. After the death of Mao and the arrest of the "gang of four" (the midwives, together with Mao, of the newborn socialist things), a flood of economic, social, political, and cultural horror stories poured forth from Beijing. There had been growth, yes, but the growth was highly skewed and erratic. Balanced development with agriculture as its centerpiece was, we were told, a myth. Asceticism had been forced down people's throats, as had been excessive egalitarianism, now accused of playing havoc with the incentive structure. The increase in industrial real wages had been minimal for more than 20 years, and in agriculture, real per capita incomes had stagnated or declined (per capita income from work in the rural social sector was less than US$56 a year in 1979). The investment rate was excessive, and much investment had been squandered. Full employment had been bought at the price of underemployment and low and falling labor productivity. The efficiency of enterprise operations was dismal, not just in the neglected light industry but in priority heavy industry as well. While soil melioration, water conservancy, and afforestation had been pursued with one hand, enormous ecological damage had been done with the other through wrong-headed grain-first policies. Gross violations of personal rights had taken place, with the abuses having been directed not only against those whose social categories were "incorrect" but against peasants, intellectuals, national minorities, and others—some 100 million persons in all. Suddenly, there were flies, there was dirt, and there was crime. Exit utopia. Enter pragmatism. Exit cadres "helicoptered" by the Cultural Revolution. Reenter the old guard, modernization banners flying. The traumatic seeking of truth from facts, as Deng Xiaoping put it, peaked in the Democracy Movement of 1978–79. Much that until then had been hidden from the eyes of outsiders, or would not be seen by visitors, was spread out for all to see.

A good portion of Western literature on the Chinese economy written in the late 1960's and early 1970's was thus put right out of business. However, since the presses could not be stopped, much less reversed, more of the same kept coming for a while longer. The blood-and-sweat model of Dazhai, for example, was still being academically dissected in the West while already discredited in China. So were egalitarian modes of income distribution.

When the dust settled in early

Reviewers in This Issue

JAN S. PRYBYLA—Professor of Economics, Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA); author of *The Political Economy of Communist China*, 1970, *The Chinese Economy: Problems and Policies*, 1978 and 1981, and *Issues in Socialist Economic Modernization*, 1981.

PHILIP DION—Washington, DC–based journalist; former editor of *Asian Business & Industry* and former associate editor of *Far Eastern Economic Review;* author of numerous articles and book reviews on the economy and politics of East and Southeast Asia.

AUREL BRAUN—Associate Professor in the Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto; author of *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy*, 1978, and of numerous articles dealing with Eastern Europe.

KAREN DAWISHA—Fellow of the Center for International Studies, London School of Economics; the recipient of a Rockefeller International Relations Fellowship for a project on the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East; author of *Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt*, 1979.

ASTRID VON BORCKE—Researcher at the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche and internationale Studien (Cologne); author of many articles and books on Soviet domestic politics, including *Die Ursprünge des Bolschewismus: Die jakobinische Tradition in Russland und die Theorie der revolutionären Diktatur* (The Origins of Bolshevism: The Jacobin Tradition in Russia and the Theory of the Revolutionary Dictatorship), 1979, and (with Gerhard Simon) *Neue Wege der Sowjet Union-Forschung* (New Directions in Research on the Soviet Union), 1981.

HARLEY D. BALZER—Research Fellow, the Program in Science, Technology, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA), and Research Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA); currently completing a monograph on technical training and the engineering profession in Russia and editing a volume on professions in tsarist Russia.

DOUGLAS S. BLAUFARB—retired overseas operations officer for the US Central Intelligence Agency; consultant and author of articles and works on counterinsurgency, insurgency, and terrorism, including *The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present*, 1977.

PETER W. RODMAN—Staff Associate in Diplomatic Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University (Washington, DC); from 1969 to 1977, a member of the staff of the US National Security Council and special assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; author of articles and book reviews on foreign policy in such publications as *Commentary*, *The American Spectator*, and *The Washington Quarterly*.

1981, people stopped talking about the "Chinese model" because the model had been largely dismantled and the wrecking crews were still hard at work (e.g., on the concept of commune). Instead of "Is the Chinese developmental model transferable to other countries?" the question now became: "What developmental model can the Chinese borrow to get them out of their bind?" At one point, there was even open talk in China about how well Taiwan had done. That, however, did not last. What is important is that the model was taken apart, not as an act of vengeance by the formerly oppressed and now ascendant party regulars, but because the model did not work in its most quintessential form. It was particularly deficient in terms of economic calculation—that is, in promoting least-cost growth, "intensive" growth, and allocative optimality. The output side, while not perfect, was satisfactory. The input side was a mess.

SO IT IS with eager anticipation that one turns to the three recently published books on Chinese development under consideration here, expecting to get help in their more than 600 pages to better find one's bearings. Unfortunately, all three, in different degrees, are a big letdown.

China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective is at first glance the most impressive, if only because it is the thickest (347 pages) and peopled with scholars of high repute in both the broad field of economic development and the narrower one of China's economy. The binding theme is the relevance of China's experience to that of other developing countries, although this theme is not always adhered to in the individual essays, as specialists pursue their favorite subjects and tack on some comments on transferability at the end.

While there is much that is interesting and useful in the book, one leaves it disappointed. The problem is that the book is in large measure obsolete. In their dust jacket blurb, the publishers deny this. The analysis of China's fundamental organization presented in the book, they say, "will not soon be outdated." Wrong. Large parts of the book are obsolete because of the huge amount of information that has become available since 1976, changes in leadership temper and perspective, and the demystification and now-advanced decomposition of the so-called Chinese model.

The problem is capsulized in some of the first words used by Benjamin Ward in his chapter on "The Chinese Approach to Economic Development": "The key [Chinese] task for the next generation or so is not modernization but the stabilization of a humane agrarian regime." It crops up again in parts of Dwight Perkins's analysis of "The Central Features of China's Economic Development" ("borrowing from abroad in order to increase imports is regarded as a particularly dangerous method of expanding trade"), and in Thomas Rawski's sanguine account of China's technological history since 1960, especially as regards the authority of professional managerial and technical staff within industrial units and the strong emphasis put on such things as cost and quality control. According to Rawski—but not according to the post-1976 Chinese analysis—these policies, instituted in 1961, were "maintained without major change to the present day." (So what happened to the Cultural Revolution?)

The book finally appeared in 1980. By this juncture, China's world had changed very significantly. The immanence of this change, its historical foundations and direction are not captured by the essays. What the book demonstrates, if indeed demonstration is needed, is that economic analysis remains an art or, at best, a very "soft" science.

In the wrap-up chapter ("Is the Model Transferable?"), editor Robert Dernberger and Françoise Le Gall try to contain the damage to the book's concept wrought by time. The model in toto is not transferable, but some of its myriad techniques "could be of great use to other developing countries." Their "ironic" conclusion:

> *Although China's development experience over the past three decades has been cited by many as a successful model for other developing countries, the dramatic events in China since the death of Mao have seen the Chinese leaders hold forth Western science, technology, and even economic principles and methods as a necessary solution to their development problem.*

The irony resides perhaps in the fact that this statement was made by conceptual model-builders who did not have to live in the real-life model.

Some of the difficulties with any economic model are due to the difference between how the model is supposed to work (e.g., consultation in the process of planning) and how it actually works ("commandism"). Beyond that, there was in the Maoist Chinese model an undoubted appeal to the utopian socialist streak in some people—particularly the intellectuals. The fact is, however, that the basic behavioral assumptions of the model are flawed. Most people will put up with asceticism (low living standards) because they have no choice, but they will not go out on their own and look for poverty—not even most monks and nuns these days. If the fruits of labor are distributed in the form of pats on the back (moral incentives), there will not be much fruit. If they are distributed equally among all the fruit growers, most will sit back, relax, and help themselves from the common pot, for extra effort is not worth their while. Learning by doing is fine, but it is a costly way of learning because it often means learning by spoiling. Economic planners, factory managers, and nuclear scientists do not really gain much by rubbing shoulders with poor and lower-middle peasants and production-line workers. In fact, they all may end up disliking each other more than before. Meantime, the experts lose their expertise, and the planned economy loses its planners. These problems are not really addressed by the book.

THAT IS where the second of the three volumes comes in. *Building China: Studies in Integrated Development* is a collection of studies on a variety of developmental topics by members of the faculty of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The thematic thread here is "integrated development," which is defined by editor John F. Jones as the coalescence of "economic progress and social betterment."

Sobered by one's experience with the first book, one approaches the second with critical sensors greatly sharpened. It proves to be a wise course, for the book adds very little to what is already known about both Chinese economic progress and social betterment.

In his introduction, Jones warns the reader that there may be "from chapter to chapter different slants, biases, and even conclusions. But that, after all, is the nature of open enquiry." This reviewer does not detect such variety. On the contrary, there is a certain slanted consistency to the volume which one might describe as "armchair socialist."

To say this is not to impugn in any way the obvious effort by all concerned to strive for scholarly objectivity. In the interest of objectivity, however, one need not bend over backward to swallow even the most incompatible things that come out of the mouths of Chinese official spokesmen. Broad generalizations—regarding the rural commune system, for example—are drawn from guided visits to and briefings at a couple of communes. Much of the information is obsolete. The post-1977 system of production responsibility in the countryside, which represents a potentially significant systemic change (amounting in some places to de facto decollectivization), is hardly mentioned. Some of the chapters read a little like the transcripts of travelers' briefing notes that used to appear in the papers in the early 1970's and that went something like this: Traveler's question: "What is the crime rate in Shanghai?" Cadre's answer: "The crime rate in Shanghai is zero." It is disappointing that students of China located right on China's doorstep, with rich informational resources presumably at their command and Chinese culture in their bones, cannot produce something more penetrating, novel, and insightful.

There are also occasional statements that are questionable on factual grounds. It is asserted, for example, that after 1970, the "well defined" agricultural policy "certainly helped to raise the income of the communes and, therefore, of the peasants." This does not seem to be accurate.

Marxism is a theory of both "fairness" of income distribution and growth through the intervention of the material productive forces. In Mao's model, political consciousness, sharpened through mass mobilization, would lead to fairness, which would lead to growth. Now, growth through a calculated harnessing of the productive forces ("objective economic laws") comes first, and perhaps eventually it will generate fairness at a higher level of income. The book does not really come to grips with the issue of the trade-off between fairness and growth—which is a pity, because it is the central issue in integrated development.

THE STORY behind the last book, *The Development of Underdevelopment in China*, seems to be the following. In 1978, Victor Lippit, an associate professor at the University of California, Riverside, submitted an article to *Modern China*. In his article, Lippit did three things. First, he gave a thumbnail sketch of Chinese economic history since 960. Second, he critically examined and rejected the major theories that had been advanced in the past to explain (each by itself alone) the development of underdevelopment in China—Ragnar Nurkse's vicious circle of poverty, Paul Baran's and K. Griffin's colonialism and imperialism, and Mark Elvin's high-level equilibrium trap. As a review of these constructs, this part of Lippit's article is useful for the general reader unacquainted with theories of underdevelopment that had been floating around academia for years. Third, Lippit advanced his own understanding of the development of underdevelopment in China:

> *China became an underdeveloped country in the late imperial era because the interest of the gentry class was in preserving the status quo, because the economic and social changes associated with economic development would have undermined the social order that provided everything it wanted. And China remained an underdeveloped country in the first half of the twentieth century because the class structure and relations of production remained largely unchanged. . . . The development of underdevelopment in China, then should be understood in terms of the emergence of a constellation of domestic*

forces inhibiting progress, into which a rapacious West intruded.

The editors of *Modern China* apparently found this thesis sufficiently weighty to make it the basis of a symposium that included some of the people whose theories Lippit had criticized. The results were then published in July 1978 and, for reasons that are not altogether clear, later republished in book form (1980).

One of the participants in the symposium comments thus:

> *Possibly there are yet some students of modern China to whom it is a novel proposition that the interests of the mainstream of the gentry and the Confucian ideology which protected them were inimical to modern economic development. It is difficult to believe, however, that the weight of that useful proposition is increased merely—and this is all that Lippit adds for his innocent readers—by the wisdom implicit in the words "class" and "relations of production." Except for those incredibly isolated from useful books, these sobriquets can hardly arouse now any sense of new discovery.*

This sets the tone for one of those testy academic storms in a teacup that, in the estimation of this reviewer, serves no useful purpose. Granted that Lippit's thesis is slim, what point is there in building a symposium around it and then republishing the whole thing as a book?

MY CRITICAL appraisal of these three recent works dealing with the origins of China's underdevelopment and the country's socialist construction is not intended to belittle the effort that the authors involved have expended to arrive at an assessment of the record. As with earlier studies of state socialist economies (notably of the Soviet prototype), outside workers who labor in this field are greatly hampered by the Communists' obsession with secrecy—the broad definition of paramilitary state economic secrets—and the Leninist view of statistics as weapons to be used in the cause of proletarian dictatorship. When faced with spotty, disjointed, and selective information about the economy, these workers, in the interest of scholarly objectivity, tend to put the best construction on what is rationed out to them by the authorities. Their tools of analysis are in themselves less than optimal. They were designed to deal primarily with market-oriented systems, and are imperfect even at that. Certainly, they are not foolproof political lie-detectors. For these and other reasons, therefore, students of state socialist economies need to marshal other sources of information, including refugee testimony, and to make use of historical experience that is by now abundant. Ultimately, such healthy skepticism and historical common sense pay off in the accuracy of conclusions.

After an interlude during which the post-Mao leadership traced almost all of China's developmental ills to leftist illusions and the arrogance of the gang of four, official diagnosis has become comparatively more perceptive and less facile. In addition to policy errors, there loomed at all times, as is now recognized, an awesome objective obstacle to development and social betterment—namely, factor proportions. The administrative command system succeeded only very partially in dealing with this problem. Current official analysis, however, still has a dangerous propensity to regard the pre-1958 systemic arrangements as by and large correct and to endow them with positive qualities they did not, in fact, possess. This is to say that the current diagnostic pragmatism is relative and in danger of being swept aside if the material aspirations it raises are not fulfilled within a reasonably brief time span.

The fundamental challenge to China's policymakers is to halt the slide toward a "lemon" socialism, in which the state subsidizes most of its sources of revenue, including industry, agriculture, and transportation. The remedies are at best elusive, at worst extremely painful and fraught with political perils. But they are not beyond reach.

Communism and Philippine Reality

By Philip Dion

RENATO CONSTANTINO (with Letizia R. Constantino). *A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War.* New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1975.

RENATO CONSTANTINO (with Letizia R. Constantino). *The Philippines: The Continuing Past.* Quezon City, The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978.

BENEDICT J. KERKVLIET. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

HALF A CENTURY after its birth, the Communist movement in the Philippines still lacks a comprehensive study. The wonder is why, for its history contains all the elements of a 20th-century saga—including whole families caught up in the ideological struggle, intense squabbling among the movement's high priests, and a nucleus of major actors who have lived to see their own historic acts analyzed, argued over, and rejected.

The material seems to be there, available for facile narration and consideration in neat time frames. For instance, one section could run from the obscure founding of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas—PKP) in 1930 through the Depression and World War II, detailing especially the PKP's formation of an effective anti-Japanese guerrilla force—the People's Army to Fight the Japanese (Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon—or "Huks").

A second part might relate how, following disbandment and supposed disarmament in 1945, the Huks resurfaced—this time as a response to extensive repression and abuse of peasants—and carried on full-scale guerrilla war in the heart of the Philippines into the early 1950's. It would also tell how the rebellion was quelled and most of its leaders were jailed, leaving the PKP moribund until the late 1960's.

Still another section could tell how a new generation in the 1960's, reacting to the economic injustices of the times, established the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist), or CPP (M-L), and in 1969 created a new guerrilla force, the New People's Army, with the objective of overthrowing the government. The CPP (M-L) saw its founding leaders captured just a few years later, while freed PKP leaders publicly espoused parliamentary accession to power and actually cooperated with a right-wing martial-law government.

But it would be a little more difficult to find a clear theme for the final—most recent—period. Although the elements of the story still seem to exist, they may not be of sufficient import to relate at any length. This raises a recurrent question about the entire history of communism in the Philippines: Does it really yield a story that has all that much relevance to the larger history of the society in which it is unfolding? Let us examine some recent works for what they may contribute to our understanding of this issue.

AMONG the few general histories of the Philippines that discuss communism in the island nation in its relevant historical framework are the two recent volumes by Renato Constantino reviewed here. Unfortunately, learning much from either of them is a daunting task.

Constantino floats back and forth between a kind of loose leftist, nationalist polemic and relatively unencumbered exposition of historical high points. His *History of the Philippines* provides useful thumbnail sketches of (1) peasant grievances against landlords in the 1920's and 1930's and resulting peasant organizations, leaders, and uprisings; and (2) early labor groups. Both are strands that contributed to the formation of the PKP. His general theme is that "labor unions and peasant movements finally evolved into radical political associations of workers and peasants" (p. 343). He observes that peasant-worker "mass actions" of the 1930's brought about a "new level of political consciousness and organization" (p. 372), and he closes the volume with a description of Central Luzon just before the beginning of the Pacific War, i.e., at a time when rallies, demonstrations, and some violence caused a dozen provinces to be placed under Constabulary control and "the projection . . . was for heightened conflict" (p. 382).

The second Constantino volume, *The Continuing Past*, is a disappointing collection of ideological one-liners. In regard to communism's most important and most successful venture to date, the Huk rebellion, Constantino has only this to say: US "reoccupation of the Philippines" after World War II brought about economic problems manifested in part by "a political crisis caused by the upsurge of Huk strength which for a brief period seemed to threaten the very existence of the government" (p. 322). According to Constantino, the US then "introduced new neocolonial devices of suppression," and the armed forces of the Philippines, "operating under a CIA-created and -assisted secretary of defense, instituted a counter-insurgency program which crushed the Huks" (p. 322).

Hardly more than a dozen other pages deal with the broader subject of communism. The Communist resurgence in the late 1960's after a long period of inactivity would seem to be of some interest to a historian writing in the late 1970's, but Constantino chooses not to touch it. He instead merely concludes that "US imperialism has been and continues to be the central fact in the life of the Filipino people" (p. 320).

Constantino does, however, let drop a significant point, one which he unfortunately does not bother to develop in his text to any extent. Talking about the pre–World War II years, he says:

> *The more politicized among the leaders of the peasants and workers tried to . . . make the masses aware that American colonialism was a fundamental factor in their poverty and oppression, but the anti-landlord thrust of peasant struggle remained primary.* (*History*, p. 391)

This primacy of domestic concerns in the peasants' struggle was something that Communist leaders either did not perceive, or if they did perceive it, did not adequately reflect as they continued to stress anti-imperialist themes, whether in the 1930's (when anticolonial, anti-imperialist, anti-American propaganda might have had some validity), in the late 1940's, (when the Philippines was already a republic and anti-imperialist propaganda was clearly irrelevant to the peasants' situation); or in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. Thus, it is not difficult to discern at least one major reason why communism has not gathered a large following in the Philippines. In Constantino's words, a "lack of knowledge of Philippine reality" helped blunt the efforts of those who "sought to organize dissent and channel its attention to the fundamental causes of Philippine social and economic problems" (p. 395).

EXISTENCE of this gap between the perceptions of the revolutionary leadership and Philippine reality is confirmed by Benedict J. Kerkvliet's book on the Huk rebellion. The volume—a lengthy and detailed effort to see "peasant revolt through the eyes . . . of those who rebelled" (p. xi)—relies largely on interviews with perhaps a hundred people from one village regarding events that took place 30–40 years before (although Kerkvliet did work through some 1,200 captured documents apparently not used in previous research and took other steps to try to check the accuracy of his data).[1] While the oral history approach has its problems with respect to selectivity of memory, this study argues persuasively that the aims of Philippine Communist leaders and of the peasants who fought beside them during the Huk rebellion after World War II were quite different.

It is worth quoting Kerkvliet at length on this point:

> *Oversimplified, the party wanted revolution whereas peasants did not. The party after 1948 wanted to overthrow the Philippine government; peasants only wanted the government to stop its repression. The party wanted to end the tenancy system, redistribute land, set up cooperative farms, nationalize industries and end American imperialism. . . . Most peasants . . . wanted to reform the tenancy system, paid little attention to nationalist issues, and saw little connection between their problems and American imperialism.* (p. 265)

But from this disparity Kerkvliet draws a strange conclusion. Communist "leaders," he says, "never caused the unrest or the rebellion. They only helped to shape it. Sometimes leaders were not even in the lead. . . . the PKP did not inspire or control the . . . Hukbalahap or the Huk rebellion itself" (pp. 262, 264).

---

[1] While Kerkvliet is one of the few foreign scholars to attempt this approach, the method has also been applied by Eduardo Lachica, a Filipino journalist. In fact, Lachica conducted interviews for his *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (New York, NY, Praeger, 1971) in an adjacent Central Luzon province about a year earlier (1969) than Kerkvliet conducted most of his interviews.

Lachica's purposes were broader than Kerkvliet's—to look at reasons for peasant unrest in the late 1960's in a country seeking to modernize, as well as to understand the rebellion of two decades earlier—and the result is a more complete book. The conclusions are starkly opposite. Kerkvliet asks a "veteran of the peasant movement" why the Huk rebellion failed and is told: "No strike, no demonstration, no rebellion fails. Protest against injustice always succeeds" (p. 269). Lachica, by contrast, concludes: "Revolution failed in the Philippines; it probably was not even possible in the first place" (p. 249).

It is not difficult to accept the fact that the unrest that developed in Central Luzon in the 1940's sprang from social and economic conditions which Communists had no part in creating. But the idea that thousands of peasants just sort of simultaneously turned to rebellion in 1946 with weapons that just happened to be nearby—although it has a certain familiar romantic ring about it—stretches the imagination a bit. After all, the Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon was formed and named in March 1942 by the PKP, and when the movement was recalled to action in June 1946 and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, or People's Liberation Army, it was again the work of the PKP. In both periods, the Huks were led by the same commander-in-chief and the same vice commander-in-chief, both of whom, as Kerkvliet himself notes, "were in the party's central committee—practically at the top of the party's hierarchy" (p. 184).[2] Consequently, it seems idle to suggest, as Kerkvliet does on p. 264, that the party decided "not to support the rebellion from 1946 to 1948"—a period when the number of Huks increased from presumably zero to something between 3,000 and 10,000. Indeed, by all accounts, including Kerkvliet's, the organization, which had been formally disbanded in September 1945, was resurrected formally in June 1946 by 20 men, all of them Huk veterans, of whom "at least . . . six were already underground and leading armed groups by this time" (p. 169).

To be sure, there were extensive, perhaps perennial, disputes within the PKP about the direction of policy—hardly an uncommon phenomenon in any political group. But Kerkvliet makes too much of this when he asserts that the party decided "not to join or support the rebellion from 1946 to 1948." Careful examination of his text reveals that the core of the argument was over which should take priority, "armed struggle" or "parliamentary struggle," not over whether or not "armed struggle" should be allowed at all.

In fairness, Kerkvliet's study is not primarily about the role of communism in the Huk rebellion. Its initial focus, and one of the central questions he sets out to answer is: What causes peasant discontent, protest unrest, rebellion? His thesis is that the rebellion had roots reaching as far back as the early 1930's. It is not necessary to accept all of his conclusions to appreciate the value of the human element he features and the tables he provides detailing incidents of unrest in the 1930's and the numerous organizations that took up the peasants' cause. Kerkvliet concludes that traditional landlord-peasant (patron-client) ties broke down in the 1930's and immediately following World War II. Moderate demands by the peasants for restoration of those ties were rejected, and there soon followed repression by the government and "the elite." The peasants of the Philippines, Kerkvliet sums up, felt that, simply on the basis of "local customs" and "decent human behavior" (that is, morality), their rebellion was justified.

TURNING to the post-1954 history of communism in the Philippines, we find a lamentable dearth of comprehensive treatment. This is only partially offset by the highly competent passages on the Philippines in Justus M. van der Kroef's larger study *Communism in Southeast Asia.*[3] The author lightly threads his way from Marxist-oriented groups dating from the turn of the century forward through the decades until the mid-1970's (for the latest period he also enumerates other opposition groups).[4] In the process, van der Kroef clearly and succinctly differentiates the respective programs and declared tactics of the two Communist parties in the Philippines. The PKP, which has praised the Marcos government's basic land reform program (p. 138) and still talks about heightening "the proletarian class consciousness of the rural working masses" (p. 150), ultimately seeks legalization. The CPP (M-L) concentrates on guerrilla war, "armed struggle," and "revolutionary politics." It seeks to forge a "united front" of "workers and peasants," "petty bourgeoisie," and "national bourgeoisie" which it aims to lead in a "revolutionary struggle" against the "US-Marcos dictatorship" (p. 136). Organizationally, the CPP (M-L) is distinctive for its combination of "democratic centralism" and "territorial organization" (p. 185), which allows for nine self-governing regional party organizations throughout the archipelago.

Van der Kroef also delineates the respective positions of the two parties vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing. Although, the PKP rejects a pro-Moscow label, it supports the "Soviet point of view" because the USSR takes a "progressive and principled position" while Beijing is "chauvinistic and pro-imperialist" in its views (p. 217). The CPP (M-L) is sometimes called the CPP (Mao Zedong Thought) and considers Moscow revisionist (p. 88). Both Moscow and Beijing have diplomatic relations with Manila now and appear to be keeping their distance from the Filipino Communist parties.

---

[2] Commander-in-chief Luis Taruc was chairman of the Military Department of the PKP at the time of the creation of the People's Anti-Japanese Army in 1942. According to Eduardo Lachica (op. cit., p. 107), Taruc even then wanted to call the group the People's Liberation Army.

[3] Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980.

[4] On the current political setting, see also the excellent study by Larry A. Niksch and Marjorie Niehaus, *The Internal Situation in the Philippines: Current Trends and Future Prospects*, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 20, 1981; also Carl H. Landé, "Philippine Prospects After Martial Law," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 1147–68.

But van der Kroef's book is only as good as what it claims to be, i.e., an introduction to Communist movements. Thus, its coverage of the Philippines, as of other countries, lacks documents, biographical material, and deep analysis of the national social and economic environment in which the Communist movement operates.

SO THE SIGNIFICANCE of the Communist movement in the Philippines today remains murky. Recent press reports are contradictory, recording both gains for the revolutionaries and disarray in the movement.[5] To keep in perspective such reports, printed in the Asian and American press, it is useful to bear in mind that observers a decade and a half ago were saying:

> *"An ideological storm is fast approaching the Philippines," [a] leading news weekly warned [recently], noting that the entrenched power of the landlords and the restiveness of Central Luzon tenant farmers were continuing to feed the Huks with new recruits. The Huks, moreover, appear to have gained new self-confidence. When government forces raided a Huk stronghold . . . last August, they captured documents indicative of plans to train a "regular" Huk army of over 20,000 men, with a fully organized command structure.*[6]

If those words had been printed last week, with "New People's Army" substituted for "Huks," a certain amount of alarm would indeed seem in order. But what, in fact, is the current situation?

Late last summer, President Marcos said that "small bands and groups of subversives, although inconsequential in the general assessment of national peace and order . . . are irritations that should be immediately attended to," while his defense minister declared that the NPA is stronger now than it was in 1972.[7] The former commander-in-chief of the NPA, who has been in a government jail since 1976 and is not even sure who the current leaders of the CPP (M-L) and NPA are, maintains that during the eight years since the impositon of martial law (in September 1972), the NPA has increased "at least five-fold in armed strength" and "expanded from Cagayan in the north to Mindanao in the south"[8]—virtually the entire length of the Philippine Islands.

There have been reports of "incidents" in more than half of the country's 72 provinces.[9] While this activity may mean that guerrilla operations are widespread, statistics indicate that operations are sporadic. There may be 5,000 guerrillas, or only 3,000, or as many as 7,000.[10] Even if there were 20,000, as NPA propaganda claimed in the mid-1970's, the guerrillas have no "rear" or base, they are least active—or inactive—in the largest concentrations of population, and most Filipinos are not affected by their actions. In sum, isolated statistics, or even series of statistics—that is, any numbers not presented in the *overall* Philippines context—cannot be accepted as representing anything more than a fraction of the total picture, and conclusions drawn from them cannot be accepted as anything but proximate, at best.

THIS LEAVES unanswered our original question concerning the significance of communism in the larger history of Philippine society. It is this observer's hypothesis that World War II created a unique confluence of conditions and circumstances in the Philippines (although not just there) that allowed communism a brief, very temporary spasm of success that will not occur again. This hypothesis rests on a number of historical observations which deserve further serious inquiry.

The first of these is that in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Huks and PKP were the only organized groups opposing the government and that they enjoyed a rough parity in arms and numbers with government ground forces and had the benefit of extensive wartime experience against the Japanese. These unique circumstances no longer pertain.

For one, government forces are today superior to the NPA in numbers, organization, mobility, arms, equipment, and intelligence, and have had extensive counterinsurgency experience. While guerrilla forces can always carry out individual acts of insurgency, they require sophisticated weaponry and a stable territorial base to launch a full-scale revolution, and an endless number of other favorable conditions, quite apart from material, to effect an actual takeover.

---

[5] See, for example, "The drift to the Left," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 21, 1981, pp. 17–24; "Time to Get Tough," *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Sept. 11, 1981, pp. 26–37; *The Washington Post*, Nov. 22 and 23, 1981.

[6] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communist Fronts in the Philippines," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1967, p. 75, citing Edward R. Kiunisada, "The Approaching Storm," *Philippines Free Press*, Oct. 22, 1966, p. 72.

[7] *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, pp. 37, 36.

[8] Ibid., p. 27.

[9] "Incidents" may vary from a two-hour battle in which 32 NPA members were killed and 20 rifles, plus dynamite, hand grenades, and ammunition, were captured, to a March 1979 raid by 100 NPA guerrillas on the rural town of Silvino Lobos in northern Samar, during which the mayor was held "hostage for several hours." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), May 12, 1981, p. P/2; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mar. 27, 1981, p. 32.

[10] The low figure of 3,600 is an estimate by Philippines Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, cited by Sheila Ocampo in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 21, 1981, p. 22. Ocampo noted that US Embassy "officers tend to give a reduced estimate." Elsewhere, Enrile has spoken of 3–5,000 "warm bodies." See *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, p. 30. A range of 5–7,000 is given by Rodney Tasker in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 21, 1981, p. 18. The figure of 5,000 is closest to intelligence estimates.

Moreover, it is not the NPA, but the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with as many as 15,000 to 20,000 members, that today constitutes the most serious military problem in the Philippines. The MNLF, openly backed and surely supported and equipped by at least one outside power,[11] consists of persons who are fighting, as did their fathers and grandfathers before them, on home ground for home ground. While there have been occasional attempts to show that there has been significant cooperation between the MNLF and the NPA on Mindanao,[12] there is nothing approaching a link-up of NPA regulars and the far more numerous MNLF forces. Indeed, it is difficult to see what advantage the MNLF would gain from making anything more than specific one-time cooperative insurgency efforts with the NPA, from taking anything other than a dominant role in any kind of relationship, or from subjugating itself and its much larger following to an ideology antithetical to its own propelling Muslim beliefs.

Whether or not the MNLF was formed because of the larger social and economic problems of the Philippines—and an argument of linkage can be made along those lines—it would be hard to demonstrate that the growth of the movement throughout the 1970's was because the MNLF purported to gain power in order to solve those national problems. Its objective in a bloody war that has seen some 15,000 die during the past 10 years has been not to overthrow the national government, but to gain autonomy from it for 2 million Filipino Muslims.

Of greater importance to the fortunes of Philippine communism is the state of the society. The nation now numbers more than 48 million people.[13] All arable land is under cultivation, so no more economically viable land will become available. Yet there are too many people on the land, and many are underemployed or unemployed. The major problem is no longer how to distribute the land among them, but how to get them off the land into productive nonagricultural jobs. Such jobs, however, are not available, and there will be a need for more than half a million new jobs a year for the rest of the decade.[14] Meanwhile, the rural-urban distribution of the population has shifted markedly, and urbanization has greatly increased.[15] Less than half of the labor force is now employed in agriculture.[16] The number of people employed in services has tripled; in industry, doubled. One-third of those 18–24 years of age attend institutions of higher learning. Government administration has been centralized and strengthened.

In the presidential election of 1946, about 15.5 percent of the Philippines' approximately 18 million people were registered to vote, and nearly 90 percent of them did so. In the 1969 presidential election, nearly 30 percent of the country's doubled population (36.5 million people) were registered to vote, and almost 80 percent did so. In only one of the seven presidential elections held in those 24 years did the voter turnout rate drop below 75 percent (in 1949); and in only one biennial local election did it fall below 79 percent.[17] Through participation in the balloting process, today's Filipinos—87 percent of them literate and most not old enough to have experienced the years of the Commonwealth under US tutelage, or the trauma of World War II and the Huk rebellion—have reached a certain level of political maturity. All indications are that, given the opportunity, they would choose a representative party system of government; there are no indications that they would join or support a violent movement to achieve such a government.

These are just a few of the numerous considerations that differentiate the Philippines of the 1980's from the same country in the early post–World War II period. Do they constitute a unique set of circumstances ripe for revolutionary exploitation? Or do they say in effect that the real revolutions—including political—

---

[11] For instance, Landé writes that, in their "resort to arms," the Muslims were "assisted by Libya with weapons smuggled in through the North Bornean states of Malaysia." Loc. cit., p. 1154. See also van der Kroef, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, p. 93.

[12] The latest was made by Benjamin de Vera, head of the NPA's "Mindanao Commission," when he was captured in May 1981. Defense Minister Enrile says he has evidence of an NPA attempt to link up with the MNLF, but believes MNLF leaders are "not receptive to the idea." *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, p. 36. See also Niksch and Niehaus, op. cit., p. 98, and van der Kroef, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, p. 94.

[13] The May 1, 1980, figure was 47.9 million, as reported in the *Preliminary Report: 1980 Census of Population*, Manila, National Economic and Development Authority, National Census and Statistics Office, n.d.

[14] There are about 600,000 new entrants to the labor force every year. See the World Bank's *Report to the Executive Director on a Proposed Structural Adjustment Loan*, August 1980, unpublished.

[15] According to 1981 World Bank working figures, 36 percent of the population now lives in urban areas.

[16] For population estimates, see *1975 Integrated Census of the Population and Its Economic Activities*, Vol. 2, National Summary, Phase 1, Manila, National Economic and Development Authority, National Census and Statistics Office, pp. 1–6; *1979 Philippines Statistical Yearbook*, Manila, National Economic and Development Authority, pp. 24–33; and *World Population 1979: Recent Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World*, Washington, DC, Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, 1980, pp. 240–42.

[17] For voting trends, see Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1965, pp. 117–33; Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response, 1830–1970*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1971; Republic of the Philippines, Commission on Elections, *Canvass of Votes Cast in Philippine Elections 1946–1963 for President and Vice President and Senators*; and Hirofumi Ando, *Elections in the Philippines: Mass-Elite Interaction Through the Electoral Process, 1946–1969*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1971, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Ando's voter tallies are the most comprehensive and precise. His analysis is complex, and his conclusions are much different from the one given here.

have already taken place? It is unlikely that the answer will be provided by the Communist parties of the Philippines. Except during one brief period in its 51-year existence, Philippine communism has never accurately analyzed or significantly affected the events taking place around it. Although its own high priests may disagree, it may never have amounted to anything but a minor element in a much more important story—perhaps the real saga—the story of a society attempting to adjust to and make accommodation with the revolutionary social, economic, and political changes of the 20th century.

Romania's Travails

By Aurel Braun

DANIEL N. NELSON. *Democratic Centralism in Romania: A Study of Local Communist Politics*. Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1980.

ROBERT R. KING. *History of the Romanian Communist Party*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

DANIEL N. NELSON. *Romania in the 1980s*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

DIONISIE GHERMANI. *Die nationale Souveränitätspolitik der SR Rumänien* (National Sovereignty Politics of the Romanian Socialist Republic). Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981.

POLISH TURMOILS have tended to divert attention from the economic difficulties faced by other East European regimes. Romania, usually viewed as a maverick in the Soviet bloc, has also not escaped such difficulties. In fact, its economic situation might be as severe as Poland's. Productivity growth rates in Romania have been declining, and it has encountered repeated agricultural failures at a time when farm products have taken on importance as export commodities. Its hard-currency debt is staggering.

In spite of the economic difficulties, however, the Romanian regime continues to be perceived as successful in asserting its distinctiveness in both domestic and foreign policy. That is to say, Romania—which describes itself as a "developing" socialist state in contradistinction to the other "developed" East European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—continues to follow its own economic development plans. In its foreign policy, Romania continues to enjoy greater scope of action and to hold positions at variance with those of the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The four books under review analyze Romanian internal political and economic developments, as well as the policies, domestic and foreign, pursued by the Romanian regime under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu. In *Democratic Centralism in Romania*, Daniel N. Nelson attempts to "explore the relationship between socio-economic and political changes in the Romanian case" (p. xii). He employs a comparative, subnational focus and tries to apply "fairly common" assumptions about "developing/modernizing" politics in the non-Communist world to a Communist state. He conducted field research in four Romanian counties (Brasov, Cluj, Iasi, and Timis), where he interviewed deputies to the people's councils. He then applied standard sampling techniques to analyze the responses to his orally administered questionnaire.

Though this may appear to be a worthwhile exercise initially, the work is plagued by several problems. It is not only a question of whether one really needs tortuous statistical analysis to demonstrate propositions that can be proved in other ways, but also whether this type of methodology is applicable to such studies at all. The difficulty in getting data, the extremely small sample, the lack of opportunity to conduct repeated sampling as a check—all should act as a warning. Nelson is not unaware of these methodological pitfalls, but he bravely plows on. His choice of the four Romanian counties is somewhat curious, since they do not adequately represent the diversity of Romania, despite the differences that Nelson found among them. The conclusions arising from his research—that there is diversity in local politics and that development/modernization may yield some antithetical results—are hardly novel. More far-reaching conclusions are scarcely justified by his data. Since his sample was so small, Nelson admits that he was reluctant to discount an interview unless "all indicators were that the session has produced responses without substance" (p. 161).

Nelson's book shows the limitations of applying various development models anchored in the experience of Western and Third World countries to a Communist state. Unfortunately, Nelson compounds the inherent difficulties of the task he has set for himself by relying in some instances on outdated statistics when more current information was readily available.[1]

Nelson himself appears somewhat uneasy in evaluating the results of his research. On finding that deputies in Iasi county were more willing than deputies in the other three to voice their opinions on local politics, he writes:

> *From such tendencies we can tentatively infer that actors in local politics from the locale with lowest socio-economic levels, but which is changing most rapidly, have backgrounds and opinions that adhere less to the Party than deputies from areas where change is slower but socio-economic levels are higher.* (pp. 146–47)

Nelson concludes:

> *Ceausescu now realizes that principally as a result of efforts to develop/modernize, subnational political life is involved in a transitional stage, where "the interaction between . . . ideological goals and the requirements of the social system . . . will generate a process that in time modifies both the ideology and the reality" of socio-economic life that the Party initially set out to change.* (p. 149)

Robert King's book is a much-needed work on the development of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR). A meticulously researched study, it traces the rise of the PCR from a small underground group of true believers in the interwar period to a ruling party exercising tight control over Romania since World War II. The Romanian party, King shows, acquired power through the Soviet army. Party membership rose from around 1,000 in August 1944 to 1,060,000 by 1948 (p. 64). By contrast, peak membership in the interwar period was 5,000, in 1936.

King carefully traces the factionalism in the party and its unpopularity in interwar Romania. He finds that a major reason for its lack of appeal was its willingness to follow the Soviet policy line in general and a non-nationalist policy in particular.

Infighting continued in the Romanian party after it came to power. The two major contending factions were the "native" group represented by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and, after his death in 1965, by Nicolae Ceausescu, and the "internationalist" group which returned from the Soviet Union with the Red Army, whose main leaders were Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca. By the early 1950's, the native group had prevailed over the Pauker-Luca faction.

The postwar Romanian party made efforts to gain acceptance and legitimacy in the country. Although industrialization became a key priority of the leadership as well as the chief initial means through which the party sought justification for its right to rule, the memories of interwar unpopularity had a significant impact on the postwar Communist leadership, particularly the native group. They realized that one of the best ways to increase the party's popularity and thereby enhance its legitimacy was to identify it with Romanian national traditions and with nationalistic foreign policy goals.

After 1962, according to King, Romania commenced an autonomous foreign policy (p. 57). King is aware of the problems that the PCR has created for itself in acquiring what he calls a distinctive Romanian coloration, especially in its dealings with Romania's large national minorities. Nevertheless, he concludes, "through longevity, the elimination of viable alternatives and political and economic success the PCR has achieved a fair degree of acceptance, legitimacy and authority" (p. 149). Whether this will continue to hold true in the 1980's will depend on a number of factors, among which the state of the Romanian economy might well be decisive.

Prediction is more of an art than a science, as Bertrand de Jouvenel has noted.[2] Nevertheless, in *Romania in the 1980s,* editor Daniel Nelson and several other contributors have tried to assess Romania's past developments and to project on this basis developments in this decade. The volume includes an excellent paper on Romania's economic development and prospects by Marvin R. Jackson, who details the problems encountered in evaluating official Romanian data on that country's economic performance. These stem both from poor statistical methodology and from a Romanian penchant for "truth-bending" (p. 261). Walter M. Bacon provides a very good assessment of the role of Romanian military policies within the broader political context. Mary Ellen Fischer supplies valuable insight into the Ceausescu cult. Some of the other contributions, however, seemed less adequate to this reviewer. The section on Romanian foreign policy, by Ronald H. Linden, provides but a superficial overview showing little insight into the nuances of Romanian policies, despite a plethora of footnotes and social-science jargon. Nelson, in his contribution to the volume, contends that Romania "has been the only Warsaw Pact member to deviate consistently from Soviet foreign policy norms, and it remains the sole Eastern European country to avoid oil imports from the Soviet Union" (p. v). Even a cursory overview of Romanian foreign policy or a reading of the articles in the volume itself would reveal that Romanian deviation has not been consistent. Moreover, a variety of sources have reported that Bucharest has been importing oil from the USSR since 1979.[3]

---

[1] For example, this 1980 book cites the *1972 World Bank Atlas* for the Romanian gross national product.

[2] Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Art of Conjecture*, New York, NY, Basic Books, 1967.

Dionisie Ghermani of the Southeast Institute in Munich has written a detailed study of the politics of national sovereignty in an attempt to explain Romanian foreign relations. He uses Romanian sources extensively and provides a salient chapter on the theoretical foundations of Romanian foreign policies. He discusses Romania's foreign relations with the Soviet Union, with other immediate neighbors, and with China. His analysis of the difficulties with the Soviet Union and Hungary over Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania provides many very helpful insights. However, the two chapters on Romania's participation in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and in the Warsaw Pact lack the depth that the complexity of the subject requires. The work on occasion suffers from a definite anti-Soviet tilt; as a result, the analysis at times verges on the polemical.

These four works collectively give useful analyses of the domestic and foreign policies of Romania. However, the rapid changes—particularly in the economic sphere—which that country is experiencing now might also bring about changes in these policies. This would in turn necessitate some major reappraisals on the part of analysts of Romanian developments.

PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU has often repeated his goal, first enunciated in the late 1960's, of building a "multilaterally developed society" in Romania. Rapid industrialization was given a vital role in this multilateral development. Indeed, statistics did indicate a very impressive economic growth rate, with Romanian industry outperforming that of other East European states in the 1970's. The growth of net material product also showed a performance superior to that of other East European states. It is undeniable that substantial growth has been achieved, particularly in heavy industry. On closer examination, however, the record is not uniformly impressive. To begin with, when the 11.3 percent reported annual growth of net material product in the period 1970–75 is translated into Western rates, it comes to only 6.1 percent.[4] More important than the actual rate of growth, however, is the quality of development.

It is in this area that the shortcomings of Romanian economic development have become apparent. Industrial growth has been largely extensive instead of intensive, fueled by an infusion of labor from rural areas. Despite massive investment, labor productivity growth rates have often been lower than those in other East European states.[5] Furthermore, industrial development has been significantly skewed toward the standard Marxist-Leninist model of heavy industrial development, to the detriment of light and consumer good industries. Other flaws range from too many prestige projects, innumerable bottlenecks, and underutilization of labor, to the failure to absorb Western technology effectively. The sight of huge oil refineries standing idle is perhaps the most telling evidence.

In the late 1970's, overall economic growth began to deteriorate badly in Romania and other CMEA states. The German Institute of Economic Research in West Berlin estimated that the combined growth rate for the six East European members of CMEA declined sharply in 1980, to 1.1 percent, with only East Germany managing to increase its rate over that of 1979.[6] Romania sustained one of the steepest decreases. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates of Washington, DC, concluded that Romania's overall economic performance in 1980 was its second worst since World War II.[7] In 1981, growth was at a postwar low: national income increased by only 2 percent, instead of the planned 7 percent.[8] Degeneration in the performance of Romanian industry was accompanied by disastrous failures in agriculture. The 1981 Romanian grain harvest of slightly more than 20 million metric tons fell well short of the target of 23.7 million.[9] In fact, farm output dropped below 1979 levels in both 1981 and 1980.[10] Underutilization of machinery, a lack of spare parts, and transport bottlenecks all contributed to severe losses during harvesting. Romania, which in any case has the lowest standard of living among the European members of CMEA, was hit by shortages of eggs, meat, potatoes, and sugar in 1980. In 1981 these shortages became exacerbated. Long lines formed outside shops, as in Poland. The government had to introduce rationing of such staples as bread, sugar, and cooking oil, and to promulgate antihoarding regulations. In mid-February 1982, the Romanian government also ordered price increases averaging 35 percent on basic food products.[11]

---

[3] Reuter and UPI, Nov. 1979, as cited in Radio Free Europe Research, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich), Jan. 29, 1980; Radio Moscow, June 5, 1980, in ibid., Oct. 10, 1980.

[4] Paul Marer, "Economic Performance, Strategy and Prospects in Eastern Europe," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, Aug. 2, 1977, pp. 523–66.

[5] Yu. Kormnov, "Scientific-Technological Progress and Integration of CMEA Member Countries in Machine Building," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1977.

[6] As reported in *Financial Times* (London), June 19, 1981.

[7] As reported in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), July 8, 1981.

[8] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Feb. 10, 1982.

[9] *Financial Times*, Dec. 4, 1981.

[10] *Toronto Star*, Feb. 24, 1982.

Nevertheless, the Romanian long-range plan, adopted at the 11th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1974, to become a "developed" socialist state by 1990,[12] has not been revised. As Marvin R. Jackson points out, at the 12th Congress of the PCR in 1979 the Romanian leadership reiterated this goal and projected a rise in per capita national product from US$1,900 to US$3,000–$3,500 by the year 1990 (*Romania in the 1980s*, p. 255).

Despite the retention of these goals, the increasing difficulties of the economy in the latter part of the 1970's forced some reexamination of the highly centralized planning mechanism. Yet, the Ceausescu regime seems wary about introducing substantive reforms. The reforms that have been instituted resemble more closely those introduced in the Soviet Union and East Germany in the 1960's than the significant decentralization measures of the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary. Bucharest's new economic mechanism, introduced in 1978, is to provide for some decentralization and a shift of emphasis toward worker self-management, profit-sharing, and the use of "net profit" instead of gross output as an indicator of performance.[13] But these measures, limited as they are when compared to those in Hungary, have been only partly implemented. Ceausescu has always preferred fine tuning to substantive change. He has usually resorted to a rotation of ministers and party leaders, or to their dismissal. In 1981, several officials, including the finance minister, the planning chief, and the agriculture minister, were dismissed.

The poor performance in agriculture highlights the need for structural corrections in this sector. It has been acknowledged by Romanian officials that foul-ups at all levels of agricultural administration were more responsible for shortfalls than the bad weather.[14] Even Ceausescu himself admitted in February 1981 that agriculture had been neglected in favor of industrial development.[15] He announced that more investment would be allocated to agriculture in the next five-year plan. Nevertheless, given the structural problems of the Romanian economy as a whole and the usual party and bureaucratic resistance to change, the prospects are slight that additional investment in Romanian agriculture would yield any better results than such investments have yielded in the Soviet Union.

ROMANIA'S GROWING internal economic problems have been worsened by external developments. Since the early 1960's, Romania has been extremely careful to diversify its trade partners in order to shield itself as much as possible from the pressures that could result from economic dependence. The availability of domestic energy resources made this possible in the 1960's. In the 1970's, however, Romania's domestic energy production began to fall, and the country became a net importer of crude oil. Most of the oil imports used to come on a barter basis from Iran and Iraq. At present, the Iraqi-Iranian conflict has largely dried up this source of oil. Romania had to purchase additional oil on the spot market for hard currency. Although Bucharest had been very careful not to have to rely on the Soviet Union for oil, in 1979 it turned to the Soviet Union for some supplies. In that year, Romania purchased 400,000 tons of oil; in 1980, 1.5 million tons;[16] and in 1981, it negotiated for additional supplies. Romania also decided to purchase natural gas from the Soviet Union.[17]

Internal economic problems and external supply difficulties have therefore induced Romania to move closer to the Soviet Union and to CMEA. This shift has taken place despite the fact that a large portion of Romania's trade continues to be with Western nations and despite Romania's unique ties (for a CMEA state) with the European Economic Community (EEC). Romania attempted in November 1981 to reach an accord on economic cooperation with the EEC to reinforce the existing trade pact.[18] Nevertheless, at the 35th CMEA session—held at Sofia, Bulgaria, in July 1981—Romania appeared eager to contribute money, equipment, and even labor in order to take part in joint projects that would assure it an expansion of energy supplies from the Soviet Union.[19]

Massive hard-currency debts are another major problem plaguing the Romanian economy. Ceausescu, like Edward Gierek in Poland, borrowed heavily in the West to finance imports of advanced technology in order to speed up economic growth. By 1981, the hard-currency debt amounted to US$10 billion,[20] and by 1982, according to some Western estimates,[21] it had reached US$13 billion. By 1981, Romania began to experience difficulty in meeting scheduled debt payments. In that year, it fell behind on repaying a part of a US$2.47 billion loan. Its debt service payments due in April 1982 alone amounted to US$1 billion. Some other repayments have been erratic.[22] For example, the European American Bank finally asked the US Commodity Credit Corporation in February 1982 to make good on an overdue installment of US$5.5 million on a loan Romania had taken out to buy US farm machinery.[23]

---

[11] Ibid.

[12] *Directivele congresului al XI-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman cu privere la planul cincinal 1976–1980 si liniile directorale ale dezvolutarii economico-sociale a Romaniei pentru perioda 1981–1990* (Directives of the 11th Romanian Communist Party Congress Regarding the Five-Year Plan for 1976–1980 and the Guidelines for the Socio-economic Development of Romania for the Period 1981–1990), Bucharest, 1974.

[13] Walter M. Bacon Jr., "Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), April 1981, p. 170.

[14] Agerpress release reported in *Financial Times*, Dec. 4, 1981.

[15] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 2, 1981.

[16] *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Oct. 17, 1980.

[17] *Romanian Situation Report*, Jan. 29, 1980.

[18] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 6, 1981.

[19] *The Times* (London), July 5, 1981.

The Romanian government has taken some remedial steps. In 1981, it reduced its balance-of-payments deficit to an estimated US$1.8 billion from the record US$2.4 billion in 1980.[24] However, it also borrowed US$1.46 billion from the International Monetary Fund. Western diplomatic sources reported in November 1981 that Romania was negotiating with Western companies for delays in payments to them of up to six months in order to avoid going deeper into debt to Western banks and damaging its credit rating.[25]

Nevertheless, Western bankers have become increasingly concerned about Bucharest's ability to repay its massive debts. In spite of this, Western governments and banks have been reluctant so far to have Romania declared in default. There have been reports that US and European banks have quietly agreed in principle to give Romania more time to repay.[26] Representatives from foreign banks went to Bucharest in January and in February 1982 for talks about rescheduling Romania's debts to private banks.[27] Should Romania's creditors either decide to call in the loans or begin to impose conditions calling for Romania to slow down its current very modest economic growth further, then, as the Institute for Comparative Economic Studies in Vienna has suggested,[28] the results for the Romanian economy could be catastrophic.

OTHER FACTORS in addition to the deteriorating economy have contributed to domestic problems and have induced a sense of malaise among the population. The Ceausescu regime represses expressions of popular dissatisfaction as ruthlessly as any socialist state in Eastern Europe. A large-scale strike by 35,000 miners in the Jiu valley in August 1977 was swiftly quelled. Thousands of workers were fired or sent back to their native villages. The leaders of the strike committee were arrested.[29] An attempt in 1979 to form a "Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers" was also quickly stifled by the Ceausescu regime. According to Amnesty International, two leaders of the movement, Ion Cana and Gheorghe Brasoveanu, were confined to psychiatric institutions, and a third was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.[30] During 1980–81, there have been Western reports of over 50 work stoppages in factories and mines (including stoppages in the Jiu valley), of sabotage, and of other acts of protest.[31] However, these seemed to be spontaneous and uncoordinated occurrences with little impact on government policies.

The policy of Romanianization has also produced considerable friction in the country. The measures of cultural repression against the large Hungarian minority (numbering close to 2 million) have evoked repeated protests from this minority and from Budapest.[32] Such policies can only bring further alienation from the regime.

Ceausescuism, the vast and at times comic personality cult of the Romanian leader, has fostered increasing cynicism in society. In the past few years, this personality cult has been extended to Ceausescu's wife Elena, who has become the second most powerful person in the country. The Romanian leader has also ensured the rise to high positions within the party and the government for sundry other relatives. This nepotism is extensive even by Balkan standards. Some wags in Bucharest have asserted that "Ceausescu has succeeded in achieving socialism in one family."

The regime continues to enforce rigid cultural conformism which has stifled artistic creativity. Only the crudest socialist realism in art is condoned—as is most evident in painting. This has only added to the corruption of an intelligensia that was already not noted for courage or principle.

IT HAS BEEN widely assumed that the pursuit of foreign policy autonomy and a safeguarding of national sovereignty have been vital among the many ways in which Ceausescu has compensated for domestic shortcomings. Indeed, several works reviewed here have suggested that by these means the

---

[20] *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1981.

[21] *The Globe and Mail*, Jan. 16, 1982.

[22] Ibid.

[23] *TIME* (New York, NY), Mar. 8, 1982, p. 73.

[24] *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1981.

[25] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 5, 1981.

[26] Ibid., Feb. 2, 1982.

[27] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1982; and *TIME*, Mar. 8, 1982.

[28] As reported in *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1981.

[29] *The Times*, Oct. 6, 1977; Agence France-Presse, Oct. 11, 1977.

[30] Amnesty International, *Annual Report 1981* (London), p. 314.

[31] *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 2 and Dec. 3, 1981.

[32] Karoly Kiraly's letter was smuggled out of Romania and published in *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1978, and in several other Western papers.

Romanian Communist Party has tried to achieve a greater degree of legitimacy. External threats, it is argued, have traditionally functioned as a unifying factor in various countries. In Romania's case, foreign policy autonomy in the 1960's may also have been a prerequisite for the pursuit of the domestic goal of rapid industrialization. This in turn enhanced regime legitimacy. Furthermore, such linkages between domestic and foreign policies are not uncommon.

Such assumptions provide an attractive and plausible explanation for Romanian behavior. Furthermore, in the past, evidence to support this hypothesis was abundant. Nevertheless, like most hypotheses, this one also needs to be subjected to reexamination. One needs to ask how autonomous Romanian policy really is; whether it increases regime legitimacy; and, ultimately, whether it may be explained purely in terms of rational decision-making.

Robert King and Dionisie Ghermani both provide numerous examples of foreign policy stands taken by Romania that differed sharply from those of the Soviet Union. Bucharest's refusal, at the 1978 Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact, to agree to increased military spending or to acquiesce to greater pact integration under Soviet command brought sharp condemnations from the Kremlin.[33] Romania has also, at least indirectly, condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,[34] and Ceausescu has warned against foreign intervention in Poland.

Yet, despite such stands in foreign policy and manifest Soviet displeasure over them, Romanian autonomy functions within certain limits.[35] These are defined by Soviet core interests. Thus, while one is justified in characterizing Romanian foreign policy as autonomous, it would be unrealistic to call it independent. Furthermore, it should be recognized that some Romanian policies encompassed dimensions which either directly or indirectly supported Moscow's policies. While Ceausescu asserted that no state has the right to intervene in Poland, he also strongly condemned the activities of the Solidarity trade union movement in language not unlike that of the Kremlin. The Romanian government voiced its approval of the imposition of martial law in Poland, declaring that this move ought to help Warsaw with its "unflinching advancement on the luminous road of communism."[36] At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meetings in Belgrade (1977) and Madrid (1980–82) Romania's position on some issues was distinctly at variance with that of the USSR. In rejecting Western criticism of the violations of human rights in the socialist states, however, Romania's position was similar to that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, although several Romanian proposals at Madrid on European security issues might well have been made to safeguard Romanian autonomy, they could also have been damaging to the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[37]

Although it is sometimes difficult to document precisely, there is little doubt that Romania has had to pay a price for going its own way within the Soviet bloc. This price comprised fairly overt Soviet economic and political pressures—e.g., reluctance to supply Bucharest with oil and other raw materials, as well as the more hidden obstacles placed in the way of Romania's exports to the USSR—and more subtle intimidation through military threats. One need but contrast the treatment of Bulgaria, a loyal client state of Moscow, with that of Romania to see that the Soviet Union can and has been willing to provide important benefits to selected East European states.

Playing on Romanian chauvinism and national pride undoubtedly helped the regime in the past to enhance its legitimacy. Yet, appeals to patriotism are also subject to the law of diminishing returns. The population eventually becomes inured to them and perhaps even cynical about them. At any rate, today there is a perception in Romania that foreign policy autonomy has extracted a burdensome price. The low standard of living has made the people look with envy not only toward Hungary but even toward Bulgaria. Furthermore, there is a growing feeling that Ceausescu's penchant to assert Romanian autonomy by involvement in the Third World has been costly. As a member of the Group of 77 and a guest at meetings of the Nonaligned Movement, Romania has had to provide very substantial foreign aid by East European standards—or so it is felt. There is a recognition that Bucharest has derived some economic benefits from its ties to the developing nations, but there is also a sense that a good deal of the effort and cost have been directed to ensuring Ceausescu's prestige as an "international statesman" rather than Romania's interests. If such perceptions become general, foreign policy autonomy may increasingly be perceived as responsible for at least some of the domestic shortfalls. In such circumstances, legitimacy is more likely to be eroded than enhanced.

LAST, one needs to ask whether Romanian foreign policy initiatives continue to serve rational goals. Besides assumptions about linkage between domestic considerations and foreign policy, analysts of Romanian developments have by and large judged that Ceausescu's foreign policy has been clever and cunning and that he has been alive to every international opportunity. As noted, Romanian foreign policy had cogent economic and political rationales in the past. This is much less certain recently. Some Romanian challenges to the Soviet Union have been gratuitous. Ceausescu's visit to Beijing in the spring of 1978, for instance, and the mandatory reciprocal visit in August 1978 by Hua Guofeng—during which Hua made anti-Soviet speeches—provoked Moscow's ire without yielding visible benefits for Romania. On this occasion, Romania appears to have broken one of the tacit, yet cardinal rules of its foreign policy, namely: "use, but never be used." Ceausescu also exhibited unseemly haste at the funeral of Josip Broz Tito in May 1980 in trying to assume the Yugoslav leader's mantle in the Nonaligned Movement. Ceausescu's courting of various Third World leaders seemed almost farcical at times, and undertaken more for the gratification of his ego than for the sake of tangible benefits to Romania.

---

[33] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 16, 1978.

[34] *Scinteia*, Jan. 24 and Dec. 4, 1980.

[35] For further elaboration, see my *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1978.

[36] *The Globe and Mail*, Dec. 16, 1981.

[37] *Scinteia*, Nov. 15, 1980.

The mounting panegyrics for Ceausescu cannot camouflage the gross mismanagement of the economy, the repressiveness of the regime, or the multiplying miscues on foreign policy. Despite some natural gravitation toward Moscow, Romania's foreign policy could remain autonomous (and thereby continue to garner certain economic benefits) if the policy goals were clearly thought out. Yet, Ceausescu's policies are beginning to show fewer linkages to domestic requirements and seem to be less well anchored in rationality.

Although the four works reviewed here provide many insights into Romanian domestic and foreign policies, they can offer only limited guidance to future Romanian developments. Widening fissures in society have become apparent in the last few years. The increase in corruption has been startling even by Romanian standards. The seriously deteriorating economic conditions add to the uncertainty. The disenchantment with the Ceausescu cult could find unpredictable expression.

In view of such factors, there is the temptation to compare Romania and Poland. Yet, too facile an analogy with Poland before the imposition of martial law would be highly misleading. I agree with Nelson's conclusion and that of the other contributors to *Romania in the 1980s* that it is highly unlikely for Romania to experience a challenge similar to Solidarity's in Poland. For one thing, the catalytic agent of political culture is different in the two states. In Romania, the worker disturbances and free unions seem to have been stifled in their infancy.

It is remarkable also that there is so little discussion of reform, especially among the intelligentsia. It is highly unlikely that anything similar to the Polish Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR) or the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) could be formed in the near future. An alliance of workers and intelligentsia seems improbable in Romania. The intelligentsia have sold out long ago and appear much more interested in the "pecking order" than in supporting civil liberties. The church in Romania is also weak and disorganized. The large Hungarian minority is alienated and in the future may be made a scapegoat for domestic difficulties. The imposition of martial law in Poland may also act as a deterrent to organized pressures for change.

Yet, as Romanian economic difficulties increase, so will domestic tensions and malaise. Though this may not block the government's ability to rule, it might erode the legitimacy of the Ceausescu regime and isolate it. A change in leadership could bring about not only significant alterations in domestic policies but also a redirection in foreign policy.

Moscow in the Middle East

By Karen Dawisha

YAACOV RO'I. *Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947–1954.* New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Press, 1980.

ROBERT S. WISTRICH, Ed. *The Left Against Zion.* London, Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., 1979.

YITZHAK SHICHOR. *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

GALIA GOLAN. *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1980.

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN. *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970,* Revised Edition. New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1978.

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN, Ed. *World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979.

THE MOTIVATIONS informing Soviet policy in the Middle East have long been the subject of considerable controversy among analysts. Some observers see Moscow's policy as an outcome of the ideological impulse to expand Marxism-Leninism to other areas of the world. Others, although they agree that the Soviets are expansionist in outlook, attribute the desire to increase the USSR's influence to more traditional imperialist objectives. Still others would concede that Moscow might have an overall grand strategy, yet they would posit that the key impulses behind Soviet strategy in the Middle East are not essentially offensive calculations—whether ideological or imperialistic in nature—but defensive considerations arising from the need to secure the areas contiguous to the southern borders of the USSR. In this view, the Soviets are merely taking advantage of opportunities presented by the decline of Western fortunes in order to expand their own influence in the area. This last explanation sees Soviet policy in the Arab world as reactive and opportunistic—more a conglomerate of tactical dexterity and realpolitik than the product of predefined and rigid strategic designs.

Disagreements over how to interpret Soviet policy in the Middle East would be of only academic interest were it not for two circumstances. The Middle East has lately become even more of an area of vital strategic importance to the West than was previously the case, and the growth of Soviet power, particularly in the military field, has greatly reduced the constraints on Moscow's capability to achieve whatever objectives it chooses to set for itself in the area. The success of Western policy in the region, therefore, is likely to depend increasingly upon the ability of Western statesmen to correctly assess the root motivations of Soviet policy. To put it crudely, you can cure a disease only when you know what it is.

The most striking recent example of the need for the West to accurately appraise Soviet goals was provided by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Those who saw it as an expression of expansionism held that force could only be met by force and that the inbuilt momentum of Soviet policy necessitated a strong Western military response to contain the inexorable march of the Russians "in the direction of the Gulf." This view found strong adherents in the United States—especially in official circles—as reflected in the moves toward establishing a rapid deployment force.

However, such assessments of Soviet goals in the invasion of Afghanistan are in striking contrast to those put forward by many in Western Europe and the Arab world. There the dominant view is that the invasion of Afghanistan was a limited and defensive move, designed to secure the USSR's southern boundaries and not to serve as a bridgehead for further southward expansion. Hence, the Russians, it is contended, can be pacified only if they are cajoled, not cudgeled. Now that they have the military means to defend their interests, the argument goes on, an overly aggressive posture by the West could have the opposite effect from the one desired. That is, such a posture could so alarm Moscow that Soviet leaders might overreact and increase their military activities even further.

In addition, it is maintained that the Soviet Union is unlikely to make substantial headway in the area if it is denied the opportunity to increase its influence through the exploitation of local conflicts between and within states. Thus, the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular is seen as the major reason for continued Soviet influence on those Arab combatants who feel they require ever more modern weapons and the guarantee of rapid resupply in the event of war.

THE BOOKS under review both reflect and shed some light on this debate over Soviet motivations and opportunities in the Middle East. Several of the books focus especially on the development of Soviet policy in the postwar period and so seek to fill a major gap in the literature. Yaacov Ro'i, whose book is an expanded version of his doctoral thesis, goes far in enlightening the reader about the origins of the shifts in Soviet policy toward Israel after Iosif Stalin's death in 1953. His analysis of the place of relations with Israel in Moscow's wider regional and global strategy is most convincing, except that it almost entirely ignores the impact on policy formulation of the Soviet leadership transition at that time. Since Ro'i has entitled his book *Soviet Decision Making in Practice*, one could have expected to see more attention devoted to this topic.

Ro'i does state, however, that after Stalin's death, "the Soviet leadership tried to sever foreign policy from internal problems and to conduct it with a new flexibility on the basis of Soviet national interests" (p. 469). In particular, the phase in which the antisemitism of the late Stalin period affected Soviet policy toward Israel came to an end. Policy was once more motivated by state interests and a desire not only to improve Soviet relations with the Arab states but also "to establish and preserve a normal and positive relationship with Israel" (p. 491).

These conclusions are in marked contrast to those drawn by Robert S. Wistrich in the chapter which he contributed to *The Left Against Zion*. Wistrich sees "antisemitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israel motifs" (p. 285) as the predominant motivations of Soviet policy even after the demise of Stalin. However, Wistrich, like many of the other contributors to the volume he edited, makes no attempt to distinguish between these very different motifs. In general, the defensive attitude of the contributors (typified by the editor's introductory comments on p. ix that "anti-Zionism has become the great bazaar in which Soviet and Chinese Communists, Arabs and Third World Marxists, anarchists and Castroists along with feudal Sheiks, conservative Islamic rulers, oil companies and capitalist interests in the West . . . can find common ground in their hatred of the Jewish State") leads many of them to make incredibly ahistorical statements. Thus, Wistrich seems unaware of the vast literature about the fact of Israeli involvement in the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956. He merely states that "the Sinai campaign of 1956 in which Israel was identified with Anglo-French aggression against Egypt greatly reinforced the anti-Israeli motif in Soviet foreign policy" (p. 286). This book should be read by anyone who is as yet unaware of the view that the entire world is against the Jewish state, but it adds little to serious scholarship. For example, while it might usefully have explored the issue of whether antisemitism has ever been a motivator of Soviet policy toward Israel, it fails even to distinguish between antisemitism and anti-Zionism.

ANOTHER possible influence on Soviet policy in the Middle East—rarely considered by Western scholars—is the state of Soviet relations with China. At issue is the extent to which Moscow tailors its policies in order to prevent China from establishing a foothold in the area. In an excellent study entitled *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy*, Yitzhak Shichor does not focus specifically on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, his basic theme that Beijing's policy in the Middle East revolves not around the Arab-Israeli dispute but rather around the Sino-Soviet conflict, provides much useful information about the USSR.

For instance, the competition between the two powers for predominance in the South Asian and Persian Gulf areas has led Moscow to withhold support from movements or regimes backed by the Chinese. Yet the fluctuations in Beijing's general foreign policy—from the peaceful coexistence of the 1950's, to the export of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's, and to the normalization of relations with the United States in the 1970's and an effort to build a common front against the USSR—have also led Moscow at times to support groups to the left and at other times groups to the right of Beijing. Thus, Shichor notes (p. 172) that during the mid-1970's, when South Yemen and Moscow went through a troubled period in their relations, South Yemen pursued a policy more favorable to the Chinese. At that juncture, South Yemen established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and reduced its support for both the Dhofari rebels in Oman and the Eritrean Liberation Front, then enjoying Moscow's favor. In July 1978, China suffered a setback when a coup d'état (engineered by Moscow, according to Shichor) brought a pro-Soviet group to power in South Yemen. Although Shichor does not deal with Afghanistan, many of his conclusions about the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Soviet policy apply to Soviet behavior there as well. Soviet policy toward Afghanistan was certainly influenced by Moscow's perception of Sino-American efforts to build up an unbroken phalanx of anti-Soviet regimes along the USSR's southern perimeter.

IF ONE is trying to divine the principal motivations behind Soviet policy in the Middle East, one cannot long ignore the Soviet attitude either toward the key conflict in the region, the Arab-Israeli dispute, or toward one of the main subjects and objects of that dispute, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Galia Golan's book is addressed precisely to the latter topic. It is necessary to say at the outset, however, that this reviewer, expecting Golan to meet the same high standards she had achieved in her previous books on Czechoslovakia and the Yom Kippur War,[1] was disappointed by the present book. For one thing, it is atrociously printed, and there are so many mistakes and differing transliterations of Russian and Arabic sources as to frequently leave the impression that the book was assembled by a research team rather than written by a single author. Moreover, the text is not always as clearly written as it should be. The theoretical basis for Soviet-PLO relations (pp. 14–39) is never really sufficiently developed, and the chapter on the Soviet attitude toward internal differences within the PLO reads more like a confused conglomeration of facts than a careful analysis.

Having said all this, I must add that the book is challenging and has to be highly recommended. Indeed, despite its deficiencies, it is still the best book under review here.

Golan's basic thesis is that the Soviet Union lacks a clear long-term strategy in the Middle East. Most aspects of Soviet policy have been subject to change and compromise. Nevertheless, Moscow has consistently opposed Arab calls for the destruction of the state of Israel. Thus, although the PLO was established in 1964, the demand for realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people was not included until 1972 in the all-important slogans propounded on the anniversary of the October Revolution. Moscow's reticence toward the PLO, Golan makes clear, has always been the product of fundamental disagreement between them over the role of armed struggle and the objectives of that struggle vis-à-vis Israel. As a consequence, the first official contact between the PLO and the Soviet government (as opposed to the link of longer duration between the PLO and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) came only in July 1974, one month after the Palestine National Council adopted, in Moscow's view, a much more "realistic policy" toward Israel (p. 36). This was followed in the autumn of 1974 by the first Soviet public reference to the right of the Palestinians "to establish their own statehood in one form or another" (p. 55). One is struck by the length of time between the establishment of the PLO and the emergence of the strong link between Moscow and the Palestinians to which we have become accustomed—one decade, to be exact. It is Golan's contention—one which this author would support—that Moscow's closer tie with the Palestinians (and other radical forces in the area) was a reaction to its decreased influence in Egypt after the early 1970's and to its exclusion first from the step-by-step negotiating process after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and then from the diplomacy leading to the Camp David agreement. The Soviet Union is intrinsically more interested in state-to-state relations with Arab governments, but, failing those, it has been eager to use any available opportunity to prevent the consolidation of American influence via the emergence of a strategic consensus among Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, by radicalizing Arab opinion on the West Bank and elsewhere, provided Moscow with a golden opportunity to increase its influence not only over radical Arab states but also over disparate Communist organizations, such as the Palestine National Front and the Palestinian Communist Organization (pp. 169–71).

Golan's conclusions—that Moscow has in effect been left the scraps off the table ever since Egypt took to supping with Israel and, moreover, that the link with the PLO has been "fraught with complications, ambiguities, limitations, and, at times, contradictions" (p. 254)—are generally seconded by Robert O. Freedman. In his contribution both to the volume he edited and in the updated edition of his own book, his basic assessment is that "Soviet policy towards the region was primarily a reaction to a series of regional developments that the Soviet leaders not only had not caused, but that they were increasingly unable to shape to fit Soviet goals in the region, and that the Soviet position in the Middle East was much weaker in 1977 than it was in 1970" (*Soviet Policy*, p. 334).

---

[1] See her *Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (1972); *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era, 1968–1969* (1973); and *Yom Kippur and After* (1977). All three books were published by Cambridge University Press.

The major events of 1977 to which Freedman is referring are the scuttling of the Soviet-American joint statement on the Middle East and the subsequent visit by President Sadat to Jerusalem. Yet neither Freedman nor John Campbell, in a chapter on the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict (*World Politics*, pp. 37–53), has pinpointed exactly who was responsible for the collapse of the plan outlined in the joint statement. Freedman suggests that it was the Soviet Union (*World Politics*, p. 64), but he himself admits only one page later that Moscow saw the statement "as a means of re-entering the center of Middle East diplomacy." It is well known that overwhelming pressure against the plan came from the Jewish lobby and from Israel, leading to the reversal of the American position. Thus, it is highly surprising that John Campbell's account of this key episode does not mention Moshe Dayan's visit to Washington and the American-Israeli working paper. Freedman mentions them, but only after putting the onus on Moscow for backtracking on the proposal.

THIS POINT is worth considering because the Soviet-American joint statement and American acquiescence to cochairmanship of the equally ill-fated Geneva talks were the only instances throughout the 1970's when the West offered the Soviet Union a role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow not only fully supported both these efforts but also put forward several other proposals designed to lead to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East with Soviet involvement. For a variety of reasons, none of these efforts came to anything. The result was that Moscow, instead of staying within the mainstream, felt compelled to promote more radical interests as a means of preserving its position.

The evidence presented by both Golan and Freedman would support the judgment that while the Soviet Union could be eliminated from the "peace process," it could not be deprived of a position of influence in the region. If one accepts the view that Moscow's support of extremist elements in the Arab world during the 1970's was tactical rather than strategic, however, one might argue that Moscow would now enjoy less influence in the area than it actually does if the opportunities to involve it in a comprehensive peace plan had not gone unexploited. Moscow benefits tremendously from the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A settlement of that conflict would remove the single greatest foothold for the USSR in the area.

Dilemmas of Single-Party Rule in the Soviet Union

By Astrid von Borcke

RONALD J. HILL and PETER FRANK. *The Soviet Communist Party*. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

MICHAEL S. VOSLENSKY. *Nomenklatura. Die herrschende Klasse der Sowjetunion* (Nomenklatura: The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union). Vienna, Verlag Fritz Molden, 1980.

HELENE CARRERE D'ENCAUSSE. *Le Pouvoir confisqué. Gouvernants et gouvernés en U.R.S.S.* (Power Confiscated: Rulers and Ruled in the USSR). Paris, Flammarion, 1980.

A REAPPRAISAL of the evolution, structure, and dynamics of the system of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union is especially timely these days, when divergent assessments of the Soviet threat have caused unprecedented strain in the Western alliance and developments in Poland once again seem to confirm that a Communist single-party system is unable to liberalize itself peacefully, contrary to the hopes of not a few Western observers in the early 1970's.

The three books under review here examine the Soviet system from a variety of perspectives and approaches. Ronald Hill and Peter Frank have chosen an "analytical," political science approach, but one that relies strongly on official Soviet sources. Michael Voslensky's book is a deeply *engagé*, often sarcastic, settling-of-accounts by a former "insider" who, in the years 1950–72, worked in close contact with the apparat of the party Central Committee. He focuses on that special world of privilege and power engendered by *nomenklatura*, the Communist Party's system of supervision and control over all appointments considered politically important.[1] Finally, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse has written a scholarly and extremely perceptive account of the evolution of the Soviet political system, one which is especially useful in its assessment of the Brezhnev era.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the picture of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that Hill and Frank present is the closest of the three to the official Soviet self-image. Perhaps because of the kind of official Soviet information available on the mundane levels of the system's operations today, the authors tend to view the system "from the bottom up." However, both the organization and the functioning of the CPSU suggest the opposite perspective. Soviet central institutions are by no means just an emanation from the local ones. Besides, more is known about the former than Hill and Frank suggest. To cite just one example, we know that during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it was not the whole Politburo that was in nearly permanent session, as the authors suggest (pp. 67, 108), but an ad hoc committee of the Politburo's leading foreign policy experts.[2]

Hill and Frank do offer some interesting citations from Soviet sources and masses of figures (albeit generally on politically "harmless" matters), but they do not really provide any essential new insights for the specialist. Moreover, their all-too-uncritical echoing of official Soviet positions—for example, acceptance of the CPSU's claim to "historical achievements" during industrialization and World War II without mentioning the costs and failures (pp. 3, 13)—makes the book not an ideal one even for the beginning student of the Soviet system.

Voslensky's hardheaded depiction of what he calls "the country of *Nomenklaturia*"—the real "legal base" of Soviet political and social life (p. 176)—is a wholesome corrective. Where Hill and Frank tend to view the ideology as a belief system, an inspiring "utopia," and even suggest some genuine striving of society toward communism, Voslensky approvingly quotes V. Shulgin to the effect that communism was merely the lever used by the new rulers to unseat the old ones (p. 129). Leninism was a justification in Marxist terms for the seizure of power in a "feudal" society (pp. 112, 115). Parenthetically, this may explain its continuing appeal in parts of the Third World.

---

[1] *Nomenklatura* has been a decisive means by which the party has ensured its "leading role" and thus perpetuated the "monopolistic" nature of this system of political power. See Bohdan Harasymiw, "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (Waterloo, Ontario), December 1969, pp. 493–512.

[2] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1971, pp. 215, 238.

Not all of Voslensky's trenchant judgments and assertions will go uncontested. To some extent he still adheres to the terminology, concepts, and models of Marxist thought. Thus, in speaking of the role of Lenin and Stalin, Voslensky alludes to "historical necessity," remarking that they "possessed, to a greater extent than other people, the qualities that under given conditions were necessary" for a leader of party and state (p. 87). However, such an implicitly apologetic view ultimately might lead to the most problematic ethical consequences. It adds up to the ideological rationalization of anything—it is good because it exists. This, of course, is by no means the point that Voslensky wants to make.

The reviewer also wonders to what extent one can regard Soviet leaders (since Trotsky at least) as more or less merely executing the collective will of the apparat (p. 366). Voslensky himself makes a bow to the personality factor when he advances the very controversial hypothesis that Stalin had been an agent of the tsarist Okhrana,[3] which could suggest that the purges of the CPSU reflected a psychological urge by Stalin to cover his tracks. Indeed, the really intriguing question about Stalinism would seem to be the extent to which Stalin deliberately worked to bring about a situation that seemed to call for a "man of steel."

Voslensky's "insider" account provides some glimpses into leading Soviet institutions—most fascinating, into the Politburo (see pp. 373, 380ff., and 391ff.). Since 1929, the operations of this body—the actual "government" of the Soviet Union—have been shrouded in a secrecy dispelled only a bit by Nikita Khrushchev and generally restored by Leonid Brezhnev. While Voslensky may not revolutionize previous interpretations developed by the best Western historians and "Kremlinologists," he does describe the type and form of information demanded by the political leadership—specifically, all information was to be written in layman's language and to be limited to no more than two typewritten pages for discussion of a resolution or five for background information (pp. 394–95). Moreover, he offers some revealing information on the real mentality of the Soviet new "ruling class"—in particular, their preoccupation with power and privilege. In contrast to Jerry Hough,[4] Voslensky tends to stress the ongoing conflict between the party and the state administrations (p. 197). He also notes conflict between the apparat and the ordinary party membership (p. 189).

The Voslensky volume affords aperçus on prominent Soviet personalities, which in turn are illuminating of the system. One example is his discussion of Konstantin Katushev, a former chief engineer at the Gor'kiy automobile plant who was promoted to a Central Committee secretaryship in 1968 (he was shifted to deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1977). Looking at his career from the point of view of a purely quantitative "elite" study, one might have concluded that Katushev's meteoric rise was another example of the party's policy of "coopting" specialists into the apparat with a view to modernizing the system—a strategy of innovation analogous to that used by Western corporations. However, Voslensky's remark that Katushev's father had been a close friend of the Brezhnev family (p. 371) reminds us that alongside "systemic requirements" (and Voslensky concedes that Brezhnev had a knack for recruiting competent specialists), nepotism and clientelism have also played an important role in appointments during the Brezhnev era.

As already suggested, the reviewer is quite partial to Carrère d'Encausse's survey of the origins and development of the Soviet political system and of its increasingly problematic relationship with a changing society. (I would hope this work is soon translated into English.) However, lest I be accused of fostering a "cult of personality," I would note several minor caveats to her otherwise commendable analysis. For example, one might wonder to what extent the modest representation of the political police on the Central Committee really demonstrates insignificant potential political weight, as Carrère d'Encausse suggests (p. 74). After all, "socialist legality" has yet to become legality *tout court,* as the author points out, and remains subject to the dictates of *partiynost'* (party-mindedness). Every "ideocracy" requires some kind of political police, and in the case of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the sheer weight of its allegedly about half a million collaborators[5] must lend it significance. Indeed, KGB chief Yuriy Andropov has been a member of the Politburo since 1967 (a full member since 1973). This reviewer would also evaluate differently the internal significance of the progressive "militarization" of Soviet foreign policy (more on this below).

---

[3] Voslensky discusses this matter on pages 68–76. He mentions, in particular, the memoirs of the Social Revolutionary S. Vereshchak. Vereshchak's memoirs are discussed in Edward Ellis Smith, *The Young Stalin,* New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967.

[4] See Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969.

THE ESSENTIALLY historical approach used by Carrère d'Encausse and, to some extent, by Voslensky explains best how and why the Soviet system has acquired its specific traits. Let us trace this evolution in brief.

It starts with the concept of the revolutionary "vanguard," a "party of a new type," which was Lenin's special contribution to 20th-century political life. Claiming to represent social "consciousness" (Lenin was a profound admirer of the radical Russian "enlighteners" of the 1860's[6]), the Bolshevik party in fact sought to substitute itself for civil society to "confiscate" society's powers (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 134). Already at the time of the October coup of 1917, Lenin had a police nucleus created within the Military Revolutionary Committee, which in December was to become the Cheka—an unequivocal demonstration that the new regime, even more than its predecessor, would base itself upon a coercive apparatus "alienated" from society (see Carrère d'Encausse, p. 19). Moreover, in the ensuing Civil War, the original egalitarianism of the October Revolution was corroded, as a bureaucratic second economy began to operate in secret (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 24).

Stalin's historical achievement, as Robert C. Tucker has remarked,[7] was to restore *gosudarstvo*, i.e., the state. Yet, in itself Stalinism was still not a viable political system (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 43). To make possible his quasi-"total" personal dictatorship, Stalin strove to suppress all centers of independent social power, indeed, all purely personal allegiances. But Stalin's technique of the "permanent purge,"[8] culminating in the Great Purge of 1936–38, was in conflict with the stability, regularity, and legality called for by the progressive bureaucratization that naturally attended forced-draft industrialization "from above." New values—hierarchy, competence, patriotism—and new "elites" called for consolidation.

Immediately upon the death of the old tyrant in 1953, his successors abolished mass terror. This meant that the regime had to find a new modus vivendi, an accommodation with society. Indeed, once having become supreme (though not uncontested) "boss" (*rukovoditel'*), Khrushchev began to push new priorities: a renewed populist egalitarianism, increased consumer welfare, and after the Cuban missile crisis, détente.

In his struggle for reform and supreme power—the two inextricably intertwined—Khrushchev proceeded to alienate all the most powerful bureaucracies of the Stalinist system: the police, the managers of heavy industry, the military, and beginning in the early 1960's, also the very party apparat. Despite having reinstitutionalized the party as a principal basis of support in his struggle with his rivals in the Politburo, Khrushchev subsequently—in the interest of his reforms—kept the party from exercising its "leading role" and began to bring increasing "outside" pressure upon the party's central decision-making organs. This course culminated in the splitting of the party apparatus in November 1962, endangering the very "monism" of the system. As the leader of the Georgian Communist Party, V. P. Mzhavanadze, remarked retrospectively, one had been ready to bear almost anything, but when Khrushchev began to meddle with the party, that was too much.[9] From November 1962 until Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, the Soviet Union may have been on the brink of a systemic transformation, as Carrère d'Encausse remarks (pp. 50, 63). However, Soviet society—lacking in political experience and, above all, in autonomous channels of communication and possibilities for organization—was unable to become a political force. The bureaucracies, offended by Khrushchev's "participatory" initiatives, won out. The First Secretary himself had erected a barrier against his new kind of "enlightened" one-man rule when, in 1956, he had dramatically denounced Stalin's "cult of personality."

Ironically, what ensued was

---

[5] See the reviewer's survey of the Soviet internal political situation in Wolfgang Berner et al., *The Soviet Union 1976–77: Domestic, Economic, and Foreign Policy*, Vol. 4, trans. by Hannes Adomeit, London, Holmes and Meier, 1979, pp. 17ff.

[6] Contrary to the assertion of Hill and Frank (p. 10), the Russian Marxists did have "models." Significantly, the Mensheviks, following Pavel Aksel'rod (and ultimately the democratic tradition of Russian populism), found their model in German Social Democracy. Lenin, on the other hand, rediscovered the organizational techniques (and philosophy) of the Russian conspirators. He envisaged "Social Democratic *Zhelyabovs*." The question of the national roots and political "essence" of Bolshevism is treated in Astrid von Borcke, *Die Ursprünge des Bolschewismus. Die jakobinische Tradition in Russland und die Theorie der revolutionären Diktatur* (The Origins of Bolshevism: The Jacobin Tradition in Russia and the Theory of the Revolutionary Dictatorship), Munich, Johannes Berchmans Verlag, 1979.

[7] Robert C. Tucker, "The Image of Dual Russia," in Cyril E. Black, Ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 595.

[8] I borrow this expression from Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1956.

[9] *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 24–26 marta 1965: stenograficheskiy otchët* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 24–26, 1965: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1965, p. 89.

essentially "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," as Beijing acidly points out. The new leadership sought to modernize the Stalinist system internally and, in foreign affairs, continued to pursue "peaceful coexistence," as a more controlled form of "competition" with the West.

At the same time, the relative fluidity of the post-Khrushchev transition in the Kremlin and the beginning of the American military involvement in Vietnam led to a new assertion of military influence in Moscow. In the years 1965–67, as after Stalin's death, there was a great debate in the USSR about national security. As earlier, the military pressed for more professional autonomy (see Carrère d'Encausse, pp. 55ff.). Although the party has repeatedly reasserted its primacy in political decision-making, with particular vigor after the death of Marshal A. A. Grechko in 1976, a certain "militarization" of Soviet society has nevertheless taken place under Brezhnev.[10] The increased weight of the military is an inescapable consequence of the party's own political priorities. It may also help explain some of the ambiguities of "peaceful coexistence." For example, the SS-20s may have been the price for SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks).

Beginning in the early 1960's and accelerating from the mid-1960's, the Soviet leadership pursued an unprecedented buildup of military power, which already by 1969 brought the USSR to parity with the United States in some key strategic categories. Buoyed by this new correlation of forces, the Soviet Union in the mid-1970's embarked on a more assertive, expansionist foreign policy course in the Third World.

Carrère d'Encausse suggests (pp. 290–91) that this new military might did not solve any of the regime's internal problems, but here I would be very skeptical. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet regime achieved what had been a major aspiration even of its tsarist predecessors: "catching up with" and possibly even "overtaking" the West, first and foremost in the military domain. The legitimating function of this achievement should not be weighed lightly.

Likewise, Brezhnev's careful internal political strategy of "muddling through" and "incrementalism" (bordering on immobility) has not been without its political rationale. Indeed, it has ensured an unprecedented political peace and stability, at least among the Russian "elites."

This era could, however, be coming to an end—i.e., a crisis may be in the making. Détente seems moribund; a new arms race, likely. The Soviet economy is sluggish, in considerable part because huge defense expenditures have detracted from capital investment in the civilian sector. Voslensky asserts (p. 251) that in 1965–66, 82 percent of industrial output was destined for the producer-goods and defense industries![11] Three successive bad harvests (1979, 1980, and 1981), despite massive investment in agriculture, threaten to endanger a social stability that has been founded on a steadily, if moderately, rising standard of living. Political stability is problematic also in Eastern Europe, as the events in Poland show. No matter how these competing problems and priorities may be dealt with, it seems safe to predict that in the 1980's, there will be growing demands upon the limited resources of the economy and therefore increased likelihood of political conflict.

What are the implications for the Soviet system in these developments? For the time being, neither a return to Stalin's "totalitarian," revolutionary methods nor a turn to radical reform seems a likely alternative. Brezhnev appears to hope for a resuscitation of some form of détente, as a prerequisite for a further evolutionary modernization, while the military and many leaders of the party and security apparatuses seem to be calling for an essentially conservative "beleaguered-fortress" sort of regime. A precise prediction is, of course, hazardous because of the complexity of the factors involved, above all the situation in the leadership, the increasing political weight of the apparatuses, and last but not least, the "parameters" set by Western policies.

CENTRAL to any prognosis about the future configuration of Soviet rule is a reexamination of the CPSU and the way its "monistic" rule conditions it to respond to new pressures.

Sigmund Neumann has long since pointed out that the CPSU cannot be considered a "party" in the traditional sense of a "part" of a pluralist whole.[12] Although Hill and Frank would dismiss this distinction as mere semantics, or even as "intellectual bankruptcy" (pp. 138–39)—they would view the Politburo as a kind of cabinet (p. 67)—such facile identification of the Soviet system with pluralist systems is crucially misleading.

Parties (in the plural) serve as a means of channeling communication *from society to government.* The single party, by contrast, in its origin is not a "vote-getting," but a fighting machine, a command structure. Claiming to represent the "whole," it has taken over functions traditionally associated with the concept of "state." Moreover, by enforcing a particularist "class" conception of the "general good," it leads to "a society that must be chained."[13] To term such an organization simply a "party" is an example of that type of conceptual "stretching" encouraged by modern, quantitative political "science" and Third World studies that all too easily leads to false identifications.[14]

---

[10] See, for example, William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1976, pp. 34–51.

[11] Western experts have estimated that in 1960 some 11 percent and in 1975 some 19 percent of Soviet durable-goods output was allocated to national security. See Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Papers No. 147–48, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1977–78, p. 11.

[12] Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, Praeger, 1965, p. 119. (The first edition appeared in 1942.)

The single-party system—a regime keyed to emergency and crisis—not surprisingly has proved to be a not very efficient way of managing a modern, increasingly complex society. The latter requires autonomous initiative and "objective feedback loops instead of subjective, administrative levers," as two Soviet cyberneticians affirm.[15] This would involve more for the CPSU than simply increasing its "trust" in its own members, as Hill and Frank propose (pp. 148–49), in view of the fact that almost all occupants of leading positions must be party members.

The "construction of communism," Soviet ideologues stress, is not a "spontaneous" process. To put things more bluntly, society would not by its own free will opt for a Communist system. Thus the very raison d'être of Communist single-party rule has been to prevent the emergence of social autonomy and hence of genuine pluralism, of autonomous interest articulation and aggregation and therefore of effective "civic competence" (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 247). To this day, all the main Soviet bureaucracies seem to agree on one point: social influences are to be kept out of central decision-making, at least to the extent that they are not mediated by the apparatuses themselves, first and foremost by the party. "Participation" Soviet style has remained essentially (heteronomous) "mobilization," socialization by means of controlled activity (Carrère d'Encausse, pp. 236, 233).

However, in practice it becomes ever more difficult to manipulate over 17 million party members (Hill and Frank, p. 49). The sheer size of the CPSU, reflecting the functional requirements of running a large modern society, makes the party membership increasingly representative of society, or, to be more precise, of society's "functional elites." This has caused growing strains between the party membership and the apparat (Voslensky, pp. 189–90). However, contrary to the hopes of many Western observers, the party since the mid-1970's has again stressed its "leading role" and the principle of *partiynost'*, even if it has tended to become more "professionalized" itself. The conflict between the demands for modernization and rationalization of the system, especially of its economic mechanism and state administration, on the one hand, and the requirements of maintaining the party's monopoly of political power, on the other, has remained unresolved. "We have to keep on searching," Brezhnev concluded with some resignation at the CPSU Congress in February 1981, in discussing problems of managing the Soviet economy.[16]

As a universal "broker" and guardian of "substantive rationality," the party theoretically fulfills genuine functions in the quasi- if not totally bureaucratized system. However, it is also a bureaucracy in its own right and an essentially conservative force. Pushing through reforms in such a system may indeed (as Max Weber's reflections on bureaucracy suggest[17]) require "charisma," i.e., a more or less "revolutionary" leader in alliance with some "public."

In a broad sense, the formation of a genuine, politically more sophisticated civil society may be in its embryonic stage, as evidenced by the various forms and techniques of dissent that have arisen in the Brezhnev era (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 217). An increasingly urbanized, educated, and informed Soviet public will no longer be characterized by the political apathy of rural Russia of former times. But what remains an open question is the extent to which Soviet society will succeed in obtaining institutions that will genuinely channel its demands to the political leadership, making the latter responsive and, ultimately, responsible. Even a reforming leader in all likelihood will have to be a man in control of the party apparat. While a post-Brezhnev leadership will be better educated and less constrained by the memories of Stalinism and the Great Patriotic War, even such a leader (or leaders) will have been recruited and socialized by the apparat. Indeed, this phenomenon may explain why Khrushchev ultimately remained halfhearted in his reforming zeal, although in the end he may, as Robert Conquest suggests,[18] have come to doubt the suitability of this apparat for running a modern society.

---

[13] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 57.

[14] For an important essay on this topic, see Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *The American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), December 1970, pp. 1033–53.

[15] A. I. Berg and J. I. Tscherniak, *Information und Leitung* (Information and Management), trans. by Günter Tschacher, 2nd ed., (East) Berlin, Dietz, 1969, p. 62.

[16] Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU Congress, *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[17] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft—Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* (Economy and Society—An Outline of Interpretive Sociology), 5th ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr. 1972.

[18] Robert Conquest, *Russia After Khruschev*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1965, pp. 121–22.

It is hazardous to try to predict the Soviet future with any precision, all the more so since, in the 1980's, the regime may again be confronted with fundamental choices. The basic determinants of its foreign policy will remain essentially the same: competition with the West, possibly even with a Western-Chinese alliance, for power in the world; and the enduring fear of encirclement on the part of a great power without real friends (Carrère d'Encausse, p. 294). Internally, too, the basic structures of the regime have proven to be remarkably stable. Among the imponderables will be the personality of the next top leader, who may be expected to emerge after a period of renewed stress on "collective leadership." For in the Soviet system, the style and personality of the leader have tended to play a greater role than in any other modern nation. Who this leader will be cannot be predicted today. Brezhnev has been hesitant either to institutionalize the succession or to advance a "crown prince" (by now conceivably K. U. Chernenko).

When it comes to prognoses about the shape of the Soviet Union in what seem likely to be the troubled 1980's, political and historical analyses hardly make political judgment superfluous, as the vivid differences in values and approaches of the three books reviewed here attest. By analyzing the fundamental achievements, problems, and dilemmas of the Soviet single-party system, these works have at least marshalled the essential facts and interpretations which must be the foundation for any realistic and balanced judgment about the "nature" and likely future of the Soviet political system.

The Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia

By Harley D. Balzer

SHEILA FITZPATRICK. *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.

KENDALL E. BAILES. *Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1978.

NICHOLAS LAMPERT. *The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State*. New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1979.

ROBERT LEWIS. *Science and Industrialization in the USSR*. New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1979.

WILLIAM A. KNAUS. *Inside Russian Medicine: An American Doctor's First-Hand Report*. New York, NY, Everest House Publishers, 1981.

NANCY MANDELKER FRIEDEN. *Russian Physicians in an Era of Reform and Revolution, 1856–1905*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981.

THE SOVIET UNION in the era of Brezhnev is probably the most technocratic society in the world.[1] Nowhere else do individuals trained as engineers occupy so large a share of top political positions. Nowhere else is life as pervaded by discussion of the "scientific-technical revolution." The "social myths" of technical progress and social mobility constitute major elements of legitimacy for the Soviet government. Science and technology are key aspects of the image Soviet leaders present to their own people and to the outside world.

The books reviewed here constitute a major contribution to the history of the Soviet scientific-technical intelligentsia—specialists trained in the natural sciences, technology, and medicine, and the smaller number of "self-taught" individuals practicing those professions. Having been frustrated in their aspirations for professional autonomy by the tsarist regime, these professional groups were initially ambivalent about the Bolsheviks. In the 1920's, an accommodation was reached, based on necessity, patriotism, and economic incentives. During the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32), this accommodation was shattered, as Stalin sought to replace suspect cadres with rapidly credentialed Communist specialists. This brief experiment was followed by a return to more traditional patterns of education and recruitment, but the period of experimentation—known as the Cultural Revolution[2]—had a lasting impact on the Soviet intelligentsia and the entire Soviet system.

Both the specific individuals who now lead the Soviet Union and the institutions they administer are products of the Cultural Revolution. In some respects, the Cultural Revolution defined new relationships, while in others it reinforced traditional attributes of the Russian style of science and technology. Although appearing to put a decisive end to professional autonomy, the Cultural Revolution in fact changed not the terms of debate but the forum. Since the First Five-Year Plan, professional interests have sought to influence Soviet political life from the inside.

THE VOLUMES by Sheila Fitzpatrick, Kendall Bailes, and Nicholas Lampert concentrate on the genesis of the Soviet technical intelligentsia. The simultaneous appearance of three monographs dealing with the technical intelligentsia in the 1930's affords an unusual opportunity to examine the assumptions and explanations three highly competent historians have brought to the same topic, and to compare their differing interpretations.

---

[1] "Technocracy" has been used both in a very specific sense (for example, by Thorstein Veblen), to postulate a society directly run by engineers, and in a much more general sense, to suggest that technical specialists and their "culture" exert a dominant influence in a society. I am using it in this second, general sense.

[2] I have adopted the usage suggested by Gail Lapidus in her essay "Educational Strategies and Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Soviet Development," in Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978. Noting that "cultural revolution" has been used to describe both a long-term process of "gradual ideological transformation" in socialist societies and also the specific campaigns to radically alter Soviet social life during the First Five-Year Plan, Lapidus proposed capitalizing the term when referring to the events of 1928–31. She is particularly instructive as well on the similarities and differences in the Soviet and Chinese cultural revolutions.

The most important issue on which the studies intersect is the social transformation of the technical intelligentsia that took place during the Cultural Revolution—a process which included the education and socialization of a new elite. The creation of a new Communist elite required not only the immediate occupation of the cultural bureaucracy by party activists but also a restructuring of the entire educational system to attract and train the "proper" sort of cadres. Beginning in the spring of 1928, Soviet professionals experienced an upheaval as shattering as the (simultaneous) restructuring of the peasantry by collectivization. In virtually every area of "creative" or "intellectual" labor, prevailing assumptions were called into question. New approaches, suited to a new socialist society, were required. If existing cultural elites could not adapt to the requirements of developing socialism, they would be replaced by new elites, drawn from the ranks of proletarians and peasants—and especially from their most conscious representatives, the members of the Communist party.

Fitzpatrick focuses on a major aspect of this process—the *vydvizheniye* (literally "promotion"), a policy of discrimination to facilitate movement of "workers and peasants into white collar jobs or into higher education." This massive effort at social engineering, which Fitzpatrick considers analogous to recent American programs of "affirmative action," quickly "provided a substantial proportion of Soviet industrial managers and party cadres" (p. 4). In something of a departure from her general interpretation of the Cultural Revolution as an outburst of radicalism that the leadership could not fully control, Fitzpatrick views the *vydvizheniye* as a conscious and highly successful policy attributable directly to Iosif Stalin.[3]

If any single event may be said to mark the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, it was the Shakhty affair in 1928—the arrest of more than 50 specialists in the mining industry and their prosecution in a highly publicized show trial. The affair provided Stalin with a rationale to exert pressure on old specialists and an excuse to launch a program for the creation of a reliable "proletarian intelligentsia." Fitzpatrick, citing Stalin's speeches from the spring of 1928, tells us that the policy of recruiting workers and party activists to higher education was Stalin's—"he was the only member of the leadership with a clearly formed concept of the policy which the trial represented" (p. 118).

In contrast to Fitzpatrick's emphasis on Stalin's conscious and successful social engineering, Bailes regards the policies of the Cultural Revolution as products of complex political and social conflicts, connected by the common thread of economic planning. He maintains that "the Soviet technical intelligentsia was more active than previously throught in changing the social structure of the Soviet Union and the cultural values of its people in this period" (p. 8). Neither Bailes nor Lampert disputes the view that Stalin turned the Shakhty episode into a club with which to beat both bourgeois specialists and political opponents. But Bailes's account indicates that the case against the Shakhty engineers originated in a local conflict involving a police official with a dubious past and that Stalin seized upon the affair as a cause célèbre no earlier than February 1928.[4] While not invalidating an interpretation arguing that Stalin used the Shakhty affair to implement policies he had carefully prepared, Bailes's interpretation emphasizes Stalin's opportunism. It also raises serious questions about how well the policy was planned—questions reinforced by the chaos that the policy produced in the educational system.

The Cultural Revolution ended in what has been called the "great retreat"—a turning away from the extremes of the First Five-Year Plan with the setting of less utopian goals for the Second. Fitzpatrick contends that in educational policy this change was part of a coherent program lasting throughout the remainder of the Stalin era. Her Stalin is an all-powerful and farsighted leader standing above Politburo squabbles, in contrast to Bailes's suggestion that Stalin suffered a defeat on this issue and subsequently made the victors' position his own. Fitzpatrick believes that Stalin, presiding over a political party threatened by numerous enemies, decisively defeated them by creating a new intelligentsia of proletarians and loyal Communists. Once these new cadres were educated and moved into position, he elevated them to top jobs by purging their competition. In an article summarizing her argument, Fitzpatrick states directly what is implied several times in the book—that Stalin may well have been contemplating the purges already in 1928.[5] Fitzpatrick's own account, however, provides documentation for Bailes's "conflict and cohesion" interpretation.[6]

---

[3] See especially the last paragraph of Chapter 9 in *Education and Social Mobility*, p. 205. This should be compared to Fitzpatrick's treatment of other aspects of the Cultural Revolution in her essay "Cultural Revolution as Class War" in *Cultural Revolution in Russia*, pp. 11, 17ff.

[4] As late as December 1927, Stalin was publicly praising the technical intelligentsia for its cooperation. See Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1949, Vol. 10, pp. 318–19.

Institutional interests constitute the dominant factor in Bailes's explanation. He attributes the 1931 policy reversal to actions by a group of "moderate" leaders who had direct responsibility for industry and the economy. Although Stalin made the first public announcement of the change, this was preceded by strenuous efforts on the part of G. K. Ordzhonikidze and his "allies" to induce the Central Committee to change its policies (pp. 150–51). Bailes ties this specific case to the broader issue of the emergence of a "moderate bloc" within the Politburo and Central Committee in 1933 or 1934, a group which he sees as influencing policy as early as 1931. He also shows how political debates reflected policy options articulated by competing interests—in this instance, a conflict between Stalinist advocates of political solutions implemented by *vydvizhentsy* (including *praktiki*, or workers promoted without formal specialized education) on the one side, and the Kirov-Ordzhonikidze-Kuybyshev group emphasizing economic rationality and educational quality on the other.[7]

Lampert emphasizes the relationship between the technical intelligentsia and the state, and views the Cultural Revolution as an effort to impose political solutions in place of "rational" decisions based on specialized knowledge. Although his judgments are expressed in muted terms, his analysis comes much closer to Bailes's than to Fitzpatrick's. For example, he identifies the leaders of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (*Vesenkha*), industrial administrators, and party *apparatchiki* as sources of "pressure" to protect technical specialists.[8]

WHATEVER the immediate causes for the policies of the Cultural Revolution, there is no question that the period constituted a decisive formative experience for the individuals who currently rule the Soviet Union. One of Fitzpatrick's major contributions is to identify the *vydvizhentsy* as a crucial group in the Soviet elite. Bailes notes that two thirds of the current Central Committee and 80 percent of the Politburo are representatives of the technostructure. Fitzpatrick takes the analysis a step further, pointing out that a majority of current government ministers and of Politburo members—including, of course, Leonid Brezhnev himself—were *vydvizhentsy* during the First Five-Year Plan. In light of the crucial importance of these individuals during the last 40 years of Soviet history, even more discussion of the implications of this common background would have been desirable, but Fitzpatrick backs away from drawing some seemingly logical conclusions regarding the quality of education and the nature of group cohesiveness among the new elite.

Certainly, the quality of education received by *vydvizhentsy* could not have been very high. Fitzpatrick hints at its deficiencies in several places, citing the high dropout rate and chaotic conditions in the early 1930's, as well as the extra burden imposed on *vydvizhentsy* by social and administrative responsibilities (pp. 66, 105, 110, 132, 204, and 217). Bailes's chapters on "The Educational Experience" confirm these impressions.

If the quality of specialized education received by *vydvizhentsy* was inferior to that of previous and subsequent generations, then we must look to something other than technical competence to explain their long political dominance. I would suggest that the key word is loyalty. The surviving *vydvizhentsy* constitute a "club" of men, with mediocre education but highly developed political skills, who have stuck together for a very long time. Their formative experiences included advancement from party work to higher education during the period of "class war" in the schools, followed by rapid promotion to important political and administrative positions during the purges. As Fitzpatrick has observed elsewhere, "the Brezhnev generation was a minority but tended to monopolize the top jobs."[9]

---

[5] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928–1939," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), September 1979, p. 401. The same article indicates that Stalin had achieved his objective by *1939*, not 1931 (p. 399).

[6] For example, Fitzpatrick notes that the change in policy toward bourgeois specialists announced in June 1931 really amounted to ratification of policies already being adopted in industry. Compare her statements on p. 211 in *Education and Social Mobility* with those on p. 214.

[7] See pp. 174ff. A few additional shreds of evidence supporting Bailes's interpretation have recently appeared in Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin: Portrait of a Tyranny*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1981, particularly pp. 61, 74, 79–80, and 112. Also see the Russian edition, *Portret tirana* (Portrait of a Tyrant), New York, NY, Khronika Press, 1980, pp. 110–11.

[8] One can only speculate on what Lampert might have achieved had he employed a greater range of materials. He tells us his "argument is based mainly on a reading of Soviet publications of the time" (p. 11). While it is perfectly reasonable for a historian to insist on the "historically specific" nature of a topic, it is not acceptable to make the same claim for one's sources.

Bailes drew upon an enormous body of secondery and memoir literature and upon much recent Soviet scholarship to document things at which Lampert can only hint. In addition, Bailes took advantage of materials from public and private archives in the United States—particularly the Harvard Project—as well as from the State Department Decimal File and the British Foreign Service Archives. He made particularly good use of unpublished Soviet dissertations, confirming the impression that much of the best scholarly work done in the Soviet Union is available in this form. Many Soviet dissertations never appear in print, or appear in published versions with some of the most interesting material deleted, and Western scholars ignore these studies to their own detriment.

Lampert omits even so obvious a source as V. N. Ipatieff's memoirs, *Life of a Chemist*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1946. Moreover, although Lampert's decision to ignore dissertation literature may be understandable, there is no excuse for his failure at least to take note of Bailes's article "The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking Among Soviet Engineers," *American Historical Review* (Washington, DC), April 1974, pp. 445–69.

The purges and the Stalinist economic system decisively influenced these future leaders' careers. Many of the *vydvizhentsy* were promoted to responsible positions when senior people were arrested. At the same time, the insecurities of work in production led many specialists to opt for jobs in local party or police work, placing them in excellent positions to climb the political ladder. One might suggest that the "retreat" in 1931 was permanent because it served the interests of both the "industrial lobby" and the *vydvizhentsy* themselves. Once the schools returned to normal, a group of upwardly mobile politicos with weak technical education would have had a definite interest in ending the recruitment to higher education of individuals with both proletarian and party credentials.

An emphasis on politics and careerism should not obscure the very real impact technical training has had on the Soviet leadership. Bailes's discussion of aviation in the 1930's suggests the attractiveness of legitimation through technology. Heroic achievements enhanced the regime's status both in the eyes of its own people and in the international arena, where public display of technological gains could also aid defense policy. A similar case may be made for the Soviet space program in the 1950's and 1960's and for the recent emphasis on the scientific-technical revolution.

Pointing out the propaganda value of science in no way implies that Soviet leaders lack a genuine commitment to technical progress. If anything, their training as engineers has left them overly enamored of technological solutions. Emphasis on the scientific-technical revolution and a seemingly incessant search for some sort of technological "quick fix" to cure the nation's economic ills attest that Soviet technocracy is more than just window dressing.

THE DURABILITY of arrangements concocted during the Cultural Revolution is attributable not only to continuity of personnel but also to the strength of institutional interests and the effects of the Soviet system of planning. In the long run, the structural factors may be of the greatest significance. The Brezhnev generation will be gone in a few years; the structural characteristics of the Soviet economic and political system are less likely to change any time soon. Institutional interests appear to have surprising longevity and the capacity to convert administrators to their point of view, while the Soviet planning system has reinforced certain historical attributes of the Russian scientific-technical community.

Struggles over the training of technical cadres are a seemingly inevitable product of educational requirements generated by industrial development. The institutional conflict over control of education between *Vesenkha* and the Commissariat of Education (*Narkompros*) is well documented by Fitzpatrick. She might have added that this was in many respects a continuation of the century-old struggle between the tsarist Ministries of Education and Finance, and that a similar conflict took place in other European countries in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The importance of institutional interests within Soviet administration is underscored by the way Ordzhonikidze's perspective altered when he became head of *Vesenkha*. No student of politics will be surprised by a finding that the person appointed to head a bureaucratic apparatus quickly becomes the patron of groups traditionally supported by that bureaucracy. Both the need to make the bureaucracy function and the logic of maintaining one's own power base *usually* induce a new leader to act as spokesperson and protector for such clients. Yet, there has not been enough investigation of these questions in Russian and Soviet history. After I. A. Vyshnegradskiy became Minister of Finance in 1887 with the support of allies in the Ministries of Interior and Education, he aroused bitter disappointment by adopting many of the positions traditionally defended by tsarist ministers of finance. There are striking parallels in Ordzhonikidze's becoming the patron of industrial specialists in the 1930's.

Perhaps the most general structural principle to emerge from the works under review is the decisive influence that planning exerts, both by enhancing previously existing characteristics of the system and by fostering informal mechanisms to achieve results or protect participants. Prerevolutionary Russian science and technology were characterized by the assignment of higher status to theory than to applied research or work in production; by deep-seated conservatism; and by weakness in design and innovation, encouraging a tendency to rely on imported technology. The Soviet planning system has reinforced all of these attributes. Dangers and pressures associated with work in production reinforce a long-standing preference for more prestigious research positions. New ideas and practices not only disrupt routines but threaten the fulfillment of the plan. It is safer to adopt a proven technology from abroad than to risk production delays or even failure by attempting to introduce an indigenous innovation.

---

[9] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Reply," *Slavic Review*, June 1980, p. 290. Bailes proposes a similar interpretation when he stresses school and production ties as major reasons for the political dominance of the First Five-Year Plan group (pp. 268–69), and Lampert notes the "careerist" motives of some party members (p. 73).

This is not to suggest that nothing has changed since 1917. One of the most impressive achievements of the Soviet regime has been the creation of an extensive network of scientific research institutes. Robert Lewis, in *Science and Industrialization in the USSR,* provides figures showing that Soviet expenditure for scientific research as a percentage of national income exceeded that of the United States in the mid-1930's, and he notes that the Soviets were ahead of everyone in endeavoring to plan scientific research. Yet, as Lewis also points out, the return on R&D investment and the achievements of planning were, and continue to be, paltry. The Soviet Union, although a world leader in basic research, performs poorly in technological innovation. While the problems in innovation in the Soviet economy have already been subjected to careful scrutiny,[10] the books reviewed here extend that analysis, placing the problems in historical context and showing how they evolved from the planning system in both science and industry.

The system of planning introduced in the Soviet Union, as Lampert reminds us, "was not a method for providing an orderly coordination of the production process," but rather was intended "to achieve a shortcut expansion of industrial production" (p. 81). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that coordination of research with industry was not a major priority. The result has been a system in which scientific research is viewed as important *in itself* but has never been linked in a meaningful way to production.

Planning priorities undermine technical development in a number of ways, as Bailes and Lewis demonstrate. One major problem has been the geographic and administrative separation between science and industry. Soviet science planning has generally been dominated by individual researchers—the "grass roots"—while industrial priorities are determined by the "command economy." Removed from contact with production, researchers are not likely to focus on the questions most relevant to industry. In the 1930's, an effort was made to resolve this difficulty by placing industrial research under the control of related enterprises, but such an approach frequently resulted in diversion of personnel and resources to meet immediate production quotas. Similar difficulties have been reported in the 1970's.

Stalinist attempts to encourage mass participation in invention likewise led to an impasse. Campaigns for practical inventions from worker-inventors brought a flood of time-consuming nonsense. Yet to ignore the "crackpot" engenders a risk that real geniuses will be passed over.

Finally, the Soviet planning system encourages the "engineering fallacy"—pursuit of technical solutions regardless of their economic rationality. While not unknown in the West, this difficulty is more severe when the researcher totally ignores profit and cost.

Despite a generally disappointing record, Soviet science has demonstrated an ability to make significant achievements in specific areas. Both Bailes and Lewis seek to explain this success in priority areas through case studies of aviation in the 1930's. Lewis puts forward a series of characteristics which he believes made aviation one of the more successful spheres of Soviet technology. The list includes concentration of design and production facilities in Moscow; competition between designs, with production decisions made only after the testing of prototypes; and the existence of good development facilities. Recognizing the importance of aviation R&D, the leadership freed it from the most detrimental constraints of the planning system. The best people were mobilized—which created a sort of ripple effect—and individual initiative was rewarded. Last but not least, there was follow-through. Soviet aircraft designers were not engaged in hypothetical exercises; they were determined to see their ideas fly.

Relative success in military aviation suggests a model for the operation of the Soviet R&D system. What might be called "functional dysfunctions" are maintained throughout the system as a way of guaranteeing political control. In priority areas such as military aviation, the party intervenes to cut through normal obstacles. The amount of effort required in such situations is enormous, but there is no sacrifice of political control at any level.

Yet even nonpriority sectors must function somehow, and the key here is in the development of informal arrangements. Lampert provides a great deal of evidence from Soviet sources illustrating the importance of informal mechanisms at various levels: among managers and party officials sharing responsibility for plan fulfillment, and between workers and managers, whose common interest in material rewards outweighs conflicts. He would not dispute Bailes's view that such arrangements are rooted in the institutional structure of Soviet planning and are unlikely to be seriously influenced by changes in personnel or piecemeal reorganization.

A comparison of efforts at reform

---

[10] The classic work on the subject is Joseph S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry,* Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1976. There are excellent discussions of the difficulties of relating scientific research to industry in the chapters by Thane Gustafson and Bruce Parrott in Susan Gross Solomon and Linda L. Lubrano, Eds., *The Social Context of Soviet Science,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980

in the 1920's and 1930's with proposals put forward in recent years is particularly instructive in this respect. Lewis notes that the suggestion of linking research to industry made in the 1920's sounds very similar to the science-production association (*ob"yedineniye*) reform adopted in 1973. The Scientific Research Sector created under *Vesenkha*'s Planning, Technical, and Economic Administration in the 1930's appears to be a forerunner of the State Committee for Science and Technology. Not only do recent reforms look quite similar to earlier panaceas; they have failed to produce much better results. Soviet difficulties with industrial production and innovation are systemic, arising directly from the planning process, and they will not be significantly alleviated without a major alteration of that process.

Effective reform would have to be carried through on a broad front, and the current Soviet leadership shows not only a lack of inclination to act decisively but even a lack of ability to conceptualize changes of such magnitude. Reform requires reformers, yet the individuals with specialized expertise and the capacity to develop real alternatives are not easily discernible in the Soviet bureaucracy. Bailes does suggest that there may recently have been a revival of the traditional Russian "critically thinking intelligentsia," and that engineers and applied scientists have played the leading role in this development (p. 7). Nevertheless, such movements must be kept in perspective. As David Joravsky has pointed out, the significant statistic may be not that a few hundred people sign a petition despite enormous personal risk and the virtual certainty of unpleasant consequences, but rather that out of more than a million members of the technostructure only a few hundred sign such petitions.[11]

Soviet concern to prevent the emergence of any independent centers of power may have been so effective that it has stifled any potential for creative solutions. Although Stalin is gone and professionals no longer fear for their lives when practicing their occupations, there are strict limits on their activity. Moreover, their ideas concerning resolution of the USSR's problems often seem stale and unrealistic. Lately, for example, there has been discussion of the potential for technocracy among Soviet managers—at a time when most Western commentators would dismiss such suggestions out of hand.[12]

THE DAMAGE that can be inflicted by political choices and historical inheritances can be seen clearly in Soviet medicine. Many of the characteristics of Soviet science and technology also apply to medical science. There is the same tendency for prestige to accrue to theory and basic research rather than to practice; there are enormous distortions generated by the planning system ("death quotas" for hospitals being the most ghoulish); and while there has been a tremendous effort to correct shortcomings, producing an impressive increase in the provision of medical facilities, the return on that investment has been less than should have been expected.

As is true in almost every profession, the Soviet general practitioner commands less prestige and a lower salary than specialists or medical researchers. Many observers have made the obvious connection between the low pay and status of "ordinary" Soviet physicians and the preponderance of females in that occupation. In his volume under review, Dr. William Knaus attributes the dominance of women in Soviet medicine to Stalin's decision to adopt a "no frills" health care system in which women would be the practitioners (p. 83). Knaus also suggests, however, that "as in the rest of the Soviet economy, part of the reason for the low wage is the high percentage of female workers in medicine" (p. 334). One might think that Knaus would need to make a choice between these two propositions. Either medicine became a low-salary, low-prestige occupation in the Soviet Union because most practitioners were women, or many women ended up in medicine because it was a relatively low-paying and low-status occupation. Knaus never untangles the two issues, preferring instead to make generalizations about Soviet women and their careers.[13]

Fortunately, the work of serious scholars offers a corrective to Knaus's confusion. Nancy Frieden has produced a carefully researched and thoughtful analysis of the Russian medical profession, focusing on the period before 1905. In the current context, one of her major contributions is to show that the great majority of doctors in Russia were always poorly paid and low-status employees of the state. No one who reads Frieden's excellent chapters on the cholera epidemic of 1891–92 and on the status of physicians will ever confuse the social, legal, or financial status of Russian doctors with that of their American counterparts. There was a determined movement among prerevolutionary physicians to change their situation through professionalization, but it was not successful.

---

[11] See David Joravsky, "Political Authorities and the Learned Estate," *Survey* (London), Winter 1977–78, pp. 36–41. Bailes does seem to recognize this consideration in his conclusion, p. 425.

[12] For example, see V. G. Grafskiy, *Gosudarstvo i tekhnokratiya* (The State and Technocracy), Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p. 282.

[13] One does not have to be a feminist to find in Knaus attitudes toward women that might make him perfectly at home in Soviet society. He suggests that "some Soviet women, unable to marry . . . have made medicine their life and developed careers as professors, scientists or researchers" (p. 95). A few pages later, on the basis of a single interview, he adds: "As Natalie demonstrates, few Soviet female physicians are aware of, or even interested in, the political aspects of their profession" (p. 97).

In broader terms, Knaus's interesting personal observations are frequently counteracted by distortions of history, and some of his errors impugn the integrity of his entire study. Knaus informs us in his preface that "to travel to another city a visitor, *like a Soviet citizen*, needs a visa" (p. 13, emphasis added). Unfortunately, this mistake pretty much sets the tone for what follows. We are told erroneously that "in February 1917, the Social Democrats took over the government and forced Nicholas to resign" (p. 74); that the *zemstvo* "represented a return-to-the-land movement in Russia" (p. 62); that in 1974 the government came up with the "new" idea of awarding the title Heroine of the Soviet Union to women bearing 10 children (p. 200); and that Gosplan is the Soviet Ministry of Finance (p. 217). One might be inclined to be less harsh if Knaus did not claim that he was presenting "a truly scholarly work" (p. 12). A traveler's account generally tells more about the traveler than the place visited. This book is no exception.

When Stalin sought to restructure Soviet society in the 1930's, the dual goals of increasing the labor force and maintaining the family reinforced traditional male-dominated hierarchies in virtually all professions.[14] But some professions were more likely to become overwhelmingly female domains, and medicine was one of them. This situation is attributable both to medicine's low prestige before the revolution and to its continued low priority thereafter.

Knaus does make a contribution by indicating the influence specialists may exert on Soviet policy decisions and by chronicling the recent revival of professional aspirations among Soviet physicians. The movement for professionalization which Frieden describes was seemingly destroyed by Stalin, yet many of the same issues are reemerging. In return for a willingness to abandon direct political claims, many professional groups wield major influence on decisions affecting their areas of expertise. This policy role of professionals, as opposed to "interest groups," is emerging as one of the most promising topics of investigation for students of Soviet politics.[15]

In analyzing professional groups, it is essential to pay special heed to the professional goals that they formulated before 1917—the best evidence available for how these professionals saw themselves in the Russian context. Attention should also be devoted to cleavages within professions, as Bailes shows in his excellent discussion of the tensions between educated specialists and *praktiki*. Such studies can shed light on the nature of the compromises and accommodations that specific professional groups made with Soviet power, on the levers Soviet leaders were able to use in subjugating professional groups, and on the interests reemergent professional groups are likely to articulate.

THE SOVIET UNION will shortly experience a succession with unprecedented potential for change. An entire leadership generation—the one dominated by *vydvizhentsy*—will pass from the scene in the 1980's. In the inevitable struggle for power, the balance of institutional interests that has been maintained by Brezhnev may be called into question, and perhaps altered.

Prospects for fundamental reform, however, appear remote. The need for such reform is already generating tensions between professional specialists who see the defects of the system and the conservative ideological-political bureaucrats who are threatened by change. The historical record suggests that serious reforms threaten enough established interests among both specialists and bureaucrats to ensure that these groups will resist or circumvent significant change. But past experience likewise suggests that problems resulting from the system and consequent pressures for change will not be eliminated.

---

[14] For a particularly perceptive discussion of these issues, see Gail Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development and Social Change*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978. Chapter 3 deals with the Stalinist "solution."

[15] See particularly Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 167ff; and Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, Chap. 6 and passim.

Terrorist Trends and Ties

By Douglas S. Blaufarb

ROBERT H. KUPPERMAN and DARRELL M. TRENT. *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1979.

CLAIRE STERLING. *The Terror Network.* New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Reader's Digest Press, 1981.

YONAH ALEXANDER, DAVID CARLTON, and PAUL WILKINSON, Eds. *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1979.

HERBERT ROMERSTEIN. *Soviet Support for International Terrorism.* Washington, DC, The Foundation for Democratic Education, 1981.

THE TROUBLE with trying to think about modern political terrorism to some purpose is that it is so widespread and so varied in form that there are few general statements that apply to all important elements except that they all use violence. A large and growing literature by Western journalists and scholars has grappled with the problem.[1]

The reason for the interest is not far to seek. Any novel social phenomenon will, of course, engage the interest of the community whose business it is to study such matters. This certainly happened in the 1950's and 1960's, for example, when guerrilla warfare loomed as an important new factor in the less developed world. In addition, political terrorism is by no means limited to remote and relatively primitive areas. For the Western world, the fascination of terrorism lies in its appearance right here, in the midst of our unexciting, suburbanized, homogenized modernity, shouting out to us between commercials for false-teeth adhesives and stomach-soothers. It has the same shock value as if a war party of Indian braves were suddenly to descend on Pennsylvania Avenue taking the scalps of commuters and file clerks on their lunch hour. Moreover, it turns out that the war party is not composed of real Indians but recognizable young compatriots from the privileged minority—Mark Rudds, Bernadine Dohrns, and Katherine Boudins. No wonder we seek to determine what it all means.

The focus here is on urban terrorism, as distinguished from the organized violence for pressure and propaganda purposes that accompanies rural insurgencies of the type conducted and advocated by such as Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara. Urban terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it frightened our ancestors in Europe and America in the last half of the 19th century. However, as an instrument of left-wing revolutionaries, it was eclipsed and somewhat discredited from the time of the Russian Revolution until quite recently. Its reemergence as a tool of the militant Left seems to have been a matter of virtually spontaneous combustion, although some exemplary role was certainly played by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) Provos, the extremist wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Trotskyites in Argentina, none of whom were in a position to follow the precepts of rural guerrilla warfare. It was quickly taken up in Latin America after the resounding failure of Castroite insurgency in Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere. After Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil became the testing grounds. While advocates of urban terrorism presented it as guerrilla warfare conducted in the cities,[2] the urban environment is really not suitable for guerrilla operations, and the phenomenon remained terrorism plain and simple. It nevertheless spread rapidly to most parts of the world (except the Communist areas), a fact brought home graphically by television and the other media.

---

[1] A reasonably thorough run-down on English-language materials is August R. Norton and Martin H. Greenberg, Eds., *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980. This guide categorizes some 1,000-plus titles topically and geographically, and includes a novel section on terrorism in fiction. It is, however, limited by its omission of works in German, Italian, or French, not to mention less accessible languages. A student seeking the titles of works by the early anarchist Johan Most would not find them here. They are written in German. Similarly with the untranslated work of Franz Fanon and Regis Debray, available only in French.

[2] See the most influential tract on the subject, Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, reproduced as an appendix to Robert Moss, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.

THERE ARE various categories of urban terrorist movements, the principal division being between nationalist and separatist movements (IRA, PLO, Basque, Quebecois, Puerto Rican, and so on), on the one hand, and militant left-wing movements in democratic or near-democratic states, on the other. What "success" terrorism would appear to have had—and certain successes doubtless underlie the persistence of the phenomenon—seems to have come in the first category. A host of modern states have emerged in part as a result of urban terrorist activity. The technique goes back at least as far as the struggle of various nations for independence from the Turks and of the Irish from England. Attached to this category as a subspecies are those desperate little separatist movements whose message is: "Do not forget us," or "Revenge is ours." Among them are Croat, Armenian, and South Moluccan groups.

Of the urban terrorists in the democratic world, we can distinguish movements in the still not fully developed nations (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, and Mexico) and those in the fully industrialized democratic nations of the West, including Japan. It is in the former that urban terrorism has had its greatest, if most perverse, political impact. In Argentina, Uruguay, and Turkey, relatively democratic regimes have been overthrown by military coups reacting against terrorism, and the terrorists themselves have been largely destroyed. That is virtually the only political result of any of the terrorist movements in noncolonial settings since modern political terrorism emerged as a noteworthy phenomenon. However, such destruction of democratic systems by right-wing counterterror, it should be noted, has been and remains a first objective of these allegedly left-wing movements: the hope is that the people at large will become sufficiently aroused by right-wing suppression to support the militants in a subsequent serious bid for power.[3]

Perhaps the most bewildering to the public and experts alike have been the urban terrorists in industrialized democracies. What motivates these scions of privilege—the Baader-Meinhof Gang of West Germany, the Angry Brigade of Britain, the Red Brigades of Italy, the Weathermen of the United States, and numerous other grouplets, many comprising a mere handful—who burst upon our awareness mouthing irrational cries and brandishing machine guns? In their study of terrorism, Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent suggest that terrorists of this stripe "seem to be propelled by a profound self-hatred, a nausea concerning their own historical-material identities that leads them to seek the negation of the very culture that nurtured them." More and more, they have tended toward violence for its own sake, as a more exciting form of self-expression.[4] The terrorists bespeak a desperation most people do not feel. The unreality of their pretensions and of their analysis of the scene about them, as well as the radical disconnection between their alleged goals and the means they advocate for reaching these goals, cause them to be viewed by their compatriots as dangerously disturbed minds rather than as the vanguard of the future.

In none of the democratic countries has the incoherent rhetoric or violent episodes evoked any detectable political response. This lack of response, problems of morale (disciplined terrorist activity can be very dull work performed over long periods of time), and improved police work seemed by the end of the 1970's to be leading to the disappearance of this social pathology from the democratic, industrialized world.

Yet in 1980 and 1981, new episodes perpetrated by a new generation of militant desperadoes broke upon us. The attempts on the lives of Pope John Paul II and Generals Frederick J. Kroesen and James Dozier, the Brinks robbery, and many other less spectacular events remind us that urban terrorism has not fully spent its power. By and large, the new generation of "decivilized" bomb-throwers appear less coherent, less rational, less well organized—mere epigones of their predecessors—and are inclined to flirt with the drug culture while plotting to bring down society. One should note, however, the continued existence of another, small category of "career professionals" of preeminent skills, available on demand so long as the goal is vaguely "revolutionary" and the resources generous. These include the famous "Carlos," a Venezuelan trained in Russia and employed by the PLO, and—probably—the Turk Mehmet Ali Agca, who carried out the attempt on the Pope.

One should also recognize the existence of terrorism of the right wing. Some observers believe that this kind is likely to increase especially in European countries with a fascist past. Recent events such as the bombing of the railway station in Bologna and the brief takeover of the Spanish parliament by a group of younger army officers add credibility to this prediction.

---

[3] A point made by Claire Sterling in *The Terror Network* (p. 22). Walter Laqueur makes a similar point, stating that the strategy dates from 19th-century terrorist theory. See his *Terrorism*, Boston, MA, and Toronto, Little Brown and Co., 1979, p. 186. Laqueur's study was reviewed in Abraham Ascher, "Lessons of Russian Terrorism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1980, pp. 70–74.

[4] Walter Laqueur describes the terrorists as suffering from "the crisis of identity, suburban boredom, the desire for excitement and action, a certain romantic streak, in short terrorism as a cure for personality problems." Op. cit., pp. 209–10.

At any rate, the landscape is generally familiar, although there are a few strange new wrinkles. For example, Claire Sterling mentions in *The Terrorist Network* that right-wing terrorists have been welcomed at some of the Middle Eastern training camps set up by the Communists and have trained there side by side with militant leftists. Neo-fascists in Italy have also accepted help from Libya, which at the same time aids and nurtures leftist terrorists. This trend suggests that less may separate the two extremes of the political spectrum than either would be prepared to admit.

In European history, threats and acts of violence from the Left have always brought forth similar threats and acts from the Right, which, because of support from the military, can usually prevail. The rise of fascism between the wars reflects this dynamic. It certainly cannot be ruled out that terrorism of the Left will bring on a resurgence of fascism with a new name. One might envision such a scenario in countries—notably Spain, Portugal, and especially Italy—which have sizable Communist movements allied to militant trade unions with a tradition of violence and which have already in modern times experienced long periods under dictatorial regimes. So far, however, only in Italy has modern urban terrorism attracted sufficient numbers of recruits, many of a high caliber in terms of education and dedication, to make such a scenario even remotely possible. And the Italian nation, despite a crushing load of serious social problems, still clings to democratic norms and fights with increasing effectiveness against the threat.

FOR ALL the difference in approach and fortunes of the terrorists, there are certain common requirements of terrorism, no matter where or by whom it is applied. Most obvious is the need for compartmentalized, cellular organization, clandestine communication, and careful attention to security.

However, the authors of the books under review point to other similarities which are of greater interest. One is the "propaganda of the deed," an old idea inherited from the 19th century but multiplied manyfold in importance by the instantaneous and dramatic effect of modern media, notably television. Instant notoriety and recognition create the illusion of success in restless and aggressive minds and stimulate their owners to further feats; they also attract emulation and thereby create a snowball effect. Something like this took place after 1968 when a phase of spectacular airplane hijackings, kidnapings, and murders was launched by the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, followed quickly by similar acts by other groups in the Middle East and Western Europe.

At the same time, the piling up of episode upon episode produces a jaded reaction and no lasting effect. Where does the terrorist turn when he has deployed his bag of tricks more than once, is still far from gaining his ostensible aims, and feels himself slipping back into obscurity and helplessness? He can, of course, change targets, techniques, and locales, but that merely postpones the reckoning. The temptation exists to try for ever more spectacular episodes, with the threat (noted by many commentators in the books under review) that the terrorists might seek to wreak mass destruction through the use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. In *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response,* Kupperman and Trent set the problem thus:

> *Violent acts against the government and society are possible today and may not be totally improbable in coming years. The LaGuardia bombing and the specter of "Philadelphia fever" convey the message; the clock is running, the irrational may occur.*

The authors take the threat seriously enough to provide detailed analyses of vulnerabilities and of the state of preparedness in the US to deal with major catastrophes.

In their useful review of recent work on terrorism, Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson also ponder the threat of mass destruction. David Carlton, writing on "The Future of Sub-state Violence," points out that until now, political terrorists have generally been "conservative" in their modalities of violence, relying mainly on bombs and automatic firearms, but he predicts that terrorists will become progressively more violent and destructive, and raises the possibility that in time the threat of mass destruction will become more serious. However, trends toward less political rationality—which would underlie any threat to destroy the very masses in whose interests the threat is ostensibly made—and toward feebler organization among the terrorists would tend to reduce their ability to mobilize the technical skills required to make a threat of mass destruction possible and to keep arrangements secret. The possibility of such threats cannot, of course, be ignored. It is prudent to improve our defenses and our ability to cope with large-scale disaster, but the menace of mass destruction should not preoccupy us to the exclusion of other threats, which evidence a more rational calculation of costs and benefits to the terrorists.

EVEN MORE important as a common factor than playing to the media and the resulting pressure for more sensational exploits is the interlocking and cooperative nature of many of the terrorist enterprises and, beyond that, their dependence not only on each other but also on certain political movements or governments for the means to carry out their programs. Most obvious among the latter are Cuba and the militant enemies of Israel in the Arab world, notably the PLO, Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen. But, if we probe further, we find that these, in turn, depend upon the training and guidance of such states as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and finally, of course, the Soviet Union.

This is the simplified essence of the somewhat breathless but still highly factual account laid out by Claire Sterling in *The Terror Network*. Her book attracted much attention when it appeared more than a year ago at the time of the installation of a new administration in Washington and the charges by the new Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, and others that the Soviets were supporting and encouraging terrorism. Although Sterling has been criticized for going beyond the evidence and for such political lapses as "undermining détente," her volume is in fact a carefully crafted amassing of detail culled largely from already public sources. Unlike most journalists' accounts, hers is in large part footnoted and sourced. The involvement of the Soviet Union through many surrogates is not very much of a secret—all the other books under consideration here make the same charge. What Sterling does is attempt to build a complete picture, to show in the most specific terms how the Soviet involvement works.

In making the case about Soviet involvement, Sterling explicitly denies that the evidence shows the Kremlin to be masterminding a worldwide terrorist conspiracy. What Moscow has done—and continues to do—is to facilitate, improve, strengthen, and encourage left-wing terrorist activities wherever they spring up against non-Communist governments. It pursues this course through education and training on a large scale (in South Yemen, North Korea, the USSR, and elsewhere) and guidance of the secret services of friendly governments in similar training efforts, through the channeling of subsidies through intermediaries, and through the provision of weapons and other support services of every kind—usually, again, via intermediaries. On the other hand, it does not in most cases plan or direct the activities of the groups it supports. It merely makes them possible.

A similar point is made more briefly by Herbert Romerstein in his pamphlet *Soviet Support for International Terrorism*. Romerstein cites some of the same evidence and some additional material to demonstrate Soviet involvement in supporting terrorism. He does not, however, go into the more difficult question of whether or not Moscow tries to direct terrorist activities.

The cost-effectiveness of this involvement by the Soviets and their cohorts is sobering. According to a CIA estimate cited by Sterling, the USSR puts the equivalent of about US$200 million a year into its support activities for so-called "wars of national liberation." This investment ensures a highly professionalized apparatus and a continuing flow of trained recruits to take the place of those who fall by the wayside. It helps embed Soviet propaganda and ideology in the minds of the terrorist cadres, with the result, carefully documented by Sterling, that the IRA, the Basques, Palestinians, and Marxist anti-Khomeini Iranians all spout the same crude "anti-imperialist" catechism. The resulting terrorism becomes a serious problem for governments whom the Soviets regard as ideological enemies, embarrassing them and exposing them as weak and vacillating, and causing serious internal strains. All of this comes at less cost than one heavy cruiser or a few modern bombers.

The beauty of the situation from the Soviet standpoint is that there have so far been no costs of a nonmonetary nature. As Sterling points out, the target governments have bent over backward to avoid confronting Moscow about its behavior and have done their best to keep what they know from coming to public attention. Indeed, there is little these governments can do directly except to put relations with the Soviet Union in the deep freeze and explain why, frequently and emphatically. Such a policy, it appears, would be unpalatable to large elements of their publics, at least in Western Europe, and would reverse policies of rapprochement with the East in which the governments, ironically, have sizable political investments.

In the past, some observers have described Soviet policy regarding terrorism of the "anarchic" type we are discussing as being firmly "negative."[5] On the other hand, Walter Laqueur has traced what he sees as a consistent thread of ambiguity in the Bolshevik stance, and opines that the Soviet Union finds itself in a dilemma vis-à-vis terrorism—between the goal of international respectability and the desire not to leave the field to its ideological rivals on the left.[6] However, there is little sign of either negative views or ambiguity in the tale that Sterling tells, and one fears that Laqueur has overlooked the effectiveness of the Soviet tactic of working largely through intermediaries.

---

[5] See, for example, Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1960, p. 237.

[6] Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 197–201.

WHAT, on balance, is the threat of urban terrorism? If we look at a map of the world, it is not the urban terrorism in Israel, Ulster, Spain, or Italy, but the combination of terrorism with rural insurgency in El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, or Guatemala that seems to pose the greatest danger.

The latter, attacking backward regimes with limited capabilities (if unaided) to defend themselves, is a pressing problem for consideration by the US and other industrialized democracies. But that is a story for another time. As for urban terrorism, it is an extremely nasty and costly problem. But it is hardly a threat to the societies in which it has appeared, except as a factor which might in some circumstances trigger a successful right-wing response.

Western Intellectuals and Communist States

By Peter W. Rodman

PAUL HOLLANDER. *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928–1978.* New York, NY, and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981.

THE ATTRACTION of communism to Western intellectuals is a subject long noted and much examined. Paul Hollander, a sociologist, has singled out an interesting aspect of the phenomenon—the "political pilgrims," that is, the Western writers, scholars, and students who, generation after generation, have traveled to Communist countries and come away fascinated and admiring. In studying this particular aspect, he sheds new light on the broader phenomenon.

Hollander is in a position to make thoughtful judgments about Communist societies and the Western intelligentsia, having firsthand experience with both. Born in Hungary, he emigrated as a young man after the events of 1956. He studied at the London School of Economics, at the University of Illinois, and at Princeton University, where he received his doctorate in sociology. He is now a fellow of the Harvard Russian Research Center and professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Although the writing in the volume is a bit heavy at times, beneath the academic prose there is serious thought, provocative analysis, and genuine insight. There is also a wealth of evidence, gleaned from the memoirists, of the incredible naiveté of Western visitors to Communist countries.

George Bernard Shaw, on a trip to the USSR in the 1930's during a period of widespread famine, was so convinced that reports of food shortages were capitalist propaganda that he threw a supply of provisions out the train window before crossing from Poland into Soviet territory. He later announced this action proudly to an audience of hungry Russians in Moscow—who gasped in horror. When it was suggested to him that he would have done better to throw the food out the window on the Soviet side of the border, Shaw refused to believe it.

Shaw's gullibility about Soviet realities was repeated many times over by other travelers to the USSR, before and after. And when disillusionment with the Soviet system eventually set in, as it did in later decades, other utopias beckoned—revolutionary China, Castro's Cuba, North Vietnam during its war with the United States, and others. Even Albania has been the subject of glowing reports by some adventurous West Europeans.

WHAT IS it that accounts for the continual suggestibility of so many Western intellectuals—precisely the class of men and women who pride themselves on their critical faculties, on their professional ability to penetrate beneath surface appearances in the search for truth? All the Communist regimes examined by Hollander perfected what he refers to as the "techniques of hospitality"—the art of providing physical comfort, solicitude, skillfully packaged tours, and calculated flattery. (Shaw was provided with a luxurious sleeping car and—amazing coincidence—two waitresses who turned out to be intimately familiar with his writings!) Such hospitality makes criticism difficult, by establishing a subtle sense of obligation as well as by misleading the visitor as to local conditions. Only in rare cases (that of André Gide, for example) did the flattery backfire or fail to have some effect.

But, as Hollander goes on to demonstrate, this factor is hardly a sufficient explanation. The visitors were misled because they allowed themselves to be misled. They were not tourists but pilgrims, yearning to believe in the virtue of regimes they regarded as moral experiments of vast importance to mankind. As in the case of the anecdote about Shaw, the socialist ideal was so compelling a vision that objective reality was ignored, wished away, or rationalized with an artfulness that perhaps does a perverse kind of credit to the creativity of the Western intellectual mind.

For example, one Jerome Davis, traveling in the USSR during World

War II, was taken into custody several times by the Soviet security police (NKVD), but his arrests only increased his admiration for the country. He found the security police well trained and intelligent and "always made it a point to compliment them on their alertness in spotting a foreigner who might be a spy." Beatrice and Sidney Webb visited a model Soviet prison and concluded that the Soviet penal system was "apparently as free from physical cruelty as any prison in any country is ever likely to be." Thirty years later, Communist Vietnam, after its victory over South Vietnam, was reported to be forcing its prisoners ("war criminals") to walk through minefields to find unexploded mines left over from the war; radical antiwar activist William Kunstler said he thought he could "understand the reasoning" behind this barbaric practice. "It's part of a terrible, terrible time," he added.

Hollander traces these and other mental contortions that many learned observers have gone through to preserve the coherence of their own visions. We see a total suspension of the skepticism that marks intellectual attitudes toward most phenomena at home. Happy children cavorting in a kindergarten in a Communist country help convince visitor after visitor that the regime *must* be a humane one—as if children did not play happily in kindergartens in most countries. By a process of "contextual redefinition," those who would deplore child labor in Western societies as an abomination find boys and girls toiling in the fields in China or Cuba a positive sign of social solidarity and community. Squalor becomes picturesque; shabbiness, a sign of a more thorough egalitarianism. A group of Concerned Asian Scholars visiting China met an old woman whose job it was to remove and collect slivers of metal from oily rags. Her hands were "covered with cuts from the slivers." Asked if these were not painful, she replied: "When you are working for the revolution, it doesn't hurt." The visitors were deeply impressed.

The inversion of values applies ironically even to the treatment of their fellow intellectuals. One visitor to Cuba wrote approvingly: "The independent intellectual, the critic of all societies and all beliefs, is a luxury they [the Cuban regime] cannot afford." Mary McCarthy wrote in identical terms about North Vietnam: "The license to criticize was just another capitalist luxury, a waste product of the system. This of course is true." Thus are the most degrading conditions and the denial of the most vital freedoms excused by virtue of the higher social ideals in the name of which, or in pursuit of which, they are undergone.

ONE OF Hollander's principal conclusions, for which he shows ample evidence, is that the motivation lies not so much in the objective appeal of the societies visited as in the rejection of one's own society. The heyday of enthusiastic reporting about the USSR was not in the 1920's, the period of the New Economic Plan (NEP) and an attractive cultural vitality, nor was it in the 1950's, the time of the anti-Stalin campaign and the "thaw," which might have prompted new hopes for the benign evolution of the Soviet system. Rather, the peak for pilgrims was in the 1930's—the high point of Stalinist terror. The systemic crisis wracking the Western democracies in the Great Depression seems to have created such a powerful psychological need for an alternative ideal that there was strong incentive to overlook or suppress all thought of the horrific underside of the worker's paradise in the Stalin era (of which much was known at the time). Criticism of Western society, so strongly expressed by so many of the Western intelligentsia, seemed to require the confidence that other, better societies were within the reach of human aspiration. When the Western crisis waned, so did the impulse to idealize the USSR. In the 1950's, the USSR's own display of self-criticism and self-doubt may only have accelerated the weakening of its appeal.

The second great wave of disaffection in Western societies came in the 1960's and 1970's. Hollander devotes considerable space to the counterculture of the period and its philosophical themes, such as they were. This time the critique was one of affluence rather than of poverty, but it prompted the second great flood of political pilgrims. The new socialist meccas were now mostly in the Third World—principally Cuba and China, which it was hoped would avoid the "mistakes" of the Soviet Union. In the United States, the Vietnam war acted as a further spur, adding North Vietnam to the itinerary.

While the context was somewhat different from that of the 1930's, the results were the same. American society, which had been rejected as a pathetic failure in the 1930's, was now scorned as brutally overweening, complacent, and corrupt. Susan Sontag offered this analysis in 1969: "To us, it is self-evident that the *Reader's Digest* and Lawrence Welk and Hilton Hotels are organically connected with the Special Forces' napalming villages in Guatemala. . . ."

LUDICROUS as some examples are, the malaise of intellectuals is not a laughing matter. No society is healthy if its most educated classes are so profoundly disaffected.

The roots of alienation are many. Hollander reviews a century of sociological literature on the subject and offers his own speculations based on the example of the political pilgrims: the feeling of many intellectuals that they are insufficiently appreciated in their own countries; a diffuse rebelliousness toward societies that fulfill all material needs; a thirst for adventure; a yearning to identify with power (and with totalitarian systems where intellectuals often have, or seem to have, a powerful role); guilt feelings at their own lives of privilege, transposed into a yearning to identify with the "masses." The reader may or may not agree with every explanation offered by Hollander, but the discussion is thoughtful and not dogmatic.

Among the estranged, the impulse to debunk seems allied to an impulse to affirm *something*. Thus, as noted, the rejection of one's own society seems to require the faith that a better alternative is within man's capability, as proven by its existence somewhere else. If it is not—if *all* societies are fatally flawed—it is much more difficult to inveigh against one's own. Indeed, if there is no ideal society *elsewhere*, mankind is sore afflicted, and one is left in a spiritual void. And the intellectuals are precisely those among us who search most assiduously not only for knowledge but for meaning, not only for truth but for harmony and coherence in the human condition.

The quest for utopias in the modern age, concludes Hollander, is one of the delayed fruits of the secularization of Western culture, for with the decline of religious faith, man must seek fulfillment here on earth. It is "delayed" because for a time the lost religious faith was supplanted by a secular belief in Progress—a belief to which the 20th century has dealt a series of devastating blows.

The prevalent modern religious faith among intellectuals is socialism—the humane ideal of equality, justice, social harmony, and well-being. As John Maynard Keynes observed nearly 50 years ago, it is a moral, not an economic, impulse:

> *Communism is not a reaction against the failure of the 19th century to organize optimal economic output. It is a reaction against its comparative success. It is a protest against the emptiness of economic welfare, an appeal to the ascetic in us all. . . . It is the curate in [H. G.] Wells, far from extinguished by the scientist, which draws him to take a peep at Moscow. . . . The idealistic youth play with Communism because it is the only spiritual appeal which feels to them contemporary. . . .*

It is a powerful dream, so powerful that it attracts even when continually perverted in practice. Either its failures and perversions are ignored, or else the faith persists that somewhere else, in some other newly discovered land of innocence, its feasibility will at last be proven.

How ironic that Marxism, which prided itself on its materialism and determinism, should find its appeal as an object of faith and a spiritual ideal, while Western values, which always claimed a spiritual origin, should seek their vindication in material abundance and find failure in their inability to provide meaning. How ironic also that intellectuals, who in our societies have usually been the chief defenders of freedom and creativity, should be so ready to overlook the stultifying brutality of systems whose response to freedom and creativity has always been to crush both. For, in the end, the tragedy of the political pilgrims is their abandonment of the liberal values that nurtured them. It is our tragedy as well. Hollander concludes with the disturbing question "whether or not, willingly or inadvertently, Western intellectuals will contribute to the destruction of their relatively free societies, in part because of their illusions about other societies and their recurrent fantasies of new forms of liberation and collective gratification."

It is an important book, as important as its subject.

CORRECTIONS

Several corrections should be made in the "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement'" (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1982, pp. 77–82).

On page 78, it should be noted that the Yemen Socialist Party did attend and the Democratic Party of Guinea did not attend the November 1981 work conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.

On page 79, the impression is erroneously given that the Zimbabwe African National Union had a vice president on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Conference; the vice president from Zimbabwe is Joshua Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African People's Union.

Finally, in the abstract at the beginning of the given issue of *POC*, the World Peace Council should be described as "Moscow-line" rather than "Moscow-sponsored."

• • •

The Editors' Note on page 71 of the March-April 1982 issue inadvertently miscited the source of the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981." This list is published by *Problems of Communism* jointly with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, edited by Richard F. Staar, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

BACK ISSUE ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

ORDER FORM

Please enter my subscription to PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) for one year (six issues) @ $14.00 domestic or $17.50 foreign.

Number of subscriptions ____________.

Enclosed is $ ________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No. ____________

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City

State

ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to
Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D C 20402

ORDER FORM

Please send the following back issue(s) of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) @ $3.25 domestic or $4.10 foreign.

Date(s) of issue(s) ____________.

Enclosed is $ ________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No. ____________

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City

State

ZIP Code

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to
Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D C 20402

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last five) issues of *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single-issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURRENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $14.00 each; outside the US, $17.50 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $3.25 each; outside the US $4.10 each. A 25% discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services, ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49–65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Microfilming Corp. of America
1620 Hawkins Avenue, Box 10
Sanford, NC 27330

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

S [redacted]
LD
U.S. DOCUMENTS dup
NEWARK PUBLIC LIBRARY

ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN

NEWARK PUBLIC LIBRARY
SEP 1 6 1982
GOVT. PUB
ORY 376

Problems of Communism

4

JULY-AUGUST 1982 VOL XXXI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032–941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editoral matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism*. Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism*, and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI*, *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents*, *Economic Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Index to US Government Periodicals*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Strategic Studies Reference Guide*, and *United States Political Science Documents*.

Cover: Sections for a pipeline to boost Soviet energy shipments to Europe, increasingly to West rather than East European markets. Photo from EUPRA.

---

1 East European Economic Slowdown
by Jan Vanous

20 Moscow and Mitterrand
by Michael J. Sodaro

37 Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement
by Vojtech Mastny

BOOKS

52 The Kissinger Years
by Frank K. Roberts

57 Negotiating, Soviet Style
by Hannes Adomeit

63 The Politics of Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe
by Jacques Rupnik

68 An Unsentimental Journey Across Russia
by Alexander Kazhdan

71 Crime and Punishment Under Socialism
by Louise I. Shelley

76 The Turkic Past and the Soviet Future
by Daniel C. Matuszewski

NOTES & VIEWS

83 Correspondence

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.

SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT)
David E. Albright

SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT)
Wayne Hall

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
William E. Freeman
Sophia Sluzar

DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom

PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
Linda A. Wray

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Gwenette Worthington

ANNOUNCEMENT

David E. Albright, since 1970 an editor and since 1976 Senior Text Editor of *Problems of Communism*, has accepted an appointment as Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL, 36112. His colleagues on this journal wish him the best in his new endeavor.

Negotiating, Soviet Style
[illegible]

Charges that the methods and negotiating style of the Soviet [illegible] do not conform to accepted diplomatic standards have persisted since the [illegible] in 1917. While any [illegible] is open to question, throughout the years Soviet diplomats seem to have shown a common [illegible] and techniques. In analyzing Soviet foreign policy, however, it is [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] and [illegible] the following theory of style.

The Politics of Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe
Jacques Rupnik

The international economic crisis of the 1970s has [illegible] in the Soviet bloc, particularly among the East European economies. The remarkable degree of interdependence between the economies of Eastern and Western Europe [illegible] economic problems in the East. [illegible] after the first attempts at a complete overhaul of systems of economic management, the question of [illegible] economic efficiency remains unresolved in East Europe, [illegible] the Soviet Union.

An Unsentimental Journey Across Russia
[illegible]

Lifting the heavy lid of Soviet [illegible] to [illegible] of Russian life is no easy task. Western journalists, writing of their experiences from work and travel in the Soviet Union, present some useful insights, [illegible]. Yet works in this genre are marred by some [illegible] and consequently fail to give a fully satisfying image of Soviet reality.

Crime and Punishment Under Socialism
Louise I. Shelley

Contrary to the expectations of Marxist ideologues, crime has not begun to disappear in socialist countries. While communist officials try to [illegible] criminal conduct. There is also a great deal of [illegible] the existing socialist systems force the average citizen into illegal activity of some kind simply to [illegible] conditions in daily life.

The Turkic Past in the Soviet Present
[illegible]

Over the last [illegible] years, there has been a [illegible] of ethnic and cultural [illegible] in the Soviet Union. The official [illegible] Turkic legacy from the past.

East European Economic Slowdown

by Jan Vanous

At the beginning of the 1980's, the economies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—the East European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—are at a crossroads. The Polish economy is in a crisis the depth of which is beginning to rival the Great Depression of the 1930's. Other East European economies face a slowdown in growth unprecedented in the postwar period.

The same sort of pressures that blew the lid off Poland will increasingly build beneath the political leaders and central planners of the other East European countries, forcing them to make hard decisions to cope with the mounting economic problems. Below, we shall look at the causes of the economic slowdown as it began in the 1970's, the factors affecting the outlook for these economies through 1985, and some specific projections regarding the economic activity of these countries through that year. At the conclusion, we shall speculate briefly about how the leaderships might respond.

The 1970's—An Overview

To evaluate the economic outlook for Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1980's, it is first necessary to review the major economic developments that took place there during the 1970's. The most important was a dramatic slowdown in overall economic growth (see Table 1 on p. 3). The average annual growth of produced national income (net material product) for the six economies taken together declined from 7.3 percent in 1971–75 to 4.0 percent in 1976–80.[1] This slowdown occurred in both industry and agriculture. The average annual growth of East European gross industrial output declined from 8.7 percent in the first half of the decade to 5.7 percent during the second half, while in agriculture the corresponding decline was from 4.0 to 1.3 percent.[2] The slowdown in growth rates also affected the construction industry, transport, communications, and other services. However, it should be pointed out that such a widespread slowdown was not a completely new phenomenon—the growth of aggregate output decelerated in Eastern Europe during 1956–60 and even more during 1961–65.[3]

The economic slowdown was caused by several factors. First, by the early 1970's, the economies of

Mr. Vanous is Senior Economist, Centrally Planned Economies (CPE) Service, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (Washington, DC) and editor of the CPE's Current Analysis *and* Balance of Payments and Debt Report. *He is coauthor with Michael Marrese of* Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, *forthcoming this year.*

---

[1] It should be noted that official East European statistics of "produced national income" are not strictly comparable to the Western measure of national income ("gross national product"—GNP), for they exclude most services. Except possibly when all sectors of material production grow very slowly—such as in several East European countries in 1981—the "net material product" measure would show faster growth of output than would the GNP measure. An additional problem with the official statistics on net material product is that they contain an upward bias stemming from systematic underestimation of inflation.

[2] Official East European statistics for industrial and agricultural output are imperfect measures because they report gross output rather than net output (value added). This results in considerable double-counting, the extent of which changes over time with the changing degree of intermediate processing/manufacturing. Official statistics on gross output are also subject to the same inflationary bias as the official statistics on national income.

In the case of agriculture, the decline in growth of output during 1976–80 relative to 1971–75 should in part be attributed to bad weather. During the five-year period 1976–80, the weather pattern probably was less favorable than usual—only 1978 and 1980 (except in Poland) were good years, 1976 and 1979 were unfavorable; and 1977 was at best mediocre.

[3] In particular, the East European growth rate for produced national income declined 31 percent during 1956–60 and an additional 42 percent in 1961–65 before increasing 52 percent in 1966–70 and an additional 20 percent in 1971–75. See the table in the continuation of this footnote on p. 2.

A tale of two economic models: at left, in Poland a wait in a queue is rewarded with the purchase of a loaf of bread and some parsley; at the right, in Hungary consumers examine wares in a Budapest supermarket.

—Photoreporters and Vincent Mentzel.

Eastern Europe began to run out of sources of what Marxists call "extensive economic growth," i.e., they were no longer able to spur growth by further increases in the physical quantities of production inputs (labor and capital). The need was perceived to shift to intensive economic growth, based on improvements in the quality of inputs (better education and training for labor, technological advances, more efficient organization of production, etc.). But while this necessity had been apparent to East European central planners for quite some time (at least since the mid-1960's), the record of the East European economies in effecting this change has been almost uniformly dismal.

A second factor contributing to the slowdown was the general failure to carry out effective economic reforms and the decision instead to place excessive reliance on a development strategy based on accelerated imports of Western technology. During the 1960's, only two East European countries—Czechoslovakia and Hungary—made a major effort to institute substantive economic reforms based on decentralization of their economies; a reduced role of central planning and its reform away from a command type toward an indicative type of planning mechanism; the introduction of more realistic prices; improvement of the system of economic incentives for both enterprise managers and workers; a shift toward profit and sales, rather than gross output, as measures of economic performance; and, last but not least, the introduction of various measures to encourage innovation, technological improvements, and risk-taking both in utilization of new technologies and in introduction of new, more technologically sophisticated products. The Czechoslovak reform lasted a mere two years (1967–68) and was effectively scrapped after the Soviet-led invasion of August 1968. The Hungarian reform began in 1968, at a much slower pace than the Czechoslovak reform, and it is still advancing—14 years later. In the other four countries, central planners were unable to introduce the type of economic reform which would foster intensive economic growth by means of proper incentives to enterprise managers and workers.

The following data are drawn from official East European statistics, with the exception of figures for Eastern Europe as a whole—these being the author's own aggregations.

Produced National Income

(average annual rate of growth, in percent)

	1951–55	1956–60	1961–65	1966–70
Bulgaria	11.2	9.6	6.7	8.8
Czechoslovakia	8.2	6.9	1.9	7.0
East Germany	13.1	7.1	3.4	5.3
Hungary	5.7	6.0	4.1	6.9
Poland	8.6	6.6	3.4	4.6
Romania	13.3	6.6	9.2	7.5
Eastern Europe	10.0	6.9	4.0	6.1

This absence of reform (Hungary's slow-paced efforts being the exception) contributed to the adoption of what quickly became a fashionable "technocratic" cure for growth deceleration: increased imports of superior Western technology and know-how. East European central planners envisaged that these imports would lead to upgrading of the quality of East European capital stock and improvement of productivity, thus reversing the slowdown in economic growth. The imports of Western technology were primarily financed by borrowing from Western commercial banks and governments. The loans were to be repaid a good bit later—in the second

Table 1: Growth Trends in Eastern Europe's Produced National Income Gross Industrial Output, and Gross Agricultural Output, 1971–85

(annual or average annual growth, in percent)

PRODUCED NATIONAL INCOME

	1971–75	1976–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981–85
Bulgaria	7.8	6.1	4.5	3.7	3.4	4.4	4.3	4.1
Czechoslovakia	5.6	3.7	0.2	2.9	1.2	2.2	2.2	1.7
East Germany	5.4	4.1	4.5	3.7	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.4
Hungary	6.2	3.2	1.8	1.4	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.0
Poland	9.8	1.6	−13.0	−7.5	1.6	1.7	2.0	−3.3
Romania	11.3	7.3	2.1	2.5	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.1
Eastern Europe	7.3	4.0	−1.2	0.6	2.3	2.7	2.8	1.4

GROSS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

	1971–75	1976–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981–85
Bulgaria	9.2	6.0	5.6	4.0	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7
Czechoslovakia	6.7	4.7	2.0	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6
East Germany	6.5	5.1	5.1	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.9
Hungary	6.4	3.4	2.3	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4
Poland	10.4	4.6	−19.0	−10.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	−4.8
Romania	13.0	9.4	4.5	3.5	4.5	5.5	5.5	4.7
Eastern Europe	8.7	5.7	−1.1	0.7	3.5	3.6	3.6	2.1

GROSS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

	1971–75	1976–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981–85
Bulgaria	2.9	0.9	4.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.3
Czechoslovakia	2.6	2.1	−3.4	3.5	1.0	1.6	1.6	0.9
East Germany	2.7	1.2	3.0	1.0	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.3
Hungary	4.6	2.5	0.0	3.0	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.4
Poland	3.7	−1.6	4.0	4.8	2.3	1.5	1.6	2.7
Romania	6.5	3.8	−0.9	3.0	2.5	3.5	3.5	2.2
Eastern Europe	4.0	1.3	0.7	3.2	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.0

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: For 1971–81, official East European statistics as reported in the respective statistical yearbooks. For 1982–85, forecasts by the Centrally Planned Economies Service of the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (see a discussion in the text below). The figures for Eastern Europe as a whole were aggregated by the author, using for purposes of weighting 1978 US government estimates of the gross national product and sectoral output of the individual countries, denominated in dollars. See Thad P. Alton, "Production and Resource Allocation in Eastern Europe: Performance, Problems, and Prospects," Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *East European Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, Part II, pp. 355 and 375.

half of the 1970's and in the early 1980's—from increased export sales.

Eastern Europe had little difficulty borrowing from the West on a massive scale. Aggregate net East European debt to the West, which at the end of 1970 had stood at US$6.0 billion, by the end of 1975 had reached US$21.2 billion, and at the end of 1980 stood at US$55.8 billion (see Table 2 on p. 4). The reason for the ease with which Eastern Europe borrowed some US$50 billion during the 1970's was the ample supply of loanable funds at the disposal of Western banks (especially after 1973, when they began to be flooded with surplus funds from member-states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—OPEC) and the eagerness of Western governments to stimulate exports (especially since the onset of a prolonged Western recession in 1975 after a fourfold increase in OPEC oil prices in 1974 coming on the heels of major increases in the prices of other raw materials in 1972–73).

Unfortunately, two unforeseen developments largely ruined East European plans to accelerate growth through increased imports of Western technology. First,

Table 2: Eastern Europe's Net Hard-Currency Debt to Non-Communist Countries, 1970–85

(in billions of current US dollars)

	1970	1975	1980	1981	1985[a]	Percent change in real debt, 1981–85[b]
Bulgaria	0.7	2.1	2.5	2.2	2.5–3.5	4
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.2	3.4	3.4	4.0–5.0	1
East Germany	1.4	4.8	11.6	12.8	16.0–17.0	−2
Hungary	0.6	2.3	6.6	7.2	8.0–9.0	−10
Poland	1.1	7.7	22.3	22.6	25.0–28.0	−11
Romania	1.6	3.1	9.4	10.1	12.0–13.0	−6
Eastern Europe	6.0	21.2	55.8	58.3	67.5–75.5	−6

[a] Forecast.

[b] Ratio of the mid-point 1985 debt estimate to the 1981 estimate, divided by the projected 7 percent change in the world price level between 1981 and 1985, measured in dollars.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: *Wharton CPE Balance of Payments and Debt Review*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, June 1982 edition.

The following methodological considerations should be noted: (1) the net hard-currency debt to the West is defined as gross hard-currency debt to Western banks (including most of the debt owed banks in the Middle East and the less-developed countries, where data are available), to Western governments, and to international financial organizations (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the case of Romania), minus deposits from Eastern Europe in Western banks; (2) hard-currency debt among members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—the total of which is equal to zero, by definition—is not included; (3) hard-currency assets of CMEA countries other than deposits in Western banks (gold, foreign exchange held by the central banks, hard-currency accounts held in banks outside the area of the Bank for International Settlements) are not taken into account; (4) categories of debt included are long- and medium-term debt, most short-term debt, the West German swing credit to East Germany, and some supplier credits (the swing credit—estimated at US$1.75 billion at the end of 1981—is viewed as a cumulative non-interest-bearing liability with no fixed repayment schedule); (5) all debt is evaluated at the appropriate foreign currency/dollar exchange rate applicable at the end of each year (thus, the portion of CMEA debt denominated in DM, French francs, British pounds, and Japanese yen declined in dollar value during 1981 in view of the strength of the dollar).

Western technology, when used in conjunction with Eastern labor without the usual Western market incentives and labor discipline, proved less productive than in the West. In effect, East European planners failed to allow for the impact of the economic, social, and political environment on the productivity of imported technology—something known in the West for some time as the "X-efficiency effect," a term first introduced by Harvey Leibenstein of Harvard University.[4] In addition, East European planners discovered that the primary cost of imports of Western technology—the cost of the machines, licenses, and know-how—was not the only cost. With a lag of a year or two, the imported Western technology generated its own requirements for increased imports of Western raw materials and semimanufactures, which also had to be bought for hard currencies. Growing hard-currency shortages made it more and more difficult for Eastern Europe to maintain the level of imports of raw materials required for full utilization of the imported technology.[5]

A third major factor contributing to Eastern Europe's economic slowdown was the Western economic recession itself, which lowered demand for East European exports of manufactured and primary goods. As marginal suppliers of Western imports, East European economies were the first to be dropped by Western importers. The impact of the Western recession was greatly reinforced by the inability of East European countries to efficiently utilize the imported capital to cut costs and improve their competitive position vis-à-vis Western exporters. The difficulties due to stagnation or drops in the level of revenue from exports to the West were further aggravated by deterioration of Eastern Europe's terms of trade with developing countries and in most cases also with the developed West.[6]

A fourth factor contributing to the slowing of growth in Eastern Europe was the dramatic deterioration in the area's terms of trade with the Soviet Union, beginning in 1975 (see Table 3). Given the fourfold increase in the world market price of crude oil, as well as large increases in world market prices of other key raw materials, the USSR pressed East European countries into accepting a new price-setting formula in 1975. Prior to

---

[4] H. Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency v. X-Efficiency," *American Economic Review* (Menasha, WI), June 1966, pp. 392–415.

[5] For example, in the case of Poland, net imports (imports minus exports) of machinery and equipment from non-Communist countries began to decline rapidly after 1976, but net imports of raw materials (other than fuels and food) kept increasing in real terms through 1979 before dropping rapidly in 1980 and 1981. However, the decline in net imports of raw materials from US$1.9 billion in 1979 to US$0.2 billion in 1981 took place purely for financial reasons. Its main consequence was a rapid decline in industrial output (and hence also in utilization of industrial capacity), followed by a decline in exports.

[6] For example, aggregate East European terms of trade with developing countries are estimated to have declined 53 percent between 1970 and 1977 (see Jan Vanous, "Soviet and East European Foreign Trade in the 1970's: A Quantitative Assessment," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, Part 2, p. 699). According to internal estimates by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (Wharton) for the same period, terms of trade with the developed West improved only in the case of Romania (by 5.1 percent). There were declines of 10.8 percent for Czechoslovakia, 8.6 percent for Hungary, 7.5 percent for East Germany, 3.7 percent for Bulgaria, and 1.1 percent for Poland. See *Wharton Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Price Databank, 1960–77*, Washington, DC, July 1981.

Table 3: Trends in Eastern Europe's Terms of Trade with the Soviet Union, 1975–85

(1970 = 100)

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1985
Bulgaria	90	76	71	66	49
Czechoslovakia	86	77	71	65	48
East Germany	85	74	69	63	47
Hungary	81	68	64	60	44
Poland	95	83	78	74	55
Romania	103	86	85	83	61
Eastern Europe	89	77	72	67	49

SOURCES: For 1975, *Wharton CPE Foreign Trade Price Databank, 1960–77*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Fall 1981. For 1980 and 1981, author's estimates based on official Hungarian and Polish ruble-trade price statistics. For 1982 and 1985, author's own forecasts.

that year, intra-CMEA foreign trade prices had been held constant during five-year periods and had been based on averages of world market prices during the preceding five years. Under the new formula, intra-CMEA prices are changed every year on the basis of five-year moving averages of world market prices. As a consequence, the USSR in 1975 more than doubled the price for its oil exports to Eastern Europe.[7] As of that year, Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe had improved by an estimated 12 percent in comparison to 1970. By the decade's end, they had improved a full 30 percent.[8] And even then, as the analysis presented below shows, the Soviet Union had not fully utilized its bargaining potential vis-à-vis Eastern Europe but continued to transfer resources to the region in the form of hidden trade subsidies on a massive scale.

Finally, the USSR, enjoying far superior terms of trade in dealings with the West compared to those pertaining in Eastern Europe,[9] has proved eager to hold back on increases in supplies of fuels and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe. Faced with slower growth of these supplies and mounting inability to compensate by purchases in the non-Communist world (because of shortages of hard currencies and increasing difficulties in raising additional credits), East European planners were forced to accept lower growth rates of industrial production and investment.[10]

It should be noted, however, that East European growth rates were slow to reflect the unfavorable external economic conditions—deteriorating terms of trade with the Soviet Union and the West, and the Western recession. The sharp downturn really began only in 1978–80.[11] In part, this delay was due to objective differences in the way centrally planned economies respond to changing external economic conditions as compared with the way market economies do.[12] At the

Ota Sik, right, former Deputy Premier of Czechoslovakia and architect of that country's economic reform in the mid-1960's, talks with Peter Colotka, Premier of the Slovak Socialist Republic, prior to a May 29, 1969, session of the Central Committee (CC) of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, at which Sik was expelled from the CC for views expressed during travels in the West.

—EUPRA.

---

[7] For a more detailed description of the inter-CMEA price-formation formula, see Jaromir Penkava, "Improvement of Price Formation in the Process of Socialist Economic Integration," *Finance a uver* (Prague), No. 10, 1975, pp. 651–57. The increase in the price of Soviet oil exported to Eastern Europe was calculated from *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1975 god* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1975), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Finansy i statistiki," 1976.

[8] The improvement in Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe mirrors exactly the deterioration in East European terms of trade with the Soviet Union. Thus, the 11 percent decline in East European terms of trade during 1970–75 represents a 12 percent improvement of Soviet terms of trade (100 divided by 89 = 1.12). Similarly, during 1970–80, Soviet terms of trade improved 30 percent (100 divided by 77 = 1.30).

[9] For example, Vanous, loc. cit., shows that between 1970 and 1977, Soviet terms of trade with the West improved 70 percent, and with Eastern Europe, a mere 23 percent. In addition, the presence of implicit trade subsidies granted by the USSR to Eastern Europe (discussed in detail below) means by definition that the Soviet Union has obtained inferior terms of trade in Eastern Europe compared to those obtainable in the world market.

[10] This type of response to import shortages is characteristic of centrally planned economies. Unable to pass the increased cost of imports on to domestic industrial enterprises and faced with growing payments difficulties, planners cut the domestic growth rate so as to ensure improved balance between aggregate supply of inputs and aggregate demand for the inputs based on targeted growth of output.

[11] Official East European national income statistics show that the downturn in growth rates began in 1978 for Poland and Hungary, in 1979 for Czechoslovakia, and in 1980 for Romania and Bulgaria. On the other hand, the East German growth rate accelerated steadily from 1978 until 1982, when it is likely to slow down.

[12] For a market economy, a deterioration in the terms of trade generally leads to rising trade deficits, followed by a decline in the value of the given country's currency vis-à-vis other currencies, increased cost of imports combined with greater export sales, and a

(fn. 12 continued on p. 6)

same time, political leaders were slow to lower growth targets, out of fear of the political consequences of a decline in living standards and increased consumer discontent. They preferred to delay adjustment, offsetting the effect of the unfavorable external developments noted above with an increased implicit transfer of resources from the Soviet Union and continued open borrowing in the developed West.

Implicit Soviet Trade Subsidies

Let us look first at the preferential trade treatment accorded to Eastern Europe by Moscow in the 1970's.[13] Throughout the decade, Soviet terms of trade with the region improved much more slowly under the intra-CMEA price-setting formula than they would have if this trade had occurred at prevailing world market prices. In effect, there was a large implicit transfer of resources from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe in the form of hidden trade subsidies. The USSR exported relatively underpriced energy and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe in exchange for imports of relatively overpriced East European machinery and industrial consumer goods (the degree of "overpricing" of the latter looms even greater if one allows for the relatively low quality and low technological sophistication of East European manufactures relative to Western counterparts). The subsidies can be viewed as a saving of hard currency that Eastern Europe achieved by trading a particular bundle of export and import goods with the Soviet Union rather than with the West. To the Soviets, the subsidies represented an opportunity cost in terms of hard currency forgone by trading with Eastern Europe instead of with the West.

Some impression of the dimensions and trends in the implicit trade subsidies granted by the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe can be seen in Table 4. These subsidies increased dramatically in 1974 as Soviet prices of energy exported to Eastern Europe remained virtually unchanged at a time when the world market price of oil quadrupled. Even in 1975, when the USSR more than doubled the price for the oil it exported to Eastern Europe, the aggregate trade subsidies to Eastern Europe declined by only US$1 billion. During 1974–78, these subsidies averaged US$5.8 billion annually. Further increases in world market prices of energy subsequently pushed the level of Soviet subsidies to US$10.4 billion in 1979 and US$17.5 billion in 1980. Preliminary estimates indicate that subsidies may have increased slightly in 1981 to US$18.6 billion and may be expected to decline to US$15.1 billion in 1982.[14]

A distribution of credits, dollar debt, and subsidies underwritten by the USSR for each East European country and a comparison with the debt to the West (including a small debt to developing countries) accumu-

Table 4: Deficits in Eastern Europe's Trade with the USSR and the West,[a] 1973-82

(billions of current US dollars)

	Deficits in trade with USSR				
Year	Reported	Trade subsidies	Total	Deficits in trade with West[a]	Grand total
1973	−0.6[b]	1.6	1.0	2.2	3.2
1974	0.1	6.3	6.4	4.9	11.3
1975	0.5	5.3	5.8	5.7	11.5
1976	0.7	5.6	6.3	6.0	12.3
1977	1.2	5.9	7.1	5.3	12.4
1978	0.1	5.8	5.9	5.6	11.5
1979[c]	0.9	10.4	11.3	5.0	16.3
1980[c]	1.6	17.5	19.1	3.7	22.8
1981[c]	2.7	18.6	21.3	0.5	21.8
1982[d]	3.3	15.1	18.4	0.7	19.1

[a] Including developing countries.
[b] Surplus.
[c] Preliminary estimate.
[d] Forecast.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Reported deficits in East European trade with the USSR calculated from official Soviet foreign trade statistics denominated in rubles and converted into dollars at an exchange rate of 1.18 rubles to the dollar. For trade subsidies in 1973–80, see Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, summer 1982 (1980 is a revised estimate by the author); 1981–82 figures are the author's own estimates. The total deficits in Eastern Europe's trade with the USSR were derived by adding reported deficits and trade subsidies. Deficits in East European trade with the West are from *Wharton CPE Foreign Trade Flow Data Bank*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, April 1982 edition.

---

downward adjustment in domestic aggregate output. This response occurs more or less automatically, and the adjustment is quite rapid—barring government intervention intended to slow the process. In the case of a centrally planned economy, this mechanism of transmission of external disturbances into the domestic economy is absent. The slowdown in the domestic aggregate output is not automatic, but requires direct intervention by central planners (see fn. 10). Since central planners are generally hesitant to make the required adjustment until they are certain that the change in external economic conditions is not just temporary, they tend to respond to these changing conditions with considerable delays and, in fact, generate a socialist version of Western business cycles.

[13] This section draws extensively on material presented in Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Summer 1982. Some of the points were also presented in Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese, "Soviet Subsidies to Eastern Economies," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Jan. 15, 1982, p. 24.

[14] Estimates of Soviet implicit trade subsidies are sensitive to assumptions about pricing of East European exports of machinery and industrial consumer goods to the Soviet Union relative to prices obtainable on the world market. For example, Soviet trade subsidies to Poland in 1980 were estimated to be in the range of US$3.0–3.6 billion, the lower estimate based on the extreme assumption that Polish machinery was equal in quality to Western machinery and that the official Soviet ruble/dollar exchange rate (1.4:1) was the appropriate conversion rate for translating this ruble trade flow into dollars. For more detail, see Elisabeth Goldstein, "Soviet Economic Assistance to Poland, 1980–81," a paper prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress for a volume entitled *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, forthcoming in 1982.

Table 5: Eastern Europe's Debt Incurred and Nonrepayable Aid Received, 1972–81

(billions of 1981 US dollars)

	Debt incurred to and nonrepayable aid from Soviet Union					
	Present value of ruble credits	Dollar debt	Present value of trade subsidies	Total	Debt to the West[a]	Total
Bulgaria	1.3	n.a.	17.8	19.1	1.4	20.5
Czechoslovakia	0.7	n.a.	19.5	20.2	2.8	23.0
East Germany	2.2	n.a.	33.5	35.7	11.2	46.9
Hungary	0.4	n.a.	12.2	12.6	6.4	19.0
Poland	2.8	2.0	17.9	22.7	21.6	44.3
Romania	−0.5[b]	n.a.	1.0	0.5	8.3	8.8
Eastern Europe	6.9	2.0	101.9	110.8	51.7	162.5

[a] Including small amount of debt to developing countries.

[b] Negative figure implies that Romania was a net creditor of the Soviet Union during the indicated period.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Ruble credits were calculated from annual Soviet foreign trade yearbooks, denominated in rubles, assuming a 5 percent interest rate in 1972–81 and converted into dollars at 1.18 rubles to the dollar. The dollar debt is a Wharton estimate based on communication from the Polish government. On the trade subsidies, see Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, Summer 1982. Debt incurred to the West is calculated as the difference between 1971 and 1981 net debt figures in *Wharton CPE Debt and Balance of Payments Data Bank*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Spring 1982.

lated by each are offered in Table 5. During the decade 1972–81, the total transfer of resources from the outside world to Eastern Europe amounted to US$162 billion in terms of 1981 dollars. The Soviet Union accounted for 68 percent of the total, while the West accounted for the remaining 32 percent. The bulk of the Soviet transfer of resources—almost 92 percent—took the form of hidden trade subsidies. The largest share of these subsidies went to East Germany (33 percent), followed by Czechoslovakia (19 percent), Poland (18 percent), Bulgaria (17 percent), Hungary (12 percent), and Romania (1 percent). By 1980, the annual amount of implicit Soviet trade subsidies represented 2.8 percent of combined East European GNP.[15] However, if we consider that these subsidies were embodied in supplies of energy and key raw materials, their importance to Eastern Europe is far greater.

One must question why the Soviet Union has concurred in this seemingly unfavorable arrangement. The benefits to the Soviets are mainly military, political, and ideological, rather than economic. Militarily, the USSR is compensated by the existence of the Warsaw Pact—which provides a buffer of several hundred miles between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, forward military bases in Eastern Europe, a partial substitute for the direct use of Soviet manpower and hardware, and even proxy interventions (particularly by East Germany) in Third World countries on Soviet behalf. Politically, Soviet preferential trade treatment serves to sustain the allegiance of and to maintain dominance over the ruling Communist parties of Eastern Europe. These countries usually vote along alliance lines in international forums, and give informal support to the USSR in government and media statements. Soviet assistance permits East European political leaders to maintain a higher living standard for their populations than otherwise possible (without major reforms) and thereby to avoid economic discontent, which could turn into political discontent. It even wins the support and friendship of certain segments of the East European populaces. Ideologically, Eastern Europe by and large officially accepts the Soviet model and propagandizes it in other countries. Finally, there are even some economic benefits accruing to the USSR in return for its trade subsidies: increased economic stability in Eastern Europe, a reduced risk of disruption in the flow of certain strategic machinery from East Germany and Czechoslovakia (items technologically superior to what the Soviets are capable of producing), and a lower likelihood that Eastern Europe will refuse to purchase Soviet exports for reasons other than their price competitiveness (such as a politically inspired refusal to purchase Soviet gas or oil).

At the same time, however, it is open to question how much better off Eastern Europe really is for having received these subsidies. Clearly, they helped to sustain a significantly higher living standard than would have been possible otherwise assuming adherence to the existing economic model. However, if the Soviet trade subsidies are viewed as "payment" for further limits on East European sovereignty, the answer is probably that the region is significantly worse off. An independent Eastern Europe, free to restructure both its internal and external economic relationships, would probably be far more productive. It is unlikely that trade subsidies make up for the low productivity of the current economic system imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.

---

[15] The US government estimates the combined 1980 East European gross national product at US$627 billion. See *NFAC Handbook of Economic Statistics*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 26. In Table 4, the 1980 Soviet subsidies are estimated at $US17.5 billion.

Indeed, the "addictive" Soviet trade subsidies have had an important distorting influence on the East European economies. By providing relatively cheap energy—for example, in 1981 the Soviet price for oil was 70 percent and for gas was 51 percent below comparable world market prices, assuming a realistic ruble/dollar exchange rate of 1.18 rubles to the dollar—the Soviet Union has encouraged energy wastefulness on the part of the economies of Eastern Europe (except in the case of Romania, which has only itself to blame). In comparison with Western Europe, Eastern Europe consumes at least twice as much energy per unit of GNP. Even though this discrepancy in part reflects a higher relative share of energy-intensive industries (metallurgy, machinery, chemicals) in total East European industrial production, a comparison on an industry-by-industry basis reveals that energy consumption per identical unit of output in the East typically runs 50 to 150 percent above that in the West. By distorting the relative price of energy, the USSR has contributed to the lack of preparedness of East European economies for the economic reality of the high energy prices of the world market in the 1980's. Without necessarily intending to do so, the Soviet Union may have seriously damaged the ability of East European economies to become competitive and thereby have threatened their long-term viability.[16]

Key Factors for the Future

The economic outlook for Eastern Europe during the first half of the 1980's depends on a number of important, primarily external, factors. These include trends in Soviet trade, in Soviet assistance, in Western economic recovery and credit policies, and in the crippled Polish economy. To this list, one should add at least two internal factors: the direction of policy regarding economic reforms and measures to reduce consumption of energy and raw materials. And finally, there is the perennial question of weather. Let us examine these factors in brief.

1. Soviet–East European terms of trade. The expected trends in the terms of trade with the USSR are very unfavorable for Eastern Europe. Prices of Soviet exports to the region in 1981 are estimated to have increased 17 percent, while prices of Soviet imports from the region increased only about 8 percent. This differential resulted in a 6 percent deterioration in East European terms of trade with the Soviets.[17] It is virtually certain that a similar deterioration in Eastern Europe's terms of trade is occurring in 1982.

The main cause of the ongoing deterioration is the rapid increase in the prices of fuels (oil, refined oil products, gas, coal, coke, and electricity) imported by Eastern Europe relative to the prices of East European manufactured goods exported to the Soviet Union. This trend is expected to continue at least through 1985 (see Table 3 on p. 5), as the intra-CMEA price-setting formula gradually comes to reflect the near-tripling in world market prices of energy that took place during 1979–81.

Relative to 1980, aggregate East European terms of trade are expected to decline by some 36 percent by 1985. If the comparison is made with 1970, then in relative terms, one ruble's worth of East European exports in 1985 will purchase less than one half the amount of typical Soviet goods it did 15 years earlier. Working from data in Table 3, we can expect the largest deterioration in terms of trade for 1970–85 to occur for Hungary (56 percent), followed by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (51–53 percent), Poland (45 percent), and Romania (39 percent).

This trend poses serious dilemmas for both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While trying to induce the USSR to maintain or even increase real exports of energy and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe, the latter must figure out how to pay for these increasingly costly imports. It must persuade the Soviet Union to increase direct financial assistance to the region either in the form of low-cost ruble trade credits or outright ruble grants. Moreover, Eastern Europe must try to maintain satisfactory levels of exports to the West in order to service its debt obligations there and satisfy domestic needs at a time when it is being pressed to greatly increase exports of manufactures to the Soviet Union to pay for increasingly costly imports. The Soviet dilemma, conversely, is precisely how to induce Eastern Europe to boost the manufacture and export to the USSR of higher-quality manufactured goods (goods more comparable to manufactures that the Soviets can import from the West) to offset the expected rapid rise in Soviet export earnings in Eastern Europe.

---

[16] "Consequences of Soviet Subsidization of East European Economies," Wharton *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis* (Washington, DC), Apr. 29, 1982.

[17] "East European Terms of Trade with the Soviet Union in 1981–82," ibid., May 10, 1982.

2. Soviet assistance. There is little doubt that the USSR will be compelled to continue large-scale economic assistance (direct and indirect) to Eastern Europe during the 1980's, albeit probably on a somewhat lower scale than during 1980–81, when Soviet assistance averaged the equivalent of more than US$20 billion a year. In this regard, the Soviet leadership, whether Leonid Brezhnev or his successors, faces an increasingly difficult decision. Eastern Europe clearly is a key Soviet political and military asset, but the economic cost of this asset may soon outweigh the noneconomic benefits that it provides.

During the 1970's, the Soviet political leadership did not have to be very seriously concerned with the cost of maintaining its "empire," for the Soviet economy was growing at a fairly satisfactory rate and was enjoying advantageous external economic relations. Between 1970 and 1980, the USSR benefited from extremely favorable developments in the country's terms of trade with non-Communist countries, as world market oil prices increased 20-fold, gold prices increased 14-fold, and prices of many other Soviet raw-material exports tripled. By contrast, the prices of Soviet imports of manufactured goods and grain grew by only 100–150 percent.[18]

Prospects for the Soviet economy in the 1980's are fundamentally different. Soviet national income is likely to grow by at most 3 percent per annum, and more likely at a rate closer to 2 percent.[19] Soviet terms of trade with non-Communist countries are not expected to improve to any significant degree, as most forecasters now conclude that world energy prices will probably follow the general trend of inflation closely.[20] The

---

[18] Author's own estimates, based on Wharton *Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Price Databank.*

[19] Wharton, *Centrally Planned Economies Outlook* (Washington, DC), April 1982, p. 37.

[20] For example, Wharton predicts that world market prices of energy in US dollar terms will rise 6.0 percent a year in 1980–87, while prices of primary raw materials will grow 4.6 percent, and prices of manufactures will grow 5.1 percent. See Wharton, *World Economic Outlook* (Philadelphia, PA), May 1982, pp. 240–42.



Erich Honecker (left of center), General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic, during a March 1980 visit to the new Buna Chemical Works in Halle, designed to produce plastic materials out of East German raw materials and Soviet petroleum.

—Eastfoto.

Yugoslav and Hungarian sections of the "Adria" oil pipeline are welded together near Csurgo in southwestern Hungary. The line, begun in 1977, is designed to facilitate importing of oil from the Middle East to the two countries, as well as to Czechoslovakia.

—Interfoto MTI from Camera Press.

mounting burden of defense, as the USSR attempts to maintain parity with the US (or the degree of superiority that the Soviet Union has gained in the 1970's, according to some estimates), will force the Soviet leaders to make difficult choices.

Since the Soviet leaders attach the highest priority to defense, the cutbacks or slower growth can occur in three areas: domestic consumption, domestic investment, or foreign economic assistance. Although it is probable that all three will be affected, the first two are likely to suffer more than the third. Since foreign economic assistance, especially preferential trade treatment of Eastern Europe, serves as a substitute for standard types of military expenditure, it will probably enjoy the second highest priority, behind defense.

Since commodity prices are not expected to rise more rapidly than other prices on the world market in the first half of the 1980's, the intra-CMEA pricing formula should gradually bring intra-CMEA commodity prices closer to those prevailing on the world market, and thereby tend to reduce the scale of implicit Soviet trade subsidies. In this circumstance, we can reasonably expect that the scale of open Soviet aid to Eastern Europe will increase. (The alternative would seem to be to plunge the region into deep economic recession, with serious political consequences.) To hide this aid burden from its own population and to make the aid more palatable to the East Europeans, the USSR is likely to opt for low-interest ruble trade credits or term its aid "development assistance to restructure the economies of Eastern Europe."[21] In this way, the Soviets would recycle some of their "petrorubles" in a fashion similar to that in which OPEC countries recycled "petrodollars" in the West during the 1970's. Such recycling of "petrorubles" would, in turn, ease the economic burden that rapidly deteriorating terms of trade with the Soviet Union will impose on Eastern Europe. Finally, in order to prevent the region from building a rapidly increasing debt to the USSR in the 1980's, we can reasonably expect that the Soviets will periodically write off some of this debt, thereby converting loans into genuine financial aid.

From the Soviet perspective, the shift from transfer of resources through implicit subsidies contained in distorted relative prices to transfer via lump-sum payments should have a positive efficiency effect on the economic policies of Eastern Europe. Lump-sum Soviet transfers combined with more realistic pricing for East European imports, particularly of energy, will tend to force the recipients of aid to consume those imports according to their true scarcity.

3. *Western markets and credits.* The economic outlook for Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1980's will also depend on the state of Western economies, their demand for East European exports, and the availability of new credits to the East.

A vigorous Western economic recovery is essential for improvement in the level of East European exports to the West. Realistically, however, such a recovery could begin to have an impact no earlier than 1983, and it may not be felt with any strength until 1984.[22]

With regard to the ability of Eastern Europe to obtain new credits from Western commercial banks and governments, one would have to be rather pessimistic at this point. Our current estimate is that between 1981 and 1985, the net hard-currency debt of Eastern

---

[21] For example, the latter form of economic assistance is advocated by Hungarian economists in informal discussions with Western economists. The important difference between these two types of credits is that ruble trade credits are a form of general-purpose financial (balance-of-payments) assistance, while development loans are tied to particular investment projects. Presumably, the Soviets would invest in projects that would increase East European capacity to export to Soviet markets, thus ensuring the repayment through additional exports in the latter half of the 1980's and in the 1990's.

[22] Wharton predicts that the combined gross domestic product for the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will increase a mere 0.8 percent in real terms in 1982, 3.6 percent in 1983, and 3.1 percent in both 1984 and 1985. Wharton, *World Economic Outlook*, May 1982, p. 223. Demand for East European exports is expected to pick up with a time lag of about six months, as Western buyers turn first to their usual suppliers and only later to marginal suppliers in Eastern Europe.

Europe to the non-Communist world will increase by only US$9–17 billion, or some 16–30 percent in current-dollar terms (see Table 2 on p. 4). If so, the growth of the East European debt will not even keep pace with an expected global average annual rate of inflation of 7 percent, 1982–85.[23] Therefore, Western credits are not likely to be a major factor in increasing Eastern Europe's ability to import from the West. (It might be noted, though, that the expected stability of relative commodity prices on the world market may bring some relief to Eastern Europe. During the 1970's, most East European countries experienced a decline in their terms of trade with non-Communist countries, and the arresting of this trend should be welcome.[24])

4. *The Polish factor.* The state of the Polish economy will have a major impact on the rest of Eastern Europe. Aggregate Polish output is not expected to regain its 1978 peak level before 1990.[25] This ailing economy will retard economic growth in the region in three principal ways. First, Poland will require increased Soviet economic assistance to keep it afloat, and some, if not all, of this assistance will be diverted by the Soviets from other potential East European recipients (assuming, as seems reasonable, that the USSR will not increase the pool of resources it transfers to Eastern Europe but rather will opt for their redistribution). Second, the continued threat of Poland's default on its debt will exert pressure on Western banks and governments to limit the growth of their exposure in Eastern Europe. A state of no growth (in real terms) in Western credit will curtail the ability of Eastern Europe to accelerate imports from the West and to increase domestic growth rates. Finally, continued disruptions in Polish trade with Eastern

Miners in the Katowice area of Poland: revival of high levels of coal production is critical to Polish economic recovery and meeting the country's obligations to its East European trade partners.

—Vincent Mentzel.

---

[23] Wharton anticipates a very cautious attitude toward new loans to Eastern Europe on the part of Western commercial banks and governments. Preference will be given to short-term rather than medium- and long-term loans (those over 24 months). Most loans will have to meet criteria required for balance-of-payments (general purpose) loans, which are more stringent than project-loan criteria.

[24] For example, between 1970 and 1977, the terms of trade with non-Communist countries declined 23 percent for Bulgaria and Romania, 22 percent for Czechoslovakia, 18 percent for East Germany and Hungary, and 9 percent for Poland. These estimates are from Wharton *Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Price Databank,* July 1981.

[25] This is the baseline scenario in Wharton long-term forecasts for Poland. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *Centrally Planned Economies Longterm Projections,* Washington, DC, Fall 1981, p. 40.

Europe will cause problems in selected East European industries that depend on Polish supplies. For example, disruption in deliveries of Polish coal, coke, sulfur, and copper have been reported to have caused shortfalls in output of electricity, steel, sulfuric acid, and copper wire in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary.

5. *Economic reforms.* Even if meaningful economic reforms were immediately introduced in countries other than Hungary, they would not be likely to have a significant impact on aggregate economic growth during the first half of the 1980's. In fact, economic reforms may have a negative impact on growth in the short run. Substantive economic reform implies changes in the organizational structure of the economy, use of the price mechanism instead of planning as a signal of scarcity, changes in output and input mix, etc. During the "learning period," which may take two to three years, enterprise managers are bound to encounter unfamiliar problems, which will take time to resolve. Thus, during this "learning period" of reform, the output of the economy may well grow more slowly than in the past.

However, even in the short term, reforms could begin to improve the "quality" of economic growth. That is, they could foster a more balanced growth and production of more goods of higher quality, thereby eliminating an imbalanced growth that has tended to produce simultaneous shortages in some areas of the economy and surpluses in other areas. In addition, reforms could prove an important psychological factor in increasing the willingness of people to work, by raising their stake in the performance of the economy, and hence could contribute to higher labor productivity.

6. *Conservation measures.* Another development that could relieve some of the pressure on East European economies during the first half of the 1980's would be the successful introduction of measures to conserve energy and reduce inputs of raw materials per unit of output. Since a significant portion of energy and raw materials is imported and since a 1 percent reduction in domestic consumption of these commodities typically reduces the volume of imports by more than 1 percent,[26] the savings of scarce foreign exchange (hard-currency and increasingly also rubles) could be considerable.

These savings, in turn, could be used to finance other types of imports or to reduce the volume of exports of those goods which are urgently needed by the domestic economy. In either case, the domestic supply of other scarce inputs could increase, permitting faster growth in sectors previously subject to foreign-exchange constraints. In view of the considerable uncertainty surrounding the developments in this area, we assume only very slow improvement during 1982–85. Better-than-expected performance by East European economies in implementing conservation measures could lift the projected annual growth rates of net material product and industrial output perhaps by as much as 1 to 2 percentage points.

7. *Weather.* As was pointed out earlier (fn. 2), the weather pattern in 1976–80 was less favorable to agriculture than usual (two good years, two bad years, and one year that was at best mediocre). Given that 1981 was a relatively good year and 1982 promises to be at least as good as 1981, there is a good chance for better-than-average weather during 1981–85. This, in turn, should give an important break to East European performance in agriculture.

Prospects Through 1985

At this point, it is possible to make some specific projections regarding the economic outlook for Eastern Europe through 1985. These projections are based on the following assumptions with regard to factors described in the preceding section:

- Aggregate East European terms of trade with the Soviet Union will decline by about one third by 1985 relative to 1980.

- The Soviet Union will maintain significant economic assistance to Eastern Europe in the form of a combination of implicit trade subsidies and ruble loans—by 1985, this assistance should still be about two thirds of the 1980 level in real terms, or an equivalent of US$16–18 billion in current-dollar terms.

- Western economic recovery will begin in late 1982, but will not have an appreciable impact on East European exports to the West before mid-1983.

- The ability of East European countries to obtain new credits from Western commercial banks and governments will be significantly constrained over the next few years—East European debt to the West (including debt to Latin American and Arab countries) will increase to no more than US$67.5–75.5 billion by 1985, and thus will probably not keep pace with inflation.

---

[26] For example, if the domestic supply of a particular raw material satisfies only 50 percent of domestic demand, then a 1 percent increase in output of a good using this raw material requires a 2 percent increase in imports—(101 minus 50) divided by 50 = 1.02. Hence, in this particular case, if domestic consumption of this raw material declines 1 percent, thanks to conservation measures, then imports will fall 2 percent.

- Aggregate Polish output will not regain its 1978 peak level before 1990, unless the West aids Poland in a massive way during the next few years.

- Economic reforms are unlikely to have a significant impact on aggregate East European economic growth during the first half of the 1980's.

- Prospects are not good for a rapid reduction of unit requirements of energy and raw materials through conservation measures.

- Weather is likely to be more favorable for East European agriculture in 1981–85 than it was in 1976–80.

The projections below were prepared with the aid of macroeconometric models of each of the six East European economies, constructed by the Centrally Planned Economies Service of Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. The forecast represents the "baseline" scenario, i.e., the forecast we believe is most likely. Forecasters frequently prepare alternative scenarios—high-growth or low-growth—based on different assumptions about the impact of exogenous variables. However, for reasons of space and in view of the much lower probability we would attach to such alternative scenarios, I have restricted discussion here to the "baseline" scenario.

There are advantages and weaknesses in using an econometric model for such forecasting. On the positive side, the results reflect a comprehensive, integrated, internally consistent view of developments in each economy. Since the model is an interdependent system of technical and behavioral relations, the analysis is able to encompass, in quantitative terms, the indirect as well as the direct effects—the total system impact—of the various assumptions under consideration in the alternative scenario projections. On the negative side, the results of projections are not precise. Much depends on the judgment and insight of the analysts. Finally, since the model has been specified to reflect past behavior or trends, it is not likely to provide much guidance in projecting events if the basic structure of the system changes radically.[27]

A private farmer sowing seed near Kolno, Poland, in September 1981.

—Jean Pierre Laffont/SYGMA.

Let us turn now to the actual forecast. Table 1 (on p. 3) gives projections of the annual growth rates of three major economic indicators—produced national income (or net material product), gross industrial output, and gross agricultural output—for individual East European countries and for the region as a whole for the years 1982–85.[28] For the whole period 1981–85, aggregate East European national income is expected to increase at an average annual rate of only 1.4 percent, as compared with 7.3 percent in 1971–75 and 4.0 percent in 1976–80. After a 1.2 percent decline in East European national income in 1981 (largely because of a 13 percent decline in Polish national income), a mild recovery is anticipated in 1982 (0.6 percent growth), followed by a modest 2.3–2.8 percent annual growth for the remaining three years. For the period 1981–85, the Polish economy should show an average 3.3 percent annual decline in national income.[29] During 1981–85, the fastest economic growth is projected for Bulgaria (with an average annual growth rate of 4.1 percent), followed by East Germany (3.4 percent), Romania (3.1 percent), Hungary (2.0 percent), and Czechoslovakia (1.7 percent).

---

[27] While there is insufficient space here to go with any detail into the structure of the individual country models, several points should be made. First, theoretical analysis of centrally planned economies considers the supply (production) side as dominant, in contrast with the demand factors stressed in analysis of Western market economies. Thus, broadly speaking, the direction of major causality in these models runs from fully employed inputs (labor and capital) through the production process to final uses.

Second, labor and capital investment are "allocated" to three major sectors—agriculture, industry, and "other." For agriculture, production functions link levels of output to available land, labor, capital and/or current purchases (primarily fertilizer). Similarly, production functions for the other major sectors link production to available capital stock and labor. A major source of differences among projections is the differing assumptions regarding the rate of growth of total factor productivity.

Third, energy consumption is derived from the level of economic activity, with deficits of energy covered by imports of fuel. (Of course, one can iterate the solution of a particular model so as to reach growth compatible with an "acceptable level of net imports of fuels.")

Fourth, in linking imports and exports in trade with the West, the model takes into consideration the use of Western credits to finance imports. The ratio of imports to exports is modeled as a function of an assumed "acceptable" (to Western creditors) debt-service ratio.

Finally, total national product is divided among end uses—the major categories being accumulation (investment, capital repair, changes in inventories), consumption (both private and public), and other uses (including defense, net trade, losses, etc.). This allocation is largely based on exogenously set parameters and thus provides another major source of differences among projections.

[28] See fns. 1 and 2 above for qualifications with respect to the meaning of these statistics.

The pattern of projected growth of gross industrial output both for Eastern Europe as a whole and for individual countries tends to be very close to that of national income and requires little additional comment. The most important aspect of the forecast is the anticipated dramatic deceleration in the 1981–85 average annual growth rate—to 2.1 percent for the region as a whole, as compared with 8.7 percent in 1971–75 and 5.7 percent in 1976–80.

As for gross agricultural output, the average annual East European growth rate is expected to reach 2.0 percent in 1981–85, somewhat higher than the 1.3 percent in 1976–80 but still a mere one half of the 1971–75 rate of 4.0 percent. Gross agricultural output is anticipated to increase fastest in the case of Poland (2.7 percent per annum, reflecting recovery from the relatively depressed level of the period 1976–80), followed by Bulgaria and East Germany (2.3 percent), Romania (2.2 percent), Hungary (1.4 percent), and Czechoslovakia (0.9 percent).

Developments in East European trade with the Soviet Union and with non-Communist countries are projected in Table 6. In both cases, the anticipated structure of exports and imports in 1985 is compared to that in 1980.

Most notable in the trade with the USSR is the projected aggregate deficit for East Europe of 4.0 billion rubles in 1985.[30] While the structure of East European exports to the Soviet Union is expected to change hardly at all, in the case of East European imports from the USSR, an increase in the share of fuels from 41 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 1985 is anticipated. In value terms, East European imports of fuels from the Soviet Union are expected to increase 138 percent by 1985, although the quantity of these imports is projected to decline only about 3 percent relative to the 1980 level

---

[29] Reflecting the Wharton baseline projection (see fn. 25).

[30] If implicit Soviet trade subsidies decline dramatically over the next four years, this deficit could well be substantially higher. It is anticipated here that in 1985 the combined size of the Soviet ruble trade surplus with Eastern Europe and the implicit trade subsidies should amount to an equivalent of about US$16–18 billion, i.e., about two thirds of the 1980 amount, measured in real terms.

Table 6: Eastern Europe's Trade with the USSR and with Non-Communist Countries, 1980 and 1985

(In millions of current rubles, percent of total in parentheses)

TRADE WITH THE USSR

	Exports				Imports			
	1980		1985		1980		1985	
Machinery	10,800	(56)	19,900	(59)	6,171	(30)	8,100	(21)
Fuels	401	(2)	700	(2)	8,599	(41)	20,500	(54)
Nonfood raw materials	2,912	(15)	4,200	(12)	5,440	(26)	8,300	(22)
Food	1,942	(10)	2,800	(8)	146	(1)	400	(1)
Nonfood consumer goods	3,403	(17)	6,400	(19)	467	(2)	700	(2)
All goods	19,458	(100)	34,000	(100)	20,823	(100)	38,000	(100)

TRADE WITH NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

	Exports				Imports			
	1980		1985		1980		1985	
Machinery	6,718	(22)	10,100	(22)	7,257	(21)	8,300	(18)
Fuels	6,395	(20)	9,300	(20)	6,192	(18)	12,600	(28)
Nonfood raw materials	9,102	(29)	13,650	(29)	14,430	(41)	16,550	(37)
Food	3,948	(13)	5,900	(13)	5,319	(15)	6,100	(13)
Nonfood consumer goods	4,934	(16)	7,400	(16)	1,582	(5)	1,800	(4)
All goods	31,907	(100)	46,350	(100)	34,780	(100)	45,350	(100)

SOURCES: For 1980, *Wharton CPE Foreign Trade Databank*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, April 1982 edition. For 1985, author's own forecast.

Table 7: East European Oil Consumption, Production, and Trade, 1980–85[a]

(millions of metric tons)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Apparent domestic consumption	97.6	93.9	94.0	96.0	98.0	100.0
Exports	22.0	18.1	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0
Total oil requirements	119.6	112.0	112.0	114.0	116.0	118.0
Domestic production	14.1	14.2	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Imports	105.5	97.8	98.0	100.0	102.0	104.0
Of which:						
From Soviet Union	80.6	79.3	76.5	75.5	74.0	72.5
From OPEC and other sources	24.9	18.5	21.5	24.5	28.0	31.5

[a] Consumption, exports, and imports include refined oil products. The table concerns itself only with oil as a primary energy source—hence domestic production of oil excludes refined oil products, which are a secondary (derived) energy source based mostly on imported crude oil.

SOURCES: For 1980–81, *Wharton CPE Energy Databank*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, March 1982 edition. For 1982–85, author's own forecast.

(with reduced oil deliveries to be compensated by additional deliveries of gas and electricity—see below).

Trade with non-Communist countries is expected to be more in balance. Most significant is the sharp projected increase (a doubling) in the cost of energy imports from the 1980 level. This, it is anticipated, will bring the share of energy in the total import bill from non-Communist partners to 28 percent in 1985, as compared with 18 percent in 1980.[31] This is a reflection of a projected decline in the quantity of Soviet oil deliveries, which will have to be offset by increased imports from OPEC, primarily in 1983–85 (see Table 7). In quantitative terms, it is anticipated here that Eastern Europe will be able to increase oil imports from non-Soviet sources (mostly OPEC) to 31.5 million metric tons in 1985, as compared with 24.9 million metric tons in 1980.

The increase in the share of fuels in total East European imports from non-Communist countries will lead to a corresponding decline in the share of imports of all other goods. In value terms, the latter are expected to increase a mere 15 percent by 1985, which, because of inflation, should actually represent a 15–20 percent decline in the physical quantities of such imports. It is not anticipated that the structure of East European exports to the West will change at all.

Greater detail on the projected development of trade of individual East European countries with the non-Communist world during 1982–85 as well as the actual results for 1980–81 are presented in Table 8 (see p. 16). Between 1980 and 1985, East European exports to non-Communist countries are expected to increase 49 percent, from US$31.1 billion to US$46.4 billion. This implies a growth of roughly 6 percent in real terms over the entire five-year period, or about 1 percent a year. East European imports from these countries are projected to rise only 30 percent, from US$34.8 billion in 1980 to US$45.4 billion in 1985. In this trade, Bulgaria's exports and imports are expected to grow the fastest (72 and 172 percent respectively, the latter figure reflecting the relatively low level of imports in 1980). In all other cases, it is anticipated that the growth of exports will exceed that of imports: for Czechoslovakia, 40 percent vs. 39 percent; for East Germany, 55 percent vs. 26 percent; for Hungary, 44 percent vs. 13 percent; for Poland, 28 percent vs. 4 percent; and for Romania, 66 percent vs. 30 percent. The net result should be an aggregate surplus in East European trade with non-Communist countries amounting to some US$1 billion in 1985, as compared with a deficit of US$3.7 billion in 1980.

The implications of the projected developments in East European trade with the non-Communist world for East European debt to these areas were set forth in Table 2 (on p. 4 above). While it is anticipated that the aggregate East European debt will amount to US$67.5–75.5 by 1985 in nominal terms, this debt is expected to fall in real terms (i.e., as corrected for expected inflation) for all countries except Bulgaria. If one takes the median projection, there would be an estimated 6 percent decline of debt in real terms for the region.

Conclusions

The economic slowdown in Eastern Europe through 1985 depicted in these projections is a serious one.

---

[31] On the assumption that the world market price for oil of will be US$43 per barrel in 1985.

Table 8: Hard-Currency Exports and Imports in Eastern Europe's Trade with Non-Communist Countries, 1980–85

(millions of current US dollars)

EXPORTS[a]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Bulgaria	3,027	3,191	3,150	3,800	4,500	5,200
Czechoslovakia	4,526	4,283	4,650	5,050	5,700	6,350
East Germany	5,277	5,206	5,750	6,400	7,250	8,200
Hungary[b]	3,966	3,733	4,000	4,500	5,050	5,700
Poland	7,496	5,431	5,900	6,900	8,050	9,600
Romania	6,805	7,724	8,150	9,100	10,150	11,300
Eastern Europe	31,097	29,568	31,600	35,750	40,700	46,350

IMPORTS[c]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Bulgaria	2,039	2,545	2,950	3,700	4,700	5,550
Czechoslovakia	4,519	3,967	4,550	5,100	5,700	6,300
East Germany	6,932	6,506	7,150	7,650	8,200	8,750
Hungary[b]	4,604	4,483	4,450	4,600	4,900	5,200
Poland	8,478	5,365	5,650	6,500	7,600	8,850
Romania	8,208	7,173	7,550	8,400	9,650	10,700
Eastern Europe	34,780	30,039	32,300	35,950	40,750	45,350

[a] Exports are projected on the basis of Wharton estimates of growth of demand for imports by members of the OECD and by the less-developed countries in 1982–85. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *World Economic Outlook* (Philadelphia, PA), May 1982.

[b] Although all centrally planned economies (CPE's) conduct some trade with one another in hard currency, only Hungary publishes information of such trade. With these transactions included, Hungarian hard-currency exports were US$905 million in 1970, US$2,299 million in 1975, US$4,939 million in 1980, and US$4,893 million in 1981. Hungarian hard-currency imports, including imports from CPE's were US$943 million in 1970, US$2,714 million in 1975, and US$5,041 million in 1980, and US$4,976 million in 1981.

[c] Given our assumptions about the availability of Western credits and permissible level of current-account deficits (surpluses), we then derived feasible imports as a residual category.

SOURCE: *Wharton CPE Balance of Payments and Debt Review*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, June 1982.

During the first half of the 1980's, the region as a whole is expected to grow at an average annual rate roughly one third that recorded in 1976–80 and one fifth that in 1971–75. In 1985, the Polish economy will only have begun to reverse its precipitous decline of the last several years, its output by then having only recovered to the 1974 level, not the 1978 peak. While none of the other East European countries is expected to register an absolute decline in aggregate output such as Poland is experiencing, in all cases the slowdown will be significant. Romania should experience the sharpest growth deceleration (55 percent from the 1976–80 average annual rate of growth in net material product), followed by Czechoslovakia (54 percent), Hungary (38 percent), Bulgaria (33 percent), and East Germany (17 percent).

This trend will pose a major challenge to the existing political leaderships throughout Eastern Europe—most notably (after Poland), in Romania and Czechoslovakia.[32] What are possible East European responses to growing economic difficulties in the first half of the 1980's? One can envisage three possible scenarios.

The most sensible, though not necessarily the most likely, solution would be to undertake large-scale, meaningful economic reforms of the Hungarian type. Aside from significantly decentralizing East European economies and improving the system of labor incentives, such reforms would require large-scale restructuring of economic activities toward a pattern of production reflecting the comparative advantage of Eastern Europe in the world economy. This "reindustrialization" would involve scrapping inefficient and obsolete industries, those with excessive energy requirements, and those with inordinate requirements for imported inputs. It would concentrate on production of light manufactured goods, on development of agro-industrial complexes, and on specialization in those segments of machinery industries in which Eastern Europe has superior export potential.

---

[32] In both countries, it is likely that a more technocratically oriented group within the party will seize this opportunity to mount a challenge to President Nicolae Ceausescu's and Gustav Husak's economic policies. In the case of Czechoslovakia, we may well witness a replay of the 1963–64 economic difficulties, followed by another attempt by more enlightened members of the party leadership to mount a major economic reform.

These reforms would have to be supported by both the Soviet Union and the West, and indeed there are valid reasons why both might be so inclined. Although the USSR would naturally be concerned about the political implications of such reforms, its leaders must also be concerned about the growing economic burden Eastern Europe places on the Soviet economy. It would be much easier to reduce this burden if the economies of the region could be made more efficient. From the Western perspective, reforms would make the economies of Eastern Europe more efficient and less dependent on the Soviet Union. Moreover, they could demonstrate to the Soviets themselves what the USSR could potentially achieve through implementation of similar reforms. While the reforms could not be expected to have a major impact on growth performance during the first half of the 1980's, they would fundamentally change the economic outlook for Eastern Europe for the rest of the decade.

The second scenario is that of "muddling through," i.e., enactment of limited reforms and ad hoc measures designed to prevent the development of a full-fledged crisis of the Polish type elsewhere in Eastern Europe (only in Hungary does this threat seem distant). Since the West would not be interested in supporting this type of "non-strategy," we could reasonably expect the political leaders of Eastern Europe to turn more and more to the Soviets for help as periodic crises develop, as shortages of goods grow, as labor discontent increases, and as challenges to the economic policies of Communist parties mount. In the second scenario, the Soviet Union would always provide "just enough to prevent the pot from boiling over."

The third scenario is that of a full-blown crisis with many elements similar to recent Polish developments. Despite mounting economic problems, East European political leaderships would refuse to undertake reforms (or would be prevented from initiating them by the

Modern harvesting machinery at work in the vineyards of the Sopron State Farm in western Hungary.

—Interfoto MTI/Photoreporters.

One of the successes of East European export efforts—the articulated Ikarus 286 bus being produced in Budapest in 1981 for export to the United States.

—Eastfoto.

Soviets), growing discontent would lead to violent outbursts on the part of the population, the regimes would grow more repressive and probably weaker, and finally there would be Soviet intervention. The output of East European economies would then drop to "subsistence" level, and a new form of totalitarian regime would be institutionalized in Eastern Europe. This would be characterized by repression far more extreme than anything now existing in the area.

Given the present information, the author's own assessment of statistical probabilities attached to the above scenarios is 40 percent for the first, 50 percent for the second, and 10 percent for the third. In all cases, the probabilities attach to developments in the period through 1985.

We anticipate that in the first half of the 1980's, East European leaders will tend to pursue the first or second scenario outlined above, with somewhat greater likelihood of "muddling through," turning toward more serious reforms only after 1985.[33] We expect that Poland will adopt a major economic reform of the Hungarian type in 1983 or 1984, to be followed by Czechoslovakia probably in 1984 or 1985.[34] The outlook for Romanian reform is more clouded, because it is unlikely that the present political leadership can bring itself to institute a genuine economic reform involving significant decentralization of economic and ultimately also political power. The leaderships in both Bulgaria and East Germany will be less pressed to reform their economies, because the expected slowdown in growth should not be nearly as serious there. Nevertheless, both countries are likely to take steps toward a substantive reform, probably with a lag of one to two years after Poland and Czechoslovakia. Finally, the Hungarian economic reform may be expected to progress at a steady pace through the first half of the decade, with its impact on growth felt mainly after 1985.

Should events follow this scenario, we would still anticipate continuation of current trends in Eastern Europe's external economic relations. First, there will be growing dependence on trade with the Soviet Union, and in *increasingly visible form*. For example, between 1980 and 1985, the value of East European imports from the Soviet Union is expected to rise 82 percent in nominal ruble terms, while the value of imports from non-Communist countries is projected to grow a mere 30 percent in nominal dollar terms. This seemingly sizable increase in dependence, however, represents merely the continuation of a trend that has actually been operative since 1974 but was previously hidden from public view because of preferential Soviet trade treatment for Eastern Europe. Now, if anything, the trend may begin to be "overstated," because ruble-price inflation on the intra-CMEA market is likely to significantly outpace dollar-price inflation on the world market, as intra-CMEA relative prices gradually approach relative world market prices.

---

[33] The main reason for the delay in introduction of reforms is that they will require the removal of a significant portion of existing party leaderships. It should be expected that individuals and factions affected will try to hold onto power as long as possible, and a prolonged struggle for power should be expected, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the meantime, the "muddling through" strategy is likely to prevail.

[34] This speculation is based on the expectation that economic pressures for reform will then be sufficiently strong to overcome political resistance to reform.

A slowing of the growth of Eastern Europe's trade with non-Communist countries seems unavoidable. The East European countries have little choice but to balance their current accounts in hard-currency transactions. As noted above, this nominal deceleration covers an expected absolute decline in the amount of real goods imported annually by 1985. Similarly, while East European debt to the non-Communist world should continue to grow in nominal terms, it may be expected to decline in real terms.

On balance, the economies of Eastern Europe and the context in which they function are undergoing significant transformations that will be felt not only through the first half of this decade but probably well beyond.

Leaders representative of two different approaches to dealing with Eastern Europe's economic problems seen at the 36th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance held in Budapest on June 8, 1982: at the left, Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party; at the right, Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

—Eastfoto.

Moscow and Mitterrand

by Michael J. Sodaro

The election of François Mitterrand to the presidency of France in May 1981 probably evoked as much surprise in the Soviet Union as it did in the rest of the world. This surprise was no doubt compounded when, in the following month, the new president's Socialist Party (PS) scored an overwhelming triumph in the legislative elections, capturing a solid majority of the seats in the National Assembly and thus ensuring the party's dominance over national policymaking for at least the next five years. To top things off, the plunge in electoral support for the French Communist Party (PCF) to its lowest level in the postwar period provided yet another unexpected shift in the French political landscape.

The Soviet leadership was clearly disappointed as it surveyed these results. Prior to the elections, Soviet commentators made no attempt to conceal the Kremlin's preference for the reelection of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and its strong reservations about Mitterrand.[1] Once the results had come in, the Soviets also voiced their disappointment with the Communists' dismal showing at the polls.[2]

Now that Mitterrand has been in power more than a year, how have the Soviets reacted to the new administration? More broadly, what general considerations guide Soviet policy toward France, and how are they likely to be affected by the foreign policy undertakings of the Mitterrand government? What is the new role of the PCF, and how does it relate to Soviet calculations? Finally, from the opposite perspective, what is the French government's orientation toward the Soviet Union, and what factors influence that orientation? While answers to some of these questions can only be tentative, review of relevant statements and policy actions by the various political forces involved provides a basis for attempting them.

Mr. Sodaro is Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Political Science, and a member of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC). He is the co-editor of Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980's *(forthcoming), and the author of numerous studies dealing with West European Communist parties, Soviet foreign policy, and East-West relations in Europe.*

Soviet Views of France and NATO

It is important to recognize that ever since Charles de Gaulle pulled the French out of the military structure of NATO in 1966, France has occupied a pivotal position in Moscow's policy toward the Western alliance. Soviet international affairs specialists continue to praise de Gaulle for having been the first West European leader to challenge American dominance of NATO and for encouraging independent European initiatives toward the Soviet Union.[3]

Since 1969, to be sure, France's singularity as the Soviet Union's *interlocuteur privilegié* in Western Europe has been eclipsed somewhat by the Federal Republic of Germany. After de Gaulle's retirement in that year and the election of a new West German government under Willy Brandt, the Soviets found in Bonn fresh opportunities to realize coveted foreign policy goals which they could not achieve in Paris. It was Germany, after all, which was the crux of postwar Europe's most intractable problems, beginning with the question of the territorial status quo and extending to such vital issues for Moscow as the nature of the Federal Republic's military posture and the necessity of securing international recognition for the USSR's key ally, the

---

[1] See, for example, Yu. Kharlanov's articles in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 13 and May 9, 1981; V. Danilenko, "Presidential Elections in France," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1981.

[2] A. Kudryavtsev, "France—Political Shifts," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter *MEMO*), No. 10, 1981, p. 109.

[3] For a major Soviet biography of de Gaulle, see N. N. Molchanov, *General de Goll,* (General de Gaulle), 2nd ed, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1980.

PAIX
REAGAN!
NON LA BOMBE
NEUTRONS

Members of the French Communist Party and of the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) demonstrate in a Paris suburb in September 1981 against use of the neutron bomb.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

German Democratic Republic. On these and related matters, only Bonn could make the concessions necessary for an accommodation of Western and Soviet interests in Europe. Beyond such political assets, West Germany also offered strong economic advantages to the Soviet Union, reinforcing Moscow's incentive to shift the main focus of its European policy to the FRG. This shift took place quite dramatically in the early 1970's, as the political and economic accords stemming from Bonn's Ostpolitik went into effect. More than a decade later, the Federal Republic is still Moscow's principal interlocutor in Western Europe.

In spite of these developments, however, France continues to enjoy high status on Moscow's scale of international priorities. Above all, it remains one of the leading proponents of greater foreign policy autonomy from the United States on the part of Western Europe. Some indication of how the Kremlin views the French role in this respect may be gleaned from the writings of Soviet academic specialists about France itself and about the Atlantic alliance as a whole.[4]

Contrary to the assumptions of a number of Western analysts of Soviet foreign policy, Soviet writers do not seem to regard the "Finlandization" of Western Europe as a likely prospect in the foreseeable future. Indeed, they do not see tendencies toward neutralism or toward a fundamental reliance on the Soviet Union as the paramount trend in any leading West European state. Rather, they tend to take a more dialectical approach to the subject of US–West European relations. Although Soviet scholars emphasize the growing intensity of the "contradictions" between the United States and its West European allies, they also recognize the enduring elements of partnership that bind the trans-Atlantic allies together. More specifically, while some writers may stress the conflictual side of the relationship and others may emphasize the cooperative aspects, all admit the presence of these two tendencies simultaneously in relations of capitalist states.

---

[4] See, for example, *SShA–Zapadnaya Yevropa: partnerstvo i sopernichestvo* (USA–Western Europe: Partnership and Rivalry), Moscow, Nauka, 1979; G. A. Vorontsov, *SShA i Zapadnaya Yevropa* (The USA and Western Europe), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1979; M. K. Bunkina, *USA versus Western Europe: New Trends*, trans. by Jane Sayer, Moscow, Progress, 1979; A. Kirsanov, *The USA and Western Europe*, trans. by David Skvirsky, Moscow, Progress, 1975; and D. Ye. Mel'nikov, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v Zapadnoy Yevrope* (International Relations in Western Europe), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1974.

This dialectical approach results in a rather nuanced Soviet perception of the Atlantic alliance. On the one hand, Moscow sees the conflicts of interest which frequently rend Western unity as opening opportunities for it to promote fissiparous tendencies. Indeed, since the early 1970's, Soviet specialists have pointed to Soviet détente policy as a major factor contributing to the disarray in the Western alliance. In the view of many Soviet authors, détente itself is desirable precisely *because* it has this disruptive effect on the West (and on US–West European relations in particular), whereas they regard rising international tensions as driving the capitalist states closer together.

On the other hand, Moscow, in light of the dialectical nature of Soviet perceptions of relations among capitalist states, virtually rules out the possibility of an imminent break-up of NATO. Economic interdependence, expanding military cooperation, and broadly construed "common class interests" among Western allies, all receive detailed coverage in Soviet analyses of the West. Far from expecting these unifying factors to disappear, Soviet commentators contend that in many cases they are growing stronger—often in spite of (or alongside) the continuing trend toward disintegration. Thus, as far as one can judge by Soviet academic specialists (and assuming that their views are at least to some extent shared by Soviet leaders), the Kremlin does not appear to consider the collapse of the NATO alliance to be a realistic foreign policy goal.

As the Soviets characterize the situation, what has occurred in the NATO alliance since de Gaulle's daring initiatives is not an irreparable breach between the West Europeans and the Americans, but rather a shift in the "correlation of forces," or balance of power, between the West European and the American components of the alliance. In contrast to the conditions that prevailed before the mid-1960's, the United States can no longer impose its will on its allies but must instead coordinate its policies with them on the basis of mutually acceptable compromises. As a consequence, the Soviets currently regard the alliance as a means for getting the West Europeans to influence American policy in a favorable direction and, when appropriate, to induce the United States to influence the West Europeans to move in a similar direction. In sum,the Soviets currently envisage US–West European ties in terms of what might be called a relationship of reciprocal influence.[5]

The implications of these perceptions have been particularly apparent in Soviet overtures toward France. In the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle's withdrawal from the NATO military command, some Soviet scholars rushed to the conclusion that the French démarche would inspire other West European states to follow suit. Kremlin decision-makers apparently shared this hope, and Soviet policy initiatives during this period (such as the Warsaw Pact's Bucharest Declaration of July 1966[6]) set out to entice Western Europe into joining an all-European security system without the participation of the United States or Canada.

At the same time, however, other Soviet specialists offered reminders of France's continuing membership in the Atlantic alliance and drew attention to de Gaulle's unswerving support for the US troop presence in West Germany and for other US policies.[7] Subsequent events justified this cautionary analysis, underscoring the inherent limits of France's declaration of independence from the United States.

Soviet policymakers accordingly scaled down their expectations of French—and West European—desires for a clean break with the United States, and the Bucharest Declaration became a dead letter by the end of the decade. A more modest approach, stressing the opportunities available for manipulating the Franco-American relationship while acknowledging the limited results to be expected from such manipulations, tends to characterize the bulk of Soviet writing on this subject today.

From De Gaulle to Giscard

Any evaluation of how the Soviet Union might regard its prospects with respect to France under Mitterrand must begin with an assessment of Soviet relations with his predecessors at the helm of the Fifth Republic. Only by comparing the outlooks and policies of the new French president with those of de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing is it possible to determine how much has been gained or lost, from the Soviet point of view, as a result of the change of leadership in Paris in 1981.

If the Soviets were to construct a balance sheet of the positive and negative features of Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy, the final tally would surely be strongly positive. It would certainly have on the "plus" side of the ledger the fact that France under de Gaulle was the first NATO state to assert its full autonomy in foreign policy matters, even moving to pursue a direct dialogue with the USSR independently of the United States. Other positive features of de Gaulle's foreign policy, from

---

[5] For a comprehensive treatment of these issues, see Michael . Sodaro, "Soviet Studies of the Western Alliance," presented at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, DC, May 6, 1982.

[6] "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe," *Pravda*, July 8, 1966.

[7] For an example of the first view, see the essay by O. N. Bykov in D. Ye. Mel'nikov, Eds., *Zapadnaya Yevropa i SShA* (Western Europe and the USA), Moscow, Mysl', 1968, Ch. 1; for the second view, see the piece by Yu. I. Rubinskiy in ibid., Ch. 3.

Moscow's vantage point, would include France's withdrawal from NATO's military organization, its assault on the dollar's privileged status in the world economy, and its veto of British entry into the Common Market. On the negative side, the Soviets had to reconcile themselves to de Gaulle's continuing adherence to the Atlantic alliance, to the expansion of France's independent nuclear strike force, and to de Gaulle's efforts to break down the barriers between Eastern and Western Europe with his conceptual designs for *l'Europe des patries*, extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." On balance, however, these "minuses" were minor in comparison with the unprecedented breakthrough to a more autonomous foreign policy which de Gaulle had charted for France.

Over the course of the 1970's, de Gaulle's two successors gradually distanced themselves from the more blatantly anti-American aspects of the Gaullist legacy and sought to smooth over at least some of the conflicts with the United States that de Gaulle had exacerbated. Thus, Georges Pompidou made way for the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) to include Britain and reached a compromise with President Richard Nixon on monetary matters. More important, Pompidou substantially moderated the shrill anti-American tone of French foreign policy under de Gaulle, and this change in tone was even more evident under his successor, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Giscard went even further than Pompidou in promoting policies that could be regarded only with consternation in Moscow. Above all, Giscard brought France into closer military cooperation with NATO. In addition, he presided over the strengthening of all aspects of the French nuclear triad, and in 1980 he announced his government's readiness to commence production of neutron weapons. Finally, at a time when the Soviets were deeply involved in assisting various clients in Africa, Giscard enlisted American help in sending French paratroopers to the beleaguered Shaba Province of Zaire in 1978, backed the Mauritanian government's struggle against the Polisario guerrillas, and, until 1980, maintained French military units in Chad.

Despite frequent criticisms of these manifestations of French solidarity with the West, the Soviet analysis of

French Legionnaires inspect a Soviet 120 mm mortar captured in June 1978 when France helped Chad suppress an insurgency by Frolinat (the Chad National Liberation Front).

—Criton/SYGMA.

Pompidou and Giscard nonetheless remained on the whole positive. Soviet authorities noted, for instance, that France had helped block the elaboration of a "new Atlantic Charter," as proposed by Henry Kissinger in 1973, and had opposed US support for Israel at the time of the October 1973 war. "Contradictions" of this sort were even held to be paramount in the area of defense policy. In the opinion of several Soviet experts writing in 1978, "French military policy objectively weakens American positions in Western Europe."[8] Thus, at least some Soviets appeared to regard France's growing military potential more as a political disadvantage for the United States than as a military danger to the Soviet Union.

In fact, the essential point for Moscow was that neither Pompidou nor Giscard had surrendered France's freedom of maneuver once that had been wrested from the United States by de Gaulle. On the contrary, France under Pompidou and Giscard was perceived, despite occasional lapses into "class solidarity" with the United States, as having secured Washington's grudging acknowledgment of its independent course. The very nature of the compromises reached between the United States and France during the terms in office of these two French leaders reflected America's willingness to consider the French equal partners. Soviet analysts duly recorded, for example, that the annual summit meetings of the major capitalist powers—an initiative proposed by the French in 1975—generally ended with a communique that made no reference to the "leadership" of the United States.[9] As far as Moscow was concerned, Washington in the 1970's "was forced to treat France as the catalyst of West European centrism."[10]

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Soviets quietly supported Giscard's Center-Right coalition in the 1978 legislative elections. As the campaign began to heat up in 1977, Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Paris with great fanfare for meetings with Giscard but did not get together with PCF leaders while there. The visit resulted in a joint declaration proclaiming the mutually beneficial effects of détente.[11] The PCF, meanwhile, was undergoing a painful identity crisis, and its relations with Moscow increasingly soured as it struggled to define its own brand of "socialism in French colors" while paired with the Socialists in an uneasy electoral alliance. When, in the summer of 1977, the Communists demanded a renegotiation of the Common Program which they had concluded with the Socialists in 1972—and thereby in effect scuttled the unity of the Left—Soviet commentary tended to parrot PCF condemnations of the Socialists rather than suggest the desirability of a reconciliation of the alliance partners. Without saying so explicitly, Moscow conveyed the distinct impression that the rupture of the French Left was eminently preferable to its victory in the parliamentary elections.

Leonid I. Brezhnev confers with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing upon the Soviet President's arrival at Chateau Rambouillet on June 20, 1977.

—SYGMA.

The Soviets continued to show their appreciation for Giscard by granting him a warm reception in Moscow in 1979, during the last of a string of annual Franco-Soviet summits initiated by Pompidou. As the 1981 presidential elections approached, Moscow continued to tilt in Giscard's direction. Soviet statements favorable to both Giscard and the PCF candidate, Georges Marchais, were perfectly consistent in their ultimate purpose—to deny attention to, and support for, the candidacy of François Mitterrand. Once again, the Soviets seemed motivated primarily by Giscard's record as a leader of European autonomy within the Atlantic alliance.

The notion that Giscard could be helpful in modifying American opinion on major questions of East-West relations assumed particular significance when the French president dramatically journeyed to Warsaw in the spring of 1980 for talks with Leonid Brezhnev. Coming at a time when the Carter administration was trying to galvanize the West behind various efforts to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Giscard initiative represented a sharp rebuff to American diplomacy and encouraged the Soviets in their belief that détente was still alive in Western Europe, if not in the United States.[12] Giscard's close personal relationship with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt took on special significance in this connection. Although the Soviets may have had some misgivings about the emergence of a strong Franco-German combination at the core of a united Western Europe,[13] they presumably welcomed Giscard's efforts to reinforce Bonn's commitment to détente, especially in the troubled atmosphere of 1980. Beyond these considerations, the Soviets probably preferred dealing with a familiar incumbent like Giscard rather than an unknown entity like Mitterrand, who drew Soviet criticisms for his vagueness. At least one authoritative Soviet analyst indicated that the Left's growing political strength in France was undesirable in itself, as it only pushed the country's "ruling circles" further to the right and ultimately into closer ties with the world's leading anti-Communist power, the US.[14]

---

[8] V. F. Davydov, T. V. Oberemko, and A. I. Utkin, *SShA i Zapadnoyevropeyskiye "tsentry sily"* (The USA and the West European "Power Centers"), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, pp. 108, 165.

[9] Ibid., p. 147.

[10] Ibid., p. 133. See also Yu. V. Dubinin and V. N. Kelin, *SSSR–Frantsiya. Opyt sotrudnichestva* (USSR-France. The Experience of Cooperation), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979; and A. Kudryavtsev, "France in the System of Inter-Imperialist Contradictions (The Economic Aspect)," *MEMO*, No. 4, 1981.

[11] *Pravda*, June 23, 1977.

Moscow and the Two Mitterrands

In keeping with the spirit of surprise created by the magnitude of his party's victory at the polls, François Mitterrand has thus far provided a number of foreign policy surprises since assuming office in 1981. Observers have been struck, for example, by the remarkable amount of continuity French foreign policy has displayed in a variety of areas, despite the transition from a Center-Right government to one headed by a Socialist. Like his predecessors, Mitterrand has confirmed his fidelity to the Atlantic alliance while reiterating France's determination to set its own course; he has taken steps to expand the French nuclear arsenal while rejecting reintegration into the NATO command; he has affirmed France's commitment to détente while demonstrating support for French security interests in Europe and the Third World; and he has asserted French acceptance of European economic integration while showing little inclination to promote efforts at supranational political integration in Europe. On these and other counts, Mitterrand has much in common with de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard.

From the Soviet perspective, however, Mitterrand has interrupted the continuity of French foreign policy in at least one important respect. The new French president has suspended, for an indeterminate period, the summit-level Franco-Soviet dialogue which had become an annual ritual for his two predecessors and a cornerstone of de Gaulle's opening to the East. While talks between French and Soviet officials proceed at the ministerial level, Mitterrand has up to now refrained from meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Brezhnev. (More recently, Mitterrand is also reported to have turned down a meeting with Soviet Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko, considered a possible successor to Brezhnev.[15]) That such a meeting has not as yet taken place reflects a conscious decision on Mitterrand's part, rooted in his concerns about Moscow's share of the responsibility for the recent aggravation of East-West tensions. It thus appears that, for the moment, the Soviet Union is no longer an *interlocuteur privilegié* of France.

In addition, the Soviets have had to confront a number of discontinuities in Mitterrand's own thinking on several major foreign and defense policy issues. In a sense, the Soviet Union has been dealing with two Mitterrands over the course of the last 10 years—one with a highly critical orientation toward the United States, the other, of somewhat more recent vintage, with pronounced anti-Soviet proclivities. If Soviet analysts were right about anything in their attempts to understand Mitterrand during the 1981 presidential campaign, it was that he failed "to concretize his positions on a number of questions."[16] Indeed, Mitterrand's characteristic evasiveness, which only reinforced traditional Soviet suspicions of West European social democratic leaders, was perhaps the chief factor that worked against his acceptance by the Soviets over the years, including the period of his most assertive anti-Americanism, when the PS–PCF alliance was in full bloom.[17]

To a considerable extent, these two sides of Mitterrand's political character reflect the practical considerations of a political realist who, on the one hand, shares the Gaullist commitment to French independence from American dictates and, on the other, expresses alarm at evidence of Soviet expansionism and disproportionate Soviet military growth. In these respects, Mitterrand affirms traditional French national interests.

---

[12] S. Vorontsova, "The USA and France: Spheres of Mutual Action and Contradictions," *MEMO*, No. 11, 1980.

[13] See Pierre Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1981, p. 51.

[14] See V. Kuznetsov, "France in the World Economy and Politics," *MEMO*, No. 1, 1981, p. 81.

[15] *Paris Match*, Feb. 17, 1982, p. 101.

[16] Kudryavtsev, "France—Political Shifts," p. 108.

[17] On the unpredictability of the PS, see E. A. Arsen'yev, *Frantsiya: problemy i politika* (France: Problems and Politics), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp. 126, 130.

There is, however, an important ideological element in his outlook. Somewhat ironically, both the anti-American and the anti-Soviet facets of Mitterrand's political makeup tend to be reinforced by his identity as a French Socialist. Thus, his criticism of the United States has firm ideological roots in his rejection of capitalism, in his vision of a Third World liberated from external economic exploitation and internal political repression, and in his quest for genuine disarmament culminating in the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While Mitterrand's attachment to these ideals is more emotional than dogmatic, and tends to condition rather than determine his actual policy choices, it nonetheless constitutes an integral part of his world view, resulting in a predisposition to oppose the United States whenever it appears to run counter to these broadly proclaimed principles.

By the same token, Mitterrand's Socialist predilections also buttress the anti-Soviet strain in his outlook. Although a Socialist, Mitterrand has never been a Marxist, and his deliberate attempts to model himself on such figures as Jean Jaurès and Léon Blum imply a rejection of Leninist socialism *à la russe*. Added to this historically rooted Socialist antipathy to communism, Mitterrand has an intimate personal acquaintance with the PCF, a relationship marked by rivalry during periods of cooperation and by bitterness following the rupture of the Union of the Left.

These twin strands in Mitterrand's political orientation, both of which are on display in such books as *L'abeille at l'architecte* (The Bee and the Architect) and *Ici et maintenant* (Here and Now),[18] derive an additional impetus from the Socialist Party. Despite the fact that Mitterrand is very much his own man, and on occasion takes positions at odds with the majority of PS activists, he cannot ignore the manifest wishes of his party colleagues. Indeed, he is usually in sympathy with them. Here, too, ideologically motivated denunciations of US policy coexist along with equally sharp condemnations of the Soviet Union.

What this means for the Soviets is that Mitterrand's occasional manifestations of anti-Americanism do not automatically imply a pro-Soviet point of view. Just as important, the Socialist Party's ideological inclinations at times impart an emotional tinge to its criticism of Soviet actions that can only complicate Moscow's efforts to resume its privileged dialogue with the French leadership. The PS congress held in October 1981 provides a graphic illustration of this point. Delegates booed the Soviet representative, Boris Ponomarëv, and showered applause on a representative of the Afghan freedom fighters. The party's harsh reaction to the proclamation of martial law in Poland (about which more below) offers another example of how the PS, with its instinctive support for the independent trade unionism represented by Solidarity, has brought ideological fervor to its rejection of Soviet-inspired policies.[19]

Although these contrasting elements of opposition to both American and Soviet positions influence Mitterrand's approach to world politics simultaneously, one tendency has at times gained the upper hand over the other. Whereas the anti-Atlanticist viewpoint tended to dominate Mitterrand's public pronouncements prior to the mid-1970's, his criticism of the USSR gradually escalated in subsequent years, and it has reached a new peak since his assumption of the presidency.

To be sure, the views that Mitterrand put forward from the early 1970's until the latter half of the decade could hardly be considered unfavorable to the Soviet Union. On a whole range of foreign and defense policy issues, he displayed considerable sensitivity to the priorities of the left wing of the Socialist Party (which, from its inception in its present incarnation in 1971, has always represented an amalgamation of several strands of Socialist thought) and to those of the French Communists. As Michael M. Harrison has written of this period:

> *. . . the dominant opinion in the PS seemed to be that the Soviet Union was essentially a defensive state, compensating for an inefficient economic system by building up exaggerated military power in Europe and on the seas. The leftist wing of the PS was especially determined that the specter of Soviet military imperialism should not again be manipulated to divert the socialists from their ideological goals and induce them to compromise with Western capitalism.*[20]

Even prior to the formation of the PS, Mitterrand's own grouping, the Republican Institution Convention (CIR), formally denounced the Atlantic alliance in 1970 as an instrument for France's "economic colonization by the United States." Party spokesmen went so far as to say that, in the event of a leftist victory at the polls, the principal threat to the existence of a Socialist government in France would be not the USSR, but the United States.[21] In accordance with these sentiments, the

---

[18] *L'abeille et l'architecte*, Paris, Flammarion, 1978, and *Ici et maintenant*, Paris, Fayard, 1980.

[19] See, for example, the article by Guy Perrimond in the PS weekly, *L'Unité* (Paris), Dec. 24, 1981.

[20] Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 120.

[21] Michael M. Harrison, "A Socialist Foreign Policy for France?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1976.

Common Program committed its signatories to renounce the independent French nuclear strike force and halt all construction on it, while working toward the ultimate dissolution of both the Western and Soviet military blocs.[22] Although Mitterrand himself, and the majority of the Socialists, insisted that existing alliance ties with the United States should be maintained until the hoped-for disappearance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and refused to commit themselves to a timetable for dismantling France's nuclear force, their basic aversion to close Atlantic ties was manifestly clear in this period.

In general, Mitterrand's stance in the early 1970's was characterized by a series of positions that could only be regarded as encouraging in Moscow. These included: (1) the dependence of the Socialists on the PCF (regarded as a virtual necessity in view of the unlikely prospects for a PS majority in the National Assembly); (2) commitment to substantial domestic economic and constitutional change, with the relegation of foreign policy to a secondary priority; (3) emphasis on major increases in budgetary outlays for social programs, and a concomitant reduction in military spending; (4) refusal to reintegrate France into the NATO military command, coupled with advocacy of a reduction in French forces; (5) ideological hostility toward the United States and a more accommodating posture toward the Soviet Union; (6) opposition to French and American military intervention in much of the Third World; (7) closer attachment to the Center-Left segment of the West German Social Democratic Party, identified with Willy Brandt, than to the Center-Right wing, led by Helmut Schmidt; (8) commitment to curtail the construction of nuclear power plants in France, thus leaving the country more dependent on imports of petroleum and natural gas.

Despite such considerations, however, the Soviets failed to warm up to Mitterrand in the 1974 presidential elections. Only after the elections were safely over did the Soviets receive a PS delegation led by Mitterrand in Moscow in April 1975 (just weeks after they had entertained Prime Minister Jacques Chirac). During his stay, they registered satisfaction that the positions of the PS and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were either similar, or nearly so, on a number of important international issues.[23]

Shifting Away From Moscow

Beginning in the mid-1970's, both Mitterrand and the shifting majority inside the PS began edging away from the more extreme views they had expressed earlier. This movement to the right gathered momentum in late 1977, after the French Communists had taken the first critical steps toward breaking the leftist alliance. The PS Executive Bureau noted that the USSR was the only state to have used military force in Europe since the end of World War II, and in January 1978, Mitterrand proclaimed that "the Americans ought to know that we will be loyal allies, if there is a war."[24]

More extensive transformations along these lines ensued after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The PS condemned the Soviet aggression and declared that the Soviets were now embarked on a "general offensive" of global proportions. Although the Socialists stopped short of approving US sanctions against Moscow, such as an economic embargo and boycott of the Olympic games, the party's majority had taken a decisive step away from its previous attitudes toward the Kremlin.

As the presidential campaign began to gather steam in the spring of 1980, Mitterrand felt sufficiently sure of his political position to criticize the negative results of Giscard's visit with Brezhnev in Warsaw.[25] With his own suspicions of Soviet intentions growing, Mitterrand let it be known that his defense policies were also undergoing a profound modification. Shortly before the elections, Mitterrand privately warned that the security of Western Europe (not to mention that of France's own nuclear strike force) required a drastic reduction in the number of Soviet SS–20 missiles. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party, despite its criticism of the SS–20's (and Mitterrand's own public acknowledgment of Soviet military superiority in Europe), for the moment refrained from formally approving NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy 572 new intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles and called instead for negotiations to redress the European nuclear balance.[26]

To no small extent, the Soviets themselves were responsible for the major shifts in Mitterrand's positions. Both Mitterrand and the majority of PS members have swung against the Soviets in the last several years largely under the pressure of events—in particular the invasion of Afghanistan, the recent changes in the European military balance in Moscow's favor, and the attempt to suppress Solidarity in Poland.

Since Mitterrand's inauguration as president, these problems have only deepened, prompting France's Socialist government to adopt a much more censorious attitude toward the USSR than might have been predicted prior to the elections. For their part, the Soviets have scored few successes in their dealings with Mitterrand so far, and they have been able to do little more than voice their displeasure at the new administration's initiatives.

---

[22] *Programme commun de gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste* (Common Program for Government of the Communist Party and Socialist Party), Paris, Editions sociales, 1972, pp. 171–76.

[23] See the communique in *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1975.

[24] Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally* . . . , p. 211.

[25] *Le Monde* (Paris), May 23, 1980.

[26] Michael M. Harrison and Simon Serfaty, *A Socialist France and Western Security*, Washington, DC, SAIS Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 1981, p. 24.

Perhaps the most striking of these initiatives is the Socialist government's defense program. Even before it was announced in November 1981, both President Mitterrand and Defense Minister Charles Hernu had indicated that significant increases in defense spending were in order. Mitterrand attracted considerable publicity with a visit to a French nuclear submarine in July. In the same month, Hernu stated that his earlier advocacy of a less robust defense posture, as outlined in a book published in 1980 (which the Soviet press was still citing approvingly), was no longer valid in view of the continuing buildup of Soviet theater missile forces. Hernu also rejected the inclusion of the French nuclear forces in any negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the European nuclear balance.[27] Before the end of July, Mitterrand consented to the continued production (but not deployment) of neutron weapons—a position sharply attacked by the Soviets.[28]

President François Mitterrand inspects a French nuclear submarine at the L'Ile Longue base on July 27, 1981.

—Keystone.

The new defense budget itself, when finally unveiled, called for a 17.6 percent increase in defense spending, including funds for the construction of France's seventh missile-carrying submarine, for the upgrading of the existing force of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and for the development of a new surface-to-surface missile to replace the Pluton. These measures gained added force with the government's official endorsement of NATO's plan to station the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The Mitterrand government combined its advocacy of a strong defense in response to the Soviet arms buildup with a refusal to support the peace movement that swelled into massive antinuclear demonstrations throughout Western Europe in the fall. Although a throng of more than 100,000 people gathered in Paris in October 1981 to protest the latest escalation in the arms race, the Socialists did not formally participate, and the bulk of the demonstrators turned out to be Communists.[29]

Mitterrand's reproachful attitude toward the neutralist and anti-American tendencies associated with the peace movement stirred ripples of discord in his relationship with the German Social Democrats. Although Mitterrand was known to have closer personal and political attachments to Willy Brandt than to Helmut Schmidt, Brandt failed to convince the French president that the protesters deserved a measure of sympathy for their peaceful intentions.[30] A number of French Socialists, in fact, feared that the German Social Democrats (particularly those associated with the SPD's left wing) were more interested in pursuing an accommodation with the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union for narrowly defined national purposes than in responding to the SS–20's or to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Poland.[31] Furthermore, PS leaders recognized that one of the reasons for the relative quiescence of the peace movement in France was that the French possessed their own nuclear force and were therefore in a militarily more independent position than the Federal Republic, whose total reliance on the American deterrent contributed to feelings of helplessness and anxiety on the part of many West German citizens.[32]

---

[27] *Le Monde*, July 11, 1981. For a discussion of the renewed debate on French nuclear strategy that surfaced in 1981, as well as of other issues related to this article, see Daniel Goldberg, "Franco-Soviet Relations and the Election of a Socialist Government in France: January-November 1981," unpublished ms.

[28] *Pravda*, July 30, 1981.

[29] *Le Monde*, Oct. 27, 1981.

[30] On Mitterrand's meeting with Brandt, see *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Aug. 24, 1981, pp. 22–24.

[31] See, for example, the interview with André Gorz in ibid., Jan. 25, 1982, pp. 34–41.

Meanwhile, the Socialist Party itself, convening in October for its first party congress since assuming power, not only withheld support from the peace movement but explicitly endorsed NATO's view that the nuclear balance in Europe was changing decidedly in Moscow's favor. Although CPSU foreign policy spokesmen such as Boris Ponomarëv, Vadim Zagladin, and Georgiy Zhukov attended the congress (Ponomarëv subsequently met with Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson), *Pravda* launched its bluntest attack to date on the Mitterrand government just one week prior to the congress and followed it up with sharp criticism of the PS resolutions.[33]

The Soviets seem to have taken particular offense at Mitterrand's repeated assertions of Atlantic solidarity and his cordial ties with the administration of Ronald Reagan. Contrary to popular expectations, the French Socialist and the American conservative for the most part have not let ideological divergences obstruct common interests in dealing with the Soviets. (The chief exception to this overall harmony—President Reagan's determination to block West European agreements with the USSR on natural gas sales and pipeline technology—will be considered in greater detail below.) The Soviet press has reacted by deploring Mitterrand's incipient Atlanticism while at the same time pointing to the "contradictions" between the United States and France—e.g., in their economic relations or with respect to the Third World.

The Third World itself represents an area of ambiguity, both for French policy and for Soviet evaluations of that policy. Although the Soviet press applauds Mitterrand for opposing US policy in Central America, it understandably overlooks the fact that Mitterrand justifies his position in terms of the West's need to avoid pushing leftist revolutionaries into an exclusive reliance on Soviet support.[34] By the same token, the Soviets tend to focus on Mitterrand's approval of a Palestinian state in the Middle East while ignoring his support for Israel.[35] The Soviets have been considerably less ambiguous, however, in their criticism of Mitterrand's decision to ship military supplies to Chad.[36]

Boris Ponomarëv, right, and Vadim V. Zagladin, left, Chief and First Deputy Chief respectively of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attend the Congress of the French Socialist Party in October 1981.

—Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

The Polish crisis, and particularly the declaration of martial law by Wojciech Jaruzelski's regime on December 13, 1981, has inevitably exacerbated Franco-Soviet relations. That event prompted Mitterrand to remark cryptically that "anything that will permit us to get away from Yalta will be good."[37] Moreover, the French government moved much earlier than the German government to assign culpability for the action to Moscow. Once again, tensions emerged between Paris and Bonn over West Germany's initial reluctance to take a firm attitude against the Soviets on the Polish question, and matters were only partially smoothed over when Helmut Schmidt visited Paris in January 1982. For a time it even appeared that French efforts to wrap up a major natural gas agreement with the USSR were in jeopardy. Although the two sides had just recently come to terms on pricing arrangements, after December 13 there was increasing pressure from certain energy experts in the French government to seek a substantial reduction in the amount of natural gas to be imported from Siberia.[38]

---

[32] On this point, see Claude Estier, "Ambiguities of Pacifism," *L'Unité*, Oct. 17, 1981.

[33] For the precongress attack, see the articles by A. Afanas'yev in *Pravda*, Oct. 16 and 17, 1981. For *Pravda*'s reaction to the PS congress, see the issues of Oct. 24 and 26.

[34] For an elaboration by one of Mitterrand's ministers of the view that the "true ground for competition between East and West is the South," see Jean-Pierre Cot, "Winning East-West in North-South," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1982, p. 5. See also Dominique Moisi, "Mitterrand's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Continuity," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Winter 1981/82.

[35] *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1982.

[36] Ibid., Oct. 29, 1981.

[37] *Le Monde*, Jan. 2, 1982.

[38] Ibid., Feb. 4, 1982.

Ultimately, the French government decided to go ahead with the gas deal as negotiated, providing Moscow with its greatest achievement to date in its relations with the Mitterrand government. On the night of January 22–23, authorities representing Soyuzgaseksport and Gas de France signed an agreement providing for the purchase by France of 8 billion cubic meters of Soviet natural gas annually over a 25-year period beginning in 1984. Although the base price was not announced, it was thought to be in the neighborhood of US$4.65 per million BTU—the price West Germany agreed to pay for Soviet gas in its agreement of November 20, 1981. The upshot of the arrangement was that within 10 years, France would be obtaining from the USSR approximately 35 percent of its natural gas, or 5 percent of its total energy needs.[39]

The French government's decision was taken in spite of intense pressure from the Reagan administration to forgo the agreement. American efforts to obstruct the implementation of this and similar agreements by West Germany and Italy became particularly forceful in June 1982, when President Reagan imposed an embargo on the export of equipment to be used in the Soviet pipeline. The embargo affected both US firms and European manufacturers holding licenses from US companies to build pipeline technology intended for the Soviet Union (e.g., Alsthom-Atlantique in France, a producer of gas turbines). This decision produced a particularly sharp reaction among the French. President Mitterrand pressed for a strong statement of protest by the Common Market in response to the American action and accused the US of "a grave lack of solidarity" with its allies that contradicted the spirit of the recently concluded Versailles summit of American, European, and Japanese leaders.[40] Mitterrand, in turn received criticism for the timing of the gas deal (in light of the Polish crisis) from both the opposition and erstwhile friendly quarters such as *Le Monde* and the French Democratic Confederation of Workers (CFDT).[41]

At least to some extent, the French approved the transaction with the Soviets because of continuing difficulties in reaching a pricing accord for Algerian gas. In response to concerns expressed by the US government and domestic critics about the possibility of French dependence on Soviet natural gas, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and other official spokesmen suggested that any attempt by the Soviets to shut off gas supplies would be akin to an act of war. Moreover, they contended that the shoe might be on the other foot as far as political leverage was concerned. The Chairman of the National Assembly stated, for example, that if the Soviets invaded Poland, the French government would cancel the contract.[42]

The Soviets, for their part, were also anxious to close the deal, and settled for a price well below the amount subsequently negotiated between France and Algeria. Once the agreement was signed, they lavishly praised French "realism" and vocally denounced US efforts to stop the deal.

Aside from the gas accord, however, the course of Soviet-French relations since Mitterrand took office has not been very smooth. This situation has placed the PCF in a particularly vulnerable position.

The PCF's Dilemmas

The PCF is caught between the need to demonstrate its loyalty to the Socialist government in which it serves and its desire to defend the Soviet Union against French assaults on Moscow's foreign and defense policies. Meanwhile, the party leadership is still reeling from the stunning losses it suffered in the elections of April, May, and June 1981. Deserted by one-fourth of its constituency, the PCF sank to a postwar nadir of 15.5 percent in the first round of the presidential elections, in which PCF chief Georges Marchais was a candidate. In the parliamentary elections held in June, the party managed to inch its way back up to 16.2 percent of the first-round vote. Devastated by abstentions and defections to the Socialists, however, it ended up with only 44 seats in the National Assembly—an embarrassing total when measured against its possession of 86 seats in the previous legislature, and especially when set against the Socialists' 269 of the Assembly's 491 seats.

For Moscow, the PCF's electoral debacle means that the Kremlin cannot exercise even the modicum of leverage over the Mitterrand government which it would have enjoyed had the PS fallen short of an absolute majority in the Assembly. The irony of this development is that the Soviets lost the opportunity to influence Mitterrand's policies through the PCF at the very moment when the PCF leadership had come closer to supporting Soviet policies than at any time during the Communist-Socialist alliance. More ironically still, it was at least in part because of this swerve in Moscow's direction, a move which took the Communists further away from what remained of the unity of the Left, that the PCF suffered such a precipitous decline.

---

[39] Ibid., Jan. 25, 1982.

[40] *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1982.

[41] *Le Monde*, Jan. 25, 1982.

[42] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), Jan. 28 and 29, 1982.



The four Communist members in the government of Socialist President François Mitterrand arrive at the Elysée Palace on June 24, 1981, for their first cabinet meeting. From left to right: Marcel Rigout, Minister of Vocational Training; Anicet Le Pors, Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in Charge of Civil Service and Administrative Reform; Charles Fiterman, Minister of State for Transportation; and Jack Ralite, Minister of Health.

—Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

Indeed, the restoration of the ties with the Kremlin that had been damaged during the days when the PCF disparaged Soviet policies for the sake of demonstrating its independence from Moscow constituted the *coup de grâce* for the moribund leftist alliance in the months leading up to the 1981 elections. Like the decision of the Communist leaders in 1977 to pull out of the alliance rather than risk participation in a government dominated by the PS, their decision to close ranks with the Soviets represented the outgrowth of a choice taken largely for domestic reasons. Once Marchais traveled to Moscow in early 1980 to broadcast his approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to French television audiences, there was no way back to a reconciliation with the Socialists.[43] If the Moscow meeting represented Marchais's "journey to Canossa" (as the Communist dissident Jean Elleinstein put it),[44] he got there by crossing the Rubicon.

Of course, it is highly doubtful that at any time prior to the elections of 1981 Marchais expected to be in his present straits. Indeed, the PCF is now somewhat less than a junior partner of the Socialists, it is a dispensable partner. The Communists' decision to accept four cabinet posts (all well removed from the key ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and defense)[45] probably reflected their fears that a rejection of the offer would only deepen their political isolation and further reduce the party's chances of regaining its former stature. It was a measure of the PCF's desperation at this point that it entered the cabinet fully cognizant of the Socialists' ability to circumscribe its freedom of action (in fomenting strikes, for example). Just as significant, the Communists took their places in the cabinet only after the two parties signed a document which called, among other things, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and for the continuation of the process of economic and political renewal then under way in Poland.[46]

---

[43] For PS reactions to Marchais's address and to the Soviet invasion, see *L'Unité*, Jan. 4, 11, 18, and Feb. 1, 1980.

[44] *Le Monde*, Jan. 8, 1980.

[45] The posts and their occupants are Charles Fiterman, Minister of Transportation and Minister of State; Anicet Le Pors, Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform; Jack Ralite, Minister of Health; and Marcel Rigout, Minister of Vocational Training.

Since joining the government, the PCF seems to have found sufficient latitude to criticize Socialist policies in a number of areas without exceeding the bounds of Mitterrand's tolerance. For example, the Communist leadership has attacked the government's decision to build the neutron bomb and launched demonstrations in support of Soviet proposals for a moratorium on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. On the domestic front, the PCF has prodded the Socialist leaders to move faster to meet their social and economic pledges, and has differed with PS proposals regarding the voting system to be employed in the municipal elections of 1983.

The most serious complication in PCF–PS relations thus far, however, has centered upon Poland. In marked contrast to the position of the Socialists (and to that of the Italian Communist Party), the PCF adopted an attitude of understanding, if not of outright approval, of the establishment of the martial law regime. Marchais argued that the imposition of martial law was a regrettable but necessary step required to prevent a civil war in Poland brought on by Solidarity's attempts to take power.[47] In support of this position, the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) refused to join in strikes called by other trade unions to protest the suppression of Solidarity. Even the May Day parade of 1982 saw the CGT and the more Socialist-oriented CFDT march separately rather than under a banner of unity, in part because the CGT refused to join in the CFDT's appeal for the release of imprisoned Solidarity members.

The Polish events have further weakened the PCF's position within the government, placing the Communists on the defensive in the face of the Socialists' widely popular repudiation of the martial law regime. For the present, however, the PS leadership has chosen not to force the issue, preferring instead to narrow the Communists' area of maneuverability by retaining them in the cabinet. Meetings between PS and PCF leaders in early January confirmed their commitment to maintaining their collaboration in spite of differences on Poland and other issues.[48]

Meanwhile, the Polish issue has aggravated discord that was already pronounced inside the PCF. Not only have many rank-and-file Communists opposed the repression of Solidarity, but a sizable number of party officials have also voiced similar views. Twenty-five PCF journalists issued a statement on December 23 enjoining the party leadership to "denounce the coup unambiguously," and local PCF officials have joined with the PS in signing resolutions condemning Jaruzelski's actions.[49] These developments came in the wake of mounting criticism of the general strategy pursued by the PCF leadership over the past several years. Intellectuals grouped around Henri Fizbin, who had earlier resigned his post as first secretary of the Paris Federation of the PCF following his criticism of the party's decision to break with the Socialists in 1977, repeated their demands for more open discussion within the party.[50] The leadership moved quickly after the 1981 parliamentary elections to "exclude" a number of these dissidents but was unable to expel them from their party cells. Criticisms of PCF procedures and policies also surfaced in the pages of the party newspaper, *L'Humanité*, during the months that preceded the 24th PCF Congress in February 1982. Some party members questioned the wisdom of Marchais's speech on Afghanistan in the Kremlin and vigorously denounced the absence of democracy in the party's implementation of "democratic centralism." One writer went so far as to oppose Marchais's reelection to the post of Secretary General.[51]

Once the congress convened, Marchais admitted the need for "a critical examination" of the party's preelection strategies but offered no concrete suggestions for opening up an in-house debate. He also affirmed that the decision to break the alliance with the PS prior to the 1978 elections had been correct.[52]

For their part, the Soviets have praised Marchais's efforts to clamp down on dissenters in the party,[53] and surely welcome the PCF's support of Soviet foreign policy actions. Nevertheless, the relationship between the PCF and the Kremlin still contains elements of potential disharmony. PCF leaders continue to insist on

---

[46] For the text, see *Le Monde*, June 25, 1981.

[47] See the text of Marchais's letter to Wojciech Jaruzelski in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Dec. 24, 1981, and his remarks in ibid., Dec. 31, 1981.

[48] *Le Monde*, Jan. 9 and 11, 1982.

[49] Ibid., Dec. 24, 1981.

[50] See Fizbin's book *Les bouches s'ouvrent* (The Mouths Are Opening), Paris, Grasset, 1980, as well as the dissidents' publication, *Rencontres communistes*.

[51] *L'Humanité*, Dec. 4 and 11, 1981; *Le Monde*, Jan. 9, 1982.

[52] *L'Humanité*, Feb. 9, 1982.

[53] See V. Semyonov's article in *New Times* (Moscow), No. 30, 1981.

Now-dissident member of the French Communist Party, Henri Fizbin, shown in February 1977, when he was the party's candidate for Mayor of Paris.

—Katherine Young.

their right to formulate their own brand of socialism, free from any reference to the Soviet model. (Marchais himself reaffirmed this position in his speech at the recent party congress.) While Soviet leaders since Khrushchev have publicly endorsed this notion, authoritative statements indicate that the Kremlin still has doubts concerning the legitimacy of the parliamentary path to socialism.[54] Furthermore, the PCF may at some point try to recover from its recent electoral defeats and massive defections in membership by distancing itself from the Soviets and adopting a more moderate domestic and international image.[55]

At present, the PCF leadership is too weak to be useful to Moscow as a lever on the PS, too constricted to challenge the Socialists, and too ossified in its commitments to relatively orthodox Communist policies and organizational norms to stem the rising currents of internal dissent and voter disaffection. Where the party goes from here depends largely on Mitterrand's prospects and on what Moscow elects to do in relation to him.

Conclusions

The foregoing *tour d'horizon* has attempted to demarcate both the possibilities and the limits inherent in the Soviet relationship with France. Over the years since Soviet leaders discovered that de Gaulle's assertive policies offered them significant opportunities for manipulating US–West European relations, they seem to have developed a realistic estimate of what they can hope to gain from their French connection. First and foremost, they value the special dialogue with France in its own right for the simple reason that it interferes with US attempts to coordinate Western policies. Hence, the Soviets place highest value on France's independence from the United States, but probably entertain few illusions about the likelihood of establishing French dependence on the Soviet Union. Beyond that, the Soviets have encouraged French efforts to promote US policies in support of détente and to oppose US policies in most other areas. They have also sought to elicit French approval for Soviet arms control proposals, for greater economic cooperation with the USSR and Eastern Europe, and for Germany's détente policies.

The Soviets can look back on some substantial successes over the years in these domains. However, they must also keep in view a number of countervailing factors which have acted to circumscribe the scope of these accomplishments. First, the initiative in most of the spheres just enumerated has come (and has to come) from the French; Moscow can at best encourage and respond to French desires to cut an independent figure in world affairs and to conduct a privileged dialogue with the USSR. This was certainly the case with de Gaulle's quixotic pursuit of French grandeur, and the same was also true for the more modest attempts by Pompidou and Giscard to assert France's political and economic interest and to play an interlocutory role in East-West relations. It is precisely this fillip of initiative in reaching out toward Moscow that has not as yet come forth from Mitterrand.

Second, many of the most favorable aspects of French policy from Moscow's point of view are often double-edged and carry disadvantages as well as advantages. Thus, France's independent nuclear force, while regarded in Moscow as a detriment to NATO's

---

[54] See Joan Barth Urban, "Moscow and the West European Parties," presented at a conference on "Recent Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe," University of Washington, Seattle, WA, Apr. 23, 1982. See also J. W. Friend, "The CPSU and the PCF," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), forthcoming in 1982.

[55] The ambiguity of the PCF's relationship with Moscow is reflected in the nature of the speculation about the purposes of the recent trip to Beijing by PCF Secretariat member Maxime Gremetz and of Marchais's forthcoming trip there in September 1982. While some have suggested that these visits have been arranged with Moscow's blessing, others surmise that the PCF was responding on its own to Chinese initiatives.

LA PAIX ET
Parti Communiste
d'Union Sovietique
U.R.S.S.

Konstantin U. Chernenko (right), member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Georges Marchais (center), Secretary General of the French Communist Party (PCF), address a rally promoting "International Solidarity" and "Peace and Friendship," held in a Paris suburb on February 5, 1982. Chernenko was in France to attend the 24th Congress of the PCF.

—Alain Mingam/Gamma-Liaison.

military cohesion, also complicates Soviet attempts to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces with the West, and it has helped retard the emergence of a mass-based peace movement in France such as those existing in West Germany and the Netherlands. Similarly, the special ties between French and West German leaders are good for Moscow if they reinforce Bonn's interests in cooperating with the Soviet Union and its allies, but unfavorable if they serve to stiffen the West German government's resolve to oppose Soviet policies on missile deployments, Afghanistan, and Poland. Up to now, the Soviets have perceived Mitterrand as stressing the negative aspect of these cross-cutting policies.[56]

The third factor concerns the question of "levers," a favorite Soviet term. Here, too, there are limits to what the Kremlin can do to influence French policy or to exploit France's differences with the United States. Above all, Moscow has fewer means available for exerting political pressure on France than it has with respect to the Federal Republic, and France usually has less influence on Washington—in part because of its political and military autonomy—than West Germany does. As a consequence, France will continue to take a back seat to the Federal Republic as a target of Moscow's attentions—or at least so long as the Social Democrats retain power in Bonn. Whether the emergence of a new government headed by Christian Democrats would alter the situation remains to be seen. While the Christian Democrats may be more willing to risk a deterioration in West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union than the SPD, the Federal Republic will continue to be a prime object of Soviet overtures, in view of its central role in the Euromissile controversy and of continuing popular support in the FRG for stable relations with the German Democratic Republic and for trade with the East.

To be sure, the Soviets possess two potential levers in dealing with France. Both, however, are of questionable effectiveness. The first is economic. The recent conclusion of the gas deal has no doubt buttressed Soviet convictions about France's interest in economic cooperation with the Soviets—convictions openly voiced by Soviet economists, particularly in connection with discussions of Europe's thirst for energy.[57] Moreover, trade with the USSR benefits certain sectors of the French economy, and the case of the gas turbine industry mentioned earlier is but one example. The Kremlin will accordingly continue to advertise the mutual advantages to be derived from expanding trade.

---

[56] *New Times*, No. 10, 1982.

It is doubtful, however, that flourishing economic ties between France and the Soviet Union can be converted into political profits. Thus far, Mitterrand has shown no signs of budging in his defense policies or in his opposition to the martial law regime in Poland despite the gas deal. Furthermore, France does not obtain as many economic rewards from its East-West trade as does West Germany.[58]

The second, at least potential, lever is the PCF. The obstacles restricting PCF influence on Mitterrand at the moment have already been explained. But things could change. Should the French economic situation deteriorate, sparking discontent within the ranks of the working class, the PCF could seek to capitalize on Mitterrand's troubles by reverting to its accustomed role as "people's tribune." (In this connection, it is instructive to recall the words of PCF Politburo member Roland Leroy, who described the PCF as a party "in" the government but not "of" the government.[59] Strikes and a vigorous propaganda campaign, perhaps accompanied by the resignation of the Communist cabinet ministers, could be used to pressure the government into cutting defense expenditures while having the added effect of boosting the PCF's recently shattered prestige. To the extent that such a strategy were coordinated with Moscow, it could be modulated with the aim of inducing a more pro-Soviet foreign policy on the part of the Socialist leadership.

Yet the implications of an economic downturn are by no means predictable. Such a turn of events could actually diminish Mitterrand's ability to conduct an active foreign policy and push him further to the right, by compelling him to make compromises with centrist forces to secure broader popular support for his government. The results of the cantonal elections of March 1982 indicate that such a process may already be under way.

French Defense Minister Charles Hernu, left, confers in Bonn with his West German counterpart, Hans Apel, in July 1981.

—Poly-Press/Katherine Young.

In the end, perhaps the most effective thing Moscow could do to ease relations with France and damage the foundations of French-American cooperation in opposing Soviet policies would be to return to a more relaxed international atmosphere, especially in Western Europe. This would require meaningful Soviet compromises in the negotiations on theater nuclear weapons at Geneva as well as a normalization of affairs in Poland. Without some movement along these lines, it appears that the Soviets can only expect the Mitterrand government to expand its nuclear forces and demonstrate traditional French solicitude for the Polish people (coupled with PS solicitude for Solidarity).

Should tensions diminish substantially, however, the Soviets might anticipate that France and the United States would resume their normal bickering over a host of international issues, including East-West relations. As indicated earlier, many of Mitterrand's ideals and preferences contain the seeds of potential conflict with the United States on a broad agenda of questions. His continuing reluctance to join in Western military undertakings beyond the NATO periphery, his willingness to maintain economic links with the Soviet Union, his sympathy for revolutionary movements in the Third World, and his commitment to disarmament—these aspects of the "other" Mitterrand have lately been forced into the background primarily by Soviet actions themselves over the past several years. But they remain part and parcel of his political outlook, and perhaps they would resurface as primary in the context of a more relaxed Soviet posture. As Robert Legvold has pointed out, the Soviets

---

[57] See, for example, A. Kudryavtsev, "France: The State and Energy," *MEMO*, No. 11, 1981.

[58] Although French imports from the USSR more than tripled between 1977 and 1981 and exports rose by more than one-third, by 1981, trade with the Soviet Union accounted for only 2.8 percent of France's total imports and 1.8 percent of its exports. *Commerce extérieure de la France 1981* (Foreign Trade of France 1981), Paris, Centre Français du Commerce Extérieur, 1982.

[59] *Le Monde*, May 7, 1982.

Franco-Soviet economic ties: at the left, three French technicians (in the center) demonstrate to Soviet operators the installation and use of a vertical two-spindle boring machine sold by the French firm "Forest" to the Soviet "Atommash" plant in Volgodonsk, which manufactures nuclear equipment; at the right, construction in France of a section of pipeline which delivers natural gas to France from the Ural Mountains under a contract between Gas de France and Soyuzgazeksport.

—TASS from Sofvoto.

appear not to have reached any firm conclusions about Mitterrand as yet and remain open to the possibility of reestablishing their dialogue with the president of France.[60]

For now, in sum, the most that Moscow can hope for is to replace the current, somewhat reluctant, Mitterrand with the more accommodating one. Turning him around, however, will entail some effort. At the very least, it will require the Soviet leadership to heed the message of those Soviet scholars who write that a relaxation of tensions sharpens capitalist contradictions while confrontation and crisis only promote Western unity.

---

[60] "The Soviet Union and France," presented at a conference on "Recent Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe," University of Washington, Seattle, WA, Apr. 23, 1982.

Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement

by Vojtech Mastny

Visitors enter the Vienna office of the Austrian Chancellor through an anteroom evocative of memories. It is the room where in 1934 an earlier chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, bled to death after having been shot by intruding Nazi conspirators—a vivid reminder of Austria's precarious position at the time. It is also the room where, as if to exorcise the ghost, the Austrians have hung an enormous painting depicting a happier event—the signing, in May 1955 in the Belvedere Palace not far away, of the Austrian State Treaty, which ended Austria's occupation by Western and Soviet troops and laid the foundation for its subsequent prosperity as a neutral state in one of the world's most heavily armed regions. Present Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, himself a prominent figure in the events of 1955, delights in reminding visitors of the startling contrast between Austria's bright present and sorry past.[1]

But the broader significance of Austria's good fortune lies in the extraordinary light it sheds on Soviet policies. Not only did the Soviets in 1955 abandon their obstruction of the State Treaty, a draft of which had been ready for signature for the past eight years. They also proved suddenly so eager to sign it that in the end they settled for terms less favorable than the original terms and came to an agreement with the Austrians even before the Western powers entered the final negotiation process. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles judged the outcome as "just one of these breaks that come if you keep on steadily, steadily, keeping the pressure on. And all of a sudden you get a break."[2]

Mr. Mastny is Professor of Strategy, US Naval War College (Newport, RI). He has written extensively on East-West relations, including Russia's Road to the Cold War, *1979, and is currently researching a book on the influence of the 1975 Helsinki agreement on international order in Europe. Mr. Mastny wishes to thank the Austrian Ministry for Science and Research and the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute for research support in the preparation of this article.*

There is a broader significance, too, for the Soviet Union's relations with the West. The Austrian State Treaty, reversing the previous trend in East-West relations, inaugurated what might be called the first period of détente. Détente did not last, but this brief period was extremely significant. In the opinion of André Fontaine, the distinguished French commentator, "a unique opportunity for getting out of the Cold War once and for all may have been lost" when East and West failed to come to any further agreement beyond the Austrian settlement.[3] According to Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschläger, however, the Austrian settlement proved that

> *even agreements of a very fundamental nature, namely, those affecting spheres of influence, are possible; it put into practice for the first time in Europe the theory of peaceful coexistence which has by now become the foundation for conducting relations without regard to ideological divisions.*[4]

With the permanence of that foundation again in doubt, it is of more than academic interest to reexamine the events that led to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Does the signing of the treaty show that Moscow was prepared to make substantial concessions only when faced with unrelenting Western pressure? Or were there other reasons why the Soviet leaders were so accommodating? Was their change of policy related to the internal struggle for power and to differences of

---

[1] Interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

[2] "Television Report to the President by Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles," May 17, 1955, Dulles Papers, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

[3] André Fontaine, *History of the Cold War*, New York, NY, Random House, 1969, Vol. 2, p. 126.

[4] Quoted by Marion Dönhoff in "Symposium on the International Situation," *Europäische Rundschau* (Vienna), No. 2, 1980, p. 138.

Signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, in Vienna's Belvedere Palace: from left to right, US Ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson; US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Il'ichëv; Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov; Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Figl; British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan; British Ambassador, Geoffrey Wallinger; French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay; and French Ambassador, Roger Lalouette.

—USIS.

opinion about priorities? In particular, how did the condition of their East European empire influence their posture toward the West? What conclusions can be drawn about the constancy of Soviet security requirements and the tactics the Soviets employ when they conclude that changes are necessary? Finally, what factors lay behind the rise and fall of the first détente, of which Austrian neutrality was the foremost, and possibly unique, product? The lessons still to be learned from the Austrian State Treaty—an episode concluded more than 25 years ago—can perhaps make the difference between the success or failure of détente in the future.[5]

Stalin and Austria

Until the end of World War II, Austria did not figure high on the list of Soviet priorities. Stalin, ever the great-power snob, had long questioned its very raison d'être as a separate state—as did also, to be sure, a great many Austrians during the unhappy interwar period. In March 1938, Moscow's much-publicized protest against Austria's *Anschluss* with Nazi Germany was little more than the last cry in its waning campaign to drum up Western resistance against Adolf Hitler.[6] Following Stalin's subsequent deal with Hitler in August 1939, the Soviet leader took care not to contravene the Nazi notion that Austria was an integral part of the German Reich. Even after the two dictators fell out with each other in 1941, Stalin still saw fit to publicly contrast *Anschluss* with the Nazis' other conquests. Privately, his Comintern aide Dmitriy Manuilskiy paid Austrian Communist exiles the dubious compliment of describing their compatriots as "a charming variety of Germans."[7]

Once the war had begun, however, the Soviets no longer had a vested interest in tolerating the absorption of Austria by Germany. In December 1941, Stalin suggested to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the restoration of an independent Austria, among other daring ideas he expounded during their memorable meeting held as the Germans were knocking on Moscow's doors.[8] But at the October 1943 conference of foreign ministers in Moscow, it was Great Britain, not the Soviet Union, that took the initiative in proposing that Austrian independence be formally declared an Allied war aim. The Soviets concurred, but acted as if they favored the idea less on its intrinsic merits and more as a convenient means to weaken postwar Germany. They inserted into the joint declaration a clause proclaiming Austria's shared responsibility for Hitler's war, a clause that not only established a Soviet claim to reparations but also implied that the Austrians had neither fought for the Führer any less willingly than the Germans themselves nor resisted his rule at home any more actively.[9] Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav Communist chief who knew Stalin well, judged him indifferent to Austria except in relation to Germany.[10]

---

[5] While the relevant Soviet archives remain closed to foreigners, the Austrians aptly celebrated the State Treaty's 25th anniversary by providing access to theirs. Even though they have more recently seen fit to close the archives again, enough new evidence about the contacts between Vienna and Moscow has come to light to clarify the picture of Soviet policy drawn in the three best available accounts: Robert L. Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," *Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City, UT), December 1968, pp. 651–67; Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty: A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe*, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970; and William L. Stearman, *The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria: An Analysis of Soviet Policy in Austria, 1945–1955*, Bonn, Siegler, 1962.

[6] Press statement by Maksim Litvinov, Mar. 17, 1938, in Jane Degras, Ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. 3, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 276–77.

[7] Report by Iosif Stalin, Nov. 6, 1941, in Andrew Rothstein, Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War*, Vol. 1, London, Hutchinson, 1944, p. 29. See also Ruth von Mayenburg, *Blaues Blut and rote Fahnen* (Blue Blood and Red Banners), Vienna, Molden, 1969, p. 292.

[8] Minutes of Eden-Stalin conversation, Dec. 16, 1941, WP (42) 8, CAB 66/20, Public Record Office, London.

The Soviet Union acquired a direct stake in Austria only when its troops moved onto Austrian territory in early 1945. Between October 1944 and February 1945, Stalin had more than once encouraged his Western coalition partners to advance on Vienna from the south.[11] Contrary to his stated preferences, however, it fell to the Red Army to spearhead the occupation of Austria. The Soviet presence in the eastern part of the country, in turn, added substance to the Allied agreement on the division of Austria into occupation zones, an agreement concluded in 1944 after the Soviets had persuaded the reluctant Americans to accept one of the zones.[12] As the end of the war neared with no clear understanding about the future of Germany, moreover, the four-power arrangement in Austria assumed special significance as reinforcing the principle of joint responsibility for the settlement in Germany as well.

As a result of these developments, the Soviets began to view the future of Austria in more ambitious terms. In April 1945, they established in Vienna a provisional government designed to exercise authority under their tutelage throughout Austria, without regard to the temporary occupation zones. They installed as chancellor a Socialist, Karl Renner, whom they expected to be their puppet.

The story of how the Soviet scheme fell apart is too well known to need recounting. In Austria, Renner confounded expectations by proving no puppet at all. In Germany, the quadripartite regime proved abortive, and the repercussions soon spilled over into Austria. As the East-West confrontation grew into the cold war, previously insignificant Austria emerged as an important part of the battlefield where Stalin clung to what he had lest any concession be interpreted as an incipient rout in the zero-sum game he imagined himself to be playing with the United States. Under such circumstances, no progress toward a settlement was likely unless one side or the other faltered.

Austrian Initiatives

After Stalin's death in 1953, it was the Soviet side that began to falter. Stalin's successors could not possibly hope to preserve the formidable grip he had maintained. No sooner had he gone than they began gingerly to alleviate some of the rigors of their occupation regime in eastern Austria.[13]

The Vienna government reacted quickly. Chancellor Julius Raab now saw the time as ripe for a breakthrough in the stalemate. Raab was under pressure from his own People's Party, which, having recently lost votes, badly needed a foreign policy success. He was ready to explore channels of communication with Moscow independently—a tendency that disturbed the Western powers, particularly the United States.[14] Eleanor Dulles, the administration's leading Central European expert, took a dim view of Raab's qualities as a statesman, describing him to her brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as a "simple person" who is "more or less a farmer, and likes to climb mountains."[15]

Norbert Bischoff, Austria's resident representative in Moscow for many years, also urged a separate initiative. On November 15, 1953, Bischoff (a career diplomat reputedly inclined to have an excessive attachment to any milieu where he happened to be serving[16]) sent a private letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in which he asserted that the time had come for a Soviet-Austrian rapprochement, preferably a relationship much like the one between the Soviet Union and Finland. Alluding to the recent resignation of Austria's pro-American Foreign Minister Karl Gruber, Bischoff alerted Molotov that "Raab had staked his political future on his being able to establish good relations with the Soviet Union, as it conforms with the deepest permanent interests of Austria." The message, which Bischoff himself characterized as "very unusual," implored the Soviets to respond with a signal that would prove Raab right.[17]

---

[9] "Amended Draft on Austria" and "Declaration on Austria," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1963, pp. 724, 761.

[10] Edvard Kardelj, *Boj za priznanje in neodvisnost nove Jugoslavije, 1944–1957: Spomini* (The Struggle for the Recognition and Independence of New Yugoslavia, 1944–57: Memoirs), Ljubljana, Drzavna zalozba Slovenije, 1980, p. 32.

[11] Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 211, 236, 240.

[12] Ibid., p. 236.

[13] Stearman, op. cit., pp. 131–34.

[14] "Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy," Office of Intelligence Research, US Department of State, Aug. 31, 1953, Intelligence Report No. 6403, National Archives, Washington, DC.

[15] "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, John Foster Dulles and Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Nov. 23, 1954, telephone conv.—Nov. 1, 1954–Dec. 31, 1954 (3)," Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951–59, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

[16] Gerald Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages, 1945–1955: Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität* (History of the State Treaty, 1945–55: Austria's Road to Neutrality), Graz, Styria, 1980, p. 115; interview with Austrian Ambassador to Switzerland Hans Thalberg, Bern, Aug. 4, 1981.

It is not clear whether Bischoff acted entirely on his own or with at least the implied consent of Raab, with whom he had recently consulted in Vienna. What is clear is that the unusual character of the probe did not save it from total failure. When Bischoff paid a visit to the Foreign Ministry a few days later, he found Molotov "if possible even a degree stiffer and more reserved than formerly."[18] It was a frustrating but indisputable fact of life for the Austrians that by themselves they were powerless to sway Moscow.

For almost a year thereafter, the Soviets were unyielding. To be sure, at the January 1954 conference of foreign ministers in Berlin, Molotov professed a readiness to sign the State Treaty if the Red Army could keep bases in Austria until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.[19] But Molotov was being disingenuous, since any such indefinite Soviet military presence was known to be unacceptable to the Western powers and Austrians alike. Moscow's higher priority remained the German question, then at a critical juncture because of the impending rearmament of West Germany under the auspices of the projected European Defense Community. As their Soviet mentors stepped up a campaign to thwart the project, the Austrian Communists in May 1954 even ceased their previous advocacy of Austria's neutralization, insisting that nothing short of a continued Soviet military presence would enable Austria to withstand the peril of a resurgent Germany.[20]

The defeat of the proposed European Defense Community by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954, was greeted in Moscow with undisguised relief and jubilation. Soviet officials suddenly began to display an unaccustomed bonhomie in conversations with Austrian representatives.[21] Whether this presaged a change of policy is an interesting but moot question, for no new Soviet policy had the time to mature before the German question took an altogether unexpected turn. By the end of September, the Allies had devised a different solution, one that envisaged West Germany's admission into NATO. For the Soviets, this was a prospect even more alarming than the one that had just been averted.

On October 21, anxious about the unexpected turn of events in Germany, Bischoff visited Mikhail Gribanov, the head of the Austrian desk at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, to urge continued dialogue between the two governments. Going a step further than Vienna's latest official pronouncements, he hinted at the possibility of

Occupation forces in postwar Vienna: at the left, Western MP's; at the right, Soviet soldiers.

—Photoreporters.

---

[17] Bischoff to Molotov, Nov. 15, 1953, Norbert Bischoff Papers (in possession of Mrs. Holda Bischoff, Vienna).

[18] Bischoff to Karl Wildmann, General Secretary of the Austrian Foreign Office, Nov. 17, 1953, in Alfons Schilcher, Ed., *Österreich und die Grossmächte: Dokumente zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik, 1945–1955* (Austria and the Great Powers: Documents on Austrian Foreign Policy, 1945–55), Vienna, Geyer, 1980, p. 180.

[19] Stourzh, op. cit., pp. 120–22.

[20] Ernst Fischer, *Das Ende einer Illusion: Erinnerungen, 1945–1955* (The End of an Illusion: Memoirs, 1945–55), Vienna, Molden, 1973, p. 367.

[21] Records of Josef Schöner-Andrey Timoshchenko and Franz Matsch-A. E. Kovalev conversations, Sept. 20 and 22, 1954, in Schilcher, op. cit., pp. 225–31.

satisfying Soviet security needs by preserving an otherwise unspecified "control machinery" *(Kontrollapparat)* in Austria even after the conclusion of the State Treaty.[22] Gribanov was friendly enough, though noncommittal. Nevertheless, after the signing two days later of the Paris agreements, which set the procedure for West Germany's early admission into NATO, the Soviets stiffened. On November 1, Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin told Bischoff that the ratification of the agreements would leave "nothing more to negotiate about"—a position confirmed in the Soviet note to the Western powers on December 10.[23] Austria had lost its value in Moscow's campaign to prevent West Germany's remilitarization. Soviet assent to an Austrian settlement had never seemed so remote.

Soviet Response

It was not long, however, before signs of a change in Soviet attitudes began to appear. In mid-December 1954, even as Soviet officials were pouring cold water on the Austrians' heads, Czechoslovak Ambassador to Belgrade Vilém Pit'hart intimated to his American colleague, James W. Riddleberger, that Moscow would be ready to negotiate about Austria "in a few months."[24] This confidence seemed rather farfetched in view of the further deterioration that followed. On December 21, Soviet High Commissioner Ivan Il'ichëv summoned an emergency session of the Allied Control Council in Vienna to accuse the United States of threatening Austrian unity by maintaining a military depot in the French occupation zone. The charge was both preposterous and puzzling, for the depot had been there for several years—as had some minor Soviet facilities in the American zone—without anybody's minding.[25] Only in retrospect does the uproar seem to make sense. By invoking the phantom threat, Moscow was really preparing a rationale for the policy change that Pit'hart had predicted.

If, regardless of Il'ichëv's posturing, nothing serious had happened in Austria, much had been happening in Moscow, where a leadership crisis was about to break out. On one side were Premier Georgiy Malenkov and his deputy Anastas Mikoyan. On the other were Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Molotov. At issue—apart from personal animosities—was the management of Stalin's difficult legacy, particularly the stability and security of his East European empire. Malenkov favored increased production of consumer goods at the expense of the defense-related heavy industries, a position that conveyed both his greater concern for domestic stability and his stronger faith in the possibility of international accommodation. He had overturned a hoary Stalinist dogma by declaring that nuclear war would result not in a victory of "socialism" over "capitalism" but in a universal catastrophe without regard to ideological distinctions.[26] To Seweryn Bialer, then a Polish Communist party activist with access to some high-level Moscow communications, Malenkov "was the only man in the Soviet Politburo that really wanted coexistence," but his colleagues feared "difficulties with the satellite countries."[27]

The nexus between power struggle and foreign policy is revealed in an extraordinary incident, curiously ignored in most literature on the subject.[28] On February 8, 1955, a Soviet-sponsored conference of parliamentarians and other public figures from East and West Europe met in Warsaw to discuss the German question. After hearing the Soviet representatives, it passed a resolution calling not only for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany but also for a Soviet withdrawal from Poland, free and supervised all-German elections (as proposed by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden ten days before), and international guarantees of the integrity of a united, nonaligned Germany. This was the very day that saw Malenkov's forced resignation in Moscow—the probable reason why the Soviet press never published the resolution, which appeared only in the Polish party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*.[29]

The coincidence suggests strongly that it was Malenkov's readiness for a far-reaching accommodation in Central Europe that cost him power. Thereafter, the Soviet government proceeded on the assumption that the Paris accords made the division of Germany permanent for the foreseeable future. It thus abandoned the last remnants of flexibility that had been evident in its handling of this crucial problem of European security.

Malenkov's fall led to the reassertion of some of the Stalinist principles he had put in doubt, such as the

---

[22] Bischoff to Foreign Office on conversation with Gribanov, Oct. 21, 1954, ibid., pp. 231–32.

[23] Bischoff to Foreign Office on conversation with Zorin, Nov. 2, 1954, ibid., p. 232; "Note of the Soviet Government to the Governments of France, England and USA," *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 10, 1954, p. 2.

[24] Walter Wodak to Leopold Figl, Dec. 13, 1954, cited in Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945 bis 1955* (The Special Case: The Occupation Period in Austria, 1945–1955), Graz, Styria, 1979, p. 329.

[25] Stourzh, op. cit., p. 128.

[26] Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1962, pp. 101–105, 112–14. Cf. Paul Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study," *Western Political Quarterly*, March 1975, pp. 133–35.

[27] US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States*, Part 29, Session of June 8, 1956, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1957, pp. 4292 and 4389.

[28] An exception is Michael Howard, *Disengagement in Europe*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1958, p. 21, despite factual errors in some of the references.

[29] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Feb. 9, 1955.

Anastas Mikoyan, left, and Georgiy Malenkov, right, were aligned on one side of a Kremlin power struggle in late 1954.

—EUPRA and UPI

traditional primacy of heavy industry. In a keynote speech at the Supreme Soviet session that accepted Malenkov's resignation, Molotov painted the picture of a perilous world in which unrelenting antagonism between the two power blocs left no room for complacency. He asserted that Moscow's East European dependencies "have so far taken only the first, though very important, steps toward socialism" and that they remained threatened by the United States. He charged that the prospective remilitarization of West Germany increased "the danger of another war."[30] Soon afterwards, Malenkov's thesis about the catastrophic effects of a nuclear war was rejected because it allegedly gave comfort to the "imperialists."[31]

However, Molotov's speech was a strangely convoluted piece of rhetoric, full of inconsistencies suggestive of last-minute editing, presumably to take into account another twist in the Kremlin intrigue that elevated to the premiership not him but Khrushchev's protégé, Marshal Nikolay Bulganin.[32] Despite his grim account of the international situation, Molotov hinted at possibilities for détente in different parts of Europe. In particular, he declared that "there is no justification for any further delay in concluding a state treaty with Austria" and that this need not await the final settlement of the German question, although he did insist that a four-power conference on both questions should convene first. Molotov further noted prospects for better relations with Yugoslavia, whose leadership, he claimed, had "to some extent departed from the position" it had held previously.

Seen against the background of continuing strife in the Kremlin, the peculiarities of Molotov's speech raise questions about the coherence and direction of subsequent Soviet policy. Had Khrushchev imposed already a concept of his own which Molotov but reluctantly implemented? Or were there actually two concepts which temporarily competed, pending the resolution of their rivalry? The Soviet rush for a decision in Austria offers a number of clues.

The Rush for Decision

Events moved rapidly beginning on February 25, 1955, when Molotov summoned Bischoff to the Foreign Ministry and expounded on the relevant passages of his Supreme Soviet speech. Asking rhetorically whether progress toward a settlement was possible, Molotov then proceeded to outline how it might be—if an ironclad guarantee against *Anschluss* could be devised. Although he conceded that there was no acute danger of *Anschluss* at present, he demanded safeguards for the future. He suggested that the Soviet Union and Austria reach a basic agreement the Western powers could not reject.[33]

---

[30] "The International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Government," Feb. 8, 1955, *New Times* (Moscow), Feb. 12, 1955, pp. 12, 14, 16, 20, 23.

[31] Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957–1964*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, p. 23–31; Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession, 1945–60*, London, Macmillan, 1961, pp. 260–61.

[32] Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1969, pp. 102–22.

Bischoff was gratified to observe that this was the very procedure he had recommended to Gribanov the previous October. He promised a quick answer from his superiors and volunteered to keep the conversation secret from Western diplomats in Vienna, who, to his embarrassment, had found out about his earlier conversation with Gribanov. Nevertheless, Vienna advised Bischoff in no uncertain terms that "negotiations conducted unilaterally or with but one of the occupation powers is not the appropriate means to achieve the guarantee." Nor did it allow him to pursue his idea of preserving "control machinery" as part of a guarantee. On March 1, the Austrian government duly informed the three Western Allies about Molotov's proposal.[34]

On March 2, when Bischoff again met with Molotov, he brought along a rather cautious reply from Vienna. Gratefully acknowledging the Soviet initiative, the Austrians expressed a willingness to supply the desired guarantee but insisted on proceeding in close cooperation with the other occupation powers to ensure the departure of all foreign troops. They implored Molotov to clarify the Soviet position.[35]

Seemingly dismayed, Molotov countered that the Soviet position was clear enough and challenged the Austrians to clarify theirs. Two days later in Vienna, Soviet Minister Semën Kudryavtsev pursued the same line with two leading Austrian Socialists, including State Secretary Bruno Kreisky, whom he had invited to dinner. Would they agree to let the Soviet Union reoccupy bases in its former Austrian zone if it saw a danger of *Anschluss*? To this transparent allusion to the 1939 Soviet doctrine of "indirect aggression," the Austrians' answer was understandably negative.[36]

Pressed to take the next step, Austrian officials agonized about how to assess the seriousness of Soviet intentions. The prevailing opinion was skeptical.[37] But at this critical moment, Bischoff proved the right man in the right place. He not only grasped that the Soviets wanted an agreement. He also offered convincing reasons why, singling out as crucial the impending ratification of the Paris accords. As Bischoff saw it, Moscow was now ready for a gesture of goodwill that could ameliorate an international situation it saw tilting uncomfortably to its disadvantage, and the Soviet leaders were genuinely concerned that "the splitting of Germany as a result of the Paris deal and the front line thus created . . . would extend to the Austrian soil."[38]

If Bischoff's analysis was correct—and nothing in the Soviet behavior contradicted it—then what the Soviets really meant by their insistent references to *Anschluss* was the integration of most of Austria into the Western defense system—a possibility underscored by the expected preeminence of rearmed West Germany in that system. (Another experienced diplomat on the spot, US Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen, arrived at the same reading as Bischoff although he knew even better than Bischoff that there was no such Western policy.[39]) Moreover, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria offered Moscow the immediate advantage of disrupting NATO's lines of communications between Germany and Italy. Yet, in the absence of actual hostilities—the likelihood of which the withdrawal would actually diminish—this narrow military consideration could have hardly warranted the risky Soviet initiative. For the Soviets, the political challenge was much more important.

The need to respond to the challenge of Western ascendancy also underlay the Soviet quest for some sort of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev was the key advocate of this course. By luring Tito back into Moscow's fold, he hoped in one bold stroke to counter the West and check the subversive appeal of Titoism in Eastern Europe. Molotov, by contrast, harbored misgivings—not so much about the desirability as about the extent of accommodation. The chief accomplice in Stalin's ill-fated scheme to topple Tito in 1948, he was prepared to tolerate an arrangement between governments but not—as Khrushchev contemplated—an entente between parties.[40] There was a difference in substance, as well as in style, between the quietly defensive nature of the Austrian settlement for which Molotov had the main responsibility and the exceedingly ambitious ploy Khrushchev was hatching in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav and Austrian projects, although proceeding simultaneously, competed with rather than complemented each other. On March 10, *Pravda* printed verbatim and without comment Tito's angry rebuttal of Molotov's patronizing statement about the supposed change in Yugoslav policy that made better

---

[33] Bischoff to Foreign Office, Feb. 25, 1955, in Schlicher, op. cit., pp. 238–40.

[34] Foreign Office to Bischoff, Feb. 28, 1955, and notification of Western powers, Mar. 1, 1955, ibid., 240–41.

[35] Soviet press statement, Mar. 11, 1955; "Documents on the Austrian Question," *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn), No. 10, 1955, p. 7484.

[36] Allard, op. cit., pp. 169–70.

[37] Interview with Herbert Grubmayr, head of Western Department, Austrian Foreign Office, Vienna, Apr. 30, 1982.

[38] Bischoff to Foreign Office, Feb. 28, 1955, in Schlicher, op. cit., pp. 241–45.

[39] Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969*, New York, NY, Norton, 1973, p. 374.

[40] US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., p. 1562.

Yugoslav party Chief Josip Broz Tito, right, welcomes Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev to Belgrade in June 1955.

—Camera Press.

relations possible.[41] This was an affront to Molotov, a signal that his position was slipping. In order to shore it up, he tried to get quick results in Austria. Two days later, without prior consultation with the Austrians, the Soviet Foreign Ministry published Molotov's recent exchanges with Bischoff. The account, published in *Pravda*, pointedly omitted Molotov's original admission that no *Anschluss* was imminent, thus implying that there was danger in delay. By dwelling on Moscow's concession that the German question need not be settled first, Molotov was urging the Austrians to respond in kind.[42]

The key question for the Austrians was the Soviet insistence that a four-power conference must meet before the Paris agreements could take effect. In Bonn, most officials still believed that Moscow wished primarily to influence events in Germany. But in Vienna, their counterparts were more astute in grasping that "the Russian initiative had nothing to do with preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements," which was by then a foregone conclusion.[43] In another conversation with Kudryavtsev, Kreisky commented that if the Soviets were making the conference a precondition to the Austrian settlement, they were asking the impossible and could not be taken seriously. Tacitly admitting that they were bluffing, Kudryavtsev protested—and rightly—that his government did want the settlement.[44]

In a note on March 14, the Austrians tried to clarify their position, as Molotov had been urging them to do. Unlike the Soviets, however, the Austrians kept basically to the same position. They reaffirmed their determination neither to join any alliances nor to allow foreign bases on their territory. While stressing their readiness to discuss a formal declaration to that effect, however, they reiterated that this could be achieved only through talks with all the occupation powers.[45] The Austrian statement wisely eschewed any mention of neutrality, which in official Soviet doctrine was no more than an ill-concealed form of collusion with the Western "imperialists." (Neither were the "imperialists" comfortable with an idea that to them smacked of collusion with the Russian Communists. Dulles's remark at the 1954 conference of foreign ministers in Berlin that true neutrality is honorable seemed to be in the realm of abstraction rather than reality.[46])

Under these difficult circumstances, the leading Austrian politicians displayed considerable dexterity in trying to reconcile their national aspirations with Moscow's seemingly undetermined preferences. When Kreisky invited Kudryavtsev and other guests for dinner on March 17, he introduced the question of his country's future in a dramatic fashion. Taking a copy of the *Dictionnaire diplomatique* from his bookshelf, he loudly recited from it the provisions of the 1815 treaty that had established the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. Kudryavtsev was attentive and seemed interested.[47]

With the benefit of hindsight, the incident at Kreisky's home may be regarded as the turning point on the way to an agreement. But Kreisky has candidly admitted that he did not attach exceptional significance to it at the time.[48] Nor is there any evidence that Chancellor Raab saw it as a breakthrough. When he spoke of the Austrian settlement in a radio speech three days later and proposed an arrangement like Swiss neutrality in all but name, he was merely demonstrating the impressive unity of purpose in Vienna. Deftly but unequivocally outlining Austria's future obligation to shun alliances and foreign bases, Raab stressed that the obligation be freely assumed rather than imposed by outside powers, which, he suggested, would merely add a guarantee of

---

[41] "Address by President Tito at the Session of the Yugoslav Parliament," *Pravda*, Mar. 10, 1955, p. 4.

[42] "In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: Concerning the Question of the Austrian Treaty," ibid., Mar. 12, 1955.

[43] Record of conversation between Austrian ambassadors and Foreign Office officials, Mar. 28, 1955, Schlicher, op. cit., p. 251. Cf. Adrian Rotter to Foreign Office, Apr. 18, 1955, ibid., pp. 290–91.

[44] Allard, op. cit., pp. 172–73.

[45] *Europa-Archiv*, No. 10, 1955, pp. 7484–85.

[46] On the Soviet concept of neutrality, see Heinz Fiedler, *Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Disengagement* (The Soviet Concept of Neutrality in Theory and Practice: A Contribution to the Problem of Disengagement), Cologne, Wissenschaft und Politik, 1959. Statement by John Foster Dulles, Feb. 13, 1954, US Department of State, *Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1954, p. 190.

[47] Allard, op. cit., pp. 174–75. Bruno Kreisky, *Die österreichische Neutralität* (Austrian Neutrality), Vienna, Verlag des Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1960, p. 6.

[48] Interview with Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

Austria's territorial inviolability.[49]

The Soviet reticence about the exact terms of the Austrian settlement reflected less a tactical ploy than genuine uncertainty about the virtues and vices of neutrality. The Soviets were still ambivalent toward Sweden, where a public debate was considering whether Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons. While Molotov's deputy Andrey Gromyko praised Swedish neutrality during a friendly visit to Stockholm, the military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* indulged in a broadside against "reactionary Swedish generals."[50] There was also dissension over Yugoslavia. During a secret Politburo session at about that time, Molotov and Khrushchev clashed about the proper strategy toward Yugoslavia.[51] Yet it was becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet answer to the consolidation of the Western alliance was to be disengagement not only in Austria but elsewhere along Europe's ideological divide. The question remained how to manage the consequences of disengagement for Moscow's East European empire.

On March 21, Soviet bloc representatives tackled this weighty question at a conference convened in Moscow to prepare the formation of what was eventually to become the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Once established six weeks later, this organization would add nothing to the military potential the Soviets derived from the network of bilateral treaties they already had with their dependencies. Nor was it expected to halt West German rearmament. Conceivably, the treaty—as indicated by its very wording, which closely followed the NATO model—might have been intended to facilitate the eventual dissolution of both alliances in the event of some still-unforeseeable improvement in East-West relations. In practical terms, however, its main purpose initially was to reinforce and institutionalize Eastern Europe's dependence on Moscow—a relationship soon to be tested by the Soviet legitimation of both the Austrian and the Yugoslav varieties of independence.[52]

Molotov's new message to Vienna on March 24 no longer set preconditions. He dropped the demand for a four-power conference to precede the ratification of the Paris agreements, and invited the Austrians to Moscow for discussions about the conclusion of the State Treaty.[53] So rapid was the pace of events that many Austrians, notably Foreign Minister Leopold Figl, suspected a trap.[54] But there was no trap, as could be seen from the pains the Soviets took to camouflage their retreat. On March 23, the day before Molotov sent the message to Vienna, *Krasnaya Zvezda* had resurrected the spurious story about the American plot to divide Austria—the phantom dragon that the Soviet knight could now pretend to slay while posing as the savior of the Austrian maiden. To generate a sense of urgency in foiling the West's evil design, the Soviet media published Molotov's letter even before it reached the Austrians.[55]

On March 27, predictably, the French Council of the Republic ratified the Paris agreements. It thus removed the last obstacle to West Germany's entry into NATO and thereby brought to completion a series of developments that the Soviets had a mere three months ago insisted would make any further negotiations impossible. Not only were negotiations on Austria about to begin, and at Soviet initiative; on March 26, even before the French vote, Premier Bulganin had also announced

Bruno Kreisky, currently Austrian Chancellor, a participant in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.

—Poly-Press/Katharine Young.

---

[49] Text of the address in Alois Mock et al., *Neue Fakten zum Staatsvertrag und Neutralität* (New Facts on the State Treaty and Neutrality), Vienna, Politische Akademie des ÖVP, 1980, pp. 249–52.

[50] V. Prokof'yev, "The Swedish Military Establishment Pushes the Country onto a Dangerous Path," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 24, 1955.

[51] Kurt Gasteyger, "Reciprocal State Visits as a Part of the New Course in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 11, 1956, p. 8896; testimony by Seweryn Bialer, in US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., pp. 4390, 4392.

[52] On the origins of the Warsaw pact, see Robin A. Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971, pp. 10–27.

[53] *Europa-Archiv*, No. 10, 1955, p. 7485.

[54] Interview with Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

[55] K. Ivanov, "The Question of the Allied Control in Austria," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 23, 1955, p. 4.

that he was prepared to meet with his Western counterparts at a summit conference. Responding to setbacks through an increased readiness for accommodation, the Soviet Union set the stage for the first détente since the onset of the cold war.

The Moscow Memorandum

The Austrian representatives, arriving in Moscow on April 11, soon gained the impression that the Soviets had already written off Austria—a good omen for haggling over details. At the onset of the talks on April 12, Molotov demanded that his negotiating partners make the first proposals—the familiar technique that had served him well in wartime negotiations with the Western allies. Raab lost no time in proposing the conclusion of the State Treaty. Molotov then shifted to the question of the troop withdrawals. At that point, the discussion quickly zeroed in on the guarantee against *Anschluss,* which was Molotov's preeminent concern. With the issues thus posed, the conference adjourned until the next day.[56]

That evening, at a gala dinner reception, Bulganin offered, perhaps unwittingly, the most candid explanation of the Soviet volte-face:

> *We had thought that the German and Austrian problems could be solved together but this proved not possible. Now a solution of the German problem has been found that is unfortunate. We had to take this into account and draw the consequences for ourselves.*[57]

As if uncertain whether he might not have said too much, Bulganin, a novice in international affairs, then turned to Molotov for reassurance: "Am I right in giving this explanation?" There was a touch of quiet resignation in Molotov's reply: "Yes, entirely."

The next day, the Soviets insisted on a declaration of neutrality, their only remaining condition. Now, however, the Austrians demurred. Vice Chancellor Schärf was especially apprehensive about the ambiguity of the term and about possible adverse reaction by the Western powers. But Molotov's logic was compelling: "If what you are offering is indeed neutrality, then why don't you use the proper word for it?" Once again Ambassador Bischoff offered timely advice for his compatriots: "Everything can be achieved if only one uses the word neutrality."[58]

Bischoff was right, of course. The word mattered less than the specifics behind it. No sooner did the Austrians speak of neutrality than they were able to pin Molotov down on an earlier date for the departure of the Soviet troops than he had originally proposed and on the repatriation of all remaining Austrian prisoners of war as well. The Soviet Union was prepared to make substantive concessions if it could preserve the appearance of dictating the terms.

The talks stumbled only over certain Austrian assets held by the Soviets in their occupation zone. The Soviets claimed this property, which included oil wells, shipping facilities, and a variety of industrial plants, under the pretext that it was German property. It is not easy to understand Soviet intransigence on this point. The property in question made little difference to the big Soviet economy but a great difference to the small Austrian economy. Yet the Soviets bargained hard about the relatively modest amount of oil they would require Austria to deliver as the price of getting its wells back.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that the issue was prestige, not substance. Chancellor Raab later mused about the supposed Armenian bargaining habits of Deputy Premier Mikoyan, who had conducted this part of the negotiations. But Raab missed the more important point. Mikoyan, as Malenkov's former associate who had saved himself by joining the winning Kremlin team at the eleventh hour, was under particular compulsion to prove tenacity in defending Soviet interests. As Molotov reminded him in the course of the negotiations, however, there was a "political price to pay," presumably in consenting to the Austrian settlement.[59]

In the end, the difficulty was resolved easily. The Soviets consented to reduce the Austrian oil deliveries and financial obligations, thus clearing the way for final agreement. Austria pledged to "perpetually maintain neutrality in the same manner as practiced by Switzerland."[60] The agreement was summed up in the "Moscow memorandum," signed in the Kremlin on April 15.[61]

---

[56] The official Austrian record of the conversations by Josef Schöner, preserved in the Vienna Foreign Office, has not been published. Notes about the talks by Vice Chancellor Adolf Schärf, supplemented by extensive inserts by Kreisky, appear in "Recollection of the Moscow Journey: Stenographic Notes of April 11–15, 1955," *Die Zukunft* (Vienna), 1980, No. 4, pp. 23–30. See also the memoir by the Austrian interpreter, Walter Kindermann, *Flug nach Moskau* (Flight to Moscow), Vienna, Ullstein, 1955, pp. 31–32, 93

[57] Schärf, loc. cit., p. 26.

[58] Ibid. See also Ludwig Steiner, "Report on the Moscow Negotiations of April 1955," in Mock et al., op. cit., pp. 40–43.

[59] Karl-Heinz Ritschel, *Julius Raab, Der Staatsvertragskanzler* (Julius Raab: The Chancellor of the State Treaty), Salzburg, Reinartz, 1975, pages not numbered.

[60] Printed in Stourzh, op. cit., pp. 226–29.

[61] The next day, *Pravda* published an unprecedented eulogy to neutrality, which commended the Swiss for the very conduct that a decade earlier Stalin had found so despicable as to call them "real swine." See "An Important Step on the Road Toward Strengthening Peace in Europe," *Pravda,* Apr. 16, 1955. See also Notes on Stalin-Churchill conversations, Oct. 11–12, 1944, FO 181/990/2, Public Record Office, London.

Molotov's remark to Mikoyan was not the only indication of high-level Soviet disagreement over the Austrian settlement. During the reception on the evening of April 14, Khrushchev had grumbled in front of the Austrian guests that "we shall examine it, and if it has been done wrong we shall take comrades Molotov and Mikoyan to task."[62] Admittedly, not every rumination of that compulsive talker had some important hidden meaning—on the same occasion, for example, he teased Raab to become a Communist. But neither was his comment entirely meaningless. At the very least, it was suggestive of a greater measure of doubt than any of the other Soviet leaders ever let slip. Nor was his simultaneous diatribe against the West calculated to gain Khrushchev credibility as an advocate of détente; that reputation came later.

For a brief period in the spring of 1955, that distinction belonged to Molotov, despite—or rather because of—his particularly close association with Stalinist policies. Molotov not only praised the outcome of the Austrian talks but struck a conciliatory note toward the United States as well. He assured the Swedish and Finnish ambassadors that if "the Austrians seem satisfied with the results of their visit, we are *very* satisfied." And he delayed Bohlen's long-planned trip to Central Asia simply because he wanted personally to report to Bohlen that in return for economic concessions the Soviet government no longer demanded the right to reintroduce troops into Austria.[63]

More Soviet Concessions

The Moscow memorandum was not to be the final word on the Austrian settlement, for further negotiations—this time among all four occupation powers—modified the agreement in small but significant ways. The Soviets, of course, wished to regard the Moscow memorandum as the essence of the final Austrian settlement. The Austrians, too, were quite happy about what had been accomplished. But the Western Allies mistrusted the whole undertaking. Dulles suspected that "the Russians may have cooked something up acceptable to the Austrians but not to us."[64] After the Soviet Union formally proposed a meeting of the foreign ministers to sign the State Treaty without further ado, the Western powers demanded that a conference of ambassadors first scrutinize the agreement. On May 1, *Pravda* publicly fretted about "New Maneuvers of the Opponents of Austria's Independence."[65]

The Soviets thus found themselves in a predicament at the conference, which met in Vienna from May 2 to 4. An anonymous Russian diplomat privately admitted to Swedish Ambassador Sven Allard that "since we have decided on neutrality as a basis of the new line, we can't allow the negotiations to fail."[66] He expressed particular resentment at the tough bargaining by the chief US representative, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., which he viewed as blackmail.

Whatever the proper word for the US tactics, the continued negotiations extracted additional Soviet concessions for the Austrians. Moscow abandoned some of the restrictions it had originally sought to impose on Austria's armed forces. Eventually, too, it agreed to delete from the State Treaty the offensive formula about Austrian complicity in Hitler's war. The Soviets finally drew the line, however, by refusing to incorporate in the document the compromise on economic matters spelled out in the Moscow memorandum. In a curious face-saving exercise, they kept the treaty's original provisions about "German property," but simultaneously agreed to append, as an integral part of the whole document, an annex that incorporated the memorandum's passages nullifying those same provisions.[67]

The ambassadors' conference of May 2–4 inaugurated the most eventful month in East-West relations since the onset of the cold war. On May 5, West Germany formally entered NATO, and the European members of the Soviet bloc announced that they would meet in Warsaw to form their own pact. Before they did, the formalistic Soviets revoked their wartime alliances with Great Britain and France, although these had long been defunct anyway. More to the point, they now gave proof of their concern about the Western defense system by submitting their most elaborate disarmament proposal so far.[68] Against this background, the actual conclusion of the Warsaw Pact on May 14 did not mean nearly so much as two announcements made on the same day: the announcement of the forthcoming summit in Geneva and especially the stunning news that a top-level Soviet delegation would soon visit Yugoslavia.

The ceremonial signing of the Austrian State Treaty took place in Vienna on May 15. The day before, Molotov had taken his Western colleagues by surprise when he produced a draft of a four-power declaration that would not only recognize but also guarantee the integrity of a neutral Austria. Evidently, he would have welcomed the declaration, as an additional safeguard against *Anschluss*. So would the Austrians, though for a different reason—to better fend off any future Soviet attempts at interference. But neither the British, haunted by the memory of their fateful guarantee to Poland in 1939, nor the Americans were interested. Molotov genially did not insist; he impressed British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan as showing his "softer side" in Vienna, even posing as "something of a philosopher."[69]

---

[62] Kindermann, op. cit., p. 79.

[63] Rauchensteiner, op. cit., p. 332; Bohlen, op. cit., pp. 373–74.

[64] "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, John Foster Dulles and James Hagerty, Apr. 15, 1955, telephone conv.—White House Mar. 7, 1955 to Aug. 29, 1955 (3)," Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951–59, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

[65] *Pravda*, May 1, 1955.

[66] Allard, op. cit., p. 194.

[67] Rudolf Kirchschläger, "Remembrances of the Vienna Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1955," *Zeitgeschichte* (Vienna), No. 2, 1975, pp. 177–79. The text of the treaty and its revisions are printed in Stourzh, op. cit., pp. 243–318.

[68] "Proposal of the Soviet Government on Reduction of Armaments, Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and Elimination of the Threat of Another War," May 10, 1955, *New Times*, Supplement, May 14, 1955, pp. 2–8.

In his address at the conclusion of the ceremonies, the old "cold warrior" rhapsodized that "in addition to Switzerland, there will henceforth be a neutral Austria in the center of Europe," adding that perhaps "this course will be followed by other states as well." Allusions in the Soviet media fomented speculation about whether West Germany might be one of these states.[70] But the allusions actually served to emphasize the difference rather than the similarity between Austria and Germany. During the Moscow talks, Vice Chancellor Schärf, in behalf of West German Social Democratic chief Erich Ollenhauer, had inquired whether the Austrian solution could apply to Germany, but Molotov's answer had been a flat no. Mikoyan's subsequent remarks were no more encouraging.[71]

Disengagement and Eastern Europe

Following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May, the Soviet policy of disengagement emerged even more clearly. At the beginning of June, the Soviet Union proposed to Bonn the establishment of diplomatic relations, thus signifying its acceptance of NATO's latest member and acting to add permanence to the division of Germany. Later that year, the Red Army evacuated the Porkkala military base in Finland.

At the same time, Moscow took measures to strengthen its hold on Eastern Europe. As early as May 22, an authoritative *Pravda* article warned against any Western attempt to question the Soviet-imposed order in Eastern Europe, thus leaving no doubt that the enviable status granted Austria was not applicable there.[72]

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders differed over the vulnerability of their East European empire and, by implication, over the risks that they could take in pursuing a new course toward the West. The differences over policy were apparent in a seemingly esoteric controversy in the pages of the ideological journal *Kommunist*, concerning the level of development attained by the other bloc countries. Molotov, by downgrading the East Europeans' accomplishments on the road to "socialism" in his speech of February 8, had indicated skepticism about their ability to hold their own against an ascendant Western Europe, thus presumably justifying a policy of reduced tension in Austria and elsewhere. In contrast, Bulganin in his speech at the inaugural session of the Warsaw Pact had attributed to the East Europeans a level of political maturity equal to that of the Soviet Union, thus implying less concern about their resilience amid increasing East-West tension.[73]

Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade served as a test of disengagement. His debut in high international politics, it fell short of expectations in ways apt to vindicate Molotov's misgivings about the venture. Tito snubbed Khrushchev publicly by giving no reply to the latter's clumsily worded conciliatory statement at the airport. During the subsequent talks, the crafty Tito also resisted being drawn into any entente between parties, thus limiting the accommodation to that between governments, as Molotov had preferred in the first place.[74] These awkward results of the incursion into Yugoslavia by Khrushchev, a still inexperienced diplomatic upstart, contrasted vividly with the graceful retreat that Molotov, an accomplished professional, had arranged in Austria.

For Khrushchev, however, the Belgrade visit, though not a striking success, was not a total failure either. It was not so bad as to threaten his rise to supreme power. But it was bad enough to require action to secure his position against Molotov. As the showdown drew near, Molotov struck Bohlen as a man "on the way out."[75] While in San Francisco for a United Nations conference at the end of June, he was evidently not in a position to discuss any specifics of the summit meeting he was soon to attend together with Khrushchev and Bulganin. Nor did Molotov ever return to the proposal for a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality that he had tabled in Vienna the month before. The impending denouement of the Kremlin power struggle augured ill for the conception of disengagement with which Molotov had been so prominently identified.

---

[69] Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955*, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 601. Text of Molotov's proposal in *Pravda*, May 15, 1955.

[70] "Statement by V. M. Molotov . . . ," *New Times*, Supplement, May 28, 1955, p. 3; Radio Moscow, May 19, 1955, quoted in Stearman, op. cit., p. 164.

[71] Interview with Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

[72] "Negotiations or Discussions About Negotiations?" *Pravda*, May 22, 1955, p. 1.

[73] See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 15, 1955, which cites the Molotov speech; and "Statement by N. A. Bulganin," May 11, 1955, *New Times*, Suppl. May 21, 1955, p. 14.

[74] Carl Gustav Ströhm, "The Soviet-Yugoslav Negotiations," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 5, 1955, pp. 284–89.

[75] Bohlen, op. cit., p. 379.

The confrontation between Khrushchev and Molotov came at the beginning of July, shortly before the East-West summit convened in Geneva. During a secret session of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev accused Molotov of hindering the rapprochement with Yugoslavia—a fair accusation though hardly the true reason for the shortcomings of his Belgrade mission.[76] More disingenuously, Khrushchev assailed his faltering rival for hampering the Austrian settlement as well. Isolated, this seasoned veteran of many a Kremlin intrigue ritually admitted erroneous judgment about Yugoslavia, although he did defend its 1948 excommunication from the Soviet bloc as justified by Tito's recalcitrance. But as far as Austria was concerned, Molotov could not easily rebuff Khrushchev's brazen claim—unsubstantiated by any contemporary evidence—to all the credit. Only after the Austrian settlement proved a success did Khrushchev begin to propagate the myth, in various public and private statements, that he had been its main architect.[77]

More important, Khrushchev began to alter the thrust of disengagement. Rather than accommodation, Khrushchev sought confrontation. As he explained the principle of "peaceful coexistence" at the July session of the CPSU Central Committee, compromises or even concessions in one area were justified to facilitate more tangible advances elsewhere.[78] Rather than stable East-West relations, Khrushchev wanted a new focus of East-West confrontation, notably the Third World. As early as June, he was publicly courting visiting Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and secretly beginning negotiations for massive arms deliveries to Egypt. Nor did Khrushchev call for a "zone of peace" in Northern Europe in order to strengthen the existing East-West balance; his purpose, rather, was to weaken the position of NATO.[79]

Khrushchev henceforth called the tune by enforcing his different brand of détente, even though Molotov remained foreign minister in name for another year (he was dismissed on the day Tito arrived in Moscow to reciprocate Khrushchev's visit). Khrushchev's ascendancy bred the barren "spirit of Geneva," where the

A scene in Moscow during Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru's June 1955 visit to the Soviet Union. From left to right: Lazar Kaganovich, Georgiy Malenkov, Indira Gandhi, Nikita Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, Premier Nehru, and Nikolay Bulganin. Kliment Voroshilov is partially visible behind Nehru.

—Sovfoto.

---

[76] Seweryn Bialer, "I Chose Truth," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, NY), 1956, No. 10, p. 11.

[77] Steiner, "Report," p. 46; *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1974, p. 493; and Kreisky, op. cit., p. 5.

[78] Bialer, "I Chose Truth," loc. cit.

[79] Cf. Wolfgang Höpker, *Europäisches Niemandsland: Moskaus Zwischeneuropa vom Nordkap bis Kreta* (Europe's No-Man's-Land: Moscow's Middle Europe from the North Cape to Crete), Düsseldorf, Diederichs, 1956.

Soviet Union avoided any substantive discussion. It led to an uneasy normalization of relations with West Germany—but only after Khrushchev's petulance had almost caused Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to break off the negotiations and leave for home. It also resulted in near-disastrous miscalculations. Swayed by rising Soviet prestige in the Third World to overestimate actual Soviet power, Khrushchev became dangerously prone to test the very foundations of that power. In particular, his denunciation of Stalinism in February 1956 touched off a chain reaction, which, by leading to explosions in Poland and Hungary, vindicated Molotov's forebodings about the vulnerability of Moscow's East European possessions.

There was an uncanny linkage between Austria in 1955 and Hungary in 1956. The alluring example of the Austrian solution helped precipitate, even though it did not cause, the upheaval in Hungary. But a neutral Austria also made it easier for Moscow to master the challenge once it came. The absence of NATO troops from neutral Austria provided perhaps the critical margin of safety that prompted the visibly hesitant Soviets to suppress the Hungarian rebellion by force of arms. Moreover, Khrushchev's accommodation with Yugoslavia had, despite all its limitations, further extended that margin. Tito had by then acquired enough stake in a partnership with Moscow to endorse Soviet intervention when, during a hurried secret visit before the Red Army moved in, Khrushchev solicited endorsement.[80] The Hungarians lost their freedom, the Soviet empire gained a new lease on life, but the brief détente that had brought freedom to Austria was at an end.

Conclusion

A rare international settlement without losers, Austrian neutrality was the happy result of a right decision made for the wrong reasons. Soviet leaders, mesmerized by the resurgence of a rearmed West Germany within NATO, were impelled toward concessions. But they misjudged the necessity of countering the rearmament of Germany through the demilitarization of Austria. There was something of a perverse historical justice in this development: for the Germans, it dimmed the prospect that Moscow would ever agree to their reunification, yet for the Austrians, it restored the freedom of which Hitler had robbed them 17 years before.

The Soviets would not have been so concerned about the growing strength of the West if they had been more certain about their own. But they were hesitant, for the East European empire Stalin had acquired as the main safeguard of Soviet security had already become a major source of Soviet insecurity. Because of this growing sense of internal insecurity, the ascendancy of the West was therefore nothing short of alarming to a ruling group steeped in the notion of an all-embracing rivalry between the two power blocs.

Stalin's successors still need not have responded by loosening their grip on Austria. As Stalin used to do in similar circumstances, they could have held all the more tightly to what they had. That they chose conciliation instead was the result of their collective weakness at a time when their individual rivalries and policy disagreements had reached a breaking point. The emergence of so inveterate a Stalinist as Molotov as an instrument of relative moderation indicated the gravity of the crisis amid the bankruptcy of long-standing policies. Molotov's reputation for intransigence concealed Moscow's genuine readiness to cut its losses.

The Austrians detected and cultivated this change in Soviet attitudes more promptly than their Western protectors. But in the end, the Western allies mustered the requisite mixture of firmness and flexibility that yielded the successful bargain.

It is tempting but idle to speculate whether greater Western faith in Soviet disengagement would have made a difference, or perhaps even have saved the budding détente. The point is that on the Soviet side the promise of moderation was never allowed to run its course regardless of anything the West did or failed to do. By the summer of 1955, once he had outmaneuvered Molotov, Khrushchev was already embarked on his destabilizing policies, which were bound to seal the fate of détente. Only later, after much trial and error, would this capable learner resume the interrupted quest for accommodation, thus preparing the ground for another, more durable détente in the mid-1960's. It was more than merely his personal tragedy that by the end of the 1970's the promise would in turn succumb to mismanagement by those who ousted him from power.

The Austrian solution offers more than passing lessons about Moscow's conduct in the enduring East-West confrontation. The product of a convergence of circumstances unlikely to recur, it can hardly offer a detailed model for other situations. But it does illuminate what opportunities for change in Soviet foreign policy may occur, especially at times of leadership crisis. Although it was an internal imperative that generated the Soviet leaders' readiness for new departures in foreign policy, it was their sizing up of their external adversaries that determined the direction of their new policies. Only Western strength provided the necessary incentive for accommodation, but only Western responsiveness to legitimate Soviet concerns produced actual results.

---

[80] Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, pp. 131–42.

As the current crisis of the Soviet empire deepens, the Austrian experience highlights the expediency of abandoning direct controls for indirect safeguards that better promote stability with justice. It also proves that Moscow's notions of security are not unchanging but subject to calculations of cost and benefit. The conclusion for both East and West is self-evident and compelling.

Books

The Kissinger Years

by Frank K. Roberts

HENRY KISSINGER. *The White House Years* and *Years of Upheaval.* Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1979 and 1982.

A COMPLETE review of Henry Kissinger's memoirs would involve a commentary on all major international issues between 1969 and 1974. It would require psychological insight into one of the most complex characters and unusual foreign ministers of any country in modern times, operating in the fantastic and debilitating climate of post-Vietnam and Watergate Washington. I have had little or no connection myself with China or Vietnam, which marked, I suppose, the peaks of Kissinger's achievements, at least during his four White House years as national security adviser. I mean, therefore, to concentrate upon the other main themes—the Soviet Union and détente diplomacy, the Middle East, and America's relations with its allies in Europe, with each of which I was professionally and am still closely concerned.

In the last pages of *Years of Upheaval,* Henry Kissinger records his attempt to comfort President Richard Nixon on the eve of the latter's departure from the White House by saying that the judgment of history would be less severe and would remember his major achievements. Nixon replied that it depended upon who wrote the history. This reminded me of Winston Churchill's advice to a Labour Party minister, who had attacked the Conservative Party's prewar record in a debate in the House of Commons in the late 1940's, to leave history to the historians, adding "more especially as I intend to write the history myself." Kissinger has taken Churchill's advice and seen to it that posterity has on record his own views of the great events which he did so much to shape.

Toward the end of *Years of Upheaval,* he summed up President Nixon's achievements—and therefore his own—in the following sentences:

> *In his way, in the field of foreign policy Nixon met the test of his encounter with destiny. He understood what was at stake in the world. In the midst of unbridled emotions, he held fast to the truth that America's credibility must not be squandered, especially by its leaders. He fought for America's honor in distant jungles into which his predecessors had committed our troops, convinced that we had no right to abandon those who had depended on us and that tens of millions would curse the abdication his critics wished to impose on us. Against the rhetoric of a lifetime, he bravely affirmed the impossibility of an international order that excluded China, a quarter of the human race. Contrary to the simpler categories of an earlier period, he perceived that resistance to Communist aggression requires a psychological foundation that positions America as the defender of a structure of peace open even to our adversaries should their ambitions yield to the imperatives of coexistence. He identified the need of the industrial democracies for a moral rededication to common purposes. He broke through the congealed hatreds of the Middle East and at the very height of his agony showed a road toward peace where all had been frustration. And he was beginning to educate the American people to the permanent challenge of responsible American involvement in the world so that they might avoid their historical oscillation between extremes of crusading and of abdication, between impetuosity and naiveté.*

It is by these criteria that Kissinger invites the judgment of history—and of his contemporaries—in an international climate more critical of his record and less inclined to see in him the miracle-worker of the secret diplomacy that extricated the United States from Vietnam and brought China back into the world concert, as well as of the shuttle diplomacy that brought at least a temporary peace to the Middle East in 1973–74. In a May 1982 BBC television interview with Bernard Levin, Kissinger said that his two greatest regrets were not having, in 1969, seen to it that fuller consideration was given to a possible alternative Vietnam policy designed to win the war quickly, although no doubt at the cost of even greater effort and sacrifice; and, not having, in 1974, also involved Jordan in the successful shuttle diplomacy with Egypt and Syria, when the "Jordanian option" for solving the Palestine question might still have been open. In the same interview, he claimed as his proudest achievement having contributed to holding the country together by a strong foreign policy, despite the aftermath of Vietnam and the shame of Watergate. He also emphasized: (1) the continuing need in a world dominated by the two nuclear superpowers for a sensible détente policy, involving a working—although adversary—relationship between them; (2) the ever-increasing need for Western unity and strength, involving, particularly, real sacrifices to build up conventional defense forces; and (3) the education of American public opinion toward a more realistic and less ideological assessment of international affairs, since even America could no longer safely oscillate between the extremes of crusade and isolationism.

Kissinger is the first to admit or rather to take pride in the fact that he was anything but a natural choice for the office of secretary of state, or indeed that of national security adviser. Perhaps only Ernie Bevin, foreign secretary in Britain from 1945 to 1951, was an equally unlikely prospect. And yet they proved to be two of the most outstanding foreign ministers of this century. Their characters and backgrounds were poles apart. Bevin was self-educated, Kissinger a highly distinguished academic. Bevin was a team man, adored by his staff in the Foreign Office as formerly in the trade unions; Kissinger was a brilliant but lone comet, few of whose admirers were to be found in the State Department. Bevin had a lifetime's experience in tough politics in the trade unions and above all in Churchill's wartime cabinet. Kissinger said to Levin on TV that he had no thought of a political career before 1969 and plunged more or less straight from Harvard University into the White House. Bevin had a deep personal knowledge of economics and labor relations, whereas Kissinger, in a world where politics and economics are increasingly interwoven, made his proclaimed ignorance of economics almost into a virtue. But they had two major assets in common, rare in contemporary busy and harassed politicians and even in foreign ministers, who have to react constantly to this or that crisis. They each had an overall and long-term concept of the international scene, into which to fit their own national interests and potential. They never lost sight of this, even under great pressure and in the most detailed negotiations. And each of them had studied and understood the main adversary, the Soviet Union—itself a state with an overall concept, conducting, if not always skillfully, a long-term rather than a reactive foreign policy. Kissinger, in addition to his deep knowledge of European history, had studied and written about nuclear armaments, which have transformed the international scene and forced a working relationship upon the two superpowers. But Bevin had a better understanding of the so-called Third World, acquired partly through his concern with the devel-

Reviewers in This Issue

FRANK K. ROBERTS—President of the British Atlantic Committee and of the European Atlantic Group; previously the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

HANNES ADOMEIT—Senior Staff Member, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Munich, West Germany); author and editor of several books and articles on Soviet foreign policy, including (with Robert Boardman), *Foreign Policy Making in Communist Countries*, 1979, and *Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior*, 1982.

JACQUES RUPNIK—Researcher and writer on East European politics for the External Service, British Broadcasting Corporation (London), and Research Fellow and head of a research project studying political culture and Communist systems, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris); author of *Histoire du Parti Communiste Tchéchoslovaque* (History of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), 1981.

ALEXANDER KAZHDAN—Senior Research Associate, Dumbarton Oaks (Washington, DC); until 1978, senior research associate, Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences (Moscow); coauthor with Giles Constable of *People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies*, 1982.

LOUISE I. SHELLEY—Associate Professor, School of Justice, American University (Washington, DC); author of numerous books and articles, including *Crime and Modernization: The Impact of Urbanization and Industrialization on Crime*, 1981, and *Comrades, Rubles, and Law: Lawyers and Soviet Work Life*, forthcoming.

DANIEL C. MATUSZEWSKI—Associate Director of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); an expert in Russian and Turkish history; author of a forthcoming book on Russian-Ottoman relations; currently researching ethnic politics and cultural dynamics in multinational states.

oping Commonwealth. Another contrast—Bevin's greatest achievements (brought about in close cooperation with the American secretaries of state George Marshall and Dean Acheson), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, were European and Atlantic, whereas his greatest failure was in the Middle East. Kissinger's greatest failure was his ill-timed and inadequately prepared "Year of Europe" in 1973, while one of his greatest successes was in the Middle East. The objectives in each case were similar—failure lay in the existing climate, in the timing, but perhaps also in the tactics employed.

MANY HISTORIANS will, I suppose, consider the major achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger era—and much of the credit is properly awarded to Nixon by Kissinger—to have been the establishment of an effective Sino-American relationship without destroying the all-important Soviet-American relationship. Thus, America was left at the key angle of the triangle (however geometrically absurd this may seem). I have been told that China and the Orient generally were previously unknown territories to Kissinger. This increases admiration for the skill of his negotiations, but may also explain what at times seemed an excessive and almost uncritical admiration for Zhou Enlai and indeed all things Chinese—even Red Chinese. This admiration contrasts with a much lower regard for his Russian interlocutors and all things Russian.

Kissinger, however, won his Nobel Peace Prize for bringing the Vietnam war to an end. Alas, as he himself admits, the results of the settlement did not come up to expectations. The present situation in a reunited Vietnam, in Kampuchea, and in Laos is hardly a source of pride. Kissinger is probably justified in claiming that American revulsion against the dirty war and the clouds of Watergate ruled out effective US support for the non-Communist regimes in Indochina. Whether he is equally justified in his strong refutation of the bitter attacks made upon him for allegedly having brought civil war and the subsequent horrors of the Khmer Rouge to Cambodia, I am not qualified to judge. In general, however, history will probably conclude that an American withdrawal from Indochina was inevitable and necessary, both for the Americans themselves and for American relations with other democracies in Europe and elsewhere. In my opinion, it will give Kissinger high marks as a most skillful agent of Nixon's policy in his interminable discussions with Le Duc Tho. Indeed, this was where Kissinger established his deserved reputation as a formidable negotiator, able to use the carrot as well as the stick even in such unpromising circumstances. The result was also an example of his overall concept and the continuity of his strategic thinking. I recall my first meeting with Henry Kissinger at a conference in England in 1968 where he gave a talk on the Vietnam problem, i.e., before there was any question of his joining the administration. The ideas he then sketched out for a solution proved very near to those he developed into the final agreement some years later as national security adviser.

Kissinger's references to Le Duc Tho, as well as his tributes to Zhou and other Chinese leaders, show his intellectual regard for worthy opponents and indeed, although he himself denies this, the greater fascination such tough adversaries had for him than had most of his colleagues in the Western alliance, so often dismissed by Kissinger as unworthy defenders of the common cause. Other such cases were Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and at the outset Anwar El-Sadat himself. While Sadat and Zhou, in their different ways, proved more than worthy of Kissinger's regard, I still find it difficult to understand, except on abstract intellectual grounds, Kissinger's obvious admiration for Le Duc Tho or Assad. Even within the Western alliance, where only Alex Douglas-Home and Hans-Dietrich Genscher receive honorable and even affectionate mention, the one man who really attracted and fascinated Kissinger was Marcel Jobert, the French foreign minister who successfully obstructed and undermined Kissinger at every stage during the "Year of Europe."

HENRY KISSINGER's personal shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East provided perhaps the most remarkable example of his virtuosity as a negotiator and above all as a master in the art of handling personal relations, even more essential in the Arab world than elsewhere. Until President Jimmy Carter's Camp David agreement, Kissinger's was, I think, the only successful example of Western diplomacy in the Middle East after World War II—and the Soviet record in the Middle East has been equally if not more unsuccessful. He not only stopped and defused the 1973 war but, with Sadat's enthusiastic help, transferred Egypt, the major Arab country, from the Soviet to the Western camp, weakened Soviet influence throughout the area, and laid the foundations for President Carter's Camp David reconciliation between Egypt and Israel. All this was accomplished while preserving both America's position as Israel's sole but effective supporter and also the vital superpower working relationship, despite military mobilization on each side during the October War and a degree of Soviet humiliation—at least in Arab eyes—in the subsequent settlement. These were major achievements, more difficult in many respects than renewing ties with a China fearful of the Soviet Union and more positive than getting the United States out of the Vietnam war.

As a former professional diplomat, I am skeptical of the long-term virtues of repeated summitry and of continuous personal high-level diplomacy involving the short-circuiting of ministers of foreign affairs and their staffs. But Kissinger's Middle East success, conducted against the background of Jewish influence in the United States and the imminent departure of President Nixon under Watergate pressures, weighs heavily in the balance on the other side. During Kissinger's White House years, the Middle East had been left to Secretary of State William Rogers and the State Department. Although the comparison is hardly a fair one, given the different circumstances in the Middle East, things certainly changed for the better when Secretary of State Kissinger took over.

CHINA, Vietnam, the Middle East, for all their importance, are sideshows compared with the superpower relationship, now covering global and no longer only continental issues. There are no easy successes in East-West relations. Like our English national sport of cricket or the Russian national game of chess, East-West relations is also a long-drawn-out affair in which a draw can sometimes be as notable an achievement as victory. Berlin in 1949 and again in the 1960's and Cuba in 1962—and for that matter the escape from the Soviet sphere of influence by such major countries as Indonesia and Egypt, not to mention Yugoslavia and China—have been defensive victories, rather than advances toward the liberation of parts of the postwar Soviet empire. But this does not diminish their importance.

Nixon and Kissinger, however, were operating for the first time in dangerous circumstances, when American self-confidence after Vietnam and its military strength relative to that of the Soviet Union had diminished and when the Russians could perceive the "correlation of forces," at least in military terms, as having moved far in their favor. Although still the strongest country in the world, America found its preeminence no longer unchallenged, whether by its adversaries, by its allies, or by the nonaligned countries. However, Nixon and Kissinger did not hesitate to face what seemed great risks, for example, over the Hanoi bombings or the threatened Soviet intervention in the Middle East war of 1973. Many earlier American leaders, most notably Harry Truman in 1948–49 and John Kennedy in 1962, had successfully called a halt to Soviet aggressive actions. But they did so from a position of assured and recognized strength. In addition, Kissinger also wanted to show the Soviets some carrots, which could be theirs in return for more cooperative behavior. Kissinger would, I think, accept the following three guides to Western policy advanced recently by *The Times* of London: (1) that the Russians are not responsible for all our troubles worldwide; (2) that they will nevertheless seek to profit from each of them; and (3) that any hope that the Russians might ever settle for a stable world in the Western sense is an illusion. And he would also agree, I expect, with the 19th-century French ambassador in St. Petersburg, who said that the Russians were never as strong or as weak as they looked. "Détente" is now a dirty word in some American circles, and Kissinger has been under attack for appeasement of the Russians. Nothing could be further from the truth; indeed, in my view, the détente diplomacy of Nixon and Kissinger, in which—as Kissinger put it in his recent Levin interview—any Soviet aggression must be toughly resisted but some vision of advantage also shown to the Russians if they behaved themselves, was their greatest achievement.

ODDLY ENOUGH, Kissinger was less successful with his allies than with his adversaries, and he himself admits the disappointments of the "Year of Europe." He was unlucky in his timing. In 1973, Europe was concerned with strengthening its own unity—incidentally a long-standing American policy objective—after the delayed entry of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark into the European Economic Community. This required, as Kissinger himself recognized, very careful diplomacy with France. Europe was not in a mood for a new look at the seasoned and dependable Atlantic Alliance. The tact and the skills that he so readily lavished on his adversaries in Moscow, Beijing, Hanoi, Cairo, or Damascus were singularly lacking in his relations with Europe. His comment that Europe's interests were only regional, whereas those of America were global, was all the more resented for its relative truth. Europe was offered its "Year of Europe" almost, it seemed, as an afterthought and without the careful preparation which had ensured, mainly through Bevin's spadework and quick reactions, the success of the Marshall Plan in 1948 and of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. Kissinger's choice of Marcel Jobert as his main European interlocutor was as odd as it was disastrous. Also, he did not appear to realize that the growing clouds of Watergate were a much greater deterrent to closer allied concert in the democratic states of

Europe than to US relations with the dictatorships of the Soviet Union, China, or the Middle East. And yet, however unfortunate the timing and tactics in 1973, Kissinger foresaw clearly that allied institutions required adaptation to a different international situation and to very different inter-allied relationships from those of the late 1940's. These problems are still with us and no one has yet done better than Kissinger to find a solution for them. Fortunately, the failure of the "Year of Europe" does not appear to have soured Kissinger toward Europe. This he made clear in a lecture at Chatham House in London in May 1982, which met the preoccupations of Atlanticists and Europeans alike and left no doubt about the value he placed on the "special relationship" between the US and England.

Space does not permit more than a passing reference to Kissinger's other less-than-successes in the Western and non-Communist world. His support for Pakistan over India in their 1971 war was hardly statesmanlike (even though understandable, in light of the help he had been given by Pakistan for his China enterprise); nor were his policies toward Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus crisis. There are even, I understand, versions of the removal and death of Salvador Allende in Chile differently slanted from that given in *Years of Upheaval*. Arguments about the degree of involvement of members of the White House staff and Nixon's cabinet in the Watergate scandal will also no doubt continue.

More relevant to my theme, Kissinger himself seems to have realized, even before he left the White House for the State Department, that conducting diplomacy in secrecy from the State Department had long-term dangers and disadvantages probably outweighing the admitted successes in the short term. Nor should shuttle diplomacy on one issue by a secretary of state retaining day-to-day responsibility for all American foreign relations, as conducted in the summer of 1974 in the Middle East, be regarded as a pattern for the future. Not only heads of government but also secretaries of state should not normally put their own and their country's credit so frequently at risk in this way. Personalized diplomacy on the model of such past masters as Metternich, Talleyrand, or Bismarck has its uses, but should not become the sole or even the main vehicle for international exchanges in the more complicated and technological world of today.

These, however, are relatively small blemishes on a considerable achievement, all the greater because it was accomplished in the post-Vietnam and Watergate climate in the United States. Thus, the claims made for the Nixon foreign policy executed by Kissinger, quoted earlier from *Years of Upheaval*, are not simply special pleading. The case made by Kissinger to Bernard Levin--that he had contributed to holding the country together in dangerous circumstances by a strong foreign policy—is convincing. And, for my money, the most important element in that foreign policy was neither China, nor Vietnam, nor the Middle East, but the realistic and tough, yet also open and receptive, conduct of relations with the Soviet Union, to which the current American administration seems now to be returning.

Negotiating, Soviet Style

by Hannes Adomeit

LOUIS J. SAMUELSON. *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Western View*. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1976.

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy*. Study prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979.

CHRISTER JÖNSSON. *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

UPON his appointment as head of the foreign ministry (the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) of the newly established Bolshevik government, Leon Trotsky thought that he would "issue a few revolutionary declarations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop." As we know, this did not happen. Created in 1917, the foreign ministry is still going strong and is now, as Soviet party leader Brezhnev was to say in 1976, "taking into account, in one way or another, the state of affairs in virtually every corner of the globe."

Like the ministry itself, charges have also persisted through the years that Soviet methods and negotiating style do not conform to accepted diplomatic standards. Many Western political leaders and diplomats have repeated such charges—for example, a German envoy in a letter to his family:

> *You can't imagine how much stubbornness and suspicion we have to struggle with. The Soviets don't trust each other, and they don't trust us. Their peasant anxiety that they might be taken advantage of impedes the negotiation as much as the fact that all the substantive decisions are made "higher up." Soviet sensitivity, real and pretended, makes it necessary to handle the Soviets like so many raw eggs, whereas their own "proletarian manners" do not make the slightest provision for such considerations. Thus, to negotiate with them is a real pain in the neck, and this pain has now been bothering us for more than eight months.*[1]

More recently, Henry Kissinger has made similar observations about the conduct of Soviet diplomacy: Foreign Minister "Gromyko's method of negotiation approached a stereotype. It seemed a reflection of the national character and of Russian history." His negotiating method and style as well as that of other Soviet diplomats, according to Kissinger, showed a preference for "steady pressure to the bold move." The style and technique were characterized by a patient accumulation of "marginal gains until they amounted to a major difference . . . endless haggling over 'general principles' . . . innate suspiciousness compounded by the congenital insecurity of the system and the bureaucratic structure . . . [a] profound absence of self-confidence . . . [and] fear of being tricked in the end despite one's most strenuous efforts."[2]

GENERALIZATIONS of this sort about how the Russians negotiate abound. Less prevalent are attempts to examine such generalizations in depth. The books under review represent rare examples of such attempts.

In his brief study, Louis Samuelson compares Soviet and Chinese negotiating behavior in order to determine whether a model can be developed for the seemingly unorthodox conduct of diplomacy by Communist states. In the volume that he prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Joseph

---

[1] Rolf Lahr, Special Envoy to Moscow in 1957 to negotiate with the Soviets about the repatriation of an estimated 130,000 German civilians deported to the Soviet Union during and immediately after World War II. Ambassador Lahr's notes and letters have been collected in *Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg* (Witness of the Fall and Rise), Hamburg, Albrecht Knaus, 1981; the above quotation is from excerpts of the book published in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), October 5, 1981, p. 126.

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 789–91.

Whelan provides a survey of the evolution of formal diplomacy in the West and then proceeds to a detailed discussion of the history of Soviet diplomatic practice and Western assessments of it and its practitioners. However, I shall concentrate my discussion primarily on Christer Jönsson's *Soviet Bargaining Behavior*. Jönsson proposes to test assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior against actual Soviet behavior in the course of the nuclear test ban negotiations. Thus, Jönsson's book is explicitly a case study on Soviet diplomatic bargaining.

The structure of Jönsson's book is sound and sets the study on a solid course. Jönsson provides a definition of bargaining, a brief but adequate conceptual framework, and an overview of the background and course of the test ban negotiations from October 1958 to August 1963. He informs his readers that he intends to examine Soviet bargaining at three different levels of analysis: (1) Soviet-American interaction, (2) intra-bloc bargaining between the Soviet Union and China, and (3) internal bargaining between pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces within the Soviet Union. The concluding chapter is to compare the relative influence exerted by the different factors on Soviet bargaining.

This promising endeavor soon runs into difficulties. The first problem is the absence of analysis at level one, that is, on the impact of general East-West interaction on the test ban negotiations. There is no examination of the political, military (nuclear or conventional), economic, technological, or ideological dimensions of the relationship between the two superpowers and the impact of these dimensions on Soviet negotiating behavior in general or negotiations on the test ban issue in particular. The section that the reader was led to expect to feature such an analysis merely advances a set of "prevalent assumptions about a characteristic Soviet negotiating behavior." Oddly enough, the views of both Western and Soviet analysts are lumped together here. These assumptions are then summarized into questions, which are answered in turn by references to Soviet behavior during the negotiations.

At one point, it seemed as if Jönsson were going to analyze the Soviet-American interplay, when he asked: "What effect, if any, did international tension have upon Soviet negotiating behavior?" (p. 75). Not so. On half a page, he touches upon the U-2 incident and the Cuban missile crisis, saying: "Both involved direct Soviet-American confrontation." He then scatters references to these two events throughout his book without ever really examining how they influenced the test ban negotiations.

Even more curious, particularly for a European, is Jönsson's failure to examine possible connections between the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the test ban issue. There is no trace in the book of either the November 1958 or the June 1961 Soviet ultimatums on Berlin. There is no hint that these overshadowed East-West relations for most of the period about which Jönsson is writing. There is no treatment of the fact that Soviet spokesmen put the dramatic unilateral resumption of nuclear testing into the appropriate international context.[3] There seems to be no awareness on Jönsson's part that on July 23, 1962, after the USSR had again resumed testing of nuclear weapons—a significant fact in itself, given the incipient Cuban venture—an editorial in *Pravda* asserted that a similar resumption of tests in the autumn of 1961 had inhibited the reactions of the USSR's Western adversaries to the erection of the Berlin Wall. There is also no inkling of an attempt to analyze connections between the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, even though other authors, for example, Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, have convincingly demonstrated that such connections do exist.[4]

ANOTHER PROBLEM with Jönsson's study is the emphasis on domestic political conflict as a factor influencing the negotiations. Such emphasis arises quite logically from the lack of analysis at level one: if "rational actor" explanations are not even attempted, "nonrational" explanations will inevitably take over. In fact, the latter's dominance is clearly foreshadowed in the question-and-answer section, where Jönsson states: "In the West it has become habitual and almost axiomatic to characterize Soviet negotiating behavior as propagandistic" (p. 52). When rephrased into a question, the issue is presented as follows: "Was propaganda rather than agreement the primary Soviet objective of the negotiation, or was propaganda at least equally a means of achieving agreement?" The expected reply is: "It seems improbable that propaganda was the primary Soviet objective of the negotiation," because the Soviet Union "willingly deprived itself of important propaganda potentials" (p. 74). Moreover, Jönsson continues, other studies suggest that what little propaganda accompanied the negotiations might have been instrumental in bringing about agreement because it was aimed, as Walter Clemens and Franklyn Griffiths have argued, "at least in part . . . at covering the Soviet left flank against internal and external criticism from 'orthodox' Communists."[5]

---

[3] The decision was taken despite the Soviet government's often repeated assurances that it would not resume testing unless the West did so first and despite the fact that the announcement that the tests would be resumed coincided with the convocation of the conference of nonaligned countries in Belgrade.

Concerning interrelationships between the resumption of nuclear testing and the Berlin crisis of 1961, see Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 238-56.

[4] See their *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp. 105-56.

In citing these two authors, Jönsson seems to have in mind only one aspect of propaganda, namely, that for domestic consumption. This propaganda portrays the "madmen" in the imperialist circles as wrecking the prospects of peace and disarmament and thus seeks to dispel illusions about the nature of imperialist policies. However, in order to obtain a balanced picture about the role of propaganda, one should not overlook that part which is clearly and unambiguously directed to Western public opinion. This aspect was quite apparent in Khrushchev's extensive campaign—at times directly linked to the test ban issue—for "general and complete disarmament"; it was present in Stalin's use of the peace movement in the early 1950's; and it is discernible today in Brezhnev's campaign against the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In all three instances, propaganda in Soviet foreign policy has performed the important function of constraining Western negotiating options.

Furthermore, the strict separation of "agreement" and "propaganda" is not very helpful in any case. Many agreements, such as those on nuclear testing, on renunciation of first use of force, on the prevention of nuclear war, or even on strategic arms limitation, have included "propagandistic" elements. That is, they are eminently political.

Let me return to Jönsson's assessment of the role of domestic politics in Soviet negotiating behavior. There is merit in his compiling and commenting on the numerous Soviet statements concerning nuclear testing and disarmament. Yet, disappointingly, he continues to use the very same framework of analysis so often used by others. There is a clear lineup of hawks and doves in the Soviet leadership and institutions: Presidium members Kozlov and Suslov, together with the military, form the core of a hard-line opposition which takes the offensive after the U-2 incident in order to force upon Khrushchev a series of measures which he really does not want to adopt, including the resumption of nuclear testing. However, all's well that ends well, and the forces of peace, détente, disarmament, and economic cooperation win the upper hand in 1963 and triumphantly conclude the test ban agreement. Jönsson does not explain why this should happen after the Cuban missile crisis. Should not this humiliation of the Soviet Union have strengthened the anti-imperialist, proarmament hard-liners?

Included in this analytical framework are some of the more questionable tools of Kremlinology. One is the attribution of attitudes and policies to the military by drawing inferences from *Krasnaya Zvezda*. To do this, one must be able to disregard the fact that this newspaper is edited under the auspices of the Main Political Administration, an institution of the party. Another is "locusology,"[6] the dubious principle that "when the cat is away, the mice will play." This art, developed to perfection by Robert Slusser and seemingly received as conventional wisdom by Jönsson, postulates that whenever Khrushchev was on vacation in Sochi, the hard-liners in Moscow would take over and change the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Drawing heavily on Slusser, Michel Tatu, Carl Linden, and Sidney Ploss, Jönsson sets out to prove a point. Unfortunately, it is not the one he promised to prove, i.e., to demonstrate the complex *interplay* between internal and external forces. His primary concerns, perhaps unintended, become twofold: to prove the dominant role of domestic politics in shaping the Soviet negotiation stance on the test ban issue, and to do away with the idea that there is anything different about the way the Soviets negotiate. Perhaps his points are valid. Jönsson, however, undermines his case by instances of questionable methodology and by giving inadequate representation to alternative explanations. It is almost as if such analysts as Thomas Wolfe, Hans Speier, Arnold Horelick, and Albert Wohlstetter had never existed.

MY PRINCIPAL quarrel with Jönsson's book arises from the section dealing with his reconstruction of prevalent Western assumptions about how the Soviets negotiate—a section which appears to be a substitute for the promised analysis of East-West interaction and its influence on Soviet negotiations concerning the test ban treaty. In my opinion, Jönsson's presentation of Western assumptions is neither as differentiated nor as fair as it ought to be. This may have much to do with the author's negative predisposition toward Western analysts who have advanced propositions about recurrent patterns and a specific style of Soviet behavior. Jönsson calls this a "mystifying tendency" (p. 77). Among these analysts he counts scholars and diplomats of quite diverse views, including George Kennan, Stephen Kertesz, Philip Mosely, Nathan Leites, Dean Acheson, W. Hayter, Fred Iklé, Richard Pipes, and Vernon Aspaturian (p. 220, fn. 1). Notwithstanding their diversity and the fact that they may have been writing about specific diplomatic instances occurring during any one of four different eras of Soviet policy (under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev), Jönsson states:

---

[5] Jönsson (pp. 52–53, 74–75) refers to Clemens and Griffiths, "The Soviet Position on Arms Control and Disarmament: Negotiations and Propaganda, 1954–1964," Research Paper, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965.

[6] This is the criticism Arnold L. Horelick, A. Ross Johnson, and John D. Steinbruner make of Robert Slusser's *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961*, Baltimore, MD, and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; see their research paper, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, December 1973, p. 44.

> *The Western view of Soviet negotiating behavior shows a high degree of consistency. First, there seems to be considerable consensus among Western observers. This can in part be explained by the fact that they apparently draw heavily on each other as can be seen from the frequent references to each other's works. Second, the set of assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior discussed in the previous sections displays a considerable degree of internal consistency. They all add up to a picture of Soviet* **inflexibility.** (p. 54)

It would be interesting to discover whether any of Jönsson's scholars and diplomats actually hold such a view or subscribe to the related assumption that "compromise is excluded from Soviet expectations of outcome" (p. 44). They could not possibly if they—as some of them do—regard Soviet negotiating techniques and operational principles as more or less a continuation of the Bolshevik tradition. Or if they have read—as most of them surely have—Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* or his *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*. Or if they have pondered the lessons to be drawn about Soviet diplomacy from the negotiations leading to the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918.

Contrary to what Jönsson would have us believe, "the Western view," to the extent that it exists, posits the necessity of drawing distinctions between strategy and tactics in Soviet foreign policy, between long-range objectives and day-to-day business, and between goals and their implementation. It also encompasses the notion that Soviet strategy and long-range goals have been fairly constant while the pursuit of these goals—by negotiations or other means—has been characterized by flexibility, pragmatism, and even opportunism.

Since Pipes, together with Mosely and Kertesz, is used by Jönsson as one of the star witnesses for "the Western view" that Soviet negotiating tactics are rigid and inflexible and that compromise is excluded from Soviet expectations of outcome, it may be useful to read what Pipes actually does say:

> *Frustrations experienced in negotiating with Communists derive from the fact that the latter often engage in talks in order not to reach an agreement but to attain some other, incidental objective, such as ascertaining how strong is their opponents' determination on a given issue, splitting hostile alliances, or influencing world opinion. When they intend to use negotiations in this manner, Communist diplomats indeed display an intransigence which can be mollified only by full acceptance of their terms. . . .*[7]

In other words, it depends on the international circumstances and the objectives to be pursued whether Soviet diplomats are using intransigence as a tool or not. On the other hand; "Whenever they are interested in a settlement, Communist diplomats act in a traditional manner, efficiently and undeterred by difficulties.[8] There is no need to belabor this point further.

Another Western observation or assumption, one that is indeed widely shared, is that suspicion is deeply engrained in the Russian psychological makeup and influences Soviet negotiating behavior. However, Jönsson's rephrasing of the problem into the following question—"Were Soviet expectations of U.S. behavior invariably characterized by suspicion and anticipated hostility?"—makes the issue disappear as if by sleight of hand. Hardly anyone is *invariably* clever, stupid, silly, or suspicious. Hence, the answer is foreordained: The Russians, contrary to what the Western analysts say, are not invariably suspicious. "In short, Soviet expectations of U.S. behavior were not unchanging over time. Neither were they characterized exclusively by suspicion and anticipated hostility" (p. 60).

ONE OF THE REASONS why Jönsson's reconstruction of prevalent Western assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior must remain unconvincing may have something to do with the fact that almost all the observations by Western diplomats and scholars which he quotes apply to or were written in the 1940's and 1950's. They were, thus, appraisals of Soviet wartime and cold war diplomacy. This is a problem of which Louis Samuelson, in his booklet *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior*, is at least conscious. He writes:

---

[7] Richard Pipes, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," memorandum prepared for US Senate, Committee on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 1.

[8] Ibid. Although Jönsson does quote this latter observation by Pipes (p. 77), he does not draw any conclusions from it for his assertion of "considerable consensus" and "internal consistency" of views among Western analysts about Soviet "inflexibility."

> *Indeed, much of what appears in the present study represents western attitudes and perceptions formulated during that time of overt East-West political hostility; and it is recognized that if the writers of that period . . . were to reevaluate their work in view of contemporary political conditions, many might choose to revise their views.* (p. 55, fn. 2)

Being aware of the problem, Samuelson does at times provide some hints and clues about differences in the Western view and about *changes* in Soviet (and mutatis mutandis, Chinese) negotiating behavior. This can be seen, for instance, when he writes: "Negotiations are most properly viewed as dynamic processes wherein the choice of methods does not remain static, but is subject to important forces of change." Such forces include changes of leadership, e.g., from Stalin to Khrushchev, or changes in international conditions, e.g., from cold war to détente (pp. 7–9).

Whereas Samuelson limits himself to hints and clues about changes in Soviet negotiating behavior and Western perceptions, Joseph Whelan deals quite extensively with this problem in his voluminous study, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior.* He does so by assembling an impressive number of case illustrations, ranging from Soviet negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in 1917–18 to Genoa in 1922; from the negotiations for collective security against Nazi Germany in the 1930's to the establishment of the postwar international order at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam; from the management of the East-West confrontations such as the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis in the era of the cold war to cooperation in the era of détente with the adversary superpower, as shown mainly by SALT I. In the process, he provides assessments—his own and those of contemporaries—of the major figures in the evolution of Soviet diplomacy: party leaders as well as commissars and ministers of foreign affairs (Trotsky, G. V. Chicherin, M. Litvinov, V. M. Molotov, and A. Gromyko) and other Soviet diplomats and negotiators (A. Dobrynin, V. V. Kuznetsov, V. S. Semënov, N. V. Ogarkov, and L. V. Smirnov). This is indeed a very commendable job of compilation as well as analysis.

What emerges from Whelan's material, vividly and clearly, is that changes have taken place over time, both in the institutional setting and in the style of Soviet negotiation. There is today a greater degree of professionalization and sophistication of Soviet diplomats and negotiators. In recognition of the increasing complexity of international issues, there is a much greater input and sometimes participation by experts from the various international relations institutes at the USSR Academy of Sciences in the preparation and evaluation of Soviet negotiating positions. In contrast to the rough-and-tumble in-fighting, abuse, distortion, crude deception, rude behavior, and shock tactics of the past, there are approaches that are more and more polished, polite, and "businesslike." Compromise, even more than in the past, seems to be regarded by the Soviet leadership as a necessary and useful tool of foreign policy. And there appears to be a greater Soviet readiness to look for possible agreements on a broader range of issues than in the past.

It is tempting, on the basis of this evolution, to agree with Jönsson after all and to dismiss the idea of a specific, unique Soviet negotiating style as a "mystifying tendency." Whelan, too, concludes that "there is no single comprehensive style in [Soviet] diplomacy and negotiations, but rather a behavior that is generally adapted to the specific needs of the times," e.g., unmitigated hostility toward the Western powers in the periods of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the cold war, or calculated conciliation during the wartime Grand Alliance and the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era of peaceful coexistence and détente (p. 521).

Nonetheless, Whelan's study also notes that this temptation should be resisted, since "certain characteristics . . . are common to all eras" of Soviet diplomacy and are "enduring" (p. 521). Among them are:

- a strong sense of realism, which Soviet negotiators demand of themselves and respect in others;
- toughness, i.e., the attempt by Soviet negotiators to take what they can get and then demand more;
- the distrust of agreements and understandings based on goodwill rather than on the balance of forces and interests;
- the view that negotiation at the conference table is but one aspect of a broad bargaining process that often necessitates the use of a variety of supplementary instrumentalities, including military maneuvers, threats, the launching of peace campaigns, and the mobilization of "progressive forces" to exert pressure on opposing governments and negotiators;
- secrecy, more specifically, the disinclination to provide information conducive to the speedy conclusion of agreements or to facilitating the course of future negotiations (e.g., the refusal to provide reliable statistics on agricultural output, on the production rates and probable depletion of oil and gas fields, and on weapons expenditures, deployment, and programs);
- the tendency—a corollary to secrecy—to let the other side take the initiative and offer proposals, thus to encourage it to reveal its

plans and dispositions, and possibly to confuse it to the point of bringing on a process of "self-negotiation."

WHELAN'S conclusions also throw some light on the purposes and, as Soviet analysts would put it, the "motive forces" behind Soviet negotiations. Among them is a relentless accumulation of power, notably military power. In all arms control negotiations so far, the Soviets have allotted an important role to the military establishment and to military rationales. They have done so, it would appear, as an integral part of their attempt to establish, as the current jargon has it, "escalation dominance" at every level of the East-West military balance—conventional, theater nuclear, strategic nuclear—and to gain the ability to project power along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass.

Another "motive force" is ideology, and the constraints set by the Soviet system, a point on which many observers agree. Kissinger has suggested there can be "no doubt [that] the Soviet system shaped Gromyko's style."[9] US Ambassador Jacob Beam has commented that negotiating with the Russians is "always unpleasant" or at least "mostly unpleasant" since they "antagonize you right away when they start out; they try to put you on the defensive right away" (Whelan, p. 50). This is, of course, not surprising since Soviet ideology posits the existence of an unbridgeable, "antagonist" relationship between two radically opposed social and economic systems and requires constant initiative so as not to be left behind and thrown upon the proverbial "rubbish heap of history." Probably for the same reason, Helmut Sonnenfeldt has observed that when negotiating with the Russians "you do not ever have the sense of the degree of comity, commonality of approach; there is always a strong residue, and more than a residué, of antagonism so that you recognize that by and large negotiations with the Soviets are adversary proceedings" (ibid., p. 507).

The determined Soviet effort to gain military advantages despite (or perhaps with the aid of?) arms control negotiations and the perceived lack of a basic commonality of approach ought to serve as a necessary reminder not to pay too much attention to the form—the techniques and style—of Soviet negotiating behavior, important and interesting though the subject may be. Matters of content, that is, the possible reasons for such behavior, the meaning of Soviet proposals and counterproposals, and the likely goals such proposals are meant to achieve, must ultimately take precedence in any analysis of Soviet foreign policy. After all, polite manners, professional competence, and occasional concessions do not add up to a qualitative difference in the substance of Soviet policies.

---

[9] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 790.

The Politics of Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe

by Jacques Rupnik

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. *East European Economic Assessment,* 2 Parts. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981.

NATO, ECONOMICS and INFORMATION DIRECTORATES, Eds. *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Prospects for the 1980's: Colloquium, 16–18 April 1980, Brussels.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980.

EGON NEUBERGER and LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, Eds. *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York and Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1980.

AT THE TIME of the great depression of the 1930's, the Soviet economy—whatever its other problems—found itself effectively insulated from the disruptions of the international market by Stalin's "socialism in one country." By contrast, the international economic crisis of the 1970's has revealed a "parallel" and to some extent related economic crisis in the Soviet bloc, particularly among its East European components. This development raises a number of intriguing questions of economic and, perhaps even more important, political analysis.

Coming a decade after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia had put an end to the theories of "convergence" popular in the 1960's, the crisis suggests a remarkable degree of interdependence between the economies of Eastern and Western Europe, or at the very least a common vulnerability to similar phenomena. The difficult task is to assess the degree to which dislocations in the East European economies can be attributed to this mutual dependence on the international economic environment and the degree to which they have specific indigenous sources.

The three volumes under review provide considerable information for examining this issue. The first two collections—the one assembled under the aegis of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress (hereafter, *JEC*) and the other compiled for the Economics Directorate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, *NATO*)—offer surveys of domestic economic trends and policies in individual East Europe states. The volume edited by Egon Neuberger and Laura D'Andrea Tyson provides a fruitful complement,[1] addressing the critical question of whether international economic disturbances have been transmitted to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and if so, how. The work is the most comprehensive and theoretically elaborate attempt yet to address this subject.

THE SIGNS of crisis in Eastern Europe are unmistakable. The combined average annual rate of economic growth (in GNP) of the European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) has dropped from 10 percent in the 1950's, to about 7 percent in the 1960's and to less than 5 percent in the 1970's, and forecasts for the early 1980's are extremely gloomy (at best, half the rate of growth of the last decade).[2]

While performance to date might seem "adequate to excellent" by international standards, as John P. Hardt suggests in his introduction to the JEC volume, it is certainly not viewed that way by either the ruling elites or the populations of Eastern Europe. Economies historically geared to achieving growth at all costs are now moving toward zero growth. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already reached that mark—set by the Club of Rome, though not by their own economic planners. The Romanian slowdown is as rapid as was its growth a decade ago (the annual rate of growth in Romania has dipped from an average 11.3 percent in 1971–75, to an average 7.2 percent in 1975–80, and was only 2.5 percent in 1980).[3] Thus, the dramatic collapse of the Polish economy does not represent, in our opinion, an exception. Rather, it magnifies a trend and crisis features present in the whole Soviet bloc.

---

[1] This complementarity is further evident in the considerable overlap among the contributors to the three collections.

[2] For assessment of economic performance in the 1970's, see Paul Marer in *JEC,* Part 1, p. 35; and "Comecon's Widening Gap Between Plan and Reality," *The Economist* (London), May 29, 1982.

SEEKING EXPLANATIONS for this trend, some observers have argued that the East European economies have been victims of circumstances, that major dislocations in the international market occurred just when the East European countries had decided on a major expansion of economic ties with the West. Such an approach tends to cloud what is a considerably more complex reality.

This, as Professor Richard Portes points out in his essay in the Neuberger-Tyson volume (p. 28),

> *was not a coincidence at all. Those impulses from the world market which the centrally planned system could not avoid, and which were transmitted to the domestic macro-economy, contributed to the pressures which were then reflected in the foreign trade, especially with the West. But this could happen only because the West was willing to accommodate the needs of the East European economies or at least the needs perceived by the planners, for more absorption than production. This was by definition impossible within CMEA as an isolated bloc.*

There is little doubt that the growing ties of the East European economies with the West and the size of their energy imports made them more sensitive to the international economic crisis. But the reasons underlying the expansion of East-West ties are integrally related to this sensitivity.

Extended ties with the West related not so much to détente (even if the relaxation of relations did create a favorable climate) as to the general attempt by the Soviet-bloc economies to shift from an "extensive" model of growth inherited from the Stalinist era (a model emphasizing massive investment programs aimed particularly at the development of heavy industry) toward an "intensive" model involving greater reliance on technological innovation and efficient use of inputs. Instead of pursuing this goal through simultaneous structural economic reforms such as were introduced by the Czechoslovak reformers in 1968, the Soviet leadership opted in the aftermath of the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia for a strategy of using imports of Western technology as a substitute for change. These imports were financed by heavy borrowing on Western capital markets, where funds were readily available, especially after the 1973 oil crisis. Moreover, member-governments of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—in an attempt to ease the impact of recession on domestic industries—were prepared to sponsor loans financing some three quarters of capital goods exports to the Soviet bloc.[4]

The assumption behind the borrowing and the related Western extension of credit was that the borrowing countries would increase their exports to the West and thereby pay off the hard-currency debt incurred. But things did not work out as planned. First, the recession that began to take on momentum with the 1973 increase in international oil prices shrank Western markets for Soviet-bloc exports. Second, and more important, the goods produced for export were of generally poor quality, ill-suited to compete in international markets.

The countries hit hardest by the international crisis were, indeed, those that in the 1970's tended to rely most overtly on this strategy (namely Poland and Romania) or that conducted the largest portion of their trade outside the CMEA area (Hungary). At the same time, it should be noted that Hungary—because of its more flexible, reform-oriented economic system—was able to cope with the situation better than the other two (more on this in a moment). Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, which—as shown in the respective surveys by Friederich Levcik and Marvin R. Jackson in *JEC* (Part 1, pp. 377 and 571)—pursued more "conservative" trade policies, were clearly less affected by the international economic turmoil. Yet Czechoslovakia, too, suffered economic failure, and the setback could not be blamed on the harshness of Western bankers.

A second dimension of Eastern Europe's external economic exposure relates to energy and raw materials. Industrialization strategies were predicated on the availability of a steady and relatively inexpensive Soviet supply of such essentials. Although the pricing system used by CMEA tended to cushion the impact of the drastic increases of international oil prices in 1973 and 1979, the relative advantage has diminished with time. Moreover, Soviet oil supplies, which account for some 80 percent of East

---

[3] See George Schöpflin, "Romania's Blind Alley," *The World Today* (London), April 1982, p. 151.

[4] See Richard Portes, "Effects of the World Economic Crisis on Eastern Europe," *World Economy* (London), June 1980.

European needs,[5] seem increasingly limited. This will require Eastern Europe to make additional purchases in hard-currency markets.

As with East-West trade, sweeping generalizations in the case of energy trade can be misleading. As Paul Marer points out in the JEC volume (Part 2, p. 32), Poland and Romania—the two countries with the worst debt problem—are also the only two East European countries which until recently were net energy exporters; thus, their terms of trade did not deteriorate after the 1973 energy crisis. By contrast, Hungary, whose terms of trade did deteriorate by some 20 percent and which exports half of its national product, proved much better equipped to deal with the international disturbance. Clearly, there are other factors than the degree of trade dependence at work here.

A COMPARATIVE analysis of recent economic trends in Poland and Hungary suggests that internal factors related to economic structures and policy account for the differing abilities of the two countries to cope with international economic crisis.

As the Polish case shows, the grafting of Western technology onto an inefficient economic structure is not sufficient to make the latter productive. The Hungarian case suggests that only if such a graft is combined with an element of systemic reform and an economic strategy adapted to the international situation can one expect more positive results.

Analysts tend to argue that Hungary resisted the external shocks of the 1970's better not so much because of greater political stability as because the authorities understood promptly the nature of the crisis and adopted policies of cautious retreat.

Writing in the Neuberger-Tyson volume (pp. 250–79), Alan Brown and Martin Tardos accept the official Hungarian line and directly link the temporary abandoning of the economic reform to the changes in the international economic situation: i.e., recentralizing of control in 1974 was undertaken with a view to managing better the disruptions of the international market. However, a closer examination of what actually happened at the time indicates that the recentralization decision had already been made in 1972, and for essentially domestic political reasons—namely, the resistance of the central party bureaucracy to losing control over economic decision-making. The international economic crisis was more a pretext than a cause for cutting back on the reform.[6] Hungarian policymakers responded very differently to the second wave of the oil crisis, in 1979. They gave the green light for a return to market-oriented reforms, again associated with the name of Reszo Nyers.[7]

This variation in the Hungarian responses highlights an essential political dilemma facing the whole Soviet bloc. Does the international economic crisis make the application of cautious reformism difficult if not impossible, because of adverse international trading conditions and the risks of internal social instability? Or, on the contrary, does the crisis make reform even more necessary in order to adapt to the new conditions? Put differently, what balance can each regime work out with respect to what Richard Portes calls the "trade-off between macro-stability and micro-rationality" (Neuberger-Tyson, p. 24)? Hungary seems to have been able to maintain the first without completely sacrificing the second. In Poland, this proved impossible because of a combination of factors involving the international context, political instability, and mainly inept economic policy.

Zbigniew Fallenbuchl (in his contributions to both the JEC and Neuberger-Tyson volumes) does not overlook the impact on the Polish economy of Western recession and inflation or the deterioration in the country's terms of trade with the Soviet Union, but he places prime emphasis on Warsaw's overambitious economic strategy of simultaneous rapid growth of investment and of consumption. Even after 1973, Poland persisted in overinvesting in the wrong industries on borrowed money while at the same time pursuing political stability through massive wage increases that overstretched the domestic market without actually increasing productivity.

Hungary and Poland were thus in very different situations when the second oil price shock hit in 1979. In Hungary, it meant the resumption of reform, which continued to be accepted as a legitimate substitute for political change. In Poland, the shock was the last straw, one which precipitated the great crash of 1980–81, confronting the party leadership with a stark choice between radical political reform or militarization as a prerequisite for a complete overhaul of the economy.

---

[5] See the chapter by Jan Vanous in *JEC*, Part 2, p. 549.

[6] The anti-reformist group led by Karoly Nemeth was able soon thereafter (in March 1974) to remove from the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) Reszo Nyers, the main spokesman for the reformist wing. For detailed analysis of Hungarian politics in that period, see George Schöpflin, *Hungary Between Prosperity and Crisis*, Conflict Studies No. 136, London, The Institute for Conflict Studies, 1981.

[7] Nyers has been strongly critical of CMEA practices. In an article in the May 1982 issue of the Hungarian economic monthly *Koskasdasagi Szemle* (Budapest), he observed that long-term collective plans of CMEA lack rational economic foundations, and that integration policies tend to slow rather than stimulate individual economies. Nyers was also critical of the weaknesses of CMEA's International Investment Bank and of Soviet moves to reduce supplies of oil and raw materials. Similar criticism of CMEA practices was voiced by Hungary's representative at an April meeting of CMEA economic experts. See the May 1982 issue of *World Marxist Review* (Prague).

Thus, Edward Gierek's Poland and Janos Kadar's Hungary, which at the beginning of the 1970's seemed to share a common technocratic, postideological approach to economic problems, a decade later are at opposite extremes of the spectrum within the Soviet bloc.

This diversity suggests that there has been some room for local initiative in national economic policies in Eastern Europe. As Hardt puts it:

> *Circumscribed by Soviet tutelage as the power of the East European leadership is in military, political and ideological matters, economic policy remains the area of greatest indigenous autonomy and responsibility.* (*JEC*, Part 1, p. 6)

Nevertheless, all three levels—economic, political, and military—are closely intertwined.

ONE OF THE MOST significant developments of the past decade was the way international economic crisis revealed both a considerable degree of East European interdependence with Western economies and at the same time the Soviet ability to turn the crisis into a powerful factor forcing political dependence upon its allies. International market mechanisms have altered the economic balance between the Soviet Union and its East European partners in intra-CMEA trade. Already shortly after the 1973–74 oil crisis, Chris Cviic observed:

> *Eastern Europe needs the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs it, especially now that Russia is better able to pay for its own imports of technology and know-how from the West. Indeed, in the new pattern of economic relations that is emerging in the mid-1970's, an important instrument of political control has been put into the Russian's hands.*[8]

These relations included a new stress on integration, featuring joint programs of investment primarily in the extraction and conveyance of Soviet energy resources and in a massive CMEA nuclear energy program.

From the Soviet point of view, the main purpose of the increased emphasis on CMEA integration appears to have been to obtain a growing East European commitment to the Warsaw Pact military effort, both directly, through increased defense expenditures, and indirectly, through economic aid to those countries more recently associated with CMEA and involved with Soviet foreign policy ambitions—Cuba, Vietnam, and, most recently, Afghanistan. East Germany, for instance, plays a very active economic and military role in Africa, and Czechoslovakia is developing a "special relationship" with the Afghan regime of Babrak Karmal. Thus, the international economic crisis, as much as the deterioration of détente and the reassertion of bipolarity in East-West relations, contributed to a greater identification of CMEA with the Warsaw Pact, i.e., of the economic with the military aspects of Soviet–East European relations.

At the same time, the region's ability to contribute economically to Soviet foreign policy ventures is being diminished. When the CMEA was set up in 1949, there was no mutuality about it: it tended to provide assistance mainly to the Soviet Union. Hence the image of the CMEA (to a large extent accurate in the 1950's) as primarily a tool of Soviet "exploitation" of Moscow's economically more advanced partners. The trouble with this view is that it is no longer supported by fact. Since 1975, world prices of energy and raw materials have been rising much more rapidly than those of manufactured goods, and because intra-CMEA prices are lagged five-year averages of world prices the Soviet Union has found itself in the de facto position of subsidizing Eastern Europe.[9]

This relationship would appear to tilt even further against the USSR in light of the heavy debt which the East Europeans have incurred in the West. Although Moscow denies the validity of the "umbrella" theory, whereby the USSR ultimately stands behind Eastern Europe's debts—a theory on which Western bankers were so keen to base their lending policies vis-à-vis East European economies—recent Soviet assistance to Poland (including hard-currency loans) is suggestive of the growing economic burden that Eastern Europe is likely to be on Moscow in the years to come. It is of note that after each major crisis in Eastern Europe, it has been the USSR, rather than CMEA as a whole, that ultimately picks up the pieces. This was the case after 1956 in Hungary, after 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and even more explicitly in 1981. If the CMEA pricing system could be described as an "imperial subsidy," the cost of managing economic crises and preventing social unrest in Eastern Europe has stretched this imperial logic to its utmost limits. In the words of Michael Kaser of Oxford University, the economic crisis has turned Eastern Europe from an asset into a liability for the Soviet Union.[10]

---

[8] See C. Cviic, "Soviet-East European Relations," in Richard Pipes, Ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, London, Macdonald & Janes, 1976, p. 113.

[9] This subsidy is well documented by Jan Vanous's article in this issue of *Problems of Communism*. This reviewer has discussed the matter in "East European Economics and the World," *Europa* (New York, NY), No. 1, 1981, pp. 38–45. See also J. Stern, *East European Energy and East-West Trade in Energy*, London, Policy Studies Institute, Chatham House, 1982.

[10] Michael Kaser, "The Cost of East Europe to the Soviet Economy," *Contemporary Review* (London), January 1982, p. 24.

MOSCOW'S decision to accord primacy to its political and military interests in Eastern Europe at the expense of economic rationality has important domestic and foreign policy implications for the region. We shall concentrate on the political aspects.[11]

As one reads in the NATO volume the country-by-country survey of the state of economic reformism—whether the "decentralizing centralization" in Czechoslovakia described by the late Vaclav Holesovsky or the "streamlined centralized system with decomposition [sic]" in Bulgaria described by Paul Weidemann—one gets a true sense of impasse. Unfortunately, these discussions pay little attention to the causes and implications of the phenomenon, i.e., to the political constraints preventing greater changes in the economic structure. While, of course, one welcomes "depoliticization" of economic debates among specialists on Eastern Europe, one is left a bit skeptical after reading three volumes in which Western analysts desperately attempt to leave political analysis out of their interpretations of the failure of economic reforms in Eastern Europe.

It is perhaps significant that it is Wlodzimierz Brus, a former professor from Warsaw University now at Oxford, who has produced the most provocative analysis of the subject.[12] Brus constantly focuses on the way that economic and political structures of the Communist system are closely intertwined. He observes that 25 years of attempts at economic reform in the Soviet bloc have foundered on the extraordinary resilience of the economic structures inherited from the Stalinist era, which in turn reflects the no less impressive staying power of the basic totalitarian features of the Soviet political system. In another recent essay, Brus analyzes the fundamental conservatism (curious outcome of a "revolutionary" venture) of a Soviet Union that he views as a "powerful and threatening giant."[13]

Since 1968, reforms in the economic structure in Eastern Europe have been—except in Hungary—frozen by the political constraints imposed by Moscow. This Soviet clinging to the political and economic status quo has been the prime cause of economic and social instability in the region. Observing the situation in their homeland in 1979, a group of critical Polish intellectuals wrote:

> *Any plan for the resolution of the crisis which is based strictly on the use of economic means is now unrealistic, since the underlying causes of the crisis are not economic. Unless the system of management is reformed and unless the general climate of social life is altered, it is inconceivable that any way will be found to harness any untapped resources in the economic realm.*
>
> *Even in the case of an alternative scenario which makes allowances for the scoring of occasional successes by the "survival tactics" policy, the threat of an outbreak of civil unrest has not been eliminated; rather it has merely been postponed, while tensions continue to build up all the while. The social consciousness is crystallizing, and it is being pushed in the direction of open revolt by unavoidable lines of reasoning.*[14]

Reflecting on the events of the intervening two years, one recognizes the astuteness of that analysis. Clearly, both East European policymakers and Western analysts should pay closer attention to the contribution of critical voices from within Eastern Europe to our understanding of the political economy of the Communist systems.[15] The impact of the international economic crisis on the Soviet bloc merely brought into the open in a more acute form existing systemic crisis symptoms. But more than 20 years after the first attempts at a complete overhaul of the economic system, the dilemma of political control vs. economic efficiency remains unresolved in Eastern Europe, at great cost both to the societies involved and to the Soviet Union.

---

[11] On the foreign policy implications of economic decline and increasing militarization in Eastern Europe, see C. Castoriadis, *Devant la guerre* (Before the War), Paris, Fayard, 1981; Ch. Schmidt-Häuer, "The Arms Buildup Is Devouring the Empire," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), No. 1, January 1982; and Jacques Rupnik, "From Party State to Army-State," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Jan. 5, 1982.

[12] See, for example, W. Brus, "The East European Reforms: What Happened to Them?" *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1979, pp. 257–67.

[13] W. Brus, "The Economic Consequences of Stalinism," *Revue européenne des sciences sociales et Cahiers V. Pareto* (Geneva), Vol. 19, 1981, No. 57, pp. 45–60.

[14] A "Report on the State of the Republic," written by the Polish group Experience and Future (DiP) and translated in *Survey* (London), Special issue on Poland, Vol. 1, 1980. See also *Poland, the State of the Republic*, London, Pluto Press, 1981.

[15] Among the most recent such documents is the lengthy analysis of the ills of the Czechoslovak economy, produced by specialists associated with the Charter 77 movement. See *L'Alternative* (Paris), Nos. 16–17, 1982, pp. 21–29. See also the DiP report "Poland Under Martial Law." For a summary, see *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), May 20, 1982.

An Unsentimental Journey Across Russia

by Alexander Kazhdan

ELIZABETH POND. *From the Yaroslavsky Station*. New York, NY, Universe Books, 1981.

LIFTING the heavy lid of Soviet secretiveness to capture the essence of Russian life is no easy task. Elizabeth Pond's *From the Yaroslavsky Station* is a most creditable effort. Embarking on a week-long rail journey across the Soviet Union with Pond, the reader can look forward not only to fascinating vignettes and scenes. The author draws on personal reminiscences, rumors, conversations, and readings of Soviet publications—accumulated while Moscow correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*—in an attempt to present an "encyclopedia of Russian life." Through well-arranged storytelling, witty observations, and an honest and objective approach to this "harsh, betrayed, and still promised land" (p. 277), Pond provides one of the best general surveys of contemporary Russian life—comparable to the works of Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser.[1]

Among her commentaries, the classification of the Russian intelligentsia is perhaps the most personal and therefore the most valuable. Within this group, she distinguishes the humanist intelligentsia, who have managed to establish a certain standard of conscience that nobody can ignore; the careerists, who deliberately compromise conscience; and the majority of intellectuals, who are "neither humanist saints nor opportunist bastards" (p. 50), and who try to maintain self-respect without taking any significant risk.

Whereas the expectation of an imminent ethnic explosion in the USSR is still quite prevalent among Western Kremlinologists, Pond is much more skeptical. She argues that "any real nationalities crisis would seem unlikely in this century" (p. 142). Police control is only one factor in this assessment. The Soviets do tolerate some national diversity. Furthermore, many non-Russians derive economic and technological benefits from assimilation; and some have even garnered high-level, if noninfluential, sinecures in government, science, literature, and art. It is also true that economic abuses are frequently more indulgently treated in the non-Russian republics.

Pond might also have considered the hatred and contempt cherished by various nationalities toward others. Animosity flourishes between Georgians and Armenians, Georgians and Abkhazians, and so forth. Strong national feelings are not necessarily centrifugal—quite the contrary. By hampering unity among small nationalities, nationalism contributes to the reinforcement of the power of the "elder brother."

FOR ALL of its merits, Pond's journalistic account fails to give a fully satisfying image of Soviet reality. In this, it shares some of the inevitable shortcomings of the genre.

A simple illustration concerns the Russian language. American correspondents, after a two- or three-year stay in Moscow, develop a tremendous desire to see profound meanings in the Russian idiom. Thus, Robert Kaiser, commenting on the term "efficiency" observed in a short and categorical footnote that the word "does not exist in Russian."[2] Such a statement, if true, is hardly innocuous; it leads automatically to the severe conclusion that Russians are by nature inefficient. Suffice it to recall that Stalin himself praised "the American *delovitost'*" and dreamed to mate it with "the Russian revolutionary range."[3] "*Delovitost'*" as a dictionary will show, means "efficiency."

---

[1] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, New York, NY, Ballantine Books, 1979; and Robert Kaiser, *Russia*, New York, NY, Pocket Books, 1976.

[2] Kaiser, *Russia*, p. 350, fn. The same assertion can be found in Smith, *The Russians*, p. 294.

[3] Iosif Stalin, "The Fundamentals of Leninism," in his *Voprosy Leninizma*, (Problems of Leninism), 2nd ed., Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1930, pp. 92, 93.

Pond is not happier in her dealing with Russian vocabulary. She claims to discern radical distinctions between *"istina"* and *"pravda,"* and between *"svoboda"* and *"volya,"* and from them draws significant conclusions concerning the Russian character. "The manipulated truth of *pravda* won out over the pure truth of *istina*," she writes (p. 225). Unfortunately, the distinction is inaccurate. Even in a famous Russian fairy tale entitled *Pravda i Krivda* (The Truth and the Lie), created by storytellers who knew and helped shape their language, *"pravda"* meant the pure truth, not a manipulated one. The only real distinction that I can find—one which is irrelevant for Pond—concerns the scientific connotation of the word *"istina"*: one can say *"nauchnaya istina"* meaning "scientific truth," whereas *"nauchnaya pravda"* is an improper construction. Nor does Pond's second distinction hold. The word *"volya"* has two major meanings: "volition" and "freedom." In the latter sense it is completely identical with *"svoboda."* For instance, we can interchangeably use *"na svobode"* or *"na vole"* when meaning that a criminal is "at large."

Habits and customs of a nation's people are even more difficult to generalize about than the idiom of their language. Pond asserts that sexual discrimination still exists in Russia. Yet, although a woman's life *is* hard in Russia, and although there are indeed no women members of the Politboro, the question is clearly a dynamic not static one. Are Soviet women being restrained or supported in the pursuit of their careers? My personal experience is that not only is a woman's salary consistently equal to a man's salary for the same job, but often women are purposely promoted because of their sex. I know of no case (nor does Pond) where a dissertation was rejected on the basis of sex (by contrast, many dissertations by Jews have been turned down because of the Jewishness of their authors). Family life in the Soviet Union is much like elsewhere, with burdens divided into equal parts. Perhaps a Russian joke reflects better the real family situation than verbose lamentations about sexual discrimination in the USSR. The wife says, "There is a division of labor in our family: my husband makes the important decisions and leaves the unimportant ones to me. That means I decide whether to buy furniture, where to go for vacations, and whether we should have a baby. He decides whether there will be a revolution in Cuba and if there is life on the moon."

THERE IS, of course, more to the problem of understanding "the harsh, betrayed, and still promised land" of the USSR than cutting through misinterpretation of language and habits or the curtain of false statistics and official lies. For foreigners to unwrap this enigma, they must jettison two major, arbitrary assumptions that thwart their understanding of contemporary Russia. The first is that Russia is simply an imperfect attempt to develop the way the West has, and the second is that Russia is completely Russian. Both ideas are very appealing to Westerners: the first allows them to look down on Russians, and the second says that Russian misfortunes are inbred and of little concern to the West. Bits of both are implicit in Pond's passage about the 1968 Prague Spring, in which she recalls that "when Prague was acquiring its Renaissance loggia and Reformation fascinations with the individual, Ivan the Terrible was founding the personal *oprichnina* terror squads" (p. 253).

The type of civilization upon which the Soviet Union is modeled is not an imperfect version of the kind found in the West. It is a civilization resembling an ant hill, in which the individual is subordinated to a higher principle, human activity is directed from above, and an unquestioned ideology seeks to determine human minds and behavior. This society creates an antiworld, inextricably bound to the first, in which personal relationships, introversion, and profound spiritual life are highly valued. The strong tension between the two levels brings forth double standards of morality, of behavior, and even of art.

This type of civilization may be contrasted to that found in the West, where the individualistic principle reigns universally. The principal ideals are materialistic: to have one's own house, one's own car, one's own yacht. At the same time, the government is helpless to protect its citizens from robbery and rape, and to protect its own political interests from the permanent onslaughts of various factions. A futile social life without stable social links serves as the antiworld of this infinite individualism.

Both descriptions are, of course, caricatures, and as such they overdraw relative advantages and disadvantages of the two types of civilization. Few, if any, Western observers of the Russian "ant hill" society have adequately studied the system of heating in Moscow. Like all the major elements of the Russian economy, it is centralized. There are no small boilers in single buildings, no menace of fire or explosion; there is constant warmth despite severe winters, and costs are low. Clearly, labor camps would be an inappropriate price to pay for a centralized heating system, or for convenient public transportation, free education, and free medical care. Yet centralization has provided Russia certain very substantial and identifiable benefits.

Extremely centralized organization of societies is not of recent origin; it reaches back in early history to the socialized societies of militarized Sparta or of the Egyptian pharaohs. The organized or planned society is a recurring phenomenon in the history of mankind—a fact that refutes naive progressionist theories claiming that humanity is steadily moving from Oriental slavery to Teutonic freedom.

WESTERN OBSERVERS must also avoid the conclusion that the Soviet Union is thoroughly Russian, a perspective suggested by Hedrick Smith when he wrote, "the longer I stayed in Moscow, the less impressed I was by how Communist the country was and the more I thought how Russian it was."[4] Although Pond joins Smith and others in pointing out many similarities between Brezhnev's Russia and Rasputin's Russia, such as the cultural traditions and popular desires and antipathies, the structure of society has changed radically.

A prerevolutionary nobleman usually built his mansion on an open hill, freely demonstrating his wealth and authority to the whole world. A Soviet "aristocrat of the desk," however, strives to avoid all conspicuousness. His mansion is hidden in the depths of the forest, surrounded by high fences and sometimes by barbed wire, and a guard is always on the alert to prevent a casual passerby from casting an indiscreet glance at the concealed dwelling. A prerevolutionary nobleman possessed his own property; he was undisputed and independent master of his riches. A modern "aristocrat of the desk" is only a usufructuary, although his wealth may be enormous and the period of his possession unlimited. The social and psychological differences are immeasurably great.

A prerevolutionary merchant or manufacturer was above all an organizer of production: he founded and expanded factories, developed progressive farming, built railways, and tried to conquer international markets. A Soviet "bourgeois" is merely a parasite on the body of the country, and his extraordinary efficiency is directed not to the production of wealth, but to its plunder. And even more so than today's aristocrats of the desk, the operators of the Soviet black market run their underground counter-economy under the constant menace of confiscation, prison, or execution, and consequently must hide their illegal wealth. Again, the social and psychological differences for them are immeasurably great.

HEDRICK SMITH asserts that, given its "essential Russianness," Soviet society cannot "become more like us."[5] Yet, the Soviet system is of social rather than ethnic origin, and hence such an evolution cannot be precluded in theory.

Ironically, the more practical question may be whether Westerners are becoming more like the Soviets. For the Soviet system is not suited just to Russians with their alleged long sufferance, poverty, love of vodka, and nostalgia for a strong leader. It is also astoundingly seductive and has exerted a colossal impact all over the world; an impact undiminished by the drastic discrediting of Stalin's regime. Wherein lies the appeal?

The Soviet system is based on dissemblance as a principle of human behavior. It calls for a consistently graduated society even while denying class division within its framework. It refutes all religious ideology and yet substitutes a solid religion of the state, including the "cult of personality." This ambiguity of Soviet words and deeds can be traced on every level of social existence. What is attractive in the system is not the empty slogans or the manifold freedoms promised by laws and propaganda. Rather the attraction seems to be more subconscious: fascination with the bureaucratic organization of power which step by step conquers the world; with the conception of labor as a cover for leisure and theft; with the illusion of economic stability—free from slumps, unemployment, and personal responsibility—built on thoughtless plundering of natural wealth; with the abolition and even the physical annihilation of the creative elite; and with the triumph of ultimate mobility whereby anyone can—regardless of skill—fill the highest administrative or academic post. It may be that, in the end, these attractions of the Soviet system are even more dangerous than the growing Soviet military power.

---

[4] Smith, *The Russians*, p. 676.

[5] Ibid., pp. 655, 676.

Crime and Punishment Under Socialism

by Louise I. Shelley

KONSTANTIN M. SIMIS. *USSR: The Corrupt Society: The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism.* New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1982.

ILYA ZELDES. *The Problems of Crime in the USSR.* Springfield, IL, Charles C. Thomas, 1981.

LUIS SALAS. *Social Control and Deviance in Cuba.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1979.

HANNA MALEWSKA and VINCENT PEYRE. *Délinquance juvénile, famille, école et société* (Juvenile Delinquency, Family, School, and Society). Vaucresson, Centre de formation et de recherche de l'éducation surveillée, 1973.

CONTRARY to the expectations of Marxist ideologues, crime has not begun to disappear under socialism. In Poland and Cuba—to cite examples covered by two of the books under review—the authorities no longer speak of achieving a crime-free society. In the Soviet Union, the authorities remain more steadfast, at least in their public utterances, predicting the disappearance of crime under communism. In most socialist countries, officials try to explain away, in various ways and in acute embarrassment, the persistence of a phenomenon that was to fade away as the material conditions of life improved and the socialist way of life was introduced.

What effect has the introduction of the socialist system had on the nature and extent of crime? On the evidence of the books under review here, it seems clear that far from eliminating crime, socialism has in fact created new categories of criminal conduct. In the economic realm, this proposition may be as simple as saying that where the means of production have been nationalized and the state runs the economy, theft is much more likely to be directed against public property than against private property. Thus, as the books under review note, "theft of socialist property" is one of the most common crimes in the socialist countries. In politics, the picture is considerably more blurred. For example, socialist regimes claim that they do not have "political crimes" as such. However, they do distinguish "antigovernment crimes," such as slander against the state, the dissemination of forbidden literature, and membership in illegal organizations. In addition, of course, political dissidents are often tried on trumped-up charges as ordinary criminals.

It is less clear that socialism in fact creates crime, although it is possible to make the argument. This question involves more than saying that in the socialist countries crime rates have risen as urbanization and industrialization have proceeded. As the books under review show, there is a great deal of evidence that the existing socialist systems force their average citizen into illegal activity of some kind—usually connected with the economy or the bureaucracy—simply in order to achieve bearable conditions in daily life. Ultimately, of course, the concentration of absolute power in a self-sustaining elite also has profound implications for the questions of crime and deviance, although it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the precise causes and processes.

THE FOUR BOOKS under review are especially helpful in answering such questions. All have the ring of authenticity, for four of the five authors are specialists—either lawyers or sociologists—who grew up and worked in the countries about which they write. Beyond that, however, the books diverge greatly in approach and scope. Three of the books are descriptive and anecdotal. Their authors are now émigrés, and the books piece together personal experiences with information gained from official publications. The fourth, the joint Polish-French study on juvenile delinquency, is highly quantitative. Its authors enjoyed the support and cooperation of the Polish government and were able to amass an imposing array of statistical data. Considered together, the four books significantly expand our knowledge of crime and deviance under socialism.

Konstantin Simis, in *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, concentrates on the problem of corruption. He is by no means the first author to discuss Soviet corruption. Like Hedrick Smith in *The Russians*, Yuri Brokhin in *Hustling on Gorky Street*, and Valery Chalidze in *Criminal Russia*, Simis presents a wealth of detail on the nature and extent of Soviet corruption. But the Simis book is more than a popular book. Simis worked for more than 17 years as a defense attorney (*advokat*) in Moscow, and his book, based on his trial experiences and supplemented by careful and extensive research, provides new insights not only into areas of corruption familiar to Western observers but also, and especially, into corruption in the police and in the courts. Unlike many other authors, furthermore, Simis goes on to search more deeply for an explanation of Soviet corruption and to provide an analytical framework for his detailed discussion.

What emerges clearly from Simis's account is the pervasiveness of corruption in Soviet life. Simis carefully documents corruption in the party, in the criminal justice system, in economic enterprises, and in medicine and education. So rife is corruption in the Soviet Union, according to Simis, that only the overthrow of the existing order can rid society of the problem.

In some instances, corruption merely ensures the proper working of the system. In his discussion of the courts, for example, Simis points out that bribes to judicial personnel often result only in a sentence in keeping with the law. To substantiate this point, he cites evidence from the corruption trials of hundreds of former criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges in the 1960's, trials in which skilled jurists were assigned to study whether these judicial personnel had made extralegal decisions as a result of bribes. In 65–75 percent of the bribery cases, it was found, the decisions were fully in accord with the law, and the bribe only ensured that one received his due. My own research among former Soviet lawyers reveals that as judges must enforce a punitive policy, those defendants who proffer bribes receive the more lenient sentences permissible and defendants who offer nothing receive harsher sentences, at or near the maximum allowable.[1] Clearly, those Soviets who resorted to corruption here did not necessarily receive outsized benefits.

It comes as no surprise, either, that party officials manipulate the law not only to enrich themselves but also to impose their will on family and political enemies. What is startling, however, is the length to which they can and on occasion do go. A vivid illustration is the story Simis tells of the romance between the daughter of a raykom first secretary and the son of a humble postal employee. The girl's father opposed the mésalliance, ordered the district *ZAGS* (the office responsible for registering marriages) not to issue permission for his daughter's marriage, and demanded that any complaints submitted by the couple be forwarded to himself or the raykom. Unable to register the marriage, the couple moved in with the boy's mother. Once again, the raykom secretary intervened, so that the boy's mother was illegally dismissed from her job and evicted from her apartment. Eventually, the "tyranny and lawlessness" of the father led to the collapse of the romance. This story as well as several others told by Simis show that control of the law is one of the instruments by which party officials are able to act as powerful local "tsars."

The most fantastic tales told by Simis are about the underground Soviet businessmen, some of whom accumulate so much money through their illegal workshops and factories that they are able to hand over $350 million rubles (nearly $500 million at the official exchange rate) to judicial officials and still have money to pass on to their families. Most of these enormous fortunes seem to have been accumulated in the postwar period. Unfortunately for them, these underground millionaires are rarely able to enjoy the fruits of their business acumen, because conspicuous consumption might result in their arrest.

The sorry consequences of even discreet extravagance are illustrated by the story of an Armenian brother and sister, who raised flowers in the south and sold them at an enormous profit in Moscow and Leningrad. The brother lived an abstemious existence, denying himself decent clothing and food. Instead, he lavished his enormous profits on the purchase of antique furniture and Western masters. Unfortunately, his collection was so good that it attracted the attention of the Armenian Ministry of Culture. Upon the flower-dealer's refusal to donate his collection to the state, he and his sister were tried on the charge of "large-scale speculation," and the collection was confiscated. Other Soviet millionaires, not choosing to follow such a course, live in utter simplicity, even going so far as to prepare two separate meals—a meager one to pass muster with their prying neighbors and the other, more lavish one that they actually eat.

---

[1] See Louise I. Shelley, "Law in the Soviet Workplace: The Lawyer's Perspective," *Law and Society* (Madison, WI), June 1982, pp. 501–26; and idem, *Comrades, Rubles and Law: Lawyers in Soviet Work Life*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, forthcoming.

One can go even further than Simis does in documenting corrupt legal practices. Simis does not generally touch on the illegal and semilegal behavior of his fellow *advokaty*, only alluding to the fact that some defense counsels transmit bribes to judges and prosecutors and omitting discussion of *mikst* (semilegal payments in addition to the regular fees paid lawyers by defendants before and after trials). But because fees for defense attorneys are established by the bar, paying *mikst* is often the only way that a client can ensure that his counsel devotes adequate attention to his case. Soviet authorities generally ignore this kind of corruption among *advokaty*, although the collection of excessive *mikst* has resulted in disbarment or even criminal prosecution. In another example, one former lawyer from the Caucasus secured the acquittal of his brother by bribing the defense attorney of his brother's codefendant, who had turned state witness. The defense attorney purposely gave the codefendant erroneous advice, making it impossible for the state to prove its case against the lawyer's brother. And Simis's tales of police use of informants and safe houses represent just two of the questionable practices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). According to former police personnel interviewed, physical abuse of witnesses and defendants still prevails in certain republics, and the police and KGB sometimes cooperate in the most underhanded ways to trap large-scale embezzlers and illegal businessmen.[2]

What are the origins of such pervasive corruption? Simis refuses to fault the ordinary Soviet citizen:

> *Homo Soveticus is not immoral, he simply has two separate systems of morality. . . . He will lie to a representative of the government administration but be truthful and honest in relations with friends and neighbors; he is happy to steal twenty packs of cigarettes from a tobacco factory where he works but will not steal a penny from another person.* (p. 16)

Rather, as Luis Salas does in the case of Cuba, Simis blames much illicit economic activity on the fact that there is more money in circulation than consumer goods to purchase. Most important, however, Simis suggests that it is the absolute power of the party leadership that is conducive to the proliferation of malfeasance and illicit economic activity. Because party leaders are responsible to no one, often not even to the law itself, they are able to commit crimes with nearly total impunity.

ILYA ZELDES, in *The Problems of Crime in the Soviet Union*, covers a broader range of topics than Simis does. His general approach and conclusions are for the most part consistent with those of Simis. On corruption, for example, Zeldes writes:

> *One of the essential causes of economic crimes, such as embezzlement of socialist property, is the socialist management system itself, with its amorphous, enormous and inexhaustible wealth. . . . Embezzlement under socialism is not directed against individuals, but against the state as a whole.* (p. 34)

Unlike Simis, however, Zeldes moves on to treat crime in the Soviet Union more generally—its extent, its causes, and its prevention. In so doing, he highlights the weaknesses of Soviet theories on crime, the divergence between theory and practice, and the enormity of the Soviet crime problem. In particular, he blames postwar industrialization for the recent growth of crime and juvenile delinquency in the Soviet Union.

Zeldes also deals with the measures of social control—which reach "gigantic proportions. Everything is subject to social control" (p. 43)—undertaken in the USSR in response to the increasing challenges crime poses to the socialist order. Zeldes's best illustration is the system of special commissions and schools devoted to the problem of controlling juvenile delinquency. At the top of the system is the Commission for Minors' Affairs, which enforces the measures that "constitute borderline cases between governmental coercion and societal actions" (p. 111). It can impose a great variety of measures, ranging from simple criticism of the juvenile to control over his actions and even to incarceration in special penal institutions. One component of the control mechanism is the special school. Founded in the mid-1960's by restructuring former correctional colonies, these schools handle youths 11 to 16 who are too young for criminal prosecution. Most such youths spend less than a year in these schools, where efforts are made to curb antisocial behavior. Another component, not mentioned by Zeldes, is the *detskaya komnata* (minors' division) of the police. This special police division keeps track of problem youths in its district and often directs them to nearby community centers for structured leisure-time activities.

Luis Salas, in *Social Control and Deviance in Cuba*, covers much the same ground for Cuba. Using the Cuban press and academic literature extensively as well as the works of non-Cuban scholars, Salas provides a detailed and coherent account of the nature and extent of crime in Cuba, including such questions as suicide and homosexuality. He also analyzes Cuba's criminal justice system and the societal measures used to curb crime and deviant behavior. In all, the Salas book is a fine contribution.

---

[2] Interviews conducted in the United States and abroad, October 1980–April 1981.

Salas carefully documents the evolution of the Cuban regime's reaction to crime in the 20 years since the Cuban revolution, showing that the regime introduced changes only after it realized that existing crime control strategies were not working. In 1969, a major reorganization of the Cuban judiciary was initiated in response to an increasing problem of social disorder among juveniles and workers. In 1973, a more centralized court structure was introduced, and in 1977, further changes followed, as a result of which "party influence over judicial procedure was increased" (p. 225). Moreover, the tightly structured Cuban judiciary is supplemented by a relatively small police system as well as by numerous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (citizen anticrime groups).

Despite such changes, Salas suggests that criticism of the independence of the Cuban judiciary may not be warranted, because many judges in Western countries are subject to "the same, and sometimes greater, political pressures" (p. 228). But Salas is too sanguine. If one is to compare the positions of judges in different countries—Salas makes much of Harold Berman's statement that the consciences of Soviet judges are molded by the demands of party campaigns, a statement that represents only part of the truth—one must have a true basis of comparison. As former Soviet judicial personnel would attest, party pressures in the Soviet Union are more continuous and far-reaching than Salas seems to suspect.

The influence of the Soviet model on the Cuban judiciary is itself an interesting question. Salas believes that "one of the cardinal principles to be followed in the examination of socialist institutions and laws is that . . . many of these institutions are reflective of a national past rather than Marxist ideology. The same general statement is applicable to Cuba" (p. 331). Consequently, he fails to appreciate the extent to which Soviet legislation and enforcement patterns have shaped Cuban justice—in such matters as definitions of crime, the structure of the judiciary, citizen involvement throughout the criminal justice system, and the criminal prosecution of homosexuality. Salas mentions none of these matters. Only in the case of the procuracy, the comrades' courts, lay assessors, and legislation against "parasitism"—where the Soviet debt is clear—does Salas acknowledge Soviet influence.

Even after major changes in its criminal justice system, Cuba has not recorded any long-term decline in crime rates. Salas's research indicates that despite extensive controls over Cuban society and despite all efforts to detect and deter crime and punish criminals, Cuban crime, while it "generally decreased during the first years of revolutionary rule, . . . has begun to rise again" (p. 44). Cuban scholars have therefore been more open than many of their socialist counterparts in asserting that "although socialist society does not produce crime, it permits the existence of objective conditions that allows these remnants to survive" (p. 130). What better evidence of the endurance of crime in Cuba than the large numbers of former Cuban inmates in the recent wave of emigration to the United States?

The study by Hanna Malewska and Vincent Peyre has one great advantage over the other three books under review. Although Simis, Zeldes, and Salas do an admirable job in describing Soviet and Cuban crime and deviance, they are hampered by the unavailability of crime statistics and by the limitations placed on independent researchers. The Malewska-Peyre study, in contrast, represents a collaborative effort by researchers at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and at the Center for Supervised Education in Vaucresson, near Paris. The result is a revealing statistical analysis of crime in two different types societies. (It is unfortunate that this and two substantial companion studies conducted in Hungary and Yugoslavia, *Juvenile Delinquency in Europe* (1968) and *Juvenile Delinquency and Socio-Economic Development* (1975), have received almost no notice in English-speaking countries.[3])

The Malewska-Peyre study is doubly remarkable as a fine example of comparative criminology. Is juvenile delinquency more extensive and severe in areas of recent economic development? Malewska and Peyre's research reveals that within an individual country, differences in economic development are significant in explaining regional variations in crime rates—for example, that in Poland, crime rates are higher in highly urbanized areas such as the cities of Warsaw and Rybnik than in economically less developed cities such as Zamosc and Koszalin. Do different social and economic systems create different problems of juvenile delinquency? As Malewska and Peyre note, the likelihood that a juvenile will commit a crime is influenced by his environment. Polish delinquents often come from disadvantaged homes, but the disadvantages cannot always be measured in socioeconomic terms. Because alcoholism figures so prominently in the homes of Polish delinquents, juvenile law-breakers in Poland are less likely to come from families at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum than are their counterparts in France. Other disadvantages are also important: less attentive parents, more physical abuse from parents, and poorer housing than in the case of law-abiding youngsters. On the whole, however, the Malewska-Peyre study indicates that the larger social force of urbanization is more important in explaining crime patterns than are national differences in education, family structure, and child-rearing techniques.

---

[3] Free University of Brussels, Institute of Sociology, *La délinquance juvénile en Europe*, Brussels, 1968; and Yves Chirol et al., Eds., *Délinquance juvénile et développement socio-économique*, The Hague, Mouton, 1975.

The strong social-control measures typical of socialist regimes are again noted in the Malewska-Peyre study. For example, more Polish delinquents have police encounters at an earlier age than their counterparts in France. By 14, almost half of Polish delinquents have already had police contact.

THE FOUR STUDIES show that socialist societies are not passive observers of their crime problems. They use diverse and encompassing control measures to enforce social conformity. These include both punitive measures and measures intended to prevent crime and social deviance.

The punitive measures are generally quite strong. Much as socialist officials are often willing to ignore the all-pervasive corruption, (because they themselves reap tangible benefits from it), the perpetrators of ordinary criminal offenses can expect a harsh societal reaction early in their deviant career. Incarceration is relatively more common than in the West and reduces crime rates by comparison. Tighter controls placed on released prisoners also reduce the incidence of crime.

The general social control measures are varied and much more extensive than in the West. They include mass youth involvement in such organizations as the Pioneers and Komsomol (or their equivalent), the monitoring of leisure-time and after-school activities of problem teenagers, and controls over the movements of the population. In the West, such measures would be considered obtrusive. In socialist societies, however, they are viewed as the basis of social order.

Such restrictions on personal choice have undoubtedly eased the crime problem, or helped slow the rise of crime, in some socialist countries. If a socialist society in fact registers a decline in criminality, it is arguably due to the tight social controls rather than the intrinsic virtues of the socialist system. In this sense, the elimination of crime has remained as elusive a goal for the socialist countries as it has been for the developed countries of the West and the developing countries of the Third World.

The Turkic Past in the Soviet Future

by Daniel C. Matuszewski

YU. V. BROMLEY with I. S. GUREVICH et al., Eds. *Sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR* (Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR). Moscow, Nauka, 1977.

T. YU. BURMISTROVA, Ed. *Nauchnoye rukovodstvo natsional'nymi otnosheniyami v razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* (The Scientific Management of National Relations in a Developed Socialist Society). Leningrad, Leningrad University Press, 1981.

S. A. TOKAREV with G. I. ANOKHIN and T. D. ZLATKOUSKAYA, Eds. *Sovremennyye etnonatsional'nyye protsessy v stranakh zapadnoy yevropy* (Contemporary Ethnonational Processes in West European Countries). Moscow, Nauka, 1981.

ERNEST GELLNER, Ed. *Soviet and Western Anthropology*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1980, and London, Duckworth, 1981.

ASKAD MUKHTAR. *Chinara* (The Plane Tree). Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1977.

MIRMUKHSIN. *Zodchiy* (The Architect). Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1978.

OLZHAS SULEYMENOV. *Az i ya.* Alma-Alta, Zhazushy, 1975.

CHINGIZ AYTMATOV. *I dol'she veka dlitsya den'* (A Day Lasts Longer Than an Age). Frunze, Kyrgyzstan, 1981.

OVER THE LAST 20 years, there has been a striking emergence of new and intense forms of ethnic and cultural identification in the Soviet Union. The tentative and artificial constructs of official "Soviet" culture have, for a variety of reasons, not satisfied the needs of the scores of nationalities and peoples who make up the multiethnic mosaic of the USSR. A search has begun by Russians and non-Russians alike for more genuine and satisfying social and cultural forms, for more personal and comforting types of human community. Not surprisingly, the search has come to focus on ethnic and religious communities with roots deep in the pre-Soviet past. It is not an exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the reversal of an old Stalinist slogan: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is increasingly becoming socialist in form, but national in content.

In this process, the Turkic peoples in the USSR have become increasingly assertive. Much of the recent Turkic literature in the Soviet Union is nothing less than an attempt to resurrect the past, a proud and accomplished past which had been forgotten or suppressed in the political transformations of the first decades of the Soviet period. This resurrection involves in part facts and in part interpretations. It is almost always undertaken cautiously, within the complex ground rules of current Soviet literary production and criticism. As in certain areas of contemporary Chinese literature, devices such as allusion, circumlocution, allegory, and symbolism are used in handling issues of political sensitivity. On occasion, however, the approach is surprisingly outspoken and blunt. Yet, whether the writers choose discretion or audacity, the important fact is that the Turkic past is being recovered piece by piece, and the outline of a great cultural legacy is being revealed and restored.

Soviet ethnographic writings and theoretical work on the structure and trends of ethnic management provide an important functional counterpoint to such assertive cultural renewal. Developing industrial societies often display signs of social discontent and sometimes witness the emergence of countercultures in reaction to oppressive homogenizing pressures of modernization. In the USSR, however, the kaleidoscopic profile of the Soviet population, combined with the intensely managerial characteristics of state policy, creates an especially severe set of challenges. The Soviets are acutely aware of the urgency of nationality issues; specialists and policymakers alike are attempting to reconcile the powerful tensions between two official goals: the "flourishing" (*rastvet*) of individual nationalities, and their "convergence" (*sblizheniye*) into a single, united Soviet people and culture.

The result is a substantial and growing body of Soviet research and publications on the dynamics of ethnic processes and on the management of nationality issues. While this literature is still frequently marked by overly general analysis and stereotyped judgments, it has begun to display some sophisticated examination of ethnic phenomena.

IN 1975, a special council was formed within the USSR Academy of Sciences for the systematic study of Soviet nationality issues. This council is headed by Yulian Bromley, director of the Academy's Institute of Ethnography, who has assembled a group of distinguished analysts to conduct complex multidisciplinary studies of ethnic and national factors. One result is the volume on *Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR*. History, linguistics, physical anthropology, ethnography, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science are all combined in an attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment of critical ethnonational structures and trends. The undertaking is propelled by a belief in the existence of scientific and managerial solutions to these issues, and by the search for the right social mechanisms and levers to bring about the eventual harmonious rapprochement of the individual nationalities.

An important characteristic of this research is the interest in the structural and historical dimensions of national questions, an interest almost as great as the concern with current sociocultural dynamics. Thus, at several points the authors of the collective volume on the *Scientific Management of National Relations* call attention to the subtle structural processes in the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the decades before its collapse and the emergence of the successor national states after World War I. It is impossible to understand what happened in 1918 and why, they argue, without tracing a set of subdued, often obscure, cultural processes which had been at work for almost a century. This admonition is, of course, appropriate to the study of any major multinational structure.

Soviet analysts seem unanimous in stressing that essential to the successful management of centrifugal trends among the nationalities are the unifying principles or cornerstones (*nachala*) of the state—the socialist economy, the socialist way of life, the ideology of socialist internationalism, and the common task of building communism. These are the major functional imperatives which will lead to the surmounting and blending of individual nationalisms. Central and statist trends are clearly to be fostered over and against multiple and diffuse minority patterns. Soviet analysts argue that an important role in this process is to be played by the administrative-political structure of the state and by the development of new traditions of all-Union rituals, holidays, and ceremonies.

The authors in the Burmistrova book point out that a critical difference has been introduced into rituals in the Soviet period. While in tsarist times, rituals were essentially ethnic and religious phenomena which served to exclude other groups and thus performed a disunifying function, new Soviet rituals have been elaborated which are secular, inclusive, and all-Union in character. Many of these new rituals were, according to the authors, grass-roots efforts to replace outmoded, sectarian practices. It was the so-called "creative masses" themselves, in various remote corners of the state, who began to destroy the old religious ceremonies which marked the life cycle.

While the older external forms may have been preserved in many cases, it is argued, the substance has often radically changed. Religious and magical symbols are consciously transformed into playful, entertaining charades and games. Many traditional events have become secularized through the participation of administrative, political, or economic functionaries, whose presence in essence transforms the occasion into a state affair. In the opinion of Soviet ethnographers, this is the proper administrative and managerial path to take, and it should be encouraged.

The Soviets are fascinated by multinational state systems in other parts of the world, and have begun to look closely at trends outside the Soviet Union for comparative purposes. The volume on *Nationality Dynamics in West European Countries* is an extremely careful exercise in this regard. From the perspective of Soviet analysts, West European nationalist phenomena exhibit three basic trends or goals: the preservation and development of the native language; the retention of a distinctive native cultural tradition; and the search for self-government and administrative autonomy, if not for a separate state. The Soviet authors are wary about the issue of native-language use. While acknowledging the right and value of such linguistic retention, they point out that in any federated or multiethnic setting, exclusive official use of the native tongue would do Basques or Bretons very little good. Bilingualism, through the mastery of Spanish, French, English, or whatever the case might dictate, is essential. Intelligent bilingualism does not conflict with careful nurture of the mother tongue. In fact, it can produce a higher level of indigenous culture. Soviet analysts and policymakers are extremely concerned about potential progressions from linguistic and cultural assertiveness to political autonomy. Thus, they are looking for precisely those mechanisms that will "manage" and contain national processes within a centralized state system. Aspirations toward self-rule among certain West European minorities could set troublesome precedents.

Soviet ethnographers also utilize a broad range of disciplinary approaches as they engage in large-scale, intensive fieldwork among Soviet nationalities—Uzbeks, Tatars, Georgians, Moldavians, Estonians, and Russians. This work involves the increasingly sophisticated use of questionnaires, interviews, and computer techniques to gauge respondents' ethnic and social attitudes—their views on the economic situation, on material and cultural conditions, on the factors affecting life and work satisfaction. While some idea of the practical slant of this research can be gleaned from the title of one of the team projects—"Optimization of sociocultural conditions for development and for bringing the Soviet peoples closer together"—the published scholarly results are solid and respectable, and have induced Western specialists to consult more closely with their Soviet colleagues.

The collective volume *Soviet and Western Anthropology* contains articles by both Soviet and Western specialists. Initially, they were prepared for a joint conference on the dynamics of ethnic processes held in 1976 in Austria. The Soviet contributions—nine in all—treat such issues as the theory of socio-economic formations (Yu. I. Semenov), the ethnic sociology of present-day life (L. Drobizheva), ethnography and psychology (I. S. Kon), the role of religion (V. Basilov), and changing demographic patterns (V. I. Kozlov). Their Western counterparts—ten in all—handle a variety of similar, though somewhat narrower, topics.

The conference participants seem to have made a valiant effort to lift the intimidating veil of differing habits of thought, terminology, and professional jargon. On the whole, the results are encouraging. It is evident that the two sides are at least attempting to begin a dialogue on a major theoretical and practical issue: the social management of ethnicity as a cultural and political force. This initial effort is of course a tentative one, with heavy emphasis on theory, primitive societies, and deep structural patterns. But it represents a start, a base from which the two sides can proceed (under suitable conditions) to a review of contemporary areas of concern. In fact, parallel efforts are now being undertaken in the USSR and the West, so that one may look forward to further discussion and, one hopes, to a more detached manner of inquiry, analysis, and dialogue.

THE TURKIC peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus will play a special role in the evolution of the nationality question. Of the roughly 262 million Soviet citizens counted in the last census, only 137 million were Russians. The patterns of birthrate and demographics continue to shift that balance in favor of the rapidly expanding Turkic peoples, now numbering approximately 45 million.

Yet, the extraordinary cultural renaissance which has taken place within the last two decades among the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union is, except in its broad contours, poorly appreciated in the West. Possessed of unique and vigorous cultural legacies, the Turkic peoples played an influential role both in the Russian past and in the formation of the Soviet present. Furthermore, their centrality in a complex of urgent economic, social, political, and cultural issues ensures them a major role in the developments which will determine the shape of Soviet society in the 21st century. The significance of the Turkic cultural renaissance is compounded by the vital geopolitical location of those expansive minorities along the Soviet Union's volatile borders with the Middle East, Inner Asia, and China.

One extremely promising area of inquiry into this cultural revival is the contemporary Central Asian literary scene. It has undergone a striking transformation from novels about bringing in the cotton and love for one's tractor to a belletristic search for cultural roots and the heritage of the past. Contemporary Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh, and Tadzhik literatures have been marked by changes of direction which throw a special light on the social dynamics of those societies. Issues of tradition, change, modernization, and cultural integrity have increasingly provided the subject matter of the novel, short story, and essay.

This new infatuation with memory and with the legacy of the past is understandable. The effect of the alphabet and language changes introduced in Turkestan in the 1920's and 1930's was to divorce the Turkic peoples from a significant portion of their traditional literature, and to make much of it unintelligible. They suddenly found themselves cut off from their literary and cultural past. Heavy emphasis was placed at that time in official social and cultural circles on the ignorance, poverty, and backwardness of Central Asia's history.

For a variety of reasons, not the least of which has been a growing dissatisfaction with the grayness and homogeneity of official Soviet culture, the Turkic peoples have come to discover that their past is not one of cultural gloom and doom. They are assiduously engaged in resurrecting their ancient past, and the contemporary Central Asian novel testifies to this. Each of the four literary works under review here is intensely preoccupied with memory, with tracing vital roots to the Turco-Persian past of Inner Asia.

In *Chinara* (The Plane Tree), by the Uzbek writer Askad Mukhtar, a cycle of ancient legends and folk tales is tightly intertwined with the life and experiences of the central figure, the old patriarch Achil Buva. The plane tree is the symbolic heart of the tale. According to popular wisdom, it is 1,000 years old, and its roots extend deep below the village to the very bowels of the mountain on which it stands. Achil Buva himself is a match for the tree. Aged 94, he has 137 children and grandchildren, not counting great-grandchildren and great-great-grandchildren. Every year, he makes a complete round of his family.

The story unfolds around one of the annual visitations, which Achil Buva makes in the company of a 40-year-old grandson, Azimdzhan, who is himself on a visit to the Soviet Union. A wealthy foreign businessman, he was born and raised abroad by his Uzbek mother who had been forced to leave the Soviet Union years ago for Afghanistan. Through personal experience and the legends recounted by the family patriarch, Azimdzhan's eyes are opened during his trip to the richness of his ethnic and cultural heritage. Contemporary moral lessons are underlined by myth, and the odyssey of Achil and Azimdzhan is paralleled by a hardly secondary excursion through Soviet history and the Turkic past. When a surprised Azimdzhan asks why Central Asians before the Revolution were often portrayed as only miserably ignorant, poor, and backward, Achil answers: "We still have a lot of those who love to simplify things. History didn't begin today."

In *Zodchiy* (The Architect), the Uzbek writer Mirmukhsin reconstructs in fictional form the days of cultural splendor and power under the Timurids (the dynasty of Tamerlane) in the 15th century. Historical figures are woven into the novel: the astronomer-ruler Ulugbeg; the Timurids Shahrukh, Baysunkur Mirza, and Ibrahim Sultan; the architects Nadzhmeddin Bukhari and Kadam; and the great poet Lutfi. The glorious civilization of that time, which united the cities of Herat, Balkh, Samarkand, Bukhara, and Kokhand, is presented in loving detail. Mirmukhsin paints on a large canvas, resurrecting the period to show the greatness of which his people were capable in the past.

Mirmukhsin writes consistently of a common Turkic heritage. His characters are Turks, not Uzbeks, Kazakhs, or Kirghiz. His heroes and poets know, and speak, and compose in the Turkic tongue. His heritage is that common to virtually the whole of Inner Asia, and the empire he glorifies is that of Timur, which was larger than the empires of Darius, Alexander, or even Chinghiz Khan. All this is done with such casualness and understatement that it is easy to miss its significance.

The Kazakh poet and novelist Olzhas Suleymenov has published several extraordinary pieces in the last 15 years, pieces which lovingly explore the ancient myths and Turkic traditions and stress their vitality and importance for today. Not only have these myths and traditions become the focus of intense interest and research by scholars, but they have been popularized for the broader public by essayists and poets such as Suleymenov. In fact, Suleymenov has gone one daring step further. In 1975, he wrote an analysis of the early Kievan epic "Tale of the Host of Igor." He attempted to show that it was permeated by Turkic epic motifs and vocabulary, with whole passages paraphrased or translated directly from the Turkic. This monograph was published in Alma-Ata in 1975, and is replete with outspoken accusations of Russian chauvinism and of distortion of early Turkic history. It is remarkable that the work was published at all. Entitled *Az i ya* (a clever play on words, but denoting "Asia"), it has triggered an acrimonious debate with political and ethnic overtones as Slavic and Turkic scholars have begun to reassess early relations.

This debate is illustrative not only of passionate new interest in cultural origins, but also of current social and political sensitivities. In 1977, Suleymenov was summoned to a special session of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, where his monograph was attacked by leading historians, literary scholars, writers, and public figures. Although Suleymenov made a statement of contrition and promised to rectify his errors, veiled debates on these issues continue in the Central Asian press. The intense discussion of cultural roots and the increasing insistence on preserving past legacies have become hallmarks of contemporary Turkic literary life.

THE BEST-KNOWN figure in Soviet Central Asian literature is the Kirghiz writer Chingiz Aytmatov. Besides being a novelist, a poet, a playwright, and a filmmaker, Aytmatov is also a member of the editorial board for the influential Moscow weekly

Literaturnaya Gazeta and a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Despite these positions and his corresponding reputation as an establishment writer, Aytmatov is the author of a number of remarkable pieces subtly criticizing abuses by the party and state bureaucracy, and deeply marked by and respectful of the Kirghiz epic tradition. Aytmatov escapes the narrow parochialism of ethnic self-concern while raising serious and moving questions about the relationship between modernity in its Soviet form and the old values of the pre-Soviet and even pre-Islamic past. Moreover, he has raised some larger questions about the integrity and structure of Soviet society in his play, *The Ascent of Mount Fuji,* which was not only translated into Russian but was also sent briefly on tour to the United States. This play remains one of the few popular pieces presented in the USSR which asks not only about the crimes of the Stalin era but about the possible collective guilt of the citizenry. Aytmatov has become a major cultural force. A number of his stories (*Dzhamila, White Steamship,* etc.) have been made into films in recent years. The strong Turkic motifs of his work have assumed a cultural significance beyond the borders of the Kirghiz republic. Commenting not long ago on a new piece by a Kazakh writer, Aytmatov not only praised the work, but added: "My heart beats with common Turkic pride."

In his recent work, *I dol'she veka dlitsia den',* Aytmatov utilizes a Kazakh setting, at a time perhaps later in this century. The novel is a complex interweaving of two parallel plot lines which eventually come together to form a powerful climax. In the first plot, two cosmonauts—one Soviet and one American—manning a space station in connection with a joint project make contact with another intelligent civilization beyond the galaxy. Without informing control authorities on Earth, they abandon the station to visit and initiate talks on the other planet. The reaction of Soviet and American officials, once they learn of this action, forms one of the themes of the book. In the second plot, Yedigey, an old Kazakh railway worker at an isolated switching station deep in the Kazakh steppe, sets off with camel and tractor, three co-workers, and the son and son-in-law of the deceased to bury his oldest friend and colleague, Kazangap, at an ancestral Muslim cemetery.

The theme which unites both stories and brings them together in the end is the pivotal importance of memory in forming a truly human present and giving hope for a just future. As the Kazakh colleagues move slowly toward the burial ground, Yedigey mourns his friend and begins to recall key moments in the decades he and Kazangap had spent together, the joy and dedication of their work, the bitterness and pain of their defeats. Yedigey recalls the anger of Kazangap over the tragedy of the Kazakh and Kirghiz herdsmen who fled to China during the collectivization, only to find oppression and disillusionment there as well and to meet a reception that was neither gentle nor warm on their subsequent return to the Soviet Union. Yedigey also recalls Kazangap's silent bitterness over the arrest, exile, and death of his father in the 1930's, all because of a false accusation by informers. It was something Kazangap would never discuss as he bore this grief in grim but dignified silence, yet it was the central event in his life, which underlay his attitudes on justice and social obligations. Sensitive to the inequities of the past, Yedigey and Kazangap were determined that nothing must be forgotten, for memory is sacred and shapes mankind's mind and the vision of the future.

The injustice suffered by his old friend finds an echo in another incident in Yedigey's past—the arrest and death in 1953 of an unhappy former schoolteacher, Abutalip. Abutalip had had the misfortune of being captured by the Germans early in World War II. Although he managed a daring escape and made his way to the Balkans where he fought heroically alongside the Yugoslav partisans, he suffered great difficulties in repatriation at the end of the war and continued to live under a cloud in the Soviet Union in the late 1940's. Ironically, what eventually damages him most is his wartime association with the Yugoslavs. When an informer, learning that Abutalip spends his evenings writing his memoirs of those events, casually turns in the information, Abutalip is hauled away from his wife and two adoring children by three security men. He never returns, and it is later learned that he "died" during interrogation. When Yedigey later attempts to learn what happened and confronts one of the security people, Tansykhbayev, the latter informs him that it is inappropriate to have certain affairs dredged up out of the past: "Lord knows what sorts of things may have happened and how! What's important is to recall the past and depict it exactly as we need to have it told today, in a form that is necessary for us, whether orally or all the more so in written form." History, in other words, has no meaning other than what Tansykhbayev wants it to mean.

Yedigey recalls how he accompanied Abutalip's wife to the post office to receive the cable informing her that her husband had died, and the bitter irony of the fact that it occurred on the same day that Stalin's death was announced. As he attempted to comfort her, he was shocked by the voices of passers-by lamenting "the passing of our beloved father."

Yedigey also recounts several folk legends in the course of his journey, legends which add special meaning and poignancy to his story. The most gruesome is the tale of Nayman-Ana and the mankurt. Legend has it that the fearsome Zhuan-Zhuan nomads had the custom of depriving their captives of memory and recall of the past, rendering them pliant and passionless slaves. This was done by plastering their shaven heads with the skin of a freshly killed camel, which would then dry and shrink under the hot sun in the desert where the captives were left bound for several days. Only a few would survive. Driven mad by the unbearable pain, the survivors would be left without memory or will and were thereafter considered to be the best possible slaves. Such a slave was called a mankurt. When a distraught mother, Nayman-Ana, attempted to reclaim her mankurt son, the latter, no longer recognizing or remembering her, killed her. The place where she was buried was Ana-Beyit, the ancient cemetery to which Yedigey is now taking Kazangap.

As they cover the last few miles to the cemetery, Yedigey and his friends suddenly come up against a solid barbed wire fence stretching into the distance across the open steppe. It is the outer perimeter of a Soviet cosmodrome, the base responsible for the errant cosmonauts. The burial party can go no further. Talks with the guard at the gate and with the security officer who is sent to adjudicate, get them nowhere. The security officer, named Tansykhbayev like the official responsible for Abutalip's arrest in 1953, refuses to speak Kazakh with Yedigey "since he is on duty," and listens coldly to him. He explains that the old cemetery is scheduled for liquidation, and that housing for cosmodrome workers will be built there, according to the latest plan. Frustrated and furious, Yedigey withdraws to a nearby hill and buries his friend there within sight of the base. In his farewell to Kazangap, he cries "Don't think that I will let this matter drop. I will go where I need to go . . . I won't be silent."

Yedigey then asks Kazangap's insolent and condescending son, the bureaucrat Sabitdzhan, to intervene through his connections in the city to prevent the cemetery's closing. Sabitdzhan laughs at him: "A plan is a plan. . . . Global, cosmic questions are being decided here, and we're supposed to go off with a complaint about some kind of cemetery!? Who needs it? . . . Why should I piss against the wind? So that one phone call from here and I'm out with a kick in the ass?" Yedigey is stunned by Sabitdzhan's insensitivity and recalls with horror and aversion the latter's recent enthusiastic description of the coming radio technology which will permit total control of human beings. Radio waves will eliminate all deviant behavior and will erase the unnecessary memory of individuals. Everything will be done according to a central plan. In his revulsion with Sabitdzhan, Yedigey hisses: "You're a mankurt, a real mankurt."

As the group departs, Yedigey attempts to return to the cosmodrome gate for one last word, but he is astonished and overwhelmed as a chain of rockets suddenly roars into the sky in a series of tremendous fireballs. Yedigey races from the scene in fright, unaware of the significance of what he had seen.

What has happened is that the Soviet and American leaders had decided that it was too hazardous—given the strife, conflict, and delicate geopolitical balance on Earth itself—to enter into contact with another intelligent civilization from space. To ensure Earth's security, they had ordered the cosmonaut team never to return, and both the Soviets and Americans had simultaneously launched a series of rockets to establish an impenetrable barrier in space and seal the planet off forever. A veil of secrecy was thrown over the event, the project was dismantled, all records were destroyed, and the technicians were sworn to silence under the threat of the most dire penalties. All memory of the event was to be erased.

The two stories come together to counterpoint and reinforce each other. Aytmatov's imaginative combination of tradition, legend, themes of modernization, and science fiction is impressive, and his point is clear. As the novel ends, Yedigey goes off to town to see the local authorities and to press his case for saving the cemetery.

WHAT IS CLEAR from Aytmatov's pointed themes or even a cursory perusal of contemporary Turkic belles lettres in the USSR is the existence of an active search to retrieve an accurate understanding of the past and to restore a sense of historical and cultural identity. Most Central Asian writers have sought this in the high culture and civilization of the distant past as well as in the centuries-old folk and religious customs of Central Asia. Some, such as Aytmatov, have also taken up more sensitive issues from the more recent past in an unusual and intriguing way. However, it would be misleading to exaggerate the dissidence or political intent of such work. Aytmatov himself is an establishment figure who writes in Russian as easily as he writes in Kirghiz, he is almost completely bicultural, and in many ways, he is an excellent example of the Russian-speaking, native-cadre, establishment figure extolled by Soviet managers of ethnicity. In his case, at least, the proposition that intelligent bilingualism will lead to a higher cultural level than monolingualism is undoubtedly correct.

What is less clear is that such patterns of syncretism and biculturalism will lead either to a unified Soviet culture and people or to a sterile disregard for the complex and rich mosaic of the past. Such figures as Aytmatov are asking more rather than fewer probing questions about such legacies and about patterns of human political behavior. None of this literature or these writers have separatist or secessionist purposes. They seek to reestablish the truth and to define their specific identity and prerogatives within the Soviet system.

The potential for conflict will arise when such aspirations are mishandled. Too primitive an emphasis by the periphery on national themes with separatist potential will bring reaction and repression. On the other hand, too repressive an approach by the center to legitimate ethnic and cultural expressions will catalyze precisely those potentially centrifugal national sentiments that the regime wants to avoid. Currently, the political and sociocultural aspirations are limited: the establishment and nourishment of a firm sense of legitimate cultural identity within a more truly federated and balanced republican system. In theory, this does not contradict the principles and guidelines of the managers of Soviet ethnicity. The impasse may come if the Tansykhbayevs of the Soviet system continue to insist that history can only be what they want it to be, while influential segments of the Turkic intelligentsia begin to insist that this will no longer do.

Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, *US International Communication Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.*

POLISH BRINKSMANSHIP

TO THE EDITORS: It is only recently that I ran across Tadeusz Szafar's article "Brinksmanship in Poland" in your May-June 1981 issue, where on seven pages he reviewed nine (bulky!) books on Poland. Since he is so widely read, I wish he could also have seen my *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (1967), for perhaps then he would have given me credit for first observing a cycle: resistance-defeat-resistance in Polish history. He would also have noted that I have no aversion to resistance, but only to one which is doomed to fail and unnecessarily exposes the Poles to losses and suffering.

ADAM BROMKE
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

EDITORS' NOTE: Two of the books discussed in the essay-review mentioned by Mr. Bromke contained chapters written by him. The books were Peter J. Potichnyj, Ed., *Poland and the Ukraine: Past and Present,* and Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, Eds., *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland.*

MR. SZAFAR RESPONDS: Prof. A. Bromke apparently has missed one essential point: his 1967 *magnum opus* on Poland's politics was not among the books I had reviewed. I had, therefore, no reason to explain how deeply we differ in our opinions on Polish history and traditions and, in consequence, on Poland's contemporary political scene.

I have only pointed out that Prof. Bromke's introductory chapter to the collection of essays edited by Simon and Kanet ignored in a very cavalier manner the emergence of political opposition to Gierek's Communist regime. Since I do not believe that an eminent historian and political scientist did so by inadvertence, I am forced to conclude that in this case it was the politician in Prof. Bromke who had gained the upper hand.

And finally, throughout Polish modern history—including the last couple of years—every act of resistance was indeed "doomed to fail" and "expose the Poles to losses and suffering." Prof. Bromke qualifies this statement—undoubtedly true—adding the adverb "unnecessarily," and here I beg to differ. Even with the benefit of hindsight, few outside the ruling establishment would qualify the unique experience of Solidarity as "unnecessary." And were it not for previous generations of "romantic" resisters, whom Prof. Bromke thinks so little of, who knows whether Polish would still be spoken today in the "Vistulaland" on the western extremities of the Russian/Soviet Empire.

TADEUSZ SZAFAR
Cambridge, MA

NATIONAL LIBERATION

TO THE EDITORS: I have a "beef" with Wallace Spaulding's excellent article "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement'," appearing in the March-April 1982 issue of *Problems of Communism.* It stems from the fact that in presenting a checklist of the "National Liberation Movement," Mr. Spaulding limited himself solely to pro-Soviet or Communist organizations. What about all those organizations that may be anti-Soviet in orientation yet fall into the category of "National Liberation Movements"? Is it really proper or wise to simply limit enquiry to one side? I shouldn't think so!

Keep up the good work, but try to bring into it a bit of balance.

PETER J. POTICHNYJ
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

MR. SPAULDING RESPONDS: My article on the "National Liberation Movement" was limited to the apparent Soviet perception thereof. Material that had become available over the last few years gave one a fighting chance at ascertaining this perception.

To redefine the category so as to include additional groupings would have involved a possibly complicated process of establishing additional criteria. Certainly, more work can be done in this field, and I will read with interest any efforts to develop such new criteria.

Incidentally, in the April 1982 issue of Moscow's *Voprosy istorii,* Yu. V. Irkhin's article "Revolutionary Vanguard Parties of Working People in Liberated Countries" (pp. 55–67) names the same seven "vanguard" parties noted in my Checklist and further states that they are in a transition phase between "revolutionary democratic" and "Marxist-Leninist" (i.e., Communist) parties. In addition, the author cites the following additional countries where parties are in the process of developing into the "vanguard category: Nicaragua, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, and Bahrain (presumably the National Liberation Front in this last case—see Checklist). Finally Irkhin notes that "revolutionary democracy" is important in "certain countries of Latin America" as well as in Asia and Africa, and he appears to treat Grenada and "the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador" along with Nicaragua in this context.

WALLACE SPAULDING
McLean, VA

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

BACK ISSUE ORDER FORM

Mail with payment or credit information to:

Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (USA)

ORDER FORM

Please enter my subscription to PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) for one year (six issues) @ $14.00 domestic or $17.50 foreign.

Number of subscriptions ____________.

Enclosed is $ _________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No. ____________

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City **State** **ZIP Code**

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to
Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D C 20402

ORDER FORM

Please send the following back issue(s) of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (PROC) @ $3.25 domestic or $4.10 foreign.

Date(s) of issue(s) ____________.

Enclosed is $ _________ ☐ check,
☐ money order, or charge to my
Deposit Account No.
☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

Order No.____________

Credit Card Orders Only

Total charges $________ Fill in the boxes below.

Credit Card No. ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Expiration Date Month/Year ☐☐☐☐

Name—First, Last

Street address

Company name or additional address line

City **State** **ZIP Code**

(or Country)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

Please make checks payable to
Superintendent of Documents USGPO

Mail To:
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D C 20402

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last five) issues of *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single-issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURRENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $14.00 each; outside the US, $17.50 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $3.25 each; outside the US $4.10 each. A 25% discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services, ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49–65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Microfilming Corp. of America
1620 Hawkins Avenue, Box 10
Sanford, NC 27330

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).